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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis addresses the question of how business schools established as public private 
partnerships (PPPs) within a regional university in the English-speaking Caribbean 
survived for over twenty-one years and achieved legitimacy in their environment. The 
aim of the study was to examine how public and private sector actors contributed to the 
evolution of the PPPs. A social network perspective provided a broad relational focus 
from which to explore the phenomenon and engage disciplinary and middle-range 
theories to develop explanations. Legitimacy theory provided an appropriate 
performance dimension from which to assess PPP success.  
An embedded multiple-case research design, with three case sites analysed at three 
levels including the country and university environment, the PPP as a firm and the sub-
group level constituted the methodological framing of the research process. The 
analysis techniques included four methods but relied primarily on discourse and social 
network analysis of interview data from 40 respondents across the three sites. A staged 
analysis of the evolution of the firm provided the ‘time and effects’ antecedents which 
formed the basis for sense-making to arrive at explanations of the public-private 
relationship-influenced change.  
A conceptual model guided the study and explanations from the cross-case analysis 
were used to refine the process model and develop a dynamic framework and set of 
theoretical propositions that would underpin explanations of PPP success and 
legitimacy in matched contexts through analytical generalisation. The study found that 
PPP success was based on different models of collaboration and partner resource 
contribution that arose from a confluence of variables including the development of 
shared purpose, private voluntary control in corporate governance mechanisms and 
boundary spanning leadership. The study contributes a contextual theory that explains 
how PPPs work and a research agenda of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ from a 
sociological perspective of ‘liquid modernity’. Recommendations for policy and 
management practice were developed.  
Keywords: PPPs; inspirational governance; competitiveness; private voluntarism; 
boundary spanning leadership; legitimacy in governance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.0 THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
Collaborative systems that include public and private stakeholders face several 
challenges which must be addressed for successful partnering (Ansell and Gash, 2008; 
Bovaird, 2005; Dienhart and Ludescher, 2010). The problem arises as public and 
private organisations develop institutionalised systems that are unique and appear 
incompatible in many respects (Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Hodge and Greve, 2005). This 
study examines the partnership between the private sector and a university in the 
establishment and development of business schools in small, developing societies of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean to determine what contributes to their success. The 
thesis yields explanations of PPP success by examining the confluence of variables in 
the relationship between public and private sector actor sub-groups which affected the 
strategic decisions and legitimacy of the PPP organisations at various stages in their 
evolution.  
1.1 A PARTNERSHIP AGENDA FOR RELEVANCE OF BUSINESS SCHOOLS  
In recent years, business schools have been subject to increasing criticism with respect 
to the value of the MBA degree and the professional relevance of management 
scholarship (Ivory et al., 2006; Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; 
Ankers and Brennan, 2002). Some of the solutions to the challenges of business schools 
include mechanisms to increase relevance to the market such as adopting more market-
oriented perspectives in strategic planning (Bailey and Dangerfield, 2000) and the 
management of faculty in new forms of knowledge co-production (Ivory et al., 2007 et 
al; James and Denyer, April 2008). These strategies involve the forging of alliances 
with the private sector (George et al., 2002). Alliance formation, and the factors that 
contribute to the success of alliances predominantly in the private sector, have been the 
subject of many studies (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Hitt et al., 2000; Harrigan, 1985; Parkhe, 
1993; Pisano and Teece, 1989). While the importance of sector is underscored in 
studies focused on PPPs (e.g. Widdus, 2001; Hodge, 2006; Hall and Kennedy, 2008; 
Jones and Bird, 2000; Pessoa, 2008; Samii et al., 2002), the dynamics of the 
relationship between the public and private sectors in various industries, including 
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education, is largely unexplored in the academic literature. This study examines the 
PPP in governance arrangements in business schools by adopting a social network 
perspective and middle-range theories that explain strategic alliances. The research 
contributes a contextual theory of strategic alliances involving public and private sector 
partners in the governance of business schools in small developing countries.  
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
1.2.1 Academic Purpose 
The challenge of this doctoral research is to arrive at defensible explanations of how 
business schools as PPPs meet the need to provide a relevant education in their 
societies. The response to the challenge of relevance in education came from various 
researchers, invariably seeking the advantage of collaboration between academia and 
industry (e.g. Starkey and Madan, 2001; Clinebell and Clinebell, 2008). Inclusion of 
the private sector in the governance of academic institutions, however, requires an 
understanding of the role of factors such as trust in the relational governance structure 
and process (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Collaborative strategy was examined 
from the perspective of the Board of Directors. The study examined the partnership 
phenomenon from a relational perspective, within the firm and in relation to its external 
environment. It is expected that the study of the partnership phenomenon in the process 
of strategic management will contribute to the discourse on achieving relevance in 
business education.  
Several factors related to the context and history of cross-sectoral partnerships combine 
to provide a strong rationale for this contribution to the theories that explain strategic 
alliances and collaborative governance. It is evident that more partnerships are being 
fashioned across both the public and private sectors, involving for-profit and not-for-
profit organisations, in an effort to harness the benefits, tangible and intangible, that 
can derive from such engagements. The assumption that these arrangements bring 
superior benefits is questionable and our understanding of how partnerships work is 
limited as PPP studies have been more descriptive, advocating and evaluative rather 
than explanatory (e.g. Jamali, 2004; Pessoa and Frias, July 2008; NEI Transport, 2001). 
This study will provide theoretical support for PPPs as a strategy to improve 
performance outcomes.  
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1.2.2 Professional Purpose 
The empirical context for the research is the three business schools established as PPPs 
within Green University1, a regional university with three campuses located in three 
countries of the region. The study seeks to determine how the PPPs functioned over the 
years and attained legitimacy in their environments. It focuses on identifying the factors 
and exploring the relationship between the factors that influence PPP governance 
models in business education in the context of the study. The researcher’s interest is in 
the process by which the relationship creates value, having regard to the differing 
inputs of the public and private sectors in the process of partnering. The intention of 
this study is to explore the factors that influence PPPs for successful outcomes and to 
develop a theory that is contextualised in the realities of small, developing countries. 
This model will serve as a useful guide to practitioners engaged in PPPs in the region.  
The study is critical to small, developing countries of the Commonwealth where 
organisations are more susceptible to the vagaries of economic, cultural and social 
environmental influences and the arbitrariness of individual action (Baldacchino, 1993; 
Briguglio, 2003). In small countries, success is often attributed to individual actors and 
the evidence of organisational learning and institutionalisation is weaker than for more 
developed countries (Baird et al., 1994; Lane et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007). Many PPPs in 
developing countries are being established with a view to advancing the development 
agenda (Pessoa, 2006) and, as such, it is important to establish the boundary conditions 
within which theories provide explanatory power and managerially relevant insights. 
The results of the study will provide valuable guidance to practitioners in the field and 
to policy makers as they engage in further partnerships with a view to optimising 
results.  
The development agenda of small, commonwealth states gives rise to the question of 
the relative value of academic literature from developed societies in general, and the 
UK in particular, from which many institutional models were derived and to which they 
cling with some tenacity (Baldacchino, 1993). The small island states of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean gained independence in the latter half of the twentieth 
century and established fledgling institutions largely on the model of the metropolis. It 
                                                     
 
1 Pseudonym. 
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is claimed that “…the orthodox development paradigm, in both its liberal and radical 
traditions, has borne little relevance to small developing states, either in theory or in 
practice” (Baldacchino, 1993, p.29). Further, it appears that “…mainstream 
development theory and strategy have borne little relevance to small developing states 
and continue to be perplexed by them” (Baldacchino, 1993, p.30). The failure of 
mainstream development theory is explained as an inability to respond to local realities 
and it is suggested that “...globally inspired innovations have often failed because they 
were not well attuned to the needs, values and cultures of the local context” (Crossley 
and Holmes, 2001, p.396). This is corroborated by authors in the Commonwealth who 
advocate “…a praxis informed by local experiences and guided by locally determined 
objectives; a formal intellectual tradition which is authentically native to their habitat” 
(Girvan and Jefferson, 1971; McIntyre, 1971, cited in Baldacchino, 1993, p.33). 
Moreover, small states face unique vulnerabilities when compared with the metropolis 
including those of size and scale that result in a “phantom of liberty” (Armstrong and 
Read, 2002, p.435). The rapid development of some small states suggests that 
smallness is not a necessary condition for lack of development and indeed, some small 
states appear to “…offset this vulnerability and increase their resilience by means of 
appropriate endogenous policies” (Armstrong and Read, 2002, p.435). The suggestion 
that “…microstates have hardly ever looked at themselves critically in terms which are 
not of foreign, typically western, provenance” (ibid.) may provide insight into the 
reasons for the absence of local literature on small, developing states.  
Indeed, the Caribbean has looked to integration within the region as a mechanism to 
overcome the limitations of size and other vulnerabilities but has failed despite several 
efforts (Axline, 1978). Relationships with the private sector are also challenging as 
“...the West’s impact during the nineteenth century on most of the developing world 
succeeded in producing almost everywhere an antipathy to private enterprise and, 
particularly, to foreign private enterprise” (Barsotti, 2002, p.338). The decolonisation 
of small states resulted in the removal of what were considered to be foreign 
authoritarian regimes and subsequent installation of democratic ones. The 
transformation project of democratization is viewed as one that requires strengthening 
of the new democratic regime and “protecting it against an authoritarian backlash” 
(Casper and Taylor, 1996, p.2). Institutional structures offer such protection and this 
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study emphasizes structure over agency in the investigation of the factors that 
contribute to successful dyadic relationships between the public and private sector sub-
groups in formal governance roles. It is argued that, in such strategic networks of fluid 
structures, “fitness for purpose” is best evaluated in the public domain and, as such, 
legitimacy is an appropriate success indicator of their performance (Diamond, 2006). 
Demonstration of fitness for purpose is achieved at the level of the firm as firms 
generate value, not governments (Porter, 1985). The PPP organisations in this study are 
not-for-profit organisations established to contribute to the organisational purpose of 
relevance in business education. Explanations of the PPPs as firms comprising public 
and private resources, including private voluntarism in governance, are postulated. It is 
argued that activities at the level of the firm provide an opportunity for the conversion 
of the technical knowledge of the West into valuable outputs to be used by developing 
nations, addressing the contention of Hagen (1963) that forces quite independent of the 
degree of contact determine whether a nation uses the knowledge of the West for 
economic growth.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The research is guided by a conceptual framework which was developed from a critical 
review of the literature on partnerships. The framework highlighted concepts and an 
appropriate interrogative process for answering the overall research question: How do 
public private partnerships influence business school performance in the English-
speaking Caribbean? The following sub-questions were developed to guide the 
collection of data:  
1. What are the defining attributes PPPs established as business schools in small, 
developing countries of the Caribbean region?  
2. How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement support 
the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?  
3. What opportunities and constraints are presented by the embeddedness of the 
PPP social network?  
4. How does the PPP strategy utilized by business schools in the English-speaking 
Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?  
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The objective of the research is to develop a dynamic model to optimise the 
performance of PPPs established in similar contexts. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
The study uses existing theories and contributes explanations of how public-private 
partnerships in business schools in small, developing countries are established and 
evolve as they attempt to address their purpose. The main propositions of the 
explanations of PPPs address the relationships between public and private sector actor 
sub-groups in voluntary organisations in the context. The explanations that have 
emerged hold implications for the practice of cross-sectoral partnering in higher 
education in small, developing countries. The findings of the study led to a 
reformulation of the view of PPPs as follows:  
PPPs exist in ‘liquid spaces of interaction’ (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) inspired by actors 
in ‘semi-autonomous spheres’ (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004a) of public 
and private institutions, seeking solutions with the other, against legitimacy threats and 
perceived gaps by the other. Actors participate in different ways, based on whether the 
PPP is perceived as an opportunity or constraint and their own position as resource 
limitation, support or inspiration. The embeddedness of actors in their institutional 
contexts and configured identity in the ‘space of interaction’ creates tensions and 
institutional distortions which influence their participation and PPP performance. The 
PPPs challenge institutional norms and agency is more an ‘act of interpretation’ 
(Suddaby et al., 2010, p.1239) of the meaning of structure of the network. PPPs and 
their parent organisations develop cognitive and socio-political legitimacy in the 
resolution of the gap, in a process that inspires innovation from one or the other.  
Causal explanations of success in the governance of the PPP at each school relied on 
unique configurations of relationships and tensions in each case. As such, they could 
not be combined to produce a compelling cross-case argument that answers the 
research question that guided the study. This finding therefore led the researcher to 
posit a theory of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ in liquid spaces of interaction 
and to re-define the research question in the context of these spaces. The new question 
“In what spaces of interaction do PPPs inspire innovation in business schools in small, 
25 
 
developing countries to achieve their purpose?” creates an agenda for further research 
into the inter-institutional arrangements considered as public private partnerships.  
Corporate governance as inspiration is based on a contextual economic theory of the 
firm. It is a theory of social change derived from the perspective of critical realism and 
contextualised at the level of the firm in business schools established as semi-
autonomous public-private organisations in small, developing countries of the 
Caribbean. The theory of social change proposes that partners in the PPP arrangement 
resolve tensions so as to optimise the legitimacy of the socio-technical system in a 
process that recognises several tensions of structuration (Giddens, 1984) as they 
confront the meaning structure of the social network (Fuhse, 2009).  
The thesis derives from the focus of the study on the Board of Directors and the way in 
which they inspired and facilitated social change. The study attempted to address a 
local need to understand why PPPs exist, the role they play as organisations in the 
context and how actors in institutional roles must come to them (Balgobin, 2005). The 
PPPs were established to respond to the need for relevance in business education by 
bridging the gap between the University and private sector in each country. They were 
legally established as non-profit semi-autonomous organisations, with boards of 
directors that separated ownership from management (Tricker, 1984). The power to 
appoint members of the board of directors reflected the ‘ownership’ of the PPP where 
private sector actors served as volunteers and University actors adopted the role of 
elites. At the level of the firm, public and private actor sub-groups adopted roles that 
reflected ownership, stakeholder agency and voluntary contribution as the PPPs 
challenged and redefined institutional norms to seek their economic success and 
legitimacy. In this context, protectionism and trust were found to be antithetical to PPP 
economic success. Private sector actors in regimes contributed to PPP economic 
success in an enactment of games described as ‘voluntary monopoly’.  
The PPPs were initiated by the private sector and challenged the view that PPPs should 
bring private resources into public projects, rather than bring public resources into 
private projects (Datta, 2009). Co-opted or voluntary partners with differing ideologies 
co-existed to provide resources or influence which were shared or contributed. Where 
resources were contributed, PPP challenges arose in relation to value for money 
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(Weihe, 2008; Yong 2010). There was close coupling of the PPP purpose and structure 
in a process of ‘structuration’ to attain the purpose of the organisation (Giddens, 1984).  
Corporate governance as inspiration is based on the view of the firm as a cosmos 
(Latour, 2004; Latour, 2007). It recognises the dynamics of disequilibrium that engage 
the tenets of a resource-based view of the firm, competitive strategy, and structuration 
for optimisation. It recognises the dynamic tensions between purpose, structure and 
strategy at the level of the firm and the particular role of the Board of Directors in PPP 
organisations. Corporate governance as inspiration proposes that the governance of the 
firm is a process for the optimisation of responsibility, ownership and leadership in 
cross-sectoral partnerships.  
Where PPPs are established as strategic developmental organisations, the purpose of 
corporate governance appears to be the inspiration, direction and control of leadership 
behaviours and strategy in the interest of the developmental purpose. This future 
research agenda that includes the “leadership challenge” (Kouzes and Posner, 2002, 
p.xviii) is perhaps already being addressed in the Caribbean context through 
explorations of leadership based on a humanist philosophy (Ferguson, 2009).  
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured into eleven chapters. Chapter One presents an overview of the 
entire study and locates the problem within its context. It also describes the rationale 
for the study of the problem in business schools in small, developing countries and 
explains the focus on the governance mechanism of the PPP.  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide an overview of the problem and explanations derived from 
both theory and practice. Chapter 2 presents the Literature Review with a critical 
assessment of partnerships that have emerged across sectors. PPPs are explored in the 
context of the New Public Management and the issues of cross-sectoral governance 
arrangements that involve public institutions and the private sector are examined. An 
overview of strategic alliances, as the main form of private sector partnerships, 
provides insight into the factors that underpin successful partnering in business 
arrangements. Based on the literature, the framework for investigating partnerships at 
the level of the firm by focusing on the purpose, structure and strategy of the 
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partnership or alliance emerged. Chapter 3 addresses the Theoretical Framework and 
examines the theories that have been used to explain the success of strategic alliances 
and PPPs. In this chapter, the focus is on explaining why these theories provide an 
appropriate framework for deriving explanations of PPP success. This chapter is 
extended and complemented by the Conceptual Framework described in Chapter 4, 
which guided the research process. The conceptual framework combines and distils the 
findings from the practice literature reviewed in Chapter 2 with the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3 to produce a “road-map” (Leshem and Trafford, 2007) for 
investigating the PPPs in the context in which the problem was derived. 
Chapter 5 describes the research design and the processes for data collection, data 
analysis and presentation of the findings. Methods and research techniques are 
described and justified in the context of the research problem. The chapter includes a 
description and rationale for the philosophical underpinnings of the study. Assumptions 
and limitations and methods to address them in the study are identified.  
The analysis of three cases is presented in Chapters 6 to 8. A background to each case 
is presented and the analysis follows the format of the country and institutional 
environment, the PPP as a firm; the dynamics of governance of the firm are included. 
Each case analysis ends with a summary of findings and questions raised for 
examination in the ensuing case.  
Chapter 9 includes the cross-case analysis and distillation of findings of the study using 
the evidence across the cases. This is guided by propositions derived from the research 
questions. Major themes are explored and causal explanations across the three cases are 
provided. The findings provide insight into new theoretical advances that further the 
explanations of success in cross-sectoral collaboration partnerships. These are 
discussed in Chapter 10. In the final chapter, the application of contributions to policy 
concerns related to cross-sectoral partnering is elaborated. The final chapter also 
examines the significance and utility of its findings for management practice. It 
includes a management toolkit that is a consulting tool for the management and 
optimisation of PPPs as organisations. This is the source of the original challenge that 
inspired the researcher and the chapter includes final reflections of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The problem identified for this research is to provide an explanation of how business 
schools established as public-private partnerships (PPPs) in small, developing countries 
achieve success. The problem is examined in the empirical context of the governance 
of organisations established as strategic alliances between a public university and the 
business community in the private sector of small, developing countries. The alliances 
were established with the broad purpose of achieving relevance in business education 
and contributing to the development agenda by bridging the gap between the University 
and the private sector. The study is located in the broader context of partnerships 
between public and private actors and agencies established for various purposes, with 
different legal and organisational forms and with varying outcomes. This chapter seeks 
to provide a critical review of cross-sectoral collaboration in order to identify the 
professional challenges, theoretical gaps, tensions and opportunities in PPP research.  
The review proceeds by providing a theoretical and practical rationale for the research, 
establishing its significance to small, developing countries. The PPP phenomenon is 
examined to locate the study in the field and identify concepts and propositions relevant 
to the research. At the country level, issues particular to small developing countries are 
discussed to determine the challenges they present to the transfer of practice of PPPs 
from other contexts. The review then turns to the firm and includes an analysis of the 
evolution of cross-sectoral partnering arrangements in institutions and strategic 
networks, examining the history of partnerships and PPPs to develop understandings 
that will guide the work (Webster and Watson, 2002).  
This critical review of the literature on partnerships compares and contrasts the 
emergence of the partnering phenomenon in the public and private sectors in developed 
and developing contexts. From this perspective, the relevance of theories and models 
from developed country contexts, including PPPs in the UK where the voluntary sector 
is actively engaged in partnerships with both government and the private sector, is 
examined. The partnership literature is reviewed to determine appropriate theoretical 
frameworks for studying cross-sectoral partnerships and the gaps or opportunities in the 
academic literature. Specific insights from public sector attempts at partnership with 
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the private sector are drawn from research on the New Public Management (NPM). 
Gleanings from private sector collaboration are derived from an examination of 
strategic alliances and networks. Finally, the relevance gap in universities and business 
schools is examined, particularly in relation to tensions in university-business 
governance arrangements, and the professional discourse is summarised in the 
chapter’s conclusions.  
2.1 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL RATIONALE 
Many years of research into the problem of business school relevance led Corley and 
Gioia (2011) to conclude that theoretical contributions borne out of academic research 
in management must meet two criteria – originality and utility. PPPs produce new 
social configurations that are unexplored in the traditional management literature and 
“…traditional management theory offers limited guidance for the rapidly evolving 
models under which public, private and not-for-profit sectors co-operate in the 
provision of public services” (Bertels and Vredenburg, 2004, p.34). Further support for 
the possible emergence of new forms of theories inherent in PPPs is provided by Jones 
and Bird (2000) who, in their study of theoretical and political presentations of 
partnership in education in England, admitted that existing theorisations might be 
inadequate to understand the dynamics of partnerships.  
2.1.1 Originality and Contextuality of the Research  
Higher education institutions that are responding to changing conditions and paradigms 
are emerging as “entrepreneurial universities” with changing internal factors and a 
dynamic relationship with the environment that sustains their entrepreneurial drive 
(Gibb et al., 2009; Cano and Pulido, 2007; Guerrero and Urbano, 2010). Such 
universities have been found to be both knowledge producers and disseminators with 
support measures for entrepreneurship (Kirby, 2005). Further, entrepreneurial 
universities develop administrative techniques, strategies and competitive postures 
(Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001). For most universities, the problem of shifting the 
paradigm still remains and this perhaps warrants a shift in considering the 
organisational and institutional context in which faculty and researchers undertake their 
roles – the business school and the university as an institution.  
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2.1.2 Significance and Practical Utility of the Research  
Collaborative efforts involve combinations of public, private and not-for-profit 
agencies and organisations in an effort to harness the benefits, tangible and intangible, 
that can derive from such partnerships (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). PPPs are deemed to 
be a panacea for the development challenges of many countries and there is a cry for 
increased public-private co-operation and partnership, especially in education (Pessoa 
and Frias, July 2008). Yet, challenges to implementation of PPPs in these contexts 
diminish the potential value to be derived (Pessoa, 2006). This study contends that 
small, developing countries require a different model of participation in PPP projects. 
There is a paucity of research on the relationship between academics in public 
universities and the private sector in small, developing countries, the empirical context 
of this study. The way in which they collaborate to derive benefits for each other, and 
for the purpose of development, must be understood. The role of the university in 
small, developing societies in the Commonwealth Caribbean is linked to the 
development purpose and the university is seen to be an instrument of economic 
readjustment and social and political change (Williams, 1968). Where there is room for 
only one national university, it is suggested that the ‘Oxbridge’ model may not be best 
suited as this model is located within a space where other universities adopt the 
responsibility for responding to the social and technological needs of the modernised 
society (ibid.). The practical question of what university model is appropriate for small, 
developing countries and how the university responds to the demands of its 
environment is central to this study.  
Practical utility is seen as the applicability of research to the problems practicing 
managers face and, as such, theories of practical importance would “…focus on 
prescriptions for structuring and organising around a phenomenon and less on how 
science can further delineate or understand the phenomenon” (Corley and Gioia, 2011, 
p.18). Corley and Gioia suggest that tests of originality often lie in the way researchers 
integrate, rather than in the way they create new, concepts, and that theories should be 
opportunity driven (ibid.). This work, while it does not provide a model of how 
researchers can bridge the academic-practitioner divide to create great research 
contributions, does provide a lens of “prescience” through which we should examine 
the world for new insights (Corley and Gioia, 2011).  
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The concern for practical utility and consideration of prescience appear to be relevant 
to another conception of the gap that contributes to the problem of business school 
relevance – the distance being created between business and society (Huff and Huff, 
2001). There is the recognition that “…we as a field have drawn the boundaries of our 
intended influence so narrowly that we have unintentionally abdicated our societal 
leadership responsibilities” (Corley and Gioia, 2011, p.28). This statement however, 
positions the role of academia and business to respond to societal needs from a motive 
of personal and professional “responsibility” – a motive that drives the corporate social 
responsibility movement (Weisband, 2009; Stratling, 2007; Moon, 2002). The realities 
and problems of developing countries, however, are so exacerbated that business and 
academia have found it necessary to explore the phenomenon as a strategic 
consideration in their business models (Prahalad, 2010). From this perspective, poverty 
and other social realities of the developing world are viewed as a business opportunity 
with a profit motive linked to social development (Prahalad, 2010) requiring other 
indicators of business performance such as the “triple bottom line” of business success 
(Elkington, 1998). This is also consistent with the view that “…both business decisions 
and social policies must follow the principle of shared value (Porter, 2008, p.487; 
author's italics). 
2.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
2.2.1 The Broad Scope of PPPs 
Public private partnerships have existed for many years and have evolved into many 
different types of relationships, often appearing to be a nebulous concept (Weihe, 
2006). Yet, co-operation between the public and private sectors has been evident 
throughout history in the evolution and development of society (Wettenhall, 2003; 
Wettenhall, 2005). PPPs include organisations in various sectors and are often 
fundamentally different with regard to “…legal status, governance, management, 
policy-setting prerogatives, contributions and operational roles” (Jamali, 2004, p.416). 
Despite these variances, the relationship is considered a PPP if it is characterised by 
“…joint definition of specific goals, and a clear assignment of responsibilities and areas 
of competence between the partners in the pursuit of a common endeavour” (Jamali, 
2004, p.416).  PPPs also fit the broader description of strategic cooperative agreements 
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and with respect to their positioning in a continuum of hierarchical control as opposed 
to market control, they can be described as “…contractual business networks based on 
joint multi-party strategic control, with the partners collaborating over key strategic 
decisions and sharing responsibilities for performance outcomes” (Todeva and Knoke, 
2005, p.3).  
PPPs are understood by many to be co-operative relationships between the public and 
private sectors for the delivery of public infrastructural projects and services (e.g. 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Yong, 2010; Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Skelcher, 2005a; 
World Bank, 2007). PPP arrangements exist in many developed and developing 
countries and across several sectors including education, health and infrastructure 
(Ghobadian et al., 2004a). Some authors discuss the complexity of defining PPPs and 
have concluded that the questions raised depend on “…how far you cast the net of 
definition” (Greve, 2010, p.87). The PPPs considered in this study are those 
collaborative ventures described as PPPs by authors such as Hodge and Greve (2005) 
and Pessoa (2008) who define PPPs broadly as institutional co-operation between 
public and private actors and agencies. The study extends the thesis of public-private 
partnerships as “…cooperative efforts between the private and public sectors in the 
areas of technical, professional, and educational activities as well as research, 
management, and public policy” (Mitchell, 1990, p.29). The bases for varying 
definitions and characteristics of PPPs are discussed in the sub-sections below. The 
PPPs in this study must be understood in the context of the overall evolution of private 
and public sector co-operation.  
2.2.2 The Need for Partnering Across Sectors  
Democratic society has always concerned itself with the just and equitable provision of 
services in all realms of human life (Paehlke, 2004). The role of the state in the 
provision of services was prominent in this regard until the 1970s when disillusion with 
“…the role of the state as an agent of accumulation, development and economic 
redistribution…swung the ideological barometer toward a celebration of the market” 
(Howell and Pearce, 2002, p.3). Free-market capitalism advanced with modernisation, 
democracy and liberalism but did not yield the equitable outcomes anticipated in 
market-state relations (Jessop, 2002). Warnings about the free-market economy, which 
33 
 
developed through the years, especially in the eighteenth century, came quite early 
from Polanyi (1944). Polanyi opposed free-market capitalism as the cause of political 
and social collapse, as he saw it as displacing the natural social state – a system of 
mutual obligation that bound and protected individuals (Polanyi, 1944). Separation of 
thought with respect to statism and free market ideology resulted in the emergence of 
public and private sectors as the vanguards of the state and free markets, respectively 
(ibid.). Within the last few decades, PPPs were seen “…as a means of reducing the 
dominance of the public sector and as a means of improving organisational efficiency 
through the market” (Harris, 2005, p.79).  
The early 1980s saw the emergence of collaborative and cooperative ventures between 
the public and private sectors as strategies of neo-statism and neo-corporatism; a 
negotiated approach to balancing co-operation and competition (Jessop, 2002). Public 
private partnerships became a dominant feature of this public-private cooperation and 
have provided a workable solution to many of the problems of financing, management 
and service quality in the provision of education, health services and public 
infrastructure (Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Hodge and Greve, 
2005). The phenomenon of PPPs, as it may be so described, given the range of projects 
and co-operative institutional arrangements included in the umbrella term of PPP across 
the globe, is prevalent in developed and developing societies where they have different 
drivers, purposes, forms and impact (Jamali, 2004). The review describes some of the 
arrangements included under the umbrella term of PPPs so as to explore the country 
and institutional factors that motivated their emergence, examine the way in which they 
worked and derive insights that would contribute to an improved understanding of the 
problem identified for this study of cross-sectoral alliances.  
2.2.3 PPPs as Long-Term Commercial Partnerships  
A PPP is defined as “…a long-term commercial arrangement for the delivery of public 
services, where there is a significant degree of risk-sharing between the public and 
private sectors” (Yong, 2010, p.7). They are predominant in the development and 
execution of infrastructure policies and projects in many countries (Weihe, 2008; 
Hodge and Greve, 2009). In the UK, they are popularised as private finance initiatives 
(PFIs) which are contractual agreements “…where the private sector performs the 
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DBFO functions and in return receives a fixed payment stream from the government” 
(Yong, 2010, p.10). They are considered as only one sub-set of the broader set of PPPs 
and the applicability of the PFI model to PPPs in developing countries is challenged on 
the basis of two major issues: “…(i) the capacity of developing countries’ governments 
to provide a regular payment stream to the PFI contractor and (ii) the poor 
creditworthiness of some governments for private investors and therefore the higher 
cost of capital and concomitant impact on the value for money of the potential 
contract” (ibid.). A broader definition that blurs the resource distinction between public 
and private is suggested by Skelcher (2005) who claims that PPPs “…combine the 
resources of government with those of private agents (businesses or not for profit 
bodies) in order to deliver societal goals” (Skelcher, 2005b, p.347). The research raises 
questions of how money and value are combined and leveraged in the PPP to deliver on 
the goal of social and economic development.  
PPPs are guided by long-term contracts (Wettenhall, 2007) or partnership agreements 
where partners “…have a mutual interest and a unified commitment” (Yong, 2010, 
p.8). This type of collaboration appears to be antithetical to most forms of contracting 
which involve competition (Milward and Provan, 2003). The nature of the contract is 
usually relational and it is claimed that it is only these that will produce genuine 
partnerships (Wettenhall, 2007). Relational contracts are usually long-term, mostly 
implicit, involve a large measure of trust between the parties, and they have been 
described elsewhere as “social contracts” (Macneil, 1980). In developing countries, 
however, it is suggested that PPP contracts should avoid ambiguities and include 
regular monitoring and reporting mechanisms and key performance indicators for 
monitoring success (Yong, 2010). A major focus of this study is the assessment of the 
extent to which elements of relational contracting and mechanisms for monitoring 
performance are utilised to legitimise and sustain the PPPs in business education in 
developing countries.  
2.2.4 PPPs as Inter-Organisational Relationships   
PPPs are broadly defined as “…cooperative institutional arrangements between public 
and private sector actors” (Hodge and Greve, 2005:1). This definition is extended to 
include the importance of purpose and interests of actors whereby the PPP is 
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considered to be “… a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the 
private sector to achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own 
individual interests” (Pessoa, 2008, pp.3-4). In these arrangements which may include 
any combination of public institutions, private organisations and NGOs, there is 
collaboration to pursue clearly defined common goals while leveraging joint resources 
and capitalising on the respective competences and strengths of the public and private 
partners (Widdus, 2001; Pongsiri, 2002; Nijkamp et al., 2002; Jamali, 2004).  
A more recent evolution of PPPs in the UK are strategic service partnerships which are 
hybrid organisational forms through which public and private sector organisations 
pursue shared interests (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Baker, 2008). While actors generally 
belong to multiple networks and contribute to them all through the various roles they 
play, the creation of new organisational and structural frameworks that guide the 
partnership arrangements requires exploration of how these new frameworks account 
for partnership outcomes (Diamond, 2005). This is a significant component of the 
agenda of this work.  
2.2.5 PPPs in Education and Business Schools 
PPPs in education were found to attain different levels of success. There are four main 
objectives of PPPs in education: increasing enrolment, improving educational 
outcomes, reducing inequality and reducing cost (Patrinos et al., 2009). PPP contracts 
gives schools more decision-making authority in terms of how they manage the 
allocation of resources, thereby gaining efficiency. In the UK, the Education Action 
Zones projects were PPP projects in the education sector designed to “…take 
education–business links to a qualitatively new level… to bring the resources and 
capabilities supposedly possessed by business directly to bear on a broad educational 
agenda organised around objectives of social cohesion as well as economic 
productivity” (Jones and Bird, 2000, p.492). It was found that theories of ‘networking’ 
and ‘heterarchy’ are “…not fully attentive to the ways in which the interplay of 
network partners is affected by inequalities of power and resources, and to the systemic 
presence in partnerships of conflicts over influence and management” (Jones and Bird, 
2000, p.504). Similarly, in their evaluative study of private finance initiatives (PFIs) in 
education in the UK, Kakabadse et al. (2007) noted that while PFIs are motivated by 
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the need to raise standards in schools, the “hard” benefits of PFI adoption related to 
cost control and project management were realised as opposed to the “soft” factors in 
terms of impact on teaching and learning. Other studies that have sought to identify the 
impacts that education partnerships have on the quality of education outcomes have 
yielded different outcomes (Eaton and Akbiyikli, 2005; Gibson and Davies, 2008). In 
their study of private investment in infrastructure at two primary schools in the UK, 
Gibson and Davies (2008) found that the PPP significantly impacted student attainment 
and behaviour and the attitude of school personnel. Challenges to sustainability of the 
relationship were a major concern as the PPPs were viewed negatively as an attempt to 
privatise education. Still, there is no mention of how exactly this unique configuration 
of relationships and processes influenced the quality of outcomes in education. While 
the study identified correlates of success, there were no rich investigations into the 
processes - acts, activities and behaviours - that brought about these successes.  
2.2.6 Challenges to PPPs  
2.2.6.1 Conceptual Challenge as ‘Partnership’ 
The definition and meaning of ‘partnership’ are perhaps the most contested notions 
within the partnership literature (Diamond, 2006). Some authors claim that 
‘partnerships’ have become over-used and ill-defined in terms of conceptualization and 
as a policy response (Laffin and Liddle, 2006). In an examination of a case study, 
Wettenhall (2007) concluded that many relationships purporting to be PPP are cross-
sectoral mixes but are “…far from “partnerships” and often likely to involve elements 
of grossly uneven risk-bearing, lack of proper accountability and even exploitation” 
(Wettenhall, 2007, p.392). The author suggests that PPPs are defined by “…consensual 
decision-making and horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships (resulting in) significant 
synergies between the parties… for the benefit of the communities involved” (ibid, 
p.407). Wettenhall (2007) also notes that a genuine PPP is marked by mutual benefit 
and mutual respect and trust between the partners that remove the competitive and 
exploitative tendencies evident in some PPP arrangements.  
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2.2.6.2 Political Challenges  
In the UK, PPPs face political challenges and are considered a language game in the 
privatisation drive as “…a number of governments have tried to avoid using the term 
‘privatisation’ or ‘contracting out’ in favour of speaking about ‘partnerships’ (Hodge 
and Greve, 2009, p.34; Savas, 2000). It is claimed that public agencies enter into co-
operative arrangements to get more resources, satisfy norms and values, obtain political 
advantage, solve problems, reduce uncertainty and obey legal mandates (Weiss, 1987). 
It is suggested that PPPs are most challenged when “…political differences come to the 
surface among the agencies and the diverse constituencies to which they must respond” 
(Friend, 2006, p.261).  
A more positive linguistic agenda related to PPPs is the use of the generative marriage 
metaphor to describe the relations between public and private partners (Datta, 2009; 
Miraftab, 2004). It appears that the marriage metaphor holds some potential for 
explaining PPP success as a generative metaphor is a “…vehicle (for organizing) our 
thoughts about the tenor in a new way, selecting and emphasizing features of the 
subject matter different from those highlighted by conventional language, and even 
pointing out properties of the underlying subject that had gone unnoticed until the 
metaphor drew attention to them” (Lewis, 1996, p.493). Although there are “multiple 
meanings” associated with the phenomenon of public-private partnering (Linder, 1999, 
p.35), PPPs are now widely understood to be more than a political game in many 
settings and are considered to be a sustainable commercial arrangement designed to 
obtain significant value for money (Weihe, 2008; Yong, 2010). The privatization 
agenda of PPPs is debunked on arguments that include the fact that PPPs are based on 
co-operation rather than competition between the public and private sectors and 
endorses new roles for each (Linder, 1999). The extent to which this is the meaning of 
partnership in emerging economies must be understood as business-group capitalism 
and public-private capitalism are particularly common outcomes of privatization and 
neither is well researched because of their rarity in the West (Amsden and Hikino, 
1994). An important differentiator is that “…the purposes remain public, even though 
the resources are eventually mixed” (Linder, 1999, p.46). 
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2.2.6.3 Dynamics of Risk and Value  
Another defining feature of PPPs is the transfer of risk from the public to the private 
sector (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Yong, 2010). In developed countries where PPP 
projects are financed by the private sector and government transfers to the private 
sector over time, much like a “mega credit card” (Greve, 2010, p.588; author’s 
quotation marks), the question of value for money arises (National Audit Office (UK), 
2008; Yong, 2010). Some researchers equate value with synergy and note that the 
model of collaboration in the PPP arrangement provides the potential for generating 
‘simple cost savings’ or ‘real synergy’ where substantive surplus value is generated 
(Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Weihe, 2008). The way in which the PPP is conceived to 
balance risk and value provides an opportunity for evaluation and it is suggested that in 
evaluating the success of the PPP “…we ought to base our analysis on the underlying 
objectives of PPPs” (Hodge and Greve, 2010, p.96). 
2.2.7 Insertion into the Field of PPPs  
This study adopts the broad view of PPPs and notes that the term is also used to 
describe the numerous ways in which civil society actors and voluntary ‘third sector’ 
organizations interact with the public sector (Hodge and Greve, 2010). In this study, the 
PPP phenomenon results from the contribution of public and private partners to the 
strategy of business schools established as not-for-profit organisations within 
universities. The PPPs are long-term economic arrangements between public and 
private organisations for the purpose of relevance in business education. Issues of PPPs 
as political games, management initiatives and governance in tertiary education are 
explored. This study is located in the broader stream of literature on PPPs as it 
examines a long-term commercial arrangement between actor sub-groups from the 
private sector and public universities. It also considers PPPs as relational exchanges for 
the creation of value as opposed to discrete transactions (Dwyer et al., 1987). 
Additionally, it examines the organisational and structural frameworks of PPPs that are 
new organisational forms, accountable for the implementation of the partnership 
(Diamond, 2005).  
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2.2.8 What is Not a PPP?  
In view of the range of collaborative arrangements considered under the PPP umbrella, 
it is useful to demarcate the partnership literature that is not considered relevant to this 
work. The following list of criteria serves to clearly define the structural and 
organisational relationships that are not directly relevant to this study of partnerships:  
 Partnerships that are short-term projects within and across sectors; 
 Projects governed by traditional contractual arrangements considered as spot or 
classical contracts (Kay, 1993); 
 Networks of firms engaged in strategic alliances within and across sectors for 
organisational value creation, rather than for an overarching, public purpose. 
2.3 SECTORS AND TENSIONS: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NON-PROFIT 
2.3.1 Tensions across Sectors  
Several studies have discussed the differences between the public and private sectors 
(Vigoda-Gadot and Kapun, 2005; Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Perry and Rainey, 1988; 
Weintraub, 1997; Cho and Lee, 2001). Dichotomies are created as the profit goals of 
private organisations are contrasted with the service goals of larger bureaucracies that 
shape the lives of citizens through public policy (Murray, 1975). One study of 
management in the public and private sectors found that there were only three major 
differences and concluded that “…public organizations are more bureaucratic, and 
public managers are less materialistic and have weaker organizational commitment 
than their private sector counterparts” (Boyne, 2002, p.97).  
Tensions between the private and public sectors also emerge from the management 
literature that provides a discourse of “public bad, private good” (Jamali, 2004, p.415; 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). With respect to education, Ball (2007, p.3) observes 
that the discourse of public sector reform generates a “discourse of distrust” that 
portrays the public sector as “…ineffective, sloppy, unresponsive, risk-averse and 
innovation-resistant”. The author considers the role of private actors in ‘entrepreneurial 
governance’ (Hall, 2003) and the “destatalisation” and the re-articulation of the 
relationship between organisations and tasks across the public-private divide (Ball, 
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2007, p.3). Any examination of what goes on inside the “black box” of the PPP 
relationship warrants active consideration of the different philosophies and values of 
actors and the institutional and behavioural differences inherent in the sectors.  
2.3.1.1 Tensions of Philosophy and Ideology  
This study focuses on the contribution of actors in two structurally categorised groups 
(public and private sector) to the strategic direction of a not-for-profit organisation with 
a developmental purpose. It assumes different ideologies of these two groups. 
Ideologies may be assumed to be “…the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the 
basic aims, interests and values of groups” (Van Dijk, 1993, p.258). The importance of 
ideology in understanding social life is underscored by the fact that “…we all live and 
communicate with and through ‘ideology’ and we are all both ‘beneficiaries” and 
‘victims” of ideology’, thanks to the fact that we speak a language and live in a culture” 
(ibid.). Meanings of actions are interpreted from an understanding of “cultural models” 
which are a “…groups’ construction that becomes a resource that an individual may 
call on to guide his or her actions” (Gee and Green, 1998, p.123). In this study, the 
existence of an ideology and the presence of cultural models that guide the actions of 
groups are assumed on the basis of the categorization of actors into roles based on their 
employment and occupation status. This presents methodological challenges and 
limitations to the work. Some of the major challenges to PPPs include areas of 
ideological contestation by those opposed to private ideology, especially from the non-
profit sectors that advocate political legitimacy, partnerships and collaboration (Taylor 
and Warburton, 2003). 
2.3.1.2 Institutional and Behavioural Differences 
A typology of differences between public and private sector organisations was 
developed by (Ghobadian et al., 2004b). The authors cite several areas where 
behaviours of public and private sector actors differ. With respect to motivation, the 
private sector’s profit motive and the creation of shareholder value is contrasted with 
the public sector’s concern for the economic, social and environmental well-being of 
the community (ibid.). Another significant difference is the scope of products or 
services. In the private sector this is determined by business imperatives and managers 
exhibit a high level of control and discretion whereas in the public sector this is 
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determined by statutory requirements and/or social considerations (ibid.). Differences 
are also cited in the pursuit of quality where the private sector is motivated to do so if it 
makes commercial sense and the public sector assesses quality in terms of social 
impact. The cultural traits of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism in the private 
sector are contrasted with fairness and respect for hierarchy and traditions in the public 
sector (Ghobadian et al., 2004b); the full list of characteristics is presented in Appendix 
1. These differences are considered in the relationship between public and private 
sector actor sub-groups in the PPP.  
2.3.2 Voluntarism and the Non-Profit Sector  
The non-profit or voluntary sector is considered important to this work as the PPPs are 
established as not-for-profit organisations where actors contribute voluntarily (e.g. 
Radin and Romzek, 1996; Waddock, 1988). The voluntary sector includes 
organisational forms that fall outside the typical definitions of public and private 
sectors and is variously referred to as the charitable sector, independent sector, 
voluntary sector, tax-exempt sector, non-governmental organisation, economie sociale 
or non-profit sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). As a result of definitional issues, 
Salamon and Anheier (1997) suggest “…a movement away from the institutional 
notion of non-profit sectors toward an operational definition of non-profit 
organizations (p.496, their italics).  
Salamon and Anheier (1997) describe four major types of definition of the non-profit 
sector including the legal definition, the economic/financial definition that recognises 
the differences of source of revenue from market activities or contributions, the 
functional definition that emphasises the function or purpose for which the organisation 
is established and the structural-operational definition that emphasizes the structure and 
operation of the entity. Based on their analysis of the models of non-profits around the 
world, Salamon and Anheier (1997, p.48) concluded that the “structural-operational” 
definition of the non-profit sector is “…a useful foundation around which to organize 
serious thinking about and research”. The authors suggest that there are five guiding 
principles:  
1. The entity must be organized or institutionalized to some extent, private or 
institutionally separate from government.  
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2. The organisation must be privately as opposed to publicly controlled. 
3. The entity must also be self-governing and equipped to control their own 
activities. 
4. Voluntary organisations do not distribute profits to stakeholders or shareholders 
and surpluses are “plowed back into the basic mission of the agency” (Salamon 
and Anheier, 1997, p.33). This contrasts with the private for-profit sector that 
focuses on profit distribution to shareholders. It does not negate the need for a 
commercial sense and managerialism in the advancement of the cause as 
advocated by Porter (1985).  
5. Not-for-profit organisations must involve “...some meaningful degree of 
voluntary participation” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.34) and actors are 
usually involved “…in the giving of gifts of time or other valuables for public 
purposes” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.13). In the continuing debate on the 
differences between ‘giving’ and ‘volunteering’ and the way in which they 
contribute to civic life, Jones (2006) concluded that “…volunteering is most 
strongly promoted by community ties and increased giving is best explained by 
personal resources and helping values” (p.249). 
The voluntary sector in the UK and the US is well developed and these countries 
appear to share a conceptual understanding of this sector whereas developing countries 
are characterised by a general lack of a distinguishable non-profit sector (Salamon and 
Anheier, 1997). The UK and the US may therefore provide insight into voluntarism in 
partnerships. The voluntary sector considered here is the private voluntary sector, as 
opposed to philanthropic organisations, and is “…a set of private organizations 
providing a wide variety of information, advocacy, and services” (ibid.). The question 
arises as to whether the voluntary contribution of the private sector in PPPs in 
developing countries is reflective of social entrepreneurs who implement “private 
sector strategies for social sector success” (Emerson and Twersky, 1996:quotation in 
title; Kearns, 2000) or whether it is “…based on the traditions of the voluntary sector 
itself than in the competition-based management approach inherent in private sector 
administrative theory and practice” (Bush, 1992, p.391). It is argued that 
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 “…administration in the voluntary sector should be mission based and 
mission driven; be grounded in the historical traditions of altruism, 
compassion, and philanthropy; remain sensitive to the key value of 
volunteerism and to the phenomenon of the volunteers themselves; 
continue to act as mediating structures between the individual, the 
community, and the public and private organizations of modern 
society…” (Bush, 1992, p.391). 
The production of revenue by doing a social good also appears to be acceptable for 
non-profits (Dart, 2004) and there may be room for synergies between both views. The 
research seeks to examine the tensions that affect the nature of private and public 
voluntary contribution to PPPs established as non-profit organisations in developing 
countries.  
2.3.3 Crossing the Divide  
Reaching across sectors to partner requires crossing many divides, including the bridge 
between the ideology and values of the public sector, the pragmatic concerns of the 
private sector and the moral codes that guide the voluntary sector. Advantages of 
partnering in PPP arrangements for the public sector include better programme 
performance, cost-efficiencies, and better service provision while the private sector 
gains better investment opportunities or opportunities to expand its business interests 
(Jamali, 2008). Non-profits are urged to examine how their narrow interests may be 
perceived as advocacy and to focus on attaining technical and political legitimacy as 
they seek to participate in new forms of governance (Taylor and Warburton, 2003).  
The issues raised in examining the divide between the private and public sectors 
suggest an internal focus on the part of the private sector (Ghobadian et al., 2007). It 
appears that private actors are motivated in the main by projects that are commercially 
viable and would be achievable on their terms of engagement (ibid.). Austin and 
McCaffrey (2002) examined the motivation of businesses and business leadership 
coalitions to engage in PPP arrangements. The authors found that CEOs choose to 
become engaged in community affairs in three ways – as individual civic leaders, as 
corporate CEOs or as members of a business collective (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002, 
p.40). They found that motivation usually centred on economic crises but then may 
44 
 
progress into the experience of the more strategically motivated partnerships. They also 
found that governance alliances were often pragmatic, functional partnerships that were 
purpose-driven with a primary focus on particular outcomes usually centred on 
economic development (ibid.). Their research framework of regime theory led them to 
describe this as a pro–growth orientation (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). This study 
though acknowledges the relational nature of PPPs and stops short of using relational 
theories to explain its findings. Yet, it is powerfully descriptive and hints at the 
challenges and competencies required to partner across the divide, as well as the 
various levels at which PPPs must be considered including the individual 
actororganisational and institutional levels.  
PPPs and other cross-sectoral collaborations result in the blurring of activities and 
responsibilities towards a “...diffuse forcefield in which public and private interests 
have to be reconciled” (Jamali, 2008, p.416). The complexity of reconciling opposing 
values in PPPs to “‘...marry the best of both sectors’ in order to overcome the 
weaknesses of both” is noted (Baru and Nundy, 2008, p.68). This requires the adoption 
of the view of partnerships as an opportunity rather than a threat of loss of control 
(Jamali, 2008). In an attempt to address the realities of partnering, Jamali (2008) 
suggested that the focus should be on “…identifying common goals, delineating 
responsibilities, negotiating expectations and building bridges…Attention needs to be 
accorded to developing mechanisms – structures, processes and skills – for bridging 
organizational/interpersonal differences and nurturing communication and 
coordination” (p.427).  
2.4 Organisational-Institutional Context of PPPs  
The PPP forms a socio-technical system which is “…the outcome of the activities of 
human actors…embedded in social groups which share certain characteristics (e.g. 
certain roles, responsibilities, norms, perceptions)” (Geels, 2004, p.900 parentheses in 
original). The involvement of cross-sectoral partners in different roles in the 
organisation raises questions about how actors from public, private and non-profit 
sectors enact their roles in the PPP organisation. The research contributes to the body of 
work that “...views organizations as constructs that interpret and elaborate institutional 
pressures” (Suddaby et al., 2010) and seeks to understand how elements of the broader 
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environment become elaborated within organisations (ibid.). A philosophy of 
organisations espoused in the developing country context is that the organisation is a 
combination of resources, strategy and execution for the attainment of purpose 
(Balgobin, 2005). This study examines how the cross-sectoral relationship influences 
the mechanism by which purpose is defined and resources are combined for 
organisational performance.  
Several normative theories and policy guidelines, however, provide suggestions for 
successful partnering. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) has published a 
checklist for successful partnerships that includes factors such as leadership, 
networking and alliances, accountability, skills assessment and building trust. Kanter 
(1994) also suggests that key ingredients of effective collaboration include eight ‘Is’ 
which are individual excellence, importance, interdependence, investment, information, 
integration, institutionalization and integrity. In like fashion, Austin (2000) proposed 
seven ‘Cs’ as guidelines for managing strategic collaborations viz., connection-based 
purpose, clarity of purpose, congruence of mission, strategy and values, creation of 
value for all parties, communication, continuous learning and commitment. Hudson and 
Hardy (2002) also produced six principles for effective partnerships and Huxam and 
Vangen (2005) distilled six themes about collaborative practice. These ‘normative 
recipes’ tend to highlight steps that should be taken to ensure success but downplay 
other important factors that explain how that success is achieved.  
Strategies to enhance success in partnerships include establishing a clear, shared sense 
of direction, adapting leadership to fit structure and moving from competition to 
collaboration (Berliner, 1997, p.5). In a study of strategic alliances, Gulati (1998) 
concluded that attention should be paid to five areas: “...(1) the formation of alliances, 
(2) the choice of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the 
performance of alliances, and (5) the performance consequences for firms entering 
alliances” (p.293). This evolutionary perspective provides a framework for examining 
the total involvement of firms and partners in strategic alliances. Davies and Hentschke 
(2006) also sought to understand the managerial implications of partnership 
arrangements and found that for partnerships to improve organisational performance, 
“…the preconditions for partnering, the change dimensions involved in partnering and 
the mechanisms for partnering have to be given serious consideration if success is to be 
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achieved” (pp. 224-225). The authors cite major gaps in knowledge about the “why” 
and “how” of partnerships, an agenda for further exploration and research which is 
undertaken in this research. In this study of small organisations in the developing 
country environment, it is posited that the environment influences cross-sectoral 
partnerships within the organisation.  
2.4.1 Organisation-Environment Challenges in Developing Countries 
Organisation-environment theories explain the dynamic relationships of the socio-
technical systems or internal environment and the external environment in which the 
organisation is located (Khandwalla, 1988; Jaeger and Kanungo, 1990). In this study of 
PPPs, the strategy of the alliance can be interpreted in the context of the external 
environment that features development challenges, and the internal environment that 
presents other performance challenges. An attempt to study PPPs in developing 
countries requires consideration of the environment and, as noted by Kiggundu et al. 
(1983) “…each time the environment is involved, the theory developed for Western 
settings does not apply, because it assumes contingencies that may not be valid for 
developing countries” (p.91). These differences are largely cultural, economic and 
political (ibid.).  
2.4.1.1 External Environment: Scarce Economic Resources in Developing Countries  
The scarcity of economic resources is perhaps one of the main challenges for 
developing countries (Hardy 1990; Briguglio, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998) and this affects the 
ability of the PPP organisation to secure project financing (Yong, 2010). Hardy (1990) 
concurred that the stage of economic development renders such countries “…more 
vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations, recession, inflation and external debt” (p.83). 
Indeed, organisations in such contexts of scarce resources may be more pressured to 
justify their existence in terms of economic success and counteract legitimacy 
challenges, especially in the early stages of their establishment. PPP projects in 
developing countries differ from those of developed countries mainly in the ability of 
governments to repay the private sector over time (Yong, 2010). The issue of 
transparency and quality in decision-making is even more important in small, 
developing countries where organisations are more susceptible to the vagaries of 
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economic, cultural and social environmental influences and the arbitrariness of 
individual action. In small countries, success is often attributed to individual actors and 
the evidence of organisational learning and institutionalisation is weaker than for more 
developed countries (Baird et al., 1994; Lane et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007).  
2.4.1.2 External Environment: The Implications of Small Size 
The issue of size is also a factor considered in this study and it may be argued that in 
small developing countries the problems of development are exacerbated by the size of 
the countries which render them more vulnerable to development pressures. A feature 
of small island states is their limited capacities both to produce and to consume as they 
cannot create monopolies and operate large-scale operations, they cannot develop 
substantial internal markets and they cannot raise large amounts of capital/finance on 
the home market (Bass, 1995). These factors often “…render the economies of these 
states very vulnerable to forces outside their control – a condition which sometimes 
threatens their economic viability. The GDP or GNP per capita of these states often 
conceals this reality” (Briguglio, 1995, p.1615). The economic vulnerability of small 
island developing states (SIDS) is demonstrated in their exposure to foreign economic 
conditions, remoteness and insularity, proneness to disasters and demographic changes, 
often caused by emigration patterns (Briguglio, 1995, p.2003). In some cases, SIDS do 
not necessarily have a relatively low GDP per capita and this conveys “…the 
impression of a relatively strong economy, even when, in reality, their economies are 
extremely delicate” (Briguglio, 1995, p.1624). In an attempt to present a broad 
overview of the problems of size within their geographic space, Douglas (2006) 
concluded that many of the problems of small island states are related to their “...insular 
geography and their fragile environmental and ecological characteristics” (p.76). The 
author goes on to explain the complexity of the environment of small island states that 
“...although spatially small, they nevertheless have characteristically uneven 
development within and across their island regions. They have complex and 
differentiated relationships within and between communities and island governments. 
These characteristic complexities give rise to resource management and governance 
issues” (ibid.). 
Challenges faced in education due to size include the tendency for “…the relationships 
among various sub-groups in the population to…be characterised by strong personal 
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ties” (Bacchus and Brock, 1987, p.6). This susceptibility to nepotism and patronage 
may often lead to maladministration and partiality in education (ibid.). In particular, 
small developing nations experience geographic isolation due to underdeveloped trade 
linkages that often result in their dependence on one or two countries for trade relations 
(Bass, 1995). This phenomenon, along with their various other dependencies, tends to 
militate against the development of external linkages and partnerships that are 
necessary for curriculum development as there are “…fewer people available than in 
larger countries to do a wider variety of educational work” (Brock, 1987, p.25).  
2.4.1.3 Challenges of Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
It is argued that development requires more than just economic models as it involves 
the transformation of society as a means and an end of the development process 
(Stiglitz, 1998). The Caribbean laments an “implementation gap” and an “…over-
emphasis on economic considerations and the tendency to overlook political, 
administrative and socio-cultural factors” in development planning” (Ryan and 
Bissessar, 2002, p.319). The assumption that price can perform all the co-ordination in 
an economy is challenged in developing countries which do not possess “…a full set of 
markets…[and]…the appropriate infrastructure, human capital and institutions” 
(Stiglitz, 1998, p.17). This results in less clarity on the next stages of the development 
process and, as such, development strategies should no longer be understood as a ‘road 
map’ but should be presented as a process model that can be adapted with the 
“…transformation of institutions, the creation of new social capital and new capacities, 
in some cases to replace traditional institutions that will inevitably be weakened in the 
process of development” (Stiglitz, 1998, p.16).  
2.4.1.4 Challenges in Participatory Models  
Development strategies should necessarily include processes for participation and 
ownership and the involvement of outsiders cannot take the place of this local 
ownership (Stiglitz, 1998).  
The partnership literature, including the UK literature on PPPs, therefore provides 
limited guidance on how the partnership should be structured for development impact. 
If development strategies are to acknowledge the historical context of the society 
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(ibid.), it is clear that the development trajectory of the UK and other developed 
countries will be of limited value. In the Caribbean in particular, participation in 
development is affected by several factors including the fact that there is a less 
developed civic society participation in developing countries (Salamon and Anheier, 
1997).  
Caribbean literature provides some insights into the challenges faced in partnership 
initiatives. Efforts to introduce the NPM in small states of the Caribbean met with 
political and economic challenges (Brown, 2002). In another study of NPM 
implementation, it was found that “…the ethnic composition of the society and the way 
the governments operated were critical factors” in the implementation efforts across 
states” (Bissessar, 2002, p.514). The more ethnically homogenous societies allowed for 
a more democratic system of governance that “…allowed for co-operation and 
negotiation between the various governments and oppositions” (ibid.). Yet, in an 
attempt at private participation and collaboration in the social partnership in Barbados, 
it was found that even in such ‘homogeneous’ societies, the model of private 
participation was affected by the private sector’s “…capacity to make meaningful use 
of the opportunity in the interest of the private sector as a whole and in the wider 
national interest” (Brown, 2002). The social partnership model represents one of the 
most significant efforts at cross-sectoral co-operation in the Caribbean (CEPAL 
Naciones Unidas, 2010).  
2.4.2 The Internal Environment: Defining the Purpose of the PPP Organisation  
PPPs distort organisational arrangements and are coordinated between markets and 
hierarchies (Powell, 1991) and any attempt to explain PPPs as organisations requires an 
application of an appropriate theory of the firm. The purpose, structure, strategy and 
governance of the firm in cross-sectoral arrangements are examined to determine how 
they distort existing theories of how the firm works. The review draws insights from 
the NPM, strategic alliances of firms and various cross-sectoral partnerships in 
understanding how partnerships work in organisations.  
The PPP organisations in this work are purpose-driven entities that involve the 
voluntary contribution of public and private sector actor sub-groups in governance 
roles. As not-for-profit organisations in education in small, developing countries, they 
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are driven by the purpose of providing a relevant education for development. In this 
context, the concept of the ‘strategic developmental organisation’ which is defined as 
“…an organization that is given, or assumes on its own, the responsibility for the 
growth and development of the domain in which it operates” appears to be appropriate 
(Khandwalla 1988-89, cited in Khandwalla, 1990, p.24). An example of strategic 
developmental organisations are the Indian Institutes of Management and Technology 
which were established in India to train scarce managerial and technological manpower 
needed to speed up the industrialisation effort (Khandwalla, 1990). The Indian 
Institutes of Management were established as a collaborative effort of the Indian 
Government, MIT Sloan School of Management and the business sector. These 
organizations tend to have three main characteristics: a developmental mission with 
respect to the sectors in which they operate; a moderate to high resource dependence on 
the government in the context of scarce resources; and, as a consequence of their youth, 
a developmental mission and change purpose. Additionally, their tasks and activities 
are usually unfamiliar, non-routine and risk-laden (ibid.). The study of PPPs is expected 
to unearth similar issues related to challenges of development and responses of the 
alliance that led to successful performance. 
Researchers claim that an actor’s understanding of the purpose of collaborative 
alliances influences his/her contribution to its success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; 
Austin, 2000). In the case of strategic developmental organisations, the motivation of 
actors to contribute to the organisation’s purpose is paramount. One Caribbean scholar 
suggested that actors in organisations “…must play and take the responsibility for 
playing. From this comes ownership. And once the constituents of an organisation feel 
a sense of ownership, then anything is possible” (Balgobin, 2005, p.25). A positive 
psychology of thinking (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) serves to provide an 
appropriate framework to interpret the evidence in order to determine the quality of 
participation, sense of ownership and contribution to the cause. This is advocated by a 
Caribbean academic who suggested that in interpreting the evidence of the world one 
should not “…look for selfishness everywhere…; it taints the purity of the world if you 
stare at it through perverted eyes” (Balgobin, 2005, p.28).  
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2.4.3 The Internal Environment: Structure of the PPP Organisation  
Partnerships represent the ‘Third Way’ of delivering public services as opposed to 
hierarchies and markets (Powell and Glendinning, 2002; Giddens, 1998). The ‘Third 
Way’ is best understood from the perspective of networks which are described as 
reflecting a central co-ordinating mechanism based on trust as opposed to commands 
and price competition inherent in bureaucracies and markets respectively (Hudson and 
Hardy, 2002; Powell and Glendinning, 2002; Rhodes, 1997; Powell and Exworthy, 
2002; Ansell and Gash, 2008). Many writers equate networks with partnerships and yet 
others claim that “...partnership is an organisational structure which is analytically 
distinct from network as a mode of governance” (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, p.314). 
Partnerships are viewed as representing a range of forms of co-ordination including 
networks, hierarchies and markets and may be described as partnership, alliance, 
collaboration, co-operating, network, joint working and multi-party working (Huxham 
et al., 2000, p.339). In a study of partnerships using both a deductive and inductive 
approach, Powell and Glendinning (2002, p.27) concluded that partnerships may be 
viewed as “quasi-network” or an intermediate form of co-ordination between 
hierarchies and markets. These quasi-network forms of governance merit further 
exploration to determine how they work, and what value is derived or sacrificed.  
The main issues of structure in the PPP arrangement are related to co-ordination and 
control of the organisation. Control is effected through control of funding and the 
provision of the service. Table 1 explains the shift away from public control towards 
private control and locates the area where PPPs in the study are located.  
Table 1: Modes of Welfare Provision and Funding 
  FINANCE (FUNDING) 
  Public Private 
PRODUCTION  
(PROVISION) 
Public  (1) (2) 
Private  (3) (4) 
Reproduced from Whitty (2000), after Klein, (1984) 
The shift away from the pure welfare state model (Cell 1) is achieved by various 
strategies including:  
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 charging for public services previously paid for out of taxation (Cell 2); 
 letting the private sector run a service that continues to be paid for out of taxation 
(Cell 3); 
 selling public services and transferring their functions to the private sector (Cell 4); 
 deregulating the private sector or liberalizing arrangements that previously 
prevented the private sector from competing with state-provided services (Cells 3/4 
competing with Cells 1/2) (Whitty, 2000, p.2). 
The financing model of PPP organisations, which may be found in all cells except Cell 
1, is important to understand in the face of public accountability challenges in 
developing countries.  
One of the fundamental concerns regarding the co-ordination and control of firms is the 
issue of ownership. In the case of PPPs, public ownership is heralded and it is felt that 
the PPP “…must aim at bringing private resources into public projects, not public 
resources into private projects” (Government of India, 2007, cited in Datta, 2009, p.73). 
Where ownership is shared, the issue becomes one of governance and the creation of 
value for both partners. In the case of non-profit ownership Otten (2008), in a blog 
post, asserts that “…no one—not the founder, the current executive director, the board, 
no one—owns a nonprofit. Nonprofits exist for the benefit of the public good, working 
on behalf of some portion of that public good”. Otten in the blog post further advises 
that control of the non-profit is important, as “…it doesn’t belong to board members, 
either, who are there as the protectors of that public trust and must exercise their 
responsibilities to keep that trust”. In the case of PPPs established as firms, actors as 
protectors of the firm or public trust, may demonstrate behaviours consistent with 
public or private organisations, despite the absence of legal ownership.  
Issues of co-ordination and control also arise in the network structure adopted through 
partnerships between private firms. In a study of partnerships between schools, Berliner 
(1997) distilled forms of partnerships described as networking, co-ordinating, co-
operating and collaborating based on the actions and skills involved in the process (the 
forms of partnerships are described in Appendix 2). Berliner (1997) identifies drivers of 
collaborative efforts in a range of sectors and organisational forms, including education 
and business alliances, as the demand to do more with fewer resources, the need to 
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establish new markets, the need for sharing expertise and the need for professional 
learning communities. 
2.5 GOVERNANCE IN CROSS-SECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS  
Reviews of the trends in the transition from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in the era of 
the NPM reveals that the term ‘governance’ is used in various ways and embodies 
different meanings (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1996). What is evident though is that 
“...governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries 
between, and within public and private sectors have become blurred” (Stoker, 
1998:17). The conceptions of governance in the NPM appears to be related to the way 
in which government makes use of new forms for the delivery of services including 
franchising, contracting within ‘quasi-markets’ and engaging in strategic service 
partnerships (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This is directly relevant to this study where 
a new organisational form was established to execute a traditional role of the 
university.  
The emergence of public-private relationships in governance arrangements presents 
new meta-frameworks of accountability and control (Acar et al., 2008; Acar and 
Robertson, 2004; Dubnick, 2005; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004b). The 
implications of PPP governance for universities and business schools that serve the 
public interest must be examined. Boards of directors are generally closed communities 
but where they have public impact it is particularly important to understand how they 
work to influence outcomes. Despite the significance of the board of directors to 
strategic decision making in firms, and its support function to managers in small 
networks (Borch and Huse, 1993), several authors have noted the lack of studies on the 
functioning of the board of directors (Mace, 1948; Mace, 1971; Thompson, 1967; 
Vance, 1983). Authors concur that, with respect to how the board of directors works, 
“…this field of management has suffered from much non-science, rule-of-thumb, and 
reliance on chance” (Castaldi and Wortman, 1984 cited in Borch and Huse, 1993, 
p.24).  
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2.5.1 Convergence of Corporate and Collaborative Governance 
Public-private forms of governance have emerged in a period of changing governance 
structures at the macro and micro levels; from nations to firms and families (Michalski 
et al., 2001). Governance, whether public or private and at all levels of analysis, may be 
defined as “…the general exercise of authority” (Michalski et al., 2001, p.9). Corporate 
governance has had a longer history of analysis and may be viewed as “…the system 
by which the company is directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992, p.14). The 
separation of management and ownership in systems of corporate governance is 
underscored by Tricker’s (1984, pp.6-7) assertion that “…the governance role is not 
concerned with running the business of the company, per se, but with giving overall 
direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of 
management and with satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability and 
regulation by the interests beyond the corporate boundaries”. 
Concerning governance, similar strands of thought are evident in both the private and 
public sectors (Rhodes, 1996). There is increased emphasis on integrity, accountability 
of persons in roles and a polycentric state with increasingly collaborative patterns of 
co-ordination (ibid.). The appeal for governance in the Caribbean is linked to 
widespread corruption “…the continuing immiseration of the mass of the population, 
clumsiness in the handling of public affairs…and doubts about public probity in the 
conduct of public affairs” (Nettleford, 2002, p.11). A governance model where 
government is seen as a network of social or power partners, seeking to maximise the 
benefits of interaction between government, private sector and community, is 
advocated (ibid.).  
The contrasting characteristics of hierarchical and market forms of governance have led 
to the position that networks exist along a dichotomy of markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1975; Thorelli, 1986). Based on historical and anthropological evidence 
however, it is argued that networks create a new administrative form with distinct 
capabilities and limitations (Powell, 1991; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Networks are 
best understood in terms of their descriptive characteristics and critical components and 
it is generally agreed that “...they are distinct from market or hierarchical arrangements 
in their heavy reliance on reciprocity, collaboration, complementary interdependence, a 
reputation and relationship basis for communication, and an informal climate oriented 
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toward mutual gain” (Larson, 1992, p.77). Other factors critical to successful 
‘collaborative governance’ include face to face dialogue and the development of 
commitment and shared understanding (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p.1). In contrast, 
market governance arrangements rely primarily on price for control whilst hierarchical 
structures rely heavily on administrative authority (Larson, 1992). The conclusion is 
that there is room for further exploration of the way in which interacting networks 
function to produce valuable outcomes (Leiblein, 2003). An exploration of the reasons 
why firms engage in network relationships and the process by which those objectives 
are achieved is critical to understanding how strategic networks work (Ingraham et al., 
2002; Dubnick, 2005; Skelcher, 2005a). With respect to partnerships as ‘governance’, 
two dimensions appear to be important to their performance: the financial arrangements 
between public and private actors and the tightness of organisational linkages between 
the two actors (Hodge and Greve, 2007). In this relationship, control mechanisms are 
critical to their success. Bradach and Eccles (1989) mapped price, authority, and trust 
as control mechanisms onto market, hierarchy, and network, respectively, and noted 
that these are ideal types that in reality are often combined. It is posited that in PPPs 
hierarchical mechanisms must co-exist with other forms of control in understanding 
network governance (Ingraham and Lynn, 2004).  
2.5.1.1 Transparency and Accountability in Governance  
Acar et al. (2008), in their study of accountability, noted that the network arrangements 
that exist in PPPs require different forms of accountability as, in this relationship, one 
party has no hierarchical authority over its partners and no full control over 
performance. The authors concluded that accountability as managing expectations, as 
opposed to the traditional notions of accountability as answerability, would be a more 
appropriate framework to use in PPPs where hierarchical authority is absent (ibid.). The 
intention of this research is to discover the realities of network structures, exploring 
issues of governance and accountability in understanding what makes PPPs work.  
2.5.1.2 Power and Dominance  
It is claimed that “...governance theory analyses power not as ‘social control’ but as 
‘social production’” (Taylor, 2007, p.299). In this case, the analysis moves away from 
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fixed ideas about power as a commodity rooted in particular institutions to more fluid 
ideas of power developed and negotiated between partners (ibid.). In an analysis of 
power in public-private regimes, it is suggested that a distinction is drawn between 
“power to” and “power over” but both conceptions of power are intertwined in the 
interpretation of social situations (Stone, 2006, p.26; author's quotations). The social 
production model or “power to” provides an opportunity to consider how actors come 
to embrace and stay with some courses of action rather than others (Stone, 2006, p.24; 
author’s italics). Although it is claimed that it is not possible to separate ‘power to’ and 
‘power over’ (Domhoff, 2006) it is important to understand which conception of power 
is enacted in addressing the PPP purpose. Does the public role align with the 
governance discourse that includes propositions about an ‘enabling’ state, ‘steering’ not 
‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) or is ‘power over’ enacted in the relationship? 
Within the firm, power may be understood to derive from access to resources (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1988), rather than influence. It is claimed that when this is understood we 
can “...broaden the definition of the firm, understand the role played by (the) internal 
organization, and explain a variety of real-world institutional arrangements” (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998, p.424).  
A discourse of dominance may be seen to be inherent in groups, including sectoral 
groups (Van Dijk, 1993). A powerful group may influence the minds of others and 
exert control over the other (ibid.). Socio-political discourse analysis is a mechanism 
for understanding power relations and dominance; the more groups have access to 
discourse the more socially powerful they are (ibid.). The study undertakes a socio-
political discourse analysis to focus on the role of discourse in the (re)production and 
challenge of dominance (ibid.). Dominance is “…the exercise of social power by elites, 
institutions, or groups, that results in social inequality” (ibid., p.250). The study pays 
attention to the “…structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal 
interaction or communicative events (that) play a role in these modes of reproduction” 
(ibid.). It recognizes the complexity of the socio-political goal of understanding how 
partnerships work, where each partner has widely differing interests, yet works 
sustainably towards some common goal. The research questions the extent to which 
dominance exists in PPPs in relation to ideology, activities, strategies or meanings. 
Acts and activities may sometimes be construed as dominant acts in the relationship; 
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however, the study focuses on the attainment of such dominance in the interest of a 
third party, the stakeholders or higher purpose and the legitimacy of the organisation.  
2.5.2 Privatisation as Strategy  
Many critics of the activities related to education under the NPM, view them as 
privatisation in disguise and this results in tensions within the political sphere (Savas, 
2000; Whitty, 2000). The primary purpose of this strategic option is to promote 
economic development in emerging, developing, and developed economies (Zahra, 
2000). The way in which it works, however, may result in outcomes that do not meet 
the planned purposes.  
It is claimed that “...privatisation makes companies move from defensive and reactive 
strategies to analytical and prospective ones” (Zabalza and Matey, n.d., p.2). The firm 
relies more on deliberate strategies through the strategic planning process, and on 
strong signals from the market (Mintzberg, 1994; Miles et al., 1978). In addition, 
privatised firms tend to explore more competitive strategic positioning and utilize 
strategies such as portfolio diversification and internationalisation (Zabalza and Matey, 
n.d., p.2). The process also leads to changes in managerial incentives, organisational 
structure and culture (Zahra, 2000). The contribution of partners to the strategic actions 
of the firm provides a basis for the assessment of the success of the new model. This 
study seeks to determine how PPPs enacted the ideology of privatisation for attainment 
of their purpose.  
Zahra (2000) presents a summary of the literature to describe the behaviours of newly 
privatised firms. Table 2 presents research at multi-levels and in different economic 
conditions including emerging economies. The dependent variables represent different 
outcomes based on profit appropriation orientation and ownership rights; the row 
shaded blue appears to be the range of structures in which PPPs may be classified:  
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Table 2: Classification of Firms with Ownership Rights and Profit Orientation 
Taken from Ghobadian et al. (2004); Original in Salas (1998) adapted in Zahra et al. 
(2000) 
The PPP is not an ‘arms-length’ arrangement and has the aim of generating surplus 
value for one or both partners (Datta, 2009). This usually involves extensive contact, 
co-ordination and information flows between actors, and the will to look beyond their 
own boundaries (Faulkner, 1995; Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Nooteboom, 1998) As 
such, PPPs are very similar to strategic alliances and networks in the private sector. The 
literature on strategic alliances spawns a number of new variables to be considered in 
understanding what challenges partnerships face and how they address them to achieve 
success.  
The emergence of strategic alliance and inter-firm co-operation has prompted 
researchers to explore several factors believed to lead to the creation of value including 
partner selection and the formation of alliances (Li and Rowley, 2002; Hitt et al., 2000; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), the motivation for partnering (Gulati, 1995; 
Harrigan, 1985) and the flow of resources between firms (Das and Teng, 2000). A large 
number of studies have sought to understand how collaboration produces competitive 
advantage (Lin, 2006; Todeva and Knoke, 2005; Kanter, 1994). Though many of these 
studies were undertaken on business partnerships, the establishment of such alliances 
between partners in the public or non-profit and private sectors has also emerged across 
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the globe and researchers have also sought to understand how they work to create value 
(Hall and Kennedy, 2008; Austin, 2000; Samii et al., 2002).  
Studies have highlighted the fact that the motivation of partners to engage in the 
alliance directly influences the framework for collaboration and the mechanisms by 
which they create value. In their study of PPPs in education, Davies and Hentschke 
(2006) underscore the importance of understanding the motivations for the partnership 
of public, private non-profit and private for-profit partners. The authors point to the fact 
that private sector motivation which is not profit driven is different from that which is 
propelled by a concern for profit (ibid.). 
The studies on partnerships and networks evolved from examining the phases and 
features of partnerships for an agenda “…focused either on the antecedent conditions or 
the structural properties of inter-organizational relationships in comparison with other 
governance forms (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, p.91). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) 
provide a summary of these studies that were approached mainly from transactions cost 
or agency theory perspectives. Additionally, research from organisational sociologists 
has focused on “...the environmental conditions and contingent factors that explain the 
formation and structure of cooperative inter-organizational relationships” (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992, p.91). These contributions are considered variance theories that 
“…deal(s) with variables and the correlations among them” and attempt to understand 
the extent to which factors are more significant to the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2004, 
p.248). Ring and Van de Ven affirm that process theories are also important in 
understanding partnerships and propose a process framework for the development of 
co-operative inter-organisational relationships that includes consideration of 
negotiations, commitments, executions and assessments (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 
p. 97). This transition to relational processes and variables is considered fundamental to 
the overall attempt to explain how partnerships work.  
2.5.2 University Partnerships in Governance  
2.5.2.1 The Changing Role of the University in Society 
The role of the university and its relationship with society have been the subject of 
much debate (Bargh et al., 1996). The university’s dominance with respect to the 
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production of knowledge is increasingly questioned in twenty-first century society as 
knowledge moves from being incidental to the economy and becomes “…an integral 
part of what is now in effect a scientized society” (Delanty, 2002, p.185). As 
knowledge became increasingly useful for capitalism the modern state and the 
university entered into alliances in which the university promised useful knowledge and 
the state gave way to academic autonomy in the process (Delanty, 2002). The 
university and the progress of the nation-state have been intertwined ever since and the 
university is the producer of knowledge in two senses. It generates academic/scientific 
knowledge that is increasingly useful to the nation state and it is a site of cognitive 
evolution as it grapples with the contradictions of modernity. According to Delanty, 
“The university became progressively implicated in the major social struggles of 
modernity and gradually shed its isolation in the ivory tower of academia” (2002, 
p.187). 
A major aim of this research is to determine how the institutional features of the 
university system influence the PPP. Universities in developing countries adopted the 
European models of their colonial masters and “…must function in the unequal world 
of centers and peripheries” (Altbach, 2002, p.3). It is postulated that this existence at 
the periphery has resulted in academic dominance of the metropole which includes 
cleavage to the institutional model, norms and values of the North (Ibid.). The way in 
which the PPP is implemented within the university system to respond to global 
pressures of university massification, accountability, privatization, and marketization 
(Altbach, 2002) in the face of the additional pressures of their contexts is significant to 
this work.  
Changes in governance are anticipated and it is claimed that governance has become 
more complex, multi-levelled and shared as more actors are drawn into the arena in the 
“massification” and “marketization” of the university (Bargh et al., 1996, pp.2-3; 
author's quotation marks). The two main models of the academic governance of 
universities are the professorial model of self-governance and, with the advent of 
student power in the 1960s, shared governance (Delanty, 2002). The advent of shared 
models of governance has brought academic freedom and the governance of knowledge 
into question. One view is that the university has always had the right to govern 
knowledge as it produced knowledge for its own use but this is contested by the 
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recognition that new cultures of knowledge are emerging that contest the freedom of 
science and the dominance of scientists and academics (Delanty, 2002). It is expected 
that there would be significant differences in the role the private sector plays in the 
governance of universities and the production of knowledge in developing countries.  
In the engagement of the university in the challenges of modernity and postmodernity, 
academic self-governance changed to more participatory forms of governance 
(Riesman and Jencks, 1998). Within the principle of academic self-governance, the 
university evolved a dual system of control (Dearlove, 2002). In each institution, 
university ‘Council’ has been the body responsible for finance and the control of 
resources and has a ‘lay’ majority. The Senate is the sovereign academic authority and 
has no lay membership (ibid.). This study postulates that the model of participatory 
governance adopted by the university in small developing countries is a response to 
challenges to its legitimacy and utility.  
2.5.2.2 University Governance and the New Managerialism 
Reed (2002) undertook a study of the changes in UK universities in an attempt to 
explore the way in which the tenets of the NPM influenced university governance since 
the 1990s. University governance is defined as “…the general organisational 
technologies and practices through which higher education institutions attempt to 
regulate and control what happens within their, increasingly porous and contested, 
boundaries” (Reed, 2002, p.164; author's italics). It was found that the new 
managerialism presents several challenges to university governance (Dearlove, 2002). 
Firstly, “...collegial governance seeks consensus through committees and so involves 
sluggish decision-making that is conservative and biased in favour of the status quo at 
the same time as it is inward-looking and insensitive to resource constraints and to 
external realities” (Dearlove, 2002, p.265). Further, the system of university 
governance “…can be indifferent to institution-wide concerns, degenerating into the 
selfish pursuit of narrow departmental advantage based on ugly log-rolling coalitions of 
heads of departments” (ibid.). Indeed, universities as a professional bureaucracy are 
bottom-heavy with the capacity to block changes of which faculty do not approve 
(ibid.). This tension between university and corporate governance as the PPP attempts 
rapid innovation in addressing the development purpose is a major subject of this study.  
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There has been increased representation of business interests in the structures and 
cultures of wider society and in the governance of universities and colleges (Thompson 
1971; Monbiot, 2000). Moreover, the state itself is seen to be intertwined with 
corporate capitalism (Monbiot, 2000). The extent to which business schools in 
developing Commonwealth nations inherit the UK ‘Oxbridge’ model from which they 
are derived is questionable. In the UK, the growth of business schools is seen to be 
“...not simply a training in the ‘techniques of management’…but also a training in the 
ideology, values and purposes of capitalist enterprise” (Miliband and Mundial, 1969, 
p.253) It is claimed that since these schools depend on the donations of wealthy 
capitalists, they are hardly likely to be critical of corporate capital and its ideology 
(Taylor and Steele, 2011). The question of how the private sector in the socioeconomic 
context of developing countries participates in the governance of business schools and 
the impact on ideology is a significant concern of this study.  
2.6 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TENSIONS IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS - 
RELEVANCE AND RIGOUR 
Academic actors in public universities and private sector actors as stakeholders view 
the public-private divide as tensions between academic rigour and real world relevance 
(Clinebell and Clinebell, 2008; Tushman et al., 2007). This section explores the 
literature, seeking the emerging understanding of the relationship between these two 
concepts and the mechanisms used to attain both. Further, the review explores the 
mechanisms utilized to attain relevance and rigour and highlights the successes, the 
challenges they present, and the areas open for further consideration and exploration. In 
so doing, the review examines the “gaps” so as to determine the exact nature of the 
problem in which to locate the questions of the study.   
The overall quest for a relevant education that can address the concerns of 
organisations is a global issue. Broader concerns about the problem of relevance in 
business school education have been raised by many researchers (Bennis and O’Toole, 
2005; Ankers and Brennan, 2002; Ivory et al., 2006; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). Pfeffer 
and Fong (2002) surmised the end of business schools, questioning the impact of 
business education on management success and the overall relevance of management 
scholarship. Ivory et al. (2006) echoed this concern about the future of business schools 
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in the UK in the face of allegations of irrelevance, lack of utility of ideas and the 
production of poor quality graduates described by The Economist in 1991 as “…critters 
with lopsided brains, icy hearts and shrunken souls” (quoted in Ivory et al., 2006, p.8).  
A more theoretical exploration of the problem of bridging the gap between relevance 
and rigour through the conduct of collaborative research yields even more dismal 
conclusions. In an examination of the “gap” using Luhmann’s systems theory, Kieser 
and Leiner (2009) found that “...specialized systems of modern societies are highly 
autonomous – ‘autopoietic.’ They operate in isolation from each other”. Systems 
produce communications which are apparently incomprehensible to each other. Two 
characteristics of systems, ‘self-reference’ and ‘operative closure’ prevent barriers to 
communication though they may use external events as prompts. Kieser and Leiner 
(2009) cite the work of Siedl, writing in 2005, and explain that systems are self-
referential which means that “…every operation refers in some way or other back to 
itself” (p.520). Science is understood as a truth system which generates theories and 
methodologies in a process that depends on the falsification of knowledge in a self-
referencing process (Kieser and Leiner, 2009). The “practice system of organisations” 
on the other hand is an economic system which generates returns in a process that 
assesses relevance using experiential and scientific knowledge (Kieser and Leiner, 
2009). The authors suggest that the two communication systems cannot meet and the 
gap between theory and practice cannot be bridged. This study contends that PPP 
performance measured by survival suggests that some progress towards bridging the 
gap between theory and practice must have been made in the PPP organisations that 
form the empirical context of the research.  
In their use of systems theory to explain the codes by which academic and practitioner 
systems work, delineating the factors that define systems and outlining the 
contradictions and differences between the two systems under consideration, Kieser 
and Leiner (2009) exposed opportunities for others to come to different conclusions 
and offer suggestions as to how the “gap” can, in fact, be bridged. In fact, these authors 
themselves, through their own surmising that “...apparently, Van de Ven and Johnson 
(2006) are not convinced that collaborative research is able to meet the standards of 
rigorous research without subsequent theoretical and methodological upgrading” 
(Kieser and Leiner, 2009, p.529) perhaps opened the way for academics to consider 
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how “upgrading” can take place. Systems theory evolved from an examination of 
biologically bounded systems and is often criticised as having an internal focus with 
“boxed in” arguments, leading researchers to consider organisations as “open systems” 
that are influenced by environmental factors (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Donaldson, 1985). 
The challenge for business schools to cross the divide requires “out of the box” 
solutions and answers may reside anywhere.  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
PPPs appear to be both promising and contested as a form of institutional co-operation. 
The developing context of small island states, however, presents unique realities for 
these collaborative ventures between the public and private sectors in the governance of 
business schools. It appears that the findings of studies of PPPs in developed countries 
may be challenged by the reality of small, developing countries where PPPs appear to 
be a promise that cannot be ignored. The context raises questions such as: 
 How does the PPP form, rather than nomenclature, serve the interests of 
partners and stakeholders in a context where the label ‘PPP’ is only just 
entering the political agenda?  
 How do actor sub-groups in the governance of PPPs in the developing world 
tackle the issues of politics and strategy that arise in the developed world?  
Based on the discussion in this chapter, it is proposed that key success factors related to 
PPP performance in business schools in developing countries are derived from an 
understanding of how the following elements work to produce successful outcomes: 
 Definition of purpose: This is negotiated between the public purpose of the social 
good and private stakeholder interests. With regard to small, developing countries, 
issues of market size, economic realities and social issues appear to present unique 
opportunities and challenges to PPPs. 
 Definition of the PPP structure and contractual agreement: This is negotiated 
between ‘arms-length’ and relational contracting between organisations. Issues of 
public contribution and private voluntarism appear to moderate the impact of 
relational governance in the PPP as an organisation.  
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 Governance: This is a negotiated version of ownership, control and direction of the 
firm. Elements of power, role definition, structure and accountability are 
fundamental to the governance of the PPP.  
 Strategy and execution: These are negotiated between markets and hierarchies and 
include elements of trust, co-operation in roles, accountability and performance 
expectations.  
These are the factors that will be explored in the study. They form the basis for the 
conceptual framework that guides the study, which is described in the Chapter 4.  
The engagement of private interest in PPPs has changed the form of ownership rights 
and the orientation of public services from non-profit and based on moral codes to 
other forms that include non-profit and for profit arrangements. They have done so for 
many purposes – purposively seeking the best resources, technical expertise, practices, 
financing and support infrastructure where they reside. Networks of relationships are 
created for various reasons and with different expectations of partners. The challenge is 
how to make them work and how to do so sustainably. The literature reviewed in this 
chapter identified factors that are relevant to the success and failure of cross-sectoral 
partnerships but does not sufficiently identify the inter-relationships between the 
factors that provide explanations of how they work. A broader theoretical framework is 
required and is the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
This study explores how alliances between actors from public universities and private 
sector partners in the governance of business schools in small, developing countries 
influence the strategy and legitimacy of the schools. The theoretical framework 
outlined in this chapter, and the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 4, together 
seek to outline, describe and justify the appropriateness of the perspective, theories and 
constructs that underpin the research methodology and guide the development of 
defensible explanations of PPP performance. In this chapter, the academic literature is 
reviewed to highlight the main theories found to be relevant in constructing 
explanations of how PPP governance mechanisms, as strategic, cross-sectoral inter-
organisational linkages, work and to identify an appropriate performance dimension for 
assessing PPP success.  
The literature review includes a critical examination of the extant theories used to 
explain partnerships to distil an appropriate theoretical framework for the study. 
Theories included in the review are articulated at all three levels of generalisation: 
grand theories that are applicable across contexts, middle-range theories that are 
specific to a phenomenon and situation or practice-specific theories appropriate to 
cross-sectoral relationships (Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). In the first section, 
the review discusses the network perspective and social network theory as a grand 
theory and explores its value to the study of cross-sectoral partnerships and the 
governance of such organisations.  
The study is guided by an overarching framework that includes two complementary 
perspectives – network perspective and the new economic sociology. The concepts, 
theories and methods drawn from both perspectives provide the theoretical framework 
to explain cross-sectoral partnerships. The concept of embeddedness, developed from 
contemporary sociology through the work of Granovetter (1985) is employed to explain 
how expectations, with respect to the behaviours of actors, are generated based on their 
embeddedness in the context. Network theories then provide descriptions and 
explanations of the distortions created by the configuration of actors in the PPP 
network. In order to understand how the PPP governance structure functions in its 
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context, an integrative theory that links purpose, structure and meaning in social 
networks is utilized (Fuhse, 2009). In order to address the ‘why” question, the 
framework includes consideration of the meaning of network structures (Fuhse, 2009) 
in the tradition of ‘relational realism’ (Mische, 2011). Legitimacy theory, as a 
stakeholder acceptance theory, allows the researcher to analyse the relationships in 
order to explain the survival of the PPP organisation. The theoretical framework is 
presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Representation of the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Source: Self-Elaboration 
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3.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE  
The study is approached from a social network perspective. A perspective is viewed as 
a “…device for filtering an examination of social events and processes, so that certain 
things are excluded while others appear particularly prominent” (Wallace and Wray, 
2006, p.65). The social network perspective has been adopted for this study based on 
the findings of the review of literature on partnerships undertaken in the preceding 
chapter. The professional literature on partnerships, both in the public and private 
sectors and across institutions and organisations, has provided a plethora of appropriate 
propositions and concepts that should be considered in any examination of the 
partnership phenomenon. The literature, however, has not provided relational analyses 
of how the behaviours and actions of actors in the partnership influence those of the 
other partner and affect the dynamics of the relationship. In this study, the basic 
proposition is that the behaviours and actions of actors in public and private sub-groups 
are influenced by the presence and actions of the other group. It is also affected by the 
way in which each sub-group perceives factors at the firm and institutional levels. 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) describe the social network perspective that 
“…encompasses theories, models, and applications that are expressed in terms of 
relational concepts or processes” (p.4). Utilising this perspective, this study is designed 
to contribute to relational theories of partnerships, exploring the dynamics of the 
partnership in its context.  
The social network perspective is adopted as, in this study of public-private 
relationships, it allows the researcher to focus away from the atomistic concepts that 
emerge in the research and to extend the examination to consider the relationship 
between concepts, exploring how features and changes in one affect the others 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.4). This perspective allows the researcher to draw on 
appropriate theories that describe and explain the linkages or ties between the actors at 
all levels of the analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Network theory also includes 
well-defined concepts and linkages between concepts that serve to describe the 
relations between actors (ibid.). The theory, therefore, provides a basis for describing 
relations between actors in a defined unit of analysis, such as the relationship between 
the public and private actors in affiliated networks as they consider decisions by the 
partnership (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
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3.2 A LINKING FRAMEWORK: PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY  
The research on partnerships undertaken in the public, private and non-profit sectors 
has utilised various theoretical bases and generated testable propositions. The main 
theories employed in these studies are transaction cost economics theory (Williamson, 
2005) and social network theory (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Moreover, researchers 
have found it useful to combine theories to generate appropriate frameworks from 
which to explore partnerships and explain the findings that emerge (a summary of 
theoretical propositions derived from the literature on partnerships is presented in 
Appendix 3). The research summary is organised on the basis of the broad constructs of 
purpose, structure and strategy that form the conceptual framing for this research study. 
The social network perspective provides the basis for the relational approach but a 
framework that defines which constructs will be explored is required. The linking 
framework explores public-private relationships with regard to the fundamental 
questions of why the partnership was formed, how it was structured and what actions 
were taken. The relationship between purpose, structure and strategy provides an 
appropriate conceptual lens from which to explain how the partnership works. These 
broad concepts connect to facilitate the task of explanation at all levels including the 
actor level, organisation level and country level. Though the network perspective and 
its focus on relations between actors, yields useful descriptions of actor relations and 
relations to events, it does not sufficiently guide the analysis of how these attributes of 
actors influence the way in which the partnership works. In order to facilitate this level 
of explanation, the research utilizes the concepts and theories of sociology, mainly 
drawn from the ‘new economic sociology’ as advocated and defined by Granovetter 
(1985). This responds to the observation that “...one area where a great deal of work 
remains is integrating network concepts and measures into more general social and 
behavioural science research” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.733).  
3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY AND THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS 
Social network explanations of phenomena are built on the relationships between units 
in a study. Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain that “...social network analysis 
provides a precise way to define important social concepts, a theoretical alterative to 
the assumption of independent actors, and a framework for testing theories about 
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structured relationships” (p.17). A technical explanation of the fundamental memes of 
social network theory and a list of relevant social network concepts used in this work is 
included in Appendix 4.  
Apart from being understood as a “perspective”, social networks are now considered by 
some to be a paradigm (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Freeman, 2004) where “…people 
influence one another... to build a cumulative body of knowledge…a ‘normal’ science 
in the sense described by Thomas Kuhn…that both generates puzzles and solves them” 
(Freeman, 2004, p. 6). Yet others have claimed that the field of social network research 
better serves the generation of new theories based on several attributes of the field in its 
current developmental status (Kilduff et al., 2006). Social network theory is perhaps 
one of the most widely used theories that have informed the study of partnerships (Acar 
and Robertson, 2004e.g.; Ahuja, 2000; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, 1998; 
Gulati et al., 2000). Establishing the explanatory power and academic significance of 
this theory to understand what makes PPPs work in the context is critical in this study. 
Some of the tensions in the theoretical framing must be confronted and the research 
position defined, beginning with the tension between agency and structure.  
3.4 AGENCY, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONAL REALISM 
The study of PPPs is approached from a critical realist perspective and seeks to 
understand how public and private actor sub-groups in governance roles contribute to 
the strategic actions of business schools. The problem of structure and action was 
confronted by Giddens (1979, p.49) who argued that “…it would be true to say that 
those schools of thought which have been preoccupied with action, have paid little 
attention to, or have found no way of coping with conceptions of structural explanation 
or social causation”. Giddens proposed the theory of structuration which, he claims 
“…begins with an absence - the lack of a theory of action in the social sciences” (1979, 
p.2). He contends that structuration requires bringing voluntarism and determinism 
together, demanding a theory of the acting subject and must “...situate action in time 
and space as a continuous flow of conduct, rather than treating purposes, reasons etc., 
as somehow aggregated together” (ibid.). Giddens argues against dichotomies but 
recognises the role of the actor in the process, though requiring a theory of the actor.  
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Social network theory and relational realism provide an opportunity to examine the 
‘meaning structure’ of networks (Fuhse, 2009) and account for the actions of sub-
groups in structural relationships. The extension of network theory in this area is driven 
by the growth of the community of network theorists who, in the main, comprised an 
academic network within their university community (Mische, 2011), and spanned the 
various areas, and among whom are White (1992) and Tilly (2004) who applied the 
“relational perspective,” taking some of the broader theoretical insights of network 
analysis and extending them into the realms of culture, history, politics, economics, and 
social psychology, making marginal use of formal network methodology (Mische, 
2011, p.1). It is suggested that “…relational thinking is a way to overcome stale 
antinomies between structure and agency through a focus on the dynamics of social 
interactions in different kinds of social settings” (Mische, 2011, p.1). The relational 
perspective and social network theory contend that actors exist in social networks that 
form a structure within which human action occurs. A relational sociology (Emirbayer, 
1997) provides an opportunity to examine the roles that actors play in these group 
structures. In these roles, they make choices that can be attributed to influence on each 
other in affiliation networks. From a critical realist perspective, we can only analyse 
them from critical analysis of the roles they play within social networks and the 
influence of the network structures on actors. As such, the research questions and data 
gathering instruments relate to roles and group influence, rather than individual action 
or individual agency.  
The meaning structure of the networks, which includes the expectations and cultural 
relations in interpersonal structures, is included in the analysis (Fuhse, 2009). In 
attempting to explore the meaning structure of the network, it is noted that “…the 
primary nature of meaning is neither subjective nor objective, but rather 
intersubjective—it only exists as incorporated in specific social structures between 
people” (Fuhse, 2009, p.59) and “…actual network structures result from the cultural 
patterning of relationships between role categories”. While network theory 
acknowledges actor attributes, the agenda of network theory is “…to explicate the 
connection between structure and outcome” and it is suggested that while these may be 
very important it must be noted that “…structural differences alone have effects” 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, p.14).  
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Although it is claimed that structuration has not (yet) been used successfully as an 
alternative to the structure/agency dichotomy (Crosbie, 2004), the focus of the study on 
the stability of the networks requires an analysis of the structural arrangements, 
acknowledging that “…structure provides a means by which organisational stability 
can be maintained, as the rules and procedures have the effect of moderating 
behaviour” (Baker, 2008, p.34). The observation of behaviour in defined roles, from a 
critical realist perspective that privileges an ontology of behaviourism, confines the 
study to one of structure. Further, trends in management reform in the 1990s have 
resulted in a move away from leadership and behavioural principles and towards more 
structural emphases on flexibility and innovation, thereby reinforcing the partnership 
ideal (Reijniers, 1994; Linder, 1999).  
As argued above, this work privileges structure over agency and further work 
examining the agency of individual actors, including actor leadership, would be helpful 
for a more complete understanding of the PPP phenomenon in business schools in 
small, developing countries. Actor-network theory recognizes the socio-technical 
system in which actors include both human and non-human actors that together define 
the network to be studied (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1996, Guo, 2005). The board of 
directors in this study is considered the non-human actor in the affiliation network. 
Further work using actor-network analyses would also aid understanding of how the 
network functioned.  
3.5 STRUCTURE AND ‘LIQUID MODERNITY’ 
Another perspective that would challenge the notion of structure and organisational 
stability is the sociological conception of a “liquid modernity” rather than a postmodern 
reality (Bauman, 2000). Bauman (2000) defines the duty of sociology as identifying 
and engaging with the changing human experience in an attempt to understand that 
experience. He defines and identifies the differences between modernity and 
postmodernity and moves toward a concept of “liquid modernity” in explaining how 
previously “solid” ideas have now become more flexible and fluid (Bauman, 2000, 
p.8). As structures become more “liquid”, as in the case of PPPs, they challenge 
traditional structures and the view of space as “...solid and stolid, unwieldy and inert 
side, capable of waging only a defensive, trench war - being an obstacle to the resilient 
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advances of time” (ibid.). This individualized theory of human action and social change 
presents another perspective from which to approach the study of cross-sectoral 
collaboration aimed at problem solving.  
3.8 LEGITIMACY THEORY AND PPP PERFORMANCE  
PPP organisations were established as new entities to address the problem of relevance 
of business education to society and, therefore, the study required an overarching 
framework from which to understand their evolution and performance. In light of the 
claim that the evaluation of success should be based on attainment of the underlying 
objectives of the PPP, it is argued that social judgement and legitimacy theory provides 
an appropriate theoretical frame from which to explore PPP performance and 
accountability (Suchman, 1995; Brown, 2001).  
Accountability in PPPs and inter-organizational networks differs from traditional forms 
of accountability and it is expected that PPP performance will be evaluated by different 
stakeholders on differing dimensions. PPPs created societal expectations with regard to 
the provision of solutions to the problem of relevance and this served as their measure 
of performance in the external environment. Acar and Robertson (2008) found that 
several factors influenced the expectations of PPP performance including the power 
differential between participating individuals and organisations which affects their 
ability to influence policy, including that of accountability. It may be construed that 
PPP performance and accountability would be judged by external stakeholders in 
relation to their parent organisations. The internal legitimacy of the organisation would 
be influenced by factors such as the centrality and significance of the partnership to 
participating organisations and institutions and it is reasonable that PPP participants 
who are volunteers must view accountability mechanisms as “…reasonable and 
practical” (Acar and Robertson, 2004, p.333). 
3.8.1 Accountability and Legitimacy 
Organisations face different institutional conditions that shape their actions in different 
countries (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The emergence of PPP organisations in 
response to social challenges appears to be an opportunity to create bridges across the 
sectors (Jooste, 2009). The PPP provided a vehicle to challenge institutional norms 
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faced by the publicly funded university as it attempted to account for performance in 
the face of development challenge and perceptions of lack of relevance in education. In 
this case, the private sector comprised a significant stakeholder body that demanded 
greater relevance to business in business education.  
Legitimacy, as a construct, may be operationalised from the definitions of Edwards 
(2000) and Brown (2001). Edwards (2000, p.5) explained that “...Legitimacy is 
generally understood as the right to be and do something in society—a sense that an 
organization is lawful, admissible, and justified in its chosen course of action” 
(Edwards, 2000, p.5).  The question of how organisations derive legitimacy is 
addressed by Brown (2001) who identified four bases of legitimacy: legal, moral, 
political, and technical or performance-related (p.64).  In this study, legitimacy will be 
explored as the responding variable of business school performance as the research 
examines the bases on which the business schools, with their PPP governance 
arrangements, achieved the right to undertake the tasks traditionally pursued by the 
universities to which they were attached. Expectations about legitimacy and 
accountability derive from analysis of all levels at which an organisation exists but is 
best understood at the level of “…the articulation of societal ideals that are established 
by laws or widely held social norms and expectations” (Brown, 2008, p.5; author's 
italics). In many cases, civil society organisations, between hierarchies and markets, 
have not been subject to state regulation and Brown (2008) explains that in the absence 
of socially agreed norms and standards of legitimate behaviour, civil society 
organisations “…can actively construct legitimacy arguments and accountability 
systems rather than wait passively for governments and other regulators to set and 
enforce standards” (p.11; author’s italics). The author explains that cross-sectoral 
partnerships and other such organisations may influence their own legitimacy through 
strategic actions and accountability measures (ibid.). These organisations do so 
“…through conformance discursive means or adoption of new practices” (Bitektine, 
2011, p.151). It may be construed that this was a critical role for the PPPs as 
institutions of higher education in business.  
Legitimacy may be understood as “...a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system or norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). 
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Legitimacy theory begins with the assumption that no organization has the inherent 
right to exist and proposes that “…organizations exist in society under an expressed or 
implied social contract (Campbell, 2000, p.82). Business schools exist as new ventures 
which need resources from their environment and, with limited resources, actors are 
motivated to provide these resources if they hold the “…belief or feeling that the 
venture is indeed competent, efficient, effective, worthy, appropriate, and/or needed” 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p.416; authors' italics). In order to ensure their survival 
and growth, business schools must deliver desirable ends, distributing economic, social, 
or political benefits to business and society from which they derive their power 
(Shocker and Sethi, 1974; Oliver, 1991).  
Taylor and Wharburton (2003) argued that “…while many third sector organizations 
give high priority to political forms of legitimacy—in the sense of participatory 
structures and accountability to members and beneficiaries—government is generally 
more likely to give priority to technical forms of legitimacy, e.g., the quality of 
research and the ability to implement policy” (p.321). Where the PPPs derive funding 
from financial allocations to the university, accountability as technical legitimacy 
appears to be critical to their success. The overall accountability of educational 
organisations to all stakeholders, including government, is considered critical to this 
study of PPP success. 
Chaskin (2003) attempted to establish the relationship between the two concepts and 
concluded that legitimacy is “...the extent to which an organization justly and properly 
speaks for and acts on behalf of...its constituency” (p.178) whereas accountability is 
“...the extent to which organizations that speak or act on behalf of a community are 
fulfilling their stated goals and can be held responsible for their actions” (p.182). The 
continuing existence of the PPPs may be considered a demonstration of their legitimacy 
in the environment. Their accountability to stakeholders, however, would require a 
much more diverse set of appropriate measures.  
Accountability and legitimacy are considered to be culturally embedded concepts 
(Taylor and Warburton, 2003) and moral legitimacy is considered to be significant to 
sectors where accountability is based on values and organisations seek “...to account for 
decisions in terms of substantial ethics” (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p.513). While this 
may be a necessary condition for decision-making, in the face of scarce resources and 
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within a firm established to generate societal value, technical legitimacy may be a 
useful external measure of accountability. Within the firm, and especially for business 
schools, financial accountability may contribute to technical legitimacy.  
The discussion above supports the thesis that the main challenge for educational 
institutions is to maintain internal and external moral and technical legitimacy. Further, 
for business schools, this legitimacy must be attained in the “…eye of the beholder” 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) from those in academia concerned about achieving the 
broad purpose of education and the external stakeholder concerned about relevance to 
business.  
The literature on PPPs supports the use of legitimacy theory to explain partner 
involvement in the development and implementation of organisational strategy. This 
theoretical framework derives from the work of institutional theorists who argue that 
legitimacy building is a critical purpose that informs organisational strategies and 
structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Taylor and Warburton (2003) provide further 
support for this position in their study of the legitimacy of third-sector organisations in 
the policy process, and concluded that as nations moved from “government” to 
“governance”, with increasing emphasis on partnerships, the question of legitimacy and 
accountability becomes important.  
Partnerships between the university and the private sector attempt to achieve 
stakeholder impact based on technical legitimacy with respect to providing services to 
business to promote their development. This is consistent with the actions of third-
sector organisations, which generally base their acceptance in society on political and 
technical legitimacy (Taylor and Warburton, 2003; Brown, 2008). These organisations 
gain legitimacy through engagement in partnerships deemed critical to their cause and 
the management of these relationships for development outcomes (Covey and Brown, 
2001). Exploration of network structures or partnerships led Human and Provan (2000) 
to conclude that legitimacy is critical to the survival of such organisations and that 
consideration must be given to “…three conceptually distinct dimensions of legitimacy 
– the network as form, the network as entity and the network as interaction” (p.327). 
Indeed, it is understood that alliances provide critical resources such as legitimacy and 
market power, which contribute to the success of the firm (Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1999).  
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In a recent study, Bitektine (2011) explained the process by which evaluators arrive at a 
judgment with regard to the legitimacy of an organisation. The author claims that “…as 
social actors evaluating an organization perceive its features, structural attributes, and 
outcomes of its activity, they subject these perceived features to different forms of 
analytical processing…(which) yields different types of judgments” (p.156). The two 
types of judgements may be termed “cognitive legitimacy”, understood as the judgment 
of the organisation as belonging to certain known organisational forms (Bitektine, 
2011, p. 156), and “socio-political legitimacy” in which “…the observed features of an 
organization, its structural attributes, and outcomes of its activity are benchmarked 
against the prevailing social norms: the actor renders a judgment as to whether the 
organization, its form, its processes, its outcomes, or its other features are socially 
acceptable and, hence, should be encouraged…” (Bitektine, 2011, p.157). 
PPPs are formed by establishing relationships that include entities, firms and 
individuals and aim to adopt the legitimacy resources of their partners or ‘parents’. It 
may be construed that, in so doing, and as they evolve and establish their own bases of 
legitimacy, they influence and are influenced by their partners or ‘parents’ in different 
ways. At the early stages of evolution, threats may derive from concerns about the 
rationale for partner involvement. Private sector partners, driven by for-profit concerns, 
“…may be attracted to invest both financially and technically in a partnership if there is 
a significant potential for return on investment compared to other available investment 
opportunities” (LaFrance and Lehmann, 2005, p.219). The inclusion of public and 
private partners in cross-sectoral alliances shifts the conversation from profitability and 
return on investment into areas of legitimacy and sustainability, propelling stakeholder 
theories and the now ubiquitous corporate responsibility paradigm (LaFrance and 
Lehmann, 2005; Weisband, 2009) where corporate governance must address the issue 
of stakeholder impact and welfare. At later stages of their evolution, PPPs may threaten 
their parent organisation on the very bases from which parents derive their legitimacy. 
This study will explore the bases of legitimacy that underpin the evolution of PPPs.  
3.8.2 Governance and Accountability  
The governance mechanism is fundamental to accountability in the PPP as it is 
intended to aid in the achievement of purpose and contribute to the increasing 
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legitimacy of the PPP. Major theories of corporate governance include agency theory 
that advocates governance structures to safeguard owners from opportunistic behaviour 
by management and maximise the interests of shareholders in the ownership structure 
of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Berle and Means, 1932). Separation of the role 
of the chairman and chief executive office is a strategy that allows for control of 
management (Tricker, 1984). Donaldson and Davis (1991) explain that this is necessary 
whether opportunistic behaviour is driven by self-interest or Theory X behaviour 
(McGregor, 1960) or by the exercise of responsibility, driven by motivation to achieve 
(McClelland, 1961; Herzberg et al., 1959) respect and reputation. The role of the 
boards of directors is not well addressed in organisational and strategic management 
theories (Tricker, 2000) and this study of PPPs may contribute to this area. The 
‘separation and control’ issue is addressed differently in stewardship theory which 
combines ownership and organisational control and includes the role of the board in the 
strategy of the firm (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It is claimed 
that corporate governance can learn from public governance in areas such as division of 
power and institutionalised competition (Benz and Frey, 2007). The way in which the 
governance structure works in PPP arrangements is central to this study.  
3.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Using the theoretical framework described in this chapter, the researcher seeks to: 
1. Examine the factors that influence the PPP governance model in business 
schools in developing countries; 
2. Develop a dynamic model to guide actors in PPP governance arrangements in 
developing countries.  
3.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined the theoretical framework that guided the study of PPPs in 
business schools in developing countries. The study utilized the broad perspective of 
social networks, employing various theories, concepts and methods derived from this 
perspective. The argument proposed to justify the appropriateness of the relational 
approach to examining the PPP was derived from the recognition that: (a) actors are 
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embedded in their contexts, which creates expectations of actions, and (b) these 
expectations and actions are distorted by the configuration of actors in the PPP 
structure, in the context in which it exists. Explanations of PPP performance were 
deemed to derive from the tradition of “relational realism” as described by Mische 
(2011). Finally, corporate governance and legitimacy theories were used to develop a 
framework for assessing accountability of the PPPs. The theoretical framework 
provided theoretical propositions and concepts that could inform the analysis of 
findings. These are described in the conceptual framework presented in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
4.0 INTRODUCTION  
The review of the literature evaluated the status of the field with respect to partnerships 
in general and cross-sectoral partnerships in particular. The theoretical framework 
described the elements of the social network perspective, social network theory and the 
concept of embeddedness and argued that they provide an appropriate theoretical 
framework to guide the study of PPPs in the governance of business schools in small 
developing countries. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework that was used to 
develop the research questions and guide the selection and construction of the research 
instruments. In the description of the conceptual framework, the opportunities and gaps 
identified from the review of the literature and from the discussion of the theoretical 
framework provide justification for the design of the conceptual model.  
4.1 DESIGNING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The question of whether or not to use a conceptual framework was discussed 
extensively by Miles and Huberman (1984) with the conclusion that this tool is an 
effective guide to the successful execution of the research project. It is argued that all 
research uses a conceptual framework, whether explicitly or implicitly (Bickman and 
Rog, 2009) and that for qualitative research, where one is studying a fairly well 
understood phenomenon, “…a loose, highly inductive design is a waste of time” (Miles 
and Huberman, 1984, p.27). Moreover, in cases where qualitative research is 
“confirmatory” a pre-structured design is recommended, at least “…enough to reach the 
ground” (ibid., p.28).  
The conceptual framework may include concepts drawn from theory and from practice 
(Maxwell, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1984). The conceptual framework in this study 
focuses attention on the purpose, structure and strategy of the governance mechanism 
and the interrelationships between these concepts. 
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Figure 2: Factors Informing the Design of the Conceptual Framework 
 
Adapted from Maxwell (2009, p.218) 
The process of developing the conceptual framework commenced by examining the 
problem functionally rather than theoretically (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
Conceptualisation commenced with the instrumental proposition that the partnership 
must be designed to address some purpose and must be structured in relation to that 
purpose. Further, and logically, the activities of the partnership must serve the purpose 
for which it was established and structured. This provided the basis of the framework 
that the operation of the PPP is an outcome of the relationship between purpose, 
structure and strategy. Revealing and recognizing experiential knowledge, as in this 
case, is not “…a licence to impose (one’s) assumptions and values uncritically on the 
research” (Maxwell, 2009, p.225) but,through the process of “critical subjectivity” 
whereby experiences of the researcher are raised to consciousness, experiential 
knowledge may be includedas part of the research process (Reason, 1998, p.12, cited in 
Maxwell 2009, author’s italics).  
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4.2 WORKING WITH THE UNDERPINNING PHILOSOPHY: CRITICAL 
REALISM 
Making clear one’s philosophical position can be a tool that guides the development of 
the conceptual framework and the questions raised in the study (Maxwell, 2009; Miles 
and Huberman, 1984). Realism is the philosophical position that a mind-independent 
reality, which has its own inherent order, exists and can be studied (Fay, 1996). Further, 
from this philosophical position, one considers that “…while many things scientists are 
interested in, such as internal human processes, cannot be directly observed, one can 
usefully measure them and study them in the context of theoretical explanations” (Lee 
and Lings, 2008, p.30). The ontological position of the critical realist is such that 
“…we must assume the existence of an objective reality so that we can make claims 
about cause and effect relationships; even though these claims will be imperfect” (ibid., 
p.112; authors’ italics). The interest of the researcher in how the partnerships worked 
demanded an exploration of cause and effect in each case. The need to make causal 
statements from cases required a “…philosophical stance that transcended the 
limitations of positivists who contend that there are regularities or law-like 
generalisations in material or social settings that provide the basis for both explanation 
and prediction (and) interpretivists (who) deny the possibility of knowing what is real 
and reject the possibility of discerning causality” (ibid.). 
Critical realism, by its very definition, presupposes a “...mind-independence of the 
world” (Sayer, 2000, p.2) which makes it problematic. In acknowledging the 
“…entrapment of knowledge within discourse” and the possibility of only knowing the 
world through available discourses, studies from a critical realist stance are limited to 
the reality that is available to the researcher (ibid.). The ontology of critical realism is 
therefore challenged as we cannot know “… the essential features of reality beyond our 
knowledge” (Cruickshank, 2004, p.568). 
In a critique of critical realism, it is claimed that “…internal linkages between practice, 
theory and metatheory, evident in (Karl) Marx's writings, provide a richer 
understanding of society than do the structured, causal relationships offered by 
philosophy” (Gunn, 1989, p.87). The value of this critique to the researcher is an 
acknowledgement of the sociological agenda and the importance of obtaining a rich 
understanding of how the societies in the study influence the PPP outcomes. An 
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appropriate inclusion in the conceptual framework of the study is therefore a 
“sociological realism” which, coupled with the interest in social networks and the 
concept of embeddedness, gave rise to a sociological movement referred to as 
“relational realism” (Mische, 2011). This is defined by Tilly (2004) as “...the doctrine 
that transactions, interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff 
of social life” (p.72). The tradition of ‘relational realism’ has led to the proposition that 
“…cultural taste or values shape network structure, rather than the other way around” 
(Mische, 2011, p.11). 
Tilly (2004) suggested that “…events or outcomes are what critical realists investigate, 
that is the external and visible behaviours of people, systems and things as they occur, 
or as they have happened” (p.120). He further argued that “...change in one body results 
in change in another body with which it has necessary relations [and] we rely on these 
referential and interdependent relations to underpin our theoretical understandings”. 
Despite this reality, “…structures may be ‘invariant under certain transformations’, that 
is, they can continue to exist while their constituents undergo changes in attributes 
which are not relevant to their reproduction” (Sayer, 1992). This is crucial because it 
recognises that there must be invariance in the system so that “...building theory and 
progress then become possible” (Easton, 2010 p. 121).  
The research sought to uncover the invariance within structures and this led to 
questions regarding the structures, events and group motivation in Research Question 1. 
The researcher also sought to understand how the composition and structure of the 
governance arrangement within the board of directors supported the contribution of 
actor sub-groups. Research Question 2 confronted the tensions of agency and structure 
and acknowledged the importance of individual actor contribution but from a critical 
realist stance of agency within structure or “structuration” (Giddens, 1979) and the 
influence of networks of sub-groups. Actors were not analysed as autonomous actors 
and this is a limitation of this study. It contrasts with studies that focus on the stories of 
elite actors from an interpretivist stance that accessed “…the historical record and 
actor-centered sources of beliefs and actions” (Bevir et al., 2003, p.24).  
It must be noted that, despite the philosophical orientation, the sources of evidence are 
similar. Interpretation of the evidence, however, is limited to the purpose for which the 
philosophical stance was adopted and the way in which it guided the research 
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questions. The limitations of the study on the roles and structures of the board of 
directors, from the critical realist stance that probed the “necessary” and “contingent” 
relationships in the pursuit of plausible explanations (Sayer, 2000; Easton, 2010, p.121) 
are acknowledged Further, this study attempted to understand the contribution of actor 
sub-groups within the affiliation network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.40) of the 
board of directors and to assess overall supportiveness in the network as a factor that 
contributed to its sustainability. Actors were grouped into sub-groups based on their 
assigned attributes of ‘public’ and ‘private’, the major role classification on the board 
of directors. Actors’ motivations and contributions were assessed in relation to the roles 
they performed, rather than to the actors as individuals and this is another limitation of 
the philosophical stance of critical realism.  
This study of how partnerships worked required a philosophical stance that allowed the 
researcher to obtain an “objective truth” within the socio-technical system that 
propelled change and success through the years. Having crafted the partnership as an 
organisational phenomenon that is operationalized in roles and rules, the case study 
method was deemed to be effective for the study of PPPs as relationships in specific 
organisations: “…it is only from a critical realist perspective that a full appreciation of 
metaphor's indispensability for scientific theorizing can be had” (Lewis, 1996, p.505). 
In constructing the framework, social concepts such as ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ were 
included and expressed in terms of their contingent relationship with other concepts in 
the study. These concepts are explored in the case studies which are considered to be 
ideal for the generation of propositions from a critical realist stance as the analysis 
gradually transitions “…from actions through reasons to rules and thence to structures” 
(Sayer, 1992, p.112).  
4.3 DEVELOPING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
4.3.1 Overview 
According to Maxwell (2005, p.4) the conceptual framework should answer the 
question, “What do you think is going on with the issues, people, or settings you plan to 
study?” The model below illustrates the propositions derived from the literature on 
partnerships that affirmed the importance of the research focus on purpose, structure 
and strategy in the new governance arrangement and the links between those concepts.  
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 Figure 3: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Conceptual Framework and Research 
Questions 
 
Having defined and justified the research focus on purpose, structure and strategy, the 
broad research questions were defined. In order to answer the ‘how’ question, further 
elaboration of the framework, to enhance the elements that would facilitate explanation 
from a relational perspective, was necessary. This required clarifying and establishing 
possible relationships between the concepts and consideration of the context of the 
study. The conceptual framework demonstrating the relationship between the concepts 
and the influence of the context is illustrated in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Conceptual Framework for the Study of PPPs  
 
 
In its extended form, the conceptual framework is a model of the theoretical position of 
the researcher, though it is not theory (Sutton and Staw, 1995). The model, though it 
may be presented graphically, must also be explained to clearly demonstrate how 
concepts evolved and the relationships between concepts (ibid.). The conceptual 
framework was derived from the goal to understand what makes private sector-
university strategic alliances work. The study was approached from a relational 
perspective and sought to address the relationship between the core constructs of 
purpose, structure and strategy, and the influences of the broader institutional and 
geographic contexts, i.e., the university and the private sector in small developing 
countries, on the functioning of the partnership. The section that follows describes the 
theoretical propositions drawn from the research literature and, recognising the 
limitations of the literature and the contexts in which studies were conducted, extends 
those propositions to include consideration of the influence of context and the notions 
of the researcher drawn from experience and integrated into the research through the 
process of critical subjectivity (Maxwell, 2009). In this process, research questions that 
guided the collection of data were drawn from the conceptual framework.  
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4.3.2 Deriving the Research Questions 
The research questions were derived from theoretical propositions in the literature on 
social networks and legitimacy. Realities of the context also provided some direction in 
crafting the research questions and sub-questions.  
4.3.2.1 Research Question 1 
The research on PPPs suggests that characteristics of the inter-organisation linkages 
related to the motivation of partners and, in this case of PPPs, the sector influences on 
motivation, coupled with the attributes of the network in which the alliance is 
embedded, influence the structure of the alliance. These factors work to create a new 
organisational form that transcends the defining attributes of the partners themselves 
with respect to decision-making so that they are reflective of neither hierarchies nor 
markets but present a new meta-framework that is driven by purpose and the context in 
which they are located (Thorelli, 1986).  
The importance of sector impact on motivation, history and other attributes relevant to 
understanding the characteristics of PPPs in their context, is the focus of Research 
Question 1. Research Question 1 and the sub-questions served to distil the concepts and 
attributes considered in exploring the PPP relationship. Some of the concepts are not 
defined in relational terms but impact the relationship between actors. The question 
sought evidence relevant to purpose and structure.  
1. What are the defining attributes of PPPs established as business schools in 
small, developing countries of the Caribbean region?  
1a. What is the structure of the board of directors? 
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
The formal structure guides the decision-making process. Firm-specific capabilities 
influence the choice of governance structure (Leiblein, 2003). Structure would vary the 
decision-making process between the hierarchical, committee structure of universities 
and the autonomous ‘market’ structure of the private sector in a small democracy. 
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1b. What factors propelled the establishment of the School?  
 Theoretical and contextual rationale 
One’s understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences one’s 
contribution to their success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Austin, 2000). This 
question seeks to establish connection-based purpose (Austin, 2000). The schools were 
set up at a time of economic downturn and IMF-led structural adjustment. They were 
established as affiliates of the university, with much greater autonomy with respect to 
decision-making.  
1c. Why were both private sector directors and university directors included in the 
governance structure?  
Theoretical and contextual rationale  
PPPs are established to obtain benefits, support and expertise, wherever they reside in a 
‘happy marriage’ (Datta, 2009). The purpose of including actors from each sector in the 
governance of the PPP is therefore related to expectations of their contribution. This 
question addresses the respondents’ views on the link between relevance and resource 
contribution in governance.  
1d. What motivates directors to contribute to the governance of the schools? 
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
Motivation for partnering influences the model of collaboration and network outcomes 
(Berliner, 1997). Motivation to participate may be linked to institutional or 
organisational concerns and is related to the meaning to the social network (Fuhse, 
2009). Understanding how contribution in the social network is related to the presence 
of ‘the other’ sub-group is informed by social network analysis. ‘Social homogeneity’ 
or ‘social capital’ are outcomes of ties and flows in the social network (Borgatti and 
Halgin, 2011). In network flow theory, ties are viewed as channels for transfer or flow 
of resources (either material or non-material) whereas the network architecture, which 
considers network ties, can result in ‘co-ordination’ or ‘adaptation’. The research seeks 
to determine what network effects were occurring between and within actor sub-groups 
within the social system, thereby influencing network performance (Borgatti and 
Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). 
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Question1: Open codes 
Governance form, private purpose, public purpose, academic disconnect, environmental 
challenges, curriculum relevance, business in environment, role of the board, role of the 
private sector, role of the public sector, legitimacy, motivation of the public sector, 
motivation of the private sector, motivation for a PPP, historical network. 
4.3.2.2 Research Question 2  
The link between structure and purpose is viewed as a duality; purpose influences 
structure and is influenced by the process of structuration or human action within 
structure (Giddens, 1984). In an attempt to deconstruct the “riddle” of structure and 
agency, Archer (1998, p.191) suggests that “…its solution ultimately precludes 
scientism” and offers the option to researchers to seek answers in relational elements 
that are not defined as real in the positivistic worldview (Lee and Lings, 2008). Realists 
view structure and agency as ontologically separate and use this as the basis for 
examining the interface between structure and agency so as to “…analyse the processes 
by which structure and agency shape and reshape one another over time and to explain 
variable outcomes at different times” (Archer, 1998, p.203). The examination of the 
relationship between structure and agency is considered from the perspective of groups 
of actors – public and private - and does not include a theory of the individual actor. 
The perspective of “relational realism” allows the researcher to explore the relationship 
by examining the way in which the embeddedness of actors in the context influences 
the network.  
The variables to be explored in answering Research Question 2 include relational 
variables such as trust, friendship, professional support and respect measured on pairs 
of actors mapped in the affiliation network of their contribution and ties to the strategy 
of the school. Other variables related to network composition or actor attributes related 
to the public and private actors in the network will also be explored in the study 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
2. How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement 
support the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?  
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2a. What are the key strategies that have positively impacted the school?  
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
Precedents yield expectations which guide the actions of rational human beings 
(Young, 2001). Economic actions are influenced by the previous actions of partners in 
the PPP. The strategy in itself would impact the relationship with the university and 
with the private sector. 
2b. What is the topology of the network of key organisational actors (executive 
directors and chairmen) within the board of directors?  
 Theoretical and contextual rationale 
Network flows and network architecture provide data to determine network resources 
and effects (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The social position of actors in small 
countries would greatly impact the partnership and the strategy of the schools would be 
guided by the professional network of key organisational actors. For this network of 
actors as individuals, the analysis does not seek to determine influence of actors as 
elites but to determine the presence of network effects such as ‘contagion’ (Borgatti 
and Halgin, 2011). 
2c. What is the topology of the network at the establishment of the schools?  
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
It is claimed that “…stable economic institutions begin as accretions of activity patterns 
around personal networks. Their structure reflects that of the networks, and even when 
those are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of their own that limits the 
forms future ones can take; they become ‘locked in’” (Granovetter, 1992, p.9). This 
question contributes to an understanding of how the partnership evolved and 
contributed to the success of the business schools.  
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2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making 
process? 
Theoretical and contextual rationale  
Granovetter (1992) suggests that “…the level of network fragmentation and cohesion, 
or coupling and decoupling, is a major determinant of outcomes” (p.10). This question 
will provide insight into the dimensions of the relationship between public and private 
actor sub-groups and contribute to an assessment of the general atmosphere of the 
network. Relational outcomes such as liking, friendship, admiration, career support, 
personal support, energy and trust are expected to be unearthed as dimensions of 
supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004).  This is to determine the extent 
to which actor sub-groups were able to cross the divide and provide support for 
decision-making.  
Question 2: Open codes 
Key decisions, trust, friend, collegiality, competition in the partnership, challenges to 
relationship building, challenges to building technical legitimacy (internal), challenges 
of managing opposing roles. 
4.3.2.3 Research Question 3  
The embeddedness of firms can be more broadly defined than their social relationships 
or structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements and 
this presents opportunities and constraints to actors (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The 
network environment at the level of the firm also provides constraints and opportunities 
that derive from the “network flow” and the “network architecture” (Borgatti and 
Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The effects of the network and the dimensions of embeddedness 
of actor groups in the internal and external environment will influence the relationship 
between partners and influence network success; this is the focus of Research Question 
3.  
3. What opportunities and constraints are presented by the embeddedness of 
the PPP social network?  
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3a. How does the role undertaken within the governance structure fit with the primary 
roles of actors in the public and private sectors?  
Theoretical and contextual rationale:  
A strong tie is created by the inclusion of people on the board of another firm where 
there is a functional relationship (Granovetter, 1983). This question seeks to explore the 
connection between roles on the boards of directors and other roles in the daily, wider 
institutional context in which directors work. Embeddedness in the institutional context 
influences the PPP at the organisational level. 
3b. To what extent does the environmental context of the school provide opportunities 
and constraints to organisational decision-making? 
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
Embeddedness in the context influences decision-making (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). 
The embeddedness of firms can be more broadly defined than their social relationships 
or structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements and 
this presents opportunities to, and constraints on, actors (ibid.). Networks also 
demonstrate cultural and cognitive embeddedness (Swedberg, 1997). The extent to 
which actors and roles are embedded in the context has implications for the PPP 
relationship. 
Question 3: Open codes 
Transfer of learning to public sector, transfer of learning to private sector, institutional 
factors, economic environment, opportunities, constraints, cultural embeddedness, 
cognitive embeddedness. 
4.3.2.4 Research Question 4 
Networks produce a new organisational form which faces legitimacy challenges that 
must be addressed to ensure their survival and growth (Human and Provan, 2000). The 
research seeks to determine how such legitimacy challenges influence decision-making 
in developing countries as it directly relates to business-university relationships. In 
exploring answers to Research Question 4, legitimacy gaps and concerns will be 
identified from the perception of key decision-makers and legitimacy theory will be 
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used to explain how the strategic posture (Magness, 2006) of the business schools serve 
to address those gaps and concerns. The findings with respect to Research Questions 1, 
2, and 3 will inform Research Question 4 and further explain how the alliance strategy 
effectively transcends legitimacy challenges presented within the strategic network to 
create value for the schools. 
4. How does the PPP strategy engaged by business schools in the English 
speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?  
4a. What were the main concerns of the schools at various points in time?  
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
The strategies of the organization include actions designed to build internal and 
external legitimacy at various times in the life cycle of the entity. The bases upon which 
legitimacy may be acquired include legal, moral, political, and technical or 
performance-related (Brown, 2001). For new organizations, it is expected that the bases 
of legitimacy would evolve over time and in relation to the evolution of the wider 
university. The task of the governance body would be to build legitimacy, facilitating 
the success of the school as a new entity.  
4b. What strategies were adopted to build the legitimacy of the school? 
Theoretical and contextual rationale 
The organization uses internal or external strategies to build legitimacy and ensure its 
survival (Human and Provan, 2000). The schools have developed in different ways, 
each choosing strategies that suit their internal and external contexts, but which afford 
them legitimacy in the context in which they operate. For these new schools, 
performance-related socio-technical legitimacy would be acquired through the 
provision of a more relevant set of curriculum-related and other experiences that are 
judged positively by stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011). This has implications for the role 
of the university and the relationship with the business schools. 
Question 4: Open codes 
Concerns, legitimacy of the university, legitimacy of the private sector. 
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4.4 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The conceptual framework described was used to develop the research questions and 
sub-questions and inform the construction of instruments used for data collection. The 
evaluation of the conceptual framework was an ongoing process in the methodology of 
the research. Following data collection and analysis, and based on the findings, new 
concepts and new questions were included to examine the relationship between 
purpose, structure and strategy. The revision of the conceptual framework is addressed 
in Chapter 10.  
4.5 CONCLUSION  
The chapter provided a description and explanation of the conceptual framework which 
was developed to guide the research that sought to address the question of how the PPP 
governance structure in business schools in small developing countries influences the 
performance of the schools. The justification for the use of a conceptual framework in 
this study included the broad literature on partnerships in various contexts that yielded 
concepts and propositions that could guide the development of questions and the 
analysis of the data. The use of “relational realism” confined the analysis process to 
examining the relationships that influence the performance of the partnership.  
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study was undertaken to provide an explanation of how PPPs in the governance of 
business schools work to influence the strategic actions of the schools in small, 
developing countries in the Caribbean. This chapter presents an explanation of, and 
provides a rationale for, the methodology used to conduct the research. The purpose of 
methodology is to “…describe and to examine the logic of composition of research 
methods and techniques, to reveal their powers and limitations, to generalize successes 
and failures, to find domains of appropriate application, and to predict possible 
contributions to knowledge” (Krippendoff, 1985, pp.10-11). This chapter explains how 
the components of the methodology work together to achieve this purpose and promote 
confidence in the research.  
The research adopted a multiple case study design and the chapter explores the 
principles involved in case study research and the applicability of this design to the 
study of cross-sectoral partnerships in the particular context. The rationale for the 
selection of cases is also explained. Case study research allows for the use of multiple 
sources of data, and multiple data collection techniques, allowing for data triangulation 
as the researcher corroborates the evidence obtained (Yin, 2009a). The data collection 
sources, techniques and logic for their use are presented in this chapter.  
In an attempt to explore the differences in findings across cases and to test and extend 
the theoretical propositions, cross-case comparisons were developed from the data 
gathered at each site. The cross-case comparison focused on the differences in findings 
across the cases, with respect to the emerging themes, providing explanations for these 
based on relationships between concepts. In this chapter, ethical issues relevant to case 
study research are identified and mechanisms to ensure ethical conduct in the research 
process are discussed. This is especially significant as the researcher was a participant 
in the context and employed at one of the research sites. Finally, the chapter identifies 
assumptions and limitations of the research methodology with respect to its 
appropriateness and sufficiency to answer the research question.  
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5.1 Research Design and Rationale for the Design: Case Study 
Case study methodology has been extensively used for research into PPPs (Jones and 
Bird, 2000; George, et al., 2002; Davies and Hentschke, 2006). In most cases, models 
of PPPs possess high political currency and studies have been evaluative, attempting to 
rationalise their value in the context in which they exist. Given the level of immaturity 
of academic and explanatory research applied to investigations of PPPs, the field is 
open for studies that may engage different theoretical frameworks, disciplines and 
research paradigms that will add to knowledge of the social dynamics of partnerships 
and guide practitioners engaged in these social constructions for particular purposes 
and in particular contexts.  
Case study design was considered to be optimal for the purpose of the research which is 
to explain how PPPs work. Yin (2009) makes the point that “how” and “why” 
questions are more explanatory and make a compelling case for the use of case studies, 
histories or experiments. In this study of cross-sectoral partnerships, the case study 
design allowed the researcher to investigate existing and historical elements of the 
partnership as an event over which the researcher had little or no control (Yin, 2009a). 
It must be noted though that many researchers maintain that case studies are only 
appropriate for exploratory research whereas surveys and histories are appropriate for 
descriptions and experiments are the hallmark of causal research. This is debunked by 
Yin (2009b) who described compelling examples of explanatory and descriptive case 
studies. The iterative method (Merriam, 1998) by which variables are examined 
contributes to the development of more convincing arguments. 
The three cases of PPPs in business education in small developing countries presented a 
unique situational context to explore the phenomenon of partnerships. The partnerships 
were established at approximately the same time, for the same overarching purpose, by 
the same university in three different territories. Case studies are appropriate to the 
examination of context that surrounds a particular phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009a) and the three cases contributed to the robustness of the findings in the context. 
The conceptual framework included variables that emerged from the literature and 
provided a “…map of theories and issues regarding the research topic” which guided 
the investigation to understand how PPPs work (Leshem and Trafford, 2007, p.99). The 
conceptual framework allowed for consideration of contextual variables, dealing with 
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events and the processes that connect them, so as to ascertain causal linkages in the 
complex social phenomenon of cross-sectoral partnerships (Maxwell, 2004). The cross-
case comparison allowed for the advancement of explanations where contradictory or 
disconfirming evidence was found (ibid.). 
The final compelling reason for the use of case studies for this research, linked to their 
relevance for contextual explorations, is the possible contribution value with respect to 
the theories that underpin the research. The theoretical framework included grand 
theories of the embeddedness of economic action in social relations (Granovetter, 1985) 
and the network perspective for understanding those relations (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). It also included a range of theoretical propositions derived from the study of 
particular instances of cross-sectoral and strategic alliances. The case study design, 
with its focus on context, provided an opportunity to extend or debunk the applicability 
of middle-range or situation-specific theories (Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). 
This yielded significant contextual knowledge which, it is argued in Chapter 11, would 
be useful for the advancement of practice in the field. 
It was noted previously that the state of empirical research into PPPs does not provide 
adequate models for understanding how they work. This researcher adopted a critical 
realist philosophy and a reflective and pragmatic stance, seeking to determine the best 
use of research for the purpose of effecting action and change, while, at the same time, 
engaging in the changes. This is described by Moldoveanu and Martin (2008) as the 
development of an ontology that can “...guide and shape managerial action” (p.95), as 
opposed to the engagement of an ontic dimension which merely facilitates cognitive 
understanding and categorization.  
5.2 MULTIPLE CASE RESEARCH DESIGN  
The PPP social phenomenon in business schools is unique in the Caribbean region. As 
such, it appears to lend itself to a single case study (Yin, 2009a). Yet, the phenomenon 
is replicated in three countries and the inclusion of cases in these sub-contexts adds 
significant value to the research. Multiple case studies are considered a “replication” 
rather than a “sampling” design and they provide the opportunity for either “literal 
replication” of similar results or “theoretical replication” of results that contrast for 
anticipatable reasons (Yin, 2009a, p.54). The three case studies, by the very nature of 
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their points of convergence and divergence, provide a rich context and opportunity to 
generate interesting results that would enhance the conceptual framework for further 
research and development of guidelines to practice in the field of PPPs. The multiple 
case study design used for this research is presented in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Case Study Design 
 
Adapted from Yin (2009, p.57) (Original Source – Cosmos Corporation) 
5.3 DEFINING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Yin (2009) advised that there are five components of the case study research design 
including questions, propositions and unit of analysis. Tellis (1997) advises that the 
case study methodology selects a unit of analysis as a system of action rather than a 
person or persons. In the case of the PPPs in the study, the network is defined as the 
relations between public and private sector directors as actor sub-groups and their 
relationship to constructs (events) in an “affiliation” network model (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994). In affiliation networks, the unit of observation is the event and in this 
case, the strategic decisions taken by the boards of directors comprise the events (ibid.). 
This is represented as follows:  
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Figure 6: Unit of Analysis 
Source: Extrapolated from Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
The research is explanatory and can be categorized as instrumental as it seeks to 
understand more than what is obvious to the observer (Stake, 1995). The analysis is 
therefore extended to include the dynamics of the social system in its socio-cultural, 
historical and political context.  
5.4 THE USE OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The study of PPPs in the particular context of business schools in small developing 
countries uncovers a number of theoretical, empirical and contextual complexities that 
warrant the selection of an appropriate approach to the study that would capture these 
complexities. It is useful to understand how the theoretical framework is related to, and 
guides the development of, an appropriate conceptual model to guide the study.  
The theoretical framework presents a critical analysis of the theories and explanations 
that underpin the study of the phenomenon. It provides concrete concepts and ideas and 
a detailed explanation of how they work together to explain a phenomenon of interest 
(Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). In this study, the grand theories of embeddedness 
of economic actions in social constructions (Granovetter, 1985) provided the 
explanatory framework for the study. Theories of strategic alliances and networks 
yielded key concepts and propositions which helped to explain the findings.  
The conceptual framework was developed from the analysis of grand and middle level 
theories. The conceptual framework is more “…abstract and refers to global ideas 
about groups, situations and events of interest to a science” (Fawcett, 2004, p.88). The 
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conceptual model provides “…discipline-specific assumptions that tie together abstract 
concepts of interest and that represent the first step in developing theoretical 
formulations needed for scientific activities” (ibid.). Concepts and issues related to the 
partnerships, the organisational context of business education and the broad 
environmental context of the partnership were included in the conceptual framework 
that guided the development of the research instruments.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) advocate the use of a conceptual framework as “… the 
best defence against overload” (p.55) which allows the researcher the opportunity to 
utilize the variables deemed to be important to the study. While the conceptual 
framework guided the study, it did not limit the researcher’s attention only to the data 
related to the concepts in the framework. Indeed, the framework itself was reviewed 
and refined on the basis of the data gathered in a process of meta-cognition as
suggested by Leshem and Trafford (2007).  
Figure 7: Research Design
Source: Extrapolated from Yin, 2009a 
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5.5 SELECTION OF CASES 
Three business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean that are governed and 
managed as PPPs comprised the target population of cases for this research. The sample 
selected included the business school where the researcher was employed and two other 
business schools established under the same university in other Caribbean territories. 
The unit of analysis was the relationship between public and private sector directors 
and the relationship of each group to the key events at the country, firm and dyadic 
levels. Public sector directors included university personnel who were current or past 
members of the boards of directors and contributed to their governance. This group also 
included university employees who were instrumental in the operations of the schools. 
Private sector directors were defined as members of industry and external organisations 
who were represented on the boards of directors and who, in one case, was instrumental 
in the establishment of one of the schools. Both private and public sector actors 
contributed to the establishment and/or governance of the schools for varying periods 
in their history.  
The cases were selected based on their areas of similarity and difference. They were all 
PPPs in business education in small developing countries in the same geographic 
region. They were established around the same time in which the region was 
experiencing economic challenges. In addition, they were all affiliates of the same 
university. The three cases provided an opportunity for exploring variation or 
homogeneity with respect to behaviours, beliefs and actions (Borgatti, 2003). The study 
focused on variation among the selected cases, emphasizing opportunities and 
developing causal arguments that focused on structural or topological concepts 
(Borgatti, 2003). A summary of some of the key areas of homogeneity and difference 
with respect to the cases in the study is presented in Appendix 5.  
Green University presented an opportunity for the examination of partnerships between 
the public and private sectors in the governance of business schools. Although the 
business schools were all established under the same university in the overall context of 
small developing countries, there were several areas of difference with respect to the 
establishment, governance arrangements, organizational and strategic position that 
impacted on the relationship between the public and private sector directors of the 
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schools. These were actively considered in the analysis of data in the process of 
developing causal explanations.  
5.6 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES  
The participatory or critical paradigm (Creswell, 2003) that underpins this research 
motivated the selection of methodological tools and data analysis methods that would 
yield both objective understandings and rich, discursive data characteristic of 
qualitative research (Robson, 2002) with a view to providing contextual and 
meaningful explanations. While the case study format is the same as many of those 
cited in the literature on PPPs, essential differences are inherent in the philosophy and 
paradigm, theoretical framework, approach to analysis of the data, reporting of 
outcomes and utility of the findings.  
5.6.1 Mixed-Method Design: The “Third Methodological Movement”  
The study falls into the mixed-methodological paradigm by virtue of the inclusion of 
tools that approach the analysis of data from both a positivistic and an interpretative 
philosophical position in order to give further credibility to the findings and 
conclusions. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p.5) explain the evolution of the mixed-
method paradigm and refer to this movement as the “third methodological movement”. 
The “third methodological movement” emerged, not in response to the paradigm wars, 
but as a result of a concern for problem solving (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed 
methods designs “...incorporate techniques from both the qualitative and quantitative 
research traditions yet combine them in unique ways in order to answer research 
questions that could not be answered in any other way” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003, 
p.10). In this study, the traditional tools of qualitative research - interviews, participant 
observation and document analysis - were used. In addition, the study incorporated the 
tools of social network analysis which was developed out of a “...propitious meeting of 
social theory and application, with formal mathematical, statistical and computing 
methodology” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.10). In this case, the quantification of 
ties in the networks locates the design between the positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms and acknowledges the researcher as a realist, using a mix of methods to find 
explanations of social phenomena.  
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In this study, mixing the methods serves a developmental purpose as “…the results 
generated by one method shape subsequent instrumentation, sampling or analysis 
strategies of the other method” (Rossman and Wilson, 1994, p.322). The purpose of 
mixing designs in this case may be conceptualised as “waves” in the methodology 
where one method shapes the next and where the second method cannot proceed 
without the first (ibid.). Social network concepts and analysis techniques were used to 
develop the “ego” nodes of the key strategic actions of the schools from the perspective 
of key organisational actors. Subsequently, qualitative data was mapped onto the 
networks to determine network attributes which served the purpose of explaining how 
the relationship between public and private actors worked to influence strategy and 
performance (Borgatti, 2003). This mixing of methods is also referred to by Creswell 
(2009) as the “concurrent embedded model” whereby the researcher uses the mixed 
methods approach in a single phase of data collection in order to obtain data that would 
“…assess different questions or different levels in an organization” (p.214). 
In this study, multiple perspectives (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) were generated by use of 
multiple data collection methods and multiple accounts at the same site. The use of 
three research sites rooted in different contexts added rigour to the findings. This is 
consistent with the suggestion that, in doing case study research, evidence of various 
kinds should be collected from multiple sources on “...what people say, what you see 
them doing, what they make or produce, what documents and records show” (Gillham, 
2000a, p.20; author's italics). In this study, evidence was collected from interviews and 
documents, and in notes recorded in the process of participant observation.  
5.6.2 Research Technique 1: Semi-Structured Interviews 
This was the primary method of data collection in this study. The study used semi-
structured interviews to obtain the perspectives of interviewees (Gillham, 2000b; 
Patton, 2002). Open-ended interview questions were designed to lead the discussion 
based on Research Questions 1, 2 and 3, seeking to understand the characteristics of the 
partnerships, the challenges presented in governance and decision-making, and the 
strategies and critical social networks of the business schools.  
The agenda of explanation in this study prompted the use of “laddering” techniques to 
cause the respondent to think critically about his/her actions and thoughts as they 
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related to motivation, addressing the question, “Why is that important to you?” 
(Reynolds and Gutman, 2001, p.26). The laddering strategy also provided evidence and 
prompts to the causal analysis within the framework of the linkages between purpose, 
structure and strategy (ibid.). The study utilized the network sampling idea of 
“snowballing” originally proposed by Goodman (1961) and deemed particularly useful 
in producing data on “ego-centred networks” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.35). In 
this respondent-driven sampling technique, interviews commenced with the executive 
directors and chairmen and the nominated persons from amongst the public and private 
sector directors. This was done to ensure that important actors were not omitted in the 
research process.  
The interview as a research technique is an important source of data in case study 
research. This study was located in the professional workplace and explored a topic that 
inherently includes discussion of disputes, successes, events and perceptions about the 
quality and value of a professional relationship among actors. In this context, 
interviewing was the best technique to “…see life in the round, from all angles, 
including multiple sides of a dispute and different versions of the same incident (Rubin 
and Rubin, 2005, p.4). Other research tools such as surveying, statistical techniques, 
and experimenting were considered and found to be inappropriate for several reasons. 
The research sought to explain how the relationship worked and to develop a dynamic 
model that could be used to explain PPP performance. More importance was therefore 
placed on the interaction rather than the distillation of concepts and the generality of 
theoretical implications based on responses from a variety of actors (Gefen and 
Ridings, 2002). As such, the survey method was found to be inadequate. Statistical 
techniques, though quite compelling in social network analysis, were also not useful for 
the research. There was no existing data source that could be trusted for accuracy and 
completeness, and the limitations of the research with respect to time and purpose did 
not facilitate the generation of a database.  
The semi-structured interview format was found to be best suited to the purpose of the 
study. In this study of PPPs where the problem was evident but the precise details of 
what to examine and how to examine it were not well defined, the semi-structured 
format of the interview was particularly useful (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). This 
format allowed for the research to explore concepts and issues as they arose while 
maintaining similarity between the interviews so that comparisons could be made 
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(Kvale, 1996). This required the researcher to understand the background of 
respondents and master the technical language of the research problem to engage in the 
conversational interview (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).  
5.6.3 Research Technique 2: Archival Records  
Archival records available to the researcher included both publicly available documents 
and organisational documents; both official and informal (Pershing, 2002). Publicly 
available documents included formal studies of phenomena at the research sites, books 
and publications produced by the University and its business schools, web pages, 
global reports, and mass media publications. Organisational documents included 
speeches, email correspondence, internal reports and legal agreements which were 
useful sources of evidence related to the research question. Document analysis in social 
research is a well-established practice and methods of analyzing texts are fairly well 
defined in this field (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009a; Fairclough, 2003). Archival records 
were included in the research as they served to facilitate across-method triangulation 
and validate claims of respondents in the interview process. The limitations of using 
archival records included access to documents (Lee and Lings, 2008) and in this study 
access to minutes of meetings and other documents was restricted, except at the site 
where the researcher was employed. This resulted in dependence on the interviews 
which gave respondents the freedom to decide what information should be conveyed to 
the researcher. The study therefore placed more emphasis on the interviews but 
documents were used to corroborate the evidence and provide a chronologically 
accurate account of events.  
Documents are useful, even though they may be biased (Yin, 2009a). Researchers have 
noted that “…you can’t trust the accuracy of records – official or unofficial, primary or 
secondary” (Babbie, 2007, p.342). When using documents, researchers must be 
cautious about their validity and the extent to which they have been edited before being 
stored in archives or published (Yin, 2009a; Babbie, 2007). Research that depends on 
historical data, as does this study, benefits from data gathering processes that serve 
“…to bring historicity and temporality into the method itself” (Somers, 1996, p.79; 
Aminzade, 1992). Documents were used to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources and also to confirm the dates, accuracy of information on contracts and 
the purpose and activities of the organisations (Yin, 2009a). Moreover, they were 
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analysed to obtain historical perspectives about how the partnerships worked. The 
devices used included “...tracking, content analysis and case study aggregation 
analysis” (Pershing, 2002, p.37).  
5.6.4 Research Technique 3: Participant Observation 
This research project included the researcher as a naturalistic researcher; not a detached 
‘scientist’ but a participant observer, who acknowledges and looks out for his/her role 
in what they discover (Gillham, 2000a). Participant observation involves watching 
participants’ everyday actions and listening to how they describe and interpret their 
own and others’ actions. The methodology seeks to describe and gain insights from the 
everyday lives of participants (Jorgensen, 1989). Participant observation aims to 
provide practical and theoretical truths about human existence by provoking concepts 
and generalisations formulated as interpretative theories that may guide critical 
examination of other propositions and th eories used in the research process (Jorgensen, 
1989).  
 A research investigation is not neutral; it has its own dynamic and there will be effects 
(on individuals, on institutions) precisely because there is someone there asking 
questions, clarifying procedures, collecting data and recognising that this is a part of 
doing good research (ibid.). Participant observation is a critical component of the 
research design, intended to acknowledge overtly the role of the researcher as a 
participant in the organisation and therefore, subject to researcher bias. Field notes were 
used to record observations that included “…an account of events, how people behaved 
and reacted, what was said in conversation, where people were positioned in 
relationship to one another, their comings and goings, physical gestures, [the 
researcher’s] subjective responses to what [was] observed, and all other details and 
observations necessary to make the story of the participant observation experience 
complete” (Mack et al., 2005, p.21). It was important to note the value of both “emic” 
and “etic” perspectives. The researcher, in an attempt to obtain the emic or “native’s 
perspective of reality” recorded events as they occurred from the perspective of the 
subject. The etic perspective or “external, social scientific perspective on reality” was 
obtained by subjecting the emic data to scientific analysis (Fetterman, 2009, pp.547-
548).  
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The procedures used in this method included preparations to collect information such as 
determining beforehand what were some of the critical observations related to the visit, 
using keywords during interviews and scheduling time to expand notes at the end of the 
main sessions using the format for the study (Mack et al., 2005). Human and Provan 
(2000), in their study of legitimacy in networks, noted the importance of participant 
observation but were unable to obtain permission to act as participant observers. In this 
study of networks, the researcher, as an employee at one of the sites, had access to 
events, actions and processes that provided appropriate contexts in which to observe the 
dynamics of the partnerships.  
Yet, having access to the research site is a necessary but insufficient reason for using 
the powerful scientific research method of participant observation. In fact, the method 
is best used where the phenomenon is large enough to be studied as a case and the 
research problem can be addressed by data gathered in the field (Jorgensen, 1989). 
Moreover, the method is most appropriate where “...the research problem is concerned 
with human meanings and interactions viewed from the insiders’ perspective 
(Jorgensen, 1989, p.13). It is evident, from the explanations included in this chapter, 
that the study of public-private partnerships in the governance of business schools in 
the Caribbean meets the criteria, outlined above, of case research methodology and an 
engaged research practitioner with access and an insider perspective.  
The researcher and the research design were prepared to optimize participant 
observation. The conceptual framework modelled the research problem at multiple 
levels: pairs of actors, within the organisation and across organisations and also 
included variables in the wider environment. This required the revisiting of data in an 
iterative process that can span the levels of analysis and use observation to reflect and 
make judgments and linkages that are often unapparent at first glance. The conceptual 
framework guided this process and worked to substantiate and inform its revisions in 
the face of continued challenges to its validity. Field notes of observations, notions and 
possible explanations were captured at the research sites, following the interviews and 
particular events. They were then coded to explanations that evolved from the other 
data where relevant. Where the researcher’s observations did not match other data, they 
were included in possible rival explanations of the observed phenomenon.  
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Participant observation is perhaps the most contested research technique and the most 
artful in the study of human subjects, requiring the researcher to “…cultivate 
appropriate interpersonal skills as well as related abilities to think and act with 
sensitivity and creative judgment in the field” (Jorgensen, 1989, p.9). Gaining rapport, 
building trust and using memory are integral to the success of this research tool 
(Bernard, 2000). The researcher, as a professional who interacted with participants at 
all the sites, had developed interpersonal relationships with the key respondents who 
could facilitate access. From the commencement of the study, she indicated that she 
would be requesting their assistance and obtained support for the research. Participant 
observation was included in the confidentiality agreement. Building rapport and trust in 
this way did not require the researcher to maintain naivety or adopt manipulative tactics 
to establish rapport (Bernard, 2000). Other technical skills, including objectivity and 
value neutrality, were actively considered by the researcher in the process of recording 
field notes (Bernard, 2000).  
5.6.5 Research Technique 4: Social Network Methods and Tools 
Studies of collaboration and partnerships, including strategic alliances, have relied 
heavily on social network methods and analyses (e.g. Gulati et al., 2000; Larson, 1992) 
and Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) provide an overview and typology of the 
studies of various forms of partnerships that have utilized network theorizing and 
methods. Social network theory and the concept of embeddedness that were included in 
the theoretical framework for this study have utilized network concepts in their 
description and include relational concepts as the basis of their explanatory power 
(Swedberg, 1997). Social network analysis can be used to “…study structural variables 
measured on actors in the set (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.9). The relational 
structure is considered to be equivalent to the pattern of relationships among actors 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The purpose of the analysis was to understand the 
patterns in the system and then, the attributes of actors in terms of their location in the 
system. Network methods were also used to study the process of change over time as 
structures, their impact and their evolution are the primary focus of the theory and 
methodology (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
In this study, four social networks are presented and analysed to provide explanations 
that are plausible and relevant to the study of cross-sectoral partnerships in governance 
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mechanisms. Firstly, the social structure of the founding members of the PPP provides 
information about the cohesion and connectedness of the actors in the founding 
network and the “shape” of the ties with respect to the inclusion of private and public 
actors (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.894). In this network relational ties are dichotomous and 
only ties that are present are included. They are also directional with respect to the 
influence of actors in the organisation in that actors contributed to the establishment of 
the organisation (ibid.). The network is shaped by the number of actors in public and 
private sub-groups. The second network deemed to be important in this study, in which 
the setting includes small numbers of actors and the presence of defined sub-groups, is 
the influence network of key organisational actors. In this network, key organisational 
actors as ‘egos’ were asked to name the persons (alters) who provided professional 
support and influenced the attainment of organisational goals. Based on the number of 
ties to actors within sub-groups, the researcher could infer the degree of influence of 
sub-groups and the impact on the relationship between sub-groups in the overall 
network architecture.  
The third network is derived from an application of the construct of “cognitive social 
structure” defined by Krackhardt (1987) as “…a set of relational statements between all 
pairs of actors in the system…” that includes a “sender,” a “receiver” and a third 
person, the “perceiver” who is the actor who perceives the relationship (Krackhardt, 
1987, p.113; author's quotation marks). This network is an affiliation network in which 
respondents as “perceivers” identify, by ranking from most significant to least 
significant, the four actors (senders) whom they perceive as contributing to the strategy 
of the school. In this network, there is no implication that the reported perceptions of 
actors are correlated with “objective” relationships that may exist (Krackhardt, 1987, 
p.113; author's quotation marks). Explanations and predictions can be derived from the 
shape of the network based on the density of private and public sub-groups determined 
from the average perceptions of sub-group contribution.  
In the final social network defined in the study, the strategies defined by key 
organisational actors are analysed and classified into two groups - ‘cognitive’ and 
‘socio-political’ - based on the researcher’s assessment of the way in which 
stakeholders would perceive and judge such actions as legitimate. Data from 
respondents, both public and private, on the contribution of each sub-group to the 
strategy of the organisation, are mapped as a dichotomous relation to either one or the 
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other category and the strength of ties to the category is determined by the number of 
ties to each category. The inclusion of data from both public and private actors on the 
contribution of public and private sub-groups is consistent with the methodological 
solution of Krackhardt (1987) to the problem of informant accuracy encountered in 
social network theorising in that “…what people say…bears no useful resemblance to 
their behaviour (Bernard et al., 1982, p.63). The use of data from the perceiver from the 
opposite sub-group, for example, private actors’ perceptions of the actions of public 
actors, provide some veracity to the data (Krackhardt, 1987). This network emphasises 
the actions of actor sub-groups and extends the discussion on cognitive social structure 
described in the aforementioned network.  
5.7 DATA TRIANGULATION 
Researchers must be concerned about the clarity of their perceptions and validity of 
their communication (Stake, 2005b). As such, every effort must be made to ensure data 
integrity, accuracy and confirmability (ibid.). The research technique in the data 
collection process to achieve greater accuracy and confirmability of the data is known 
as triangulation (Denzin, 1978). Triangulation is defined by Denzin (1978) as "...the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (p.21).  In this 
study, data from documents was triangulated with the data obtained from interviews in 
a process of methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978). In addition, participant 
observation was used as a “within-method” form of triangulation using “multiple 
comparison groups”. The same phenomena were observed across the three sites where 
possible, checking for internal consistency and reliability of the data. Further, 
participant observation was used for “between methods” triangulation for convergent 
validity of the interview data. With respect to the analysis, the research process 
included reflexivity, whereby the analysis of field data was guided by the process of 
critical self-reflection to consider factors such as whether the character of the research 
data was affected by factors that included the sensitivity of the research issues, the 
presence of the researcher or the relationship between researcher and respondents 
(Waddington, 2004, p. 157). The process also included the extended mode of analysis 
suggested by Atkinson and Delamont (2005), as multi-level analysis served to 
encapsulate frames from within which to understand the data.  
111 
 
5.8 PILOT OF THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT  
The interview instrument was piloted with one member of the existing board of 
directors at the first case study site. This was conducted in her office and at her 
convenience. The relationship was not open and therefore responses were very 
restricted to the interview questions. Based on the progress of the discussion, the 
interviewer did not ask the last question on the interview instrument. The findings in 
the pilot interview and actions taken are given in Table 3; ‘P’ refers to the prompt from 
the interview process, ‘R’ is the response of the respondent or outcome of the 
interview, and ‘A’ refers to the considerations and actions taken as a result of the 
response. 
The pilot interview resulted in several changes to the instrument that served to generate 
useful data for addressing the research question (see appendices 6 and 7 for the final 
instrument). The responses seemed reserved and non-committal and the researcher gave 
further thought to questions that would elicit more open responses. The interview 
yielded important insights and the data was retained and used in the overall analysis.  
In the conduct of case studies, the first case is usually considered to be a test or pilot 
case and this study observed this research tradition (Yin, 2009a). The study positioned 
the first case (at the workplace of the researcher) as a pilot case that aided the 
researcher in developing relevant lines of questions. Yin (2009) makes the point that 
the pilot case study is not a pre-test and that, done properly and using the case study 
protocol effectively, will help the researcher to improve the questions used in data 
gathering and provide conceptual clarification for the research design. In the process of 
engaged scholarship, this theoretical exploration was facilitated by selecting key 
respondents who provided feedback on the quality of the interview questions and new 
theoretical insights about the research design. In addition, analysing the findings at the 
pilot site and generating the case report served to illuminate areas of omission, 
ambiguity or inadequacy of data for answering the research questions. 
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Table 3: Assessment and Review of the Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Pilot 
Test  Interaction in the Pilot Interview 
Anonymity  P: Interview preamble: “Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and 
your anonymity will be maintained as far as possible” (Researcher, Interviewer). 
R: “That is impossible! You will always know who is making statements. But I 
have no problem with that. You are free to quote me” (Pilot respondent). 
A: This was a major consideration and it was necessary to take steps to safeguard 
the identity of respondents as far as possible. It was also decided that the 
statement should be retained in the preamble of the interview instrument.  
Restricted 
responses from 
respondent 
R: The respondent produced very short responses to each question in the pilot. 
Further, the failure of the recording device resulted in very limited data from the 
pilot interview.  
A: Several variables might have been responsible for this:  
 Distance in the relationship between researcher and respondent, in which 
case, it would be necessary to take actions to reduce distance in further 
interviews. 
 Closed lenses with respect to the interview questions, in which case, the 
researcher would be prepared to expand the preamble of the interview as 
required.  
Destruction of 
data  
P: “The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed after 
2 years” (Researcher, Interviewer). 
R: “Why would you do that? It is archival records! You should not destroy the data. 
You can donate the interview, with my permission, to the Main Library. Of 
course it can be blocked for a period” (Pilot respondent). 
A: This suggestion was in contravention of the UK Data Protection Act. The 
possibility of restricting access to the thesis was considered but the researcher 
made no promise to do so. 
Audio-recording  P: “I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview” (Researcher, 
Inteviewer).  
R: “It goes without saying… I would expect you to audiotape it” (Pilot respondent). 
A: This position would have been adopted as the respondent was also a researcher. 
Yet, the statement was retained in the interview prelude as it is a necessary part 
of ethical conduct in the academic research process (Wiles et al., 2005).  
Uncertainty of 
respondents that 
their involvement 
in the 
organisation 
positions them to 
contribute to the 
research topic.  
P: “Please do indicate to me if at any point you are uncomfortable with the 
questions asked and if you wish to stop or defer the interview” (Researcher, 
Interviewer). 
R: “I think this interview will be very short because I was only (position). Of 
course, if you talk to (name)…and you can talk to (name)… it would be more 
valuable” (Pilot Respondent).  
P: “Your input will be very important to the study” (Researcher, Interviewer)  
R: “I am not sure about that but let’s go ahead” (Pilot Respondent). 
A: This vignette suggested that the respondent did not feel that his/her contribution 
would be valuable. It also suggested some level of disengagement with the 
research, researcher and/or the organisation. The researcher was alerted to 
attempt to make people feel that their contributions were important.  
Restrictive P: “Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector 
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Test  Interaction in the Pilot Interview 
questions with 
answers 
documented in 
history 
directors and university directors?” (Researcher, Interviewer).  
R: “Well it was a given. It was agreed that there must be a board of directors that 
included the Principal as Chairman of the Board. There was a ratio – two thirds 
corporate sector and one third… (University)” (Pilot Respondent). 
A: This response suggested that the question was too restricted and did not 
encourage the researcher to reflect on purpose. The question was retained to 
give direction and a new question was added to the interview instrument, 
specifically examining the reason for the partnership.  
New Question: But what do you think the University hoped to achieve through 
involvement of the private sector?  
“Laddering” Opportunity: Why was this important to the University? To have the 
Principal as Chairman?  
Questions and 
probes  
P: New laddering question: “Why was this important to Green? To have the 
Principal as Chairman?” (Researcher, Interviewer) 
R: “Well, it was Green programmes that were being delivered and the Principal has 
to ensure that what is delivered meets with Green requirements for quality. It is 
important to understand that it’s Green. This is what attracts students to the 
business school.  
A: The rapaciousness with which the answer was given prompted the researcher to 
probe. The probing question focused on roles and this was critical to the 
purpose of the study.  
New Question: But what do you see as the responsibility of private sector and UWI 
directors? 
 
5.9 DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL AND PROCESSES 
The data collection protocol was developed to ensure the integrity of the case study 
evidence in the data collection process. It also guided the process of data management, 
ensuring that data was accessible, comparable and well preserved (Yin, 2009a; Wiles et 
al., 2005; Stake, 2005b). 
The case study protocol serves to demonstrate how data was collected using each 
research technique. 
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Table 4: Case Study Database 
Research Question Source of Data 
 Interviews  Archival 
Documents 
Participant observation 
1. What are the defining 
attributes of the PPP 
governance structure 
utilized by the business 
schools? 
Interviews  Document analysis 
based on conceptual 
framework  
Observations of activities 
and behaviours related to 
the partnership, using case 
study questions and 
conceptual framework as a 
basis for observations.  
2. How do the composition 
and structure of the 
governance arrangement 
influence the 
contribution of public 
and private partners to 
decision-making? 
Interviews 
(reporting codes, 
counts, relationship 
among concepts)  
Document analysis 
(reporting concepts 
and relationship 
among concepts)  
Observations of activities 
and behaviours related to 
the partnership, using case 
study questions and 
conceptual framework as a 
basis for observations 
3. What opportunities and 
constraints are presented 
by the structural 
embeddedness of the 
PPP network?  
Direct question on 
the interview  
 Observations of activities 
and behaviours related to 
the partnership, using case 
study questions and 
conceptual framework as a 
basis for observations 
4. How does the PPP 
strategy utilized by 
business schools in the 
English-speaking 
Caribbean help to build 
legitimacy and contribute 
to their success? 
Though this is not a 
direct question on 
the interview it was 
ascertained based on 
the data in the 
interview protocol 
using the definitions 
of legitimacy in the 
conceptual 
framework  
Documents 
provided evidence 
of performance and 
sources of 
legitimacy 
 
 
5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents  
The respondents at Apple Business School included existing and past members of the 
Board of Directors, senior administrative staff at the University who interacted with the 
School and critical informants in the private sector who had close relationships with the 
School. Respondents selected for the research were sent emails requesting their 
participation in the research. Existing members of the Board of Directors were selected 
based on availability and ‘snowballing’. There was also an attempt to include a balance 
from the public and private sectors and, as such, some new members of the Board from 
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the private sector were excluded from the research. The email included a formal 
commitment agreement between the researcher and the director/participant that 
included the purpose of the study, research techniques, target group and a request for a 
meeting (Appendix 8). The researcher then followed up with telephone calls to 
schedule interviews. Interviews were rescheduled as many times as necessary to 
facilitate the timetables of participants. All interviews were conducted face to face.  
The participation of respondents at the other two sites was secured and arranged by the 
executive directors of those schools. They made arrangements for interviews to be held 
within a defined period of up to five (5) days. Interviews were held at respondents’ 
offices and homes and also at the business schools or the hotel where the researcher 
stayed during the process of data collection. Where participants were not available 
during the week of face-to-face interviews, those interviews were conducted by 
teleconference. This entire process required extensive follow up by the researcher. The 
lists of participants in each case are presented in tables 5 to 7.  
Table 5: Interview Respondents: Gerran Business School 
Position in study Experience No. of Respondents 
KOA** Private 1 
KOA  Public-private  2 
KOA  Public  1 
Director Public  5 
Director  Private  3 
Director Public-Private  1 
Total Respondents 13 
** KOA = key organizational actor 
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Table 6: Interview Respondents: Apple Business School 
Position in study Experience No. of Respondents 
KOA Private  1 
KOA  Public-private  2 
KOA  Public  4 
Director Public  3 
Director  Private  3 
Protagonist  Private  1 
Staff Public  2 
Total Respondents 16 
 
Table 7: Interview Respondents: Rotter Business School 
Position in study Experience No. of Respondents 
KOA Private 2 
Director Public  3 
Director  Private  4 
Management staff  Public  1 
Management staff  Private  1 
Total Respondents 11 
 
At each interview the interview protocol was read. Interviews were taped with the 
express permission of participants and fully transcribed to capture pauses, intonation 
and other expressions. Forty (40) interviews were conducted in total for the three cases. 
At the close of the interview respondents were thanked for their participation in the 
study. 
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5.9.2 Archival Data  
Archival data was collected at all three sites based on availability and access. The data 
included in the study is presented below.  
Table 8: Summary of Archival Data 
 Apple Rotter Gerran 
Minutes of meetings X   
Brochures X   
School magazines X X X 
Newspaper publications X X X 
Books  X X X 
Websites  X X X 
Affiliation agreement and/or other formal agreements  X X X 
Strategic plans X   
Emails X   
 
Access to documentation at the site where the researcher is employed was unrestricted. 
This was not the case at the other two sites as demonstrated in Table 9; the request was 
made for access but denied on the basis of confidentiality in both cases. In an effort to 
obtain more archival data while respecting the right to confidentiality, a document 
analysis schedule was developed to guide a research assistant approved by the 
executive directors to extract the relevant data from the records (Appendix 9); this 
however, did not yield any results.  
The use of archival data also presented the problem of how much data to collect and 
how to identify data that would relate to the phenomenon of PPPs being studied 
(Bickman and Rog, 2009). Multiple data sources in qualitative research are used to 
support validity of conclusions in that “…the more diverse the sources and methods, 
the greater confidence there is in the convergence of the findings” (Bickman and Rog, 
2009, p.23). The researcher confronted this challenge of data triangulation focused on 
the research issues by developing the document analysis protocol based on the research 
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propositions and the concepts included in the conceptual framework. The researcher 
attempted to collect data from as many documented sources as possible.  
The use of archival data requires that the researcher be sensitive to its possible areas of 
bias (Yin, 2009b). Archival data is subject to under or over representation depending on 
the context (ibid.). In this study, the documents collected were both public and internal 
documents of organisations and, as such, the data is represented from the perspective of 
the organisation and subject to “editorial leanings” of insider actors (Luke, 2009) 
Indeed, with regard to the phenomenon of cross-sectoral relationships, the data would 
make limited direct references to the phenomenon and there was need for active 
interpretation in the actual selection of data to be drawn from records. Based on this 
constraint, the data collected was significantly more than that used in the analysis and 
presentation of the case findings.  
5.9.3 Participant Observation 
Participant observation is considered one of the more powerful research methods in 
ethnographic studies (Babbie, 2007; Bernard, 2000; Jorgensen, 1989; Fetterman, 2009). 
The method demands significant preparation and attention to activities in the process 
including “discovering the obvious” and taking field notes (Bernard, 2000). In this 
study, the researcher engaged in participant observation while carrying out her 
professional duties. There was no attempt by the researcher to insert herself into 
situations that appeared to be sources of field data and participant observation. Field 
notes were recorded after interviews with respondents that yielded observations deemed 
worthy of inclusion in the study. The field notes included descriptions of what occurred 
and the researcher’s analysis of the event (Fetterman, 2009). In some cases, 
observations were audio recorded, transcribed and included in Nvivo for analysis. In 
other cases, field notes were written, often at the end of the day following the event. In 
one case, the researcher was required to use her field notes to construct a report of a 
particular occurrence. The report was requested as part of the professional duties of the 
researcher and there was no prior knowledge within the organisation that the field notes 
existed. It was important to report only what was considered to be the facts of the 
situation.  
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There were more opportunities for participant observation at the site where the 
researcher was employed. The researcher used reflective processes and documented the 
actions, contexts and dates of observations relevant to the research issue. Data collected 
using participant observation was also historical. Observations were noted as they were 
made from the commencement of preparation for the study, well before formal 
approval was granted to commence data collection. This data was reviewed for 
relevance and notes found to be irrelevant were discarded prior to data analysis.  
5.10 ASSEMBLING THE BACKGROUND DATA 
The background data on the schools were significantly linked to the data analysis and 
findings in this multilevel research. For the Apple case study, background data was 
collected by the researcher from archival records. In the case of Rotter Business School 
and Gerran Business School, the researcher developed the descriptions of each 
phenomenon and sent this to a key organisational actor (KOA) for checking. The 
background data confirmed the appropriateness of the three cases selected for this study 
of PPPs. Similarities between the three cases included their presence in small 
developing countries and location within the same university system. In addition, the 
governance structure in each case included actors with public, private and a mix of 
public and private experience The local realities of the university campus and its 
relationship with the society in which it existed presented points of difference that 
could facilitate “…the comparison between two sets of things – persons, roles, 
activities, sites as a whole – that are known to differ in some other important respect” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.237) .  
5.11 DATA ANALYSIS: STRATEGY, PROCEDURE AND PRESENTATION  
Yin (2009) suggests that the formulation of a sound data analysis strategy at the start of 
the research study will aid in the collection of data and lead seamlessly into analysis. 
The analysis presents the logic that links the data to the research question and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings (Stake, 2005a; Yin, 2009a). The data analysis 
strategy is intended to “...help you to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling 
analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (Yin, 2009a, p.30). The 
strategy for interpreting the findings of the case study may include identifying and 
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addressing rival explanations, allowing for analytic generalization in the testing of 
theories and the development of new theories (Yin, 2009a). The procedure for data 
analysis is to start with the research question, identify evidence that addresses the 
research questions or sub-questions, draw a tentative conclusion or finding/s related to 
the research question and decide on how to present the evidence so that readers will 
understand why you have come to those conclusions (Yin, 2009b). This section 
addresses how the case analysis was conducted to arrive at a general explanation for the 
performance of PPPs being studied.  
This study examined three cases of PPPs as alternative governance structures in 
business schools, created through the strategic alliance of Green University and 
members of the private sector in the countries of Arden, Gerran and Rotter. Each case 
was analysed to determine the variables and relationships between variables at three 
levels of analysis of the PPP relationship - the private and public actor groups, the 
organisational level and the environmental context of the country in which each 
partnership was located. Explanations were derived based on the interaction and 
linkages between variables and the relationship between public and private actors that 
resulted from the way in which their interaction was influenced by the factors in the 
context and at the various levels of analysis. The individual case reports present 
plausible explanations with regard to what made the PPP arrangement work at each 
site, over the past twenty-one years, the shortest time that each school existed. The 
propositions described in the theoretical framework were examined in the light of 
evidence derived from the research. The analysis was approached from the social 
network perspective and from a critical realist paradigm and produced explanations of 
the dynamics of the public-private relationship in the PPP governance structure and the 
influence of that relationship on the key strategies of the school. The research 
techniques employed produced qualitative data which was analysed using social 
network analytical methods and data coding guided by the analytic technique of content 
analysis.  
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Figure 8: Model of Data Analysis 
Source: Extrapolated from Yin (2009a) 
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5.11.1 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
5.11.1.1 Content Analysis 
The contextualisation of research and search for meanings that may influence 
behaviours makes content analysis an appropriate analytical methodology. The data 
obtained was analysed using content analysis which is defined by Krippendorff (2004) 
as “…a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p.18; author’s italics). The 
content was coded and broken down into manageable categories of keywords, phrases 
or themes. The researcher then analysed the presence, meanings and relationships of 
such words and concepts, making inferences about the messages within the texts, the 
writer(s), the audience, and the culture and time of which they were a part (ibid.). 
5.11.1.2 Text Analysis Procedures 
The study incorporated text data from three sources: interviews, observations and 
documents. Interviews and participant observations are researcher-instigated data and 
therefore subject to the limitations and opportunities of the research environment 
whereas documents are naturally occurring data, influenced by the social context in 
which they were constructed (Perakyla, 2005). Three major tools of text analysis are 
used in this study. The first is the historical and Foucaultian way of analyzing and 
interpreting texts (Perakyla, 2005, p.872); the second is conversation analysis (Sacks et 
al., 1974) and the third is critical discourse analysis which seeks to understand power 
and dominance in relationships (Van Dijk, 1993).  
In describing the use of the Foucaultian method used by Armstrong (2002), Perakyla 
(2005) indicated that the focus is on the ‘propositional content’ (not the linguistic 
forms) of the texts, “…trying to pin down the assumptions and presuppositions that the 
texts incorporated” (Perakyla, 2005, p.872). One technique is to analyse the text by 
examining the characteristic language, especially the use of rhetoric which is “…how 
texts (spoken and written) persuade their readers and hearers” (Silverman, 2004, p.73; 
author's italics).  The interview allowed the researcher to overcome distance in 
“…space and in time; past events or faraway experiences, by studying people who took 
part in them” (Perakyla, 2005, p.869).  
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Conversation analysis studies offer “…qualitative descriptions of interactional 
structures (e.g., turn taking, relations between adjacent utterances) and practices (e.g. 
telling and receiving news, making assessments)” (Perakyla, 2005, p.875; author's 
parentheses ). This method “…is attributed to [Harvey] Sacks who started to study the 
very structures of the interaction itself” (Schegloff, 1992, p.xviii). Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed to include the structures of the interaction such as pauses and 
linguistic devices (Silverman, 2004, p.73). The researcher included incidents in the 
participant observation memos where they were evident during the interview process. 
The coded memos along with the text analysis provided insights into how public and 
private actors functioned in the PPP arrangement. The methods were also mutually re-
enforcing with respect to the theoretical propositions and were used separately, 
following the advice of Perakyla (2005) who indicated that “…rather than combining 
different methods…we should perhaps let each method do its job in its own way…and 
then, only at the end of that, let their results cross-illuminate each other” (p.881).  
5.11.1.3 Text Coding 
Data collected from the three sources were all converted to text and used in the analysis 
and case reports. Interviews were transcribed and checked for accuracy. Data from 
archival documents from each site were summarised in a single document in text 
format. Audio files from the process of participant observation were also transcribed 
and a single document in text format was produced. All data collected were included in 
the process of analysis.  
The data analysis was facilitated to a limited extent by the use of data analysis software. 
Data analysis software are tools available to the researcher and it is important to 
describe exactly how they are used to support the process. The qualitative data analysis 
software, NVivo 8, was used to code and categorize text from the interviews, archival 
records and participant observation memos, thereby aiding the process of triangulation. 
Nvivo 8 is a code and retrieve programme that facilitates theory and conceptual 
building. Codes and patterns were developed into causal networks using explanatory 
effects matrices in order to develop an integrated understanding of the case (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
124 
 
In the open coding process, codes were not limited to those generated from the 
theoretical and conceptual framework. Other codes were developed where they 
appeared to fit the research questions or present a possible causal link to events. This 
was necessary in order to capture the meanings in the language and the way in which 
public and private actors interpreted the interactions. It was important that the use of 
the software did not transform the data analysis into a rigid coding by words as 
suggested by (Kelle, 1997). While it would have been simple to identify word 
frequencies or coding stripes, and even sort by sector to find recurring concepts, the 
process of analysis at this point varied to generate the most appropriate and useful axial 
codes.  
The study sought to determine how the governance relationship between public and 
private partners in the PPP arrangement contributed to the survival of the business 
schools. The study attempted to do this by emphasizing the unit of analysis as the 
relationship between public and private sector directors with respect to the key 
strategies of the schools. The main strategies identified by the KOAs in the interview 
processes were extracted (Research Question 2) and through data reduction, selective 
codes were generated to reflect each strategy. These were considered to be core 
categories that are enduring in the schools (Borgatti, 2006). These selective codes 
formed the basis for axial coding.  
The process of axial coding was used to identify important concepts that embodied the 
relationship among the codes. Axial coding “…is the process of relating codes 
(categories and properties) to each other, via a combination of inductive and deductive 
thinking” (Borgatti, 2006, website). The conceptual framework served as a guide to 
relate open codes to the key strategies (selectively coded). Borgatti (2006) explains that 
through axial coding relationships are developed using a causal relationships in a 
framework that includes a description of the phenomenon, causal conditions, context 
intervening conditions, action strategies and consequences. This framework was not 
used and instead, the conceptual framework, which is also based on causal relationships 
for the purpose of explanation, was used to guide the process of axial coding. This 
process led to the identification of findings of the study which were explained using the 
theoretical propositions.  
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5.11.1.4 Social Network Analysis 
In this study, four social networks were mapped and analysed as an integral part of 
providing answers to the research question. The initial task of the analysis was to map 
the professional networks of KOAs to determine their density and then to assess the 
impact that this could have on the PPP and relationships between sub-groups of actors 
in the network. The second network examined in this study of PPPs was that of actors 
and relationships that were instrumental in the establishment of the schools. The 
historical network architecture was mapped to determine the density of public and 
private actors at the start of the school. The network was extended as far as possible to 
include actors and ties that could be identified from the interviews and documents. Two 
other networks were constructed to determine the density of actor sub-groups which 
contributed to the strategy of the PPPs. The social network research method adopted by 
Krackhardt (1987) was used in this study to determine the weighted perceptions of 
colleagues of the contribution of public and private actors to the strategy of the school. 
In this case, data collection deviated from the usual who to whom matrices and 
included the perceptions of actors with respect to the contribution of their own group 
and that of the other groups in the study (ibid.).  
5.11.1.5 Presentation of Social Networks  
In the networks included in the case, nodes representing actors with mainly university 
experience are coloured yellow whereas green nodes denote actors with both public and 
private sector experience; private sector actors are denoted by blue nodes. The 
designation ‘KOA’ means the actor is considered a key organisational actor in the 
business school. The unique challenges to ethical conduct in social network research 
required that the research adopt measures to protect the anonymity of actors (Borgatti 
and Molina, 2003; Borgatti and Molina, 2005). Actors are given anonymity in three 
different ways in the study. Actors are referred to as ‘respondents’ and by sector 
experience, where ‘Pub’ represents ‘public,’ ‘Priv’ represents ‘private’ and Pub/Private 
represents an actor having both public and private experience. Names are fictitious and 
are only used where they contribute to the analysis. Names have no relationship to 
gender as this is not a factor in this study. The masculine form of the third person is 
used where references are made to actors. 
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The combination of qualitative and social network analysis is not without precedence 
and advances in network methodology have provided the opportunity to utilise the 
appropriate combination of tools to study the social relationships between actors and 
answer the research question on how the relationship between public and private sector 
actors in the governance of business schools in the Caribbean influences their 
contribution to strategy and impacts the outcomes for the schools (Breiger, 2004). 
5.11.2 Within-Case Analysis 
The study included qualitative data from three sources: interviews, the reflections of the 
researcher as participant researcher, and archival documents. The purpose of the 
analysis was to derive explanations of how PPPs work in business schools in small, 
developing countries. In this study, the research question and theoretical propositions 
that emerged from the critical review of the literature were used to guide the data 
analysis (Yin, 2009a). Data that either supported or refuted those propositions were 
presented and explained. Possible alternative explanations were identified and assessed 
to determine whether they should be examined and treated iteratively in the process of 
within-case verification (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Rival explanations, such as 
whether private control was motivated by a concern for financial risk and possible 
demise, were identified and assessed as they arose from the data and participants’ 
perspectives.  
The overall data analysis strategy was supported by the use of appropriate analytic 
techniques. As an explanatory study, pattern matching and seeking out patterns related 
to possible dependent (e.g. private motivation) and the independent (e.g. relationship, 
trust, etc.) variables is a valid analytic technique (Yin, 2009a). The study included both 
existing and past members of the boards of directors and, as such, included both real-
time and retrospective data. The analysis of the public-private relationship was 
conducted across levels that included the public and private actor sub-groups in the 
governance arrangement, within the organisation with respect to the purpose, structure 
and strategy of the organisation and the wider context of the university and country. 
Relationships between the concepts and variables that emerged from the analysis of 
data were analysed to generate plausible explanations of PPP performance in each case.  
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5.11.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
This study includes three cases of PPP governance in business schools in small, 
developing countries. The cases were selected on the basis of several points of 
comparative similarity and difference. The aim of multi-case design is to “...increase 
generalizability, reassuring oneself that the events and processes in one well-described 
setting are not wholly idiosyncratic” (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.151). By 
comparing sites or cases, one can establish the range of generality of a finding or 
explanation and at the same time pin down the conditions under which that finding will 
occur (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The use of multiple sites in this study facilitated 
the development of general explanations of PPP governance in business schools in 
small, developing countries. The extent to which the findings can be generalised 
depends on the replication logic of analytical generalisation where “…the investigator 
is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 2009a, 
p.43).  
Cross-site analysis requires the researcher to devise an appropriate method that would 
produce “a meta-ethnography… (that includes) a theory of social explanation that both 
preserves uniqueness and entails comparison” (Hoblit and Hare, 1983, p.1). The main 
findings in each case were analysed within the case study and the propositions derived 
from one case were examined across subsequent cases, explaining where differences in 
the contexts would have yielded different outcomes. Where differences existed across 
cases, they were addressed in the cross-case analysis through propositions and 
explanations. The cross-case analysis was undertaken to identify key issues that 
emerged from the findings and to explain the similarities and differences across the 
sites. The cross-case analysis was reviewed for clarity and accuracy by an independent 
expert from one of the research sites. 
5.12 Research Quality: Validity, Reliability and Generalizability  
Scientific research requires the researcher to demonstrate the validity and reliability of 
his/her study, making the case that the findings are accurate and credible (Patton, 
2002). Further, researchers differentiate between the internal validity and external 
validity, explaining the latter as “…defining the domain to which the study’s findings 
can be generalised” (Yin, 2009a, p.40). In case study research, various tactics are used 
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to meet the criteria defined by these tests of quality and the following sections will 
demonstrate how these tactics were used in this study to meet the demands of the tests 
of rigour and quality.  
5.12.1 Validity 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain that “...a measure of a concept is valid to the 
extent that it actually measures what it is intended to measure” (p.57). Research that is 
deemed to be valid is, by nature, credible as the arguments are logically consistent and 
the data collected and analysed support the conclusions that have been drawn (Patton, 
2002). Yin (2009a) indicates that the quality of the research design in case studies can 
be judged by three dimensions of validity: construct validity, internal validity and 
external validity.  
5.12.1.1. Construct and Theoretical Validity 
Construct validity refers to the process for “…identifying correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2009a, p.40). In this study of partnerships, 
attention was paid to construct validity during the literature review and development of 
the conceptual framework. The constructs were determined from existing research and 
the relationship between the constructs was developed from the theoretical framework 
that included the relationship between structure and purpose (Giddens, 1984), the 
influence of the embeddedness of economic actions in social networks (Granovetter, 
1983) and consideration of a range of constructs and concepts from the literature on 
PPPs, strategic alliances and other forms of partnerships.  
Construct validity “…arises when measures of concepts behave as expected in 
theoretical predictions” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.58). As such, the authors 
suggest that construct validity of social network measures (and measures attained using 
other instruments) can be studied by examining how they behave in a range of 
theoretical propositions. The theoretical propositions that formed the basis for the 
generation of questions to guide the research were tested in the process of data analysis. 
Where a concept did not behave as expected, the process yielded a theoretical 
contribution that met the requirements of originality (incremental or revelatory) and 
utility (scientific and practical) (Corley and Gioia, 2011).  
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Construct validity is demonstrated in case study research by using multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing a chain of evidence and having key informants review the case 
study report (Yin, 2009a). The cross-site analysis was reviewed by one member of staff 
at Apple who is familiar with all the sites and the findings confirmed (Appendix 10). 
This independent expert was selected for his knowledge of the region, his familiarity 
with the business schools, interactions with both academic and private sector actors and 
institutions, and his expertise in corporate governance.  
5.12.1.2 Internal Validity 
In this explanatory study of PPPs, internal validity was particularly important (Yin, 
2009a; Yin, 2009b). Case study researchers must demonstrate confidence in the 
analysis of relationships between variables or else “…we are left with interesting 
stories of what happened, of unknown truth and utility” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p.11). This research used the analytical techniques of pattern matching and explanation 
building with the aid of organisational logic and sense-making models to meet the test 
of internal validity (Yin, 2009a). The logic model used in the analysis is a multi-level 
model that traces the strategic actions of the schools over time and explains their 
legitimacy in terms of the public-private relationship.  
Two mechanisms within the study greatly facilitated internal validity. Firstly, a mixed-
method design utilized data obtained from both qualitative and quantitative analytic 
processes and, secondly, a multi-level analytical strategy examined variables in the 
environment, institutional context and actor sub-group level, giving scope to the 
research. The multi-level analytical strategy is a valid one as the concepts that describe 
variables in the macro-environment of developing countries are “…global properties 
(which) are relatively objective, descriptive, and easily observable” and can be 
generated from the researchers’ analysis of the data (Klein and Kozlowski, 2000, 
p.215).  
5.12.1.3 External Validity and Generalizability of Findings 
Several theorists warn that researchers should not commit the perennial error of 
attempting to generalise their case study findings, explaining that the process of 
generalisation in case study research is based on analytic generalisation or 
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generalisation to the theory (Yin, 2009a; Perry et al., 1998; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Using the principle of analytic generalisations in case studies, determinations 
were generalised in so far as there was evidence of “replication logic” predicting 
similar results or contrasting results for reasons which are anticipated based on the 
theoretical framework (Yin, 2009a).  
5.12.2 Reliability 
Reliability is another test of a good quality case study; “A measure of a variable or 
concept is reliable if repeated measurements give the same estimates of the variable” 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.58). The objective in the case study is to demonstrate 
that if another researcher adopts the same procedures and conducts the same case study 
they would arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009a). The reliability of 
this study was facilitated by the use of a case study protocol and by developing the case 
study database (Yin, 2009a). The protocol carefully described the process used by the 
researcher and, if followed, should lead another researcher to the same conclusions. 
The database was also easily examinable and included notes on the observations and 
reflections of the researcher stored in Nvivo, case study documents, and interview 
transcripts.  
5.13 RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENTATION FORMAT  
Communication of theories is a critical consideration in qualitative research and the 
acceptability of the theoretical framework was considered in the presentation of the 
findings. Glaser and Strauss (1965) capture the essence of the problem as “…how to 
describe the social world so vividly that the reader can almost literally see and hear its 
people – but see and hear in relation to the theoretical framework” (p.9). This is 
perhaps one of the best contrasts between qualitative and quantitative research and 
supports the use of qualitative methods for this enquiry into PPPs. Human and Provan 
(2000) used the direct words of interviewees to present their findings about critical 
factors in network evolution. Researchers suggest that qualitative data are characterised 
by their richness and fullness because of the opportunity to explore a subject in as real a 
manner as is possible (Dey, 1993; Robson, 2002). This contrasts with the ‘thin’ 
abstraction or reductionism that characterizes interpretive work (Lee and Lings, 2008) 
and which the researcher was cautious to avoid. 
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The presentation of findings of this multiple case study sought to address the 
expectations of various audiences including thesis examiners, academic colleagues, 
policy makers and practitioners involved in PPP arrangements. The findings, therefore, 
are reported as three individual cases that included the most important evidence 
highlighting the existence of variables. A cross-case analysis was conducted to 
determine similarities and differences between the cases, and account for social change 
within the PPPs.  
5.14 Ethical Issues in the Research Process 
The National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects (1978) developed 
fundamental principles to govern human research: “…respect for the autonomy of 
persons, beneficence, or concern to support the best interests of human subjects in 
research and the best interests of society; and justice or fairness of procedures and 
outcomes so that there is an equitable distribution of social benefits and costs” (cited in 
Stanley et al., 1996, p.12). The Commission developed a set of guidelines for ethical, 
scientific research that include inter alia, validity of the research design such that 
subjects are not used for trivial purposes, and voluntary informed consent whereby it is 
ensured that subjects consent freely, without threat of undue inducement, and that they 
be informed and understand all that they reasonably need to know prior to giving 
consent.  
The study is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and, as such, 
guidelines included in the Framework for Research Ethics (ESRC) published by the 
ESRC were followed in the conduct of this research. The guidelines include six key 
principles, including clarity on the independence of research and making explicit any 
conflicts of interest or partiality (Economic and Social Research Council, 2010). Based 
on the ethical and moral principles that underpin scientific research, and the dictates of 
the Framework for Research Ethics, the researcher identified the ethical issues of 
beneficence, non-malfeasance, informed consent, confidentiality/anonymity, and the 
potential for conflicts of interest arising from the employment of the researcher at one 
of the case study sites, as significant to this study involving members of the boards of 
directors of business schools in small developing countries. The measures taken to 
stave off threats to research ethics are described below.  
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5.14.1 Beneficence and Non-Malfeasance  
It is expected that the results of this study will inform practitioners engaged in cross-
sectoral partnerships and engineer greater value from those partnerships, especially in 
the context of developing countries with limited resources and tremendous hope for 
such arrangements (Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). In ensuring non-malfeasance, it was 
important that participants felt completely at ease with respect to their personal and 
professional protection as a result of participating in the research. Non-malfeasance was 
guaranteed by adopting the principles of informed consent. Additionally, one key 
informant was asked to review the case study report and provide a response in an email.  
There was an instance of apparent perceived malfeasance. In one case, a key participant 
required a signed legal document from the researcher that indicated she would be liable 
to legal proceedings in the event of any breach of confidentiality. Although this 
condition was accepted, the participant eventually declined to participate in the study. 
On reflection, this might have been due to the apparently competitive relationship 
between the researcher’s organisation and the primary organisation of that participant. 
This required the researcher to demonstrate non-malfeasance, as schools might be 
considered to be ‘vulnerable populations’ and to optimize the benefits of the research 
(Sieber, 2009). At the other two sites, access to all participants was facilitated by the 
executive directors who were at liberty to indicate the position of the researcher at one 
of the “sister” business schools. This approach to gaining access to participants at the 
other two sites apparently served to mitigate perceptions of malfeasance.  
The use of confidentiality agreements (Appendix 11) with respondents served to 
militate against non-malfeasance. Further, the researcher took steps to protect the data 
which was stored on the desktop of her personal computer, as this was an 
organizational asset. Storing the data on the desktop with passwords ensured that no 
one could have access to it, other than the researcher.  
5.14.2 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity  
The principle whereby participants must be fully informed about research prior to 
giving their consent must be adopted with respect to research involving human subjects 
(Fontana and Frey, 2000). It is recommended that the researcher be completely open 
about the research, the position and intentions of the researcher, and the purpose of the 
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research (Patton, 2002). In this study, the interview preamble highlighted the objectives 
of the research project, the methodology, the purpose of the research and participants’ 
right to withdraw at any time (Appendix 6); the interview pre-amble was also included 
in the Confidentiality Agreement (Appendix 11).  
During data collection at the other two sites, whenever respondents mentioned the site 
where the researcher was employed, the researcher ensured that she explicitly stated 
that she was employed there and the position held. This was important to ensure that 
respondents were fully aware of the fact and would give due consideration to it during 
the interview.  
Confidentiality and anonymity are related but different concepts (Wiles et al., 2008). 
Confidentiality in research is generally taken to mean that the researcher will employ 
all possible measures to protect the respondent from being identified (Wiles et al., 
2008) and that identifiable information about respondents will not be disclosed without 
permission (British Sociological Association, 2004). The researcher maintained 
confidentiality by not deliberately or accidentally disclosing any information gained 
from an interviewee in ways that might identify an individual and by presenting 
findings in ways that ensured that individuals could not be identified (Wiles et al., 
2008).  
Participants in the study were made anonymous by the use of a naming protocol as 
follows:  
 Number: numbers generated in random order; 
 Sector: type of experience - public or private; 
 Post on boards of directors – director or KOA.  
This protocol served to preserve the context and important variables in the study while 
maintaining the anonymity of respondents. In addition, the naming protocol was used 
in transcripts of the interviews retained as part of the data bank. Fictitious names were 
used in some network diagrams where individuals were important to the analysis of the 
data.  
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5.14.3 Researcher as Participant 
The methodology raised ethical concerns about the position of the researcher as an 
active participant and presented ethical challenges to exploring the work of people at 
strategic levels of the organisation and at other organisations, at times considered as 
competitors. The issues related to the participant researcher, including ethics and over 
involvement with the research goals (Rapoport, 1970 cited in Baskerville and Wood-
Harper, 1996), were addressed by various means. Firstly, the Confidentiality 
Agreement (Appendix 11) included the theoretical underpinnings of the study and 
declared the researcher’s intentions, ensuring that the academic purpose of the research 
was clearly communicated. Other issues of researcher as participant were explored in 
the execution of the research instruments.  
The interviews were held to high standards of rigour and ethics by the way in which 
they were conducted and transcribed. Though a research assistant was engaged to 
transcribe the interviews, she was advised about the sensitivity of the information and a 
promise of confidentiality was obtained. She was also selected as a relative of the 
researcher who had no interest in the issues of the research or the respondents 
themselves. Interviews were conducted at the convenience of respondents and at times 
when they were not distracted by other activities. This required ensuring that each 
interview was confirmed in advance and rescheduled as required for participants’ 
comfort. The researcher made introductory statements regarding confidentiality and 
anonymity (Appendix 7), asking interviewees to raise any concerns they might have 
regarding these issues, and indicating to participants that they could stop the interview 
at any time. No matter how well acquainted the researcher was with the interviewees, 
care and time was taken to read the interview prelude that outlined the measures to 
maintain confidentiality and protection of data. This perhaps served to instil confidence 
in the respondents who, in all but two cases, were unreserved in their responses to the 
questions.  
The trade-off to maintain an ethical stance with respect to participant observation was 
greatest. The researcher was faced with many instances where it would have been 
expected that she would divulge information gained through the research process for 
the benefit of the other in the conversation. The position adopted by the researcher was 
to maintain a position of “no comment” on issues that arose. It is very easy to construe 
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where such situations, in some cases, could compromise the job position of the 
researcher. This was not the case in this instance and it may be that the researcher’s 
history of maintaining an ethical stance served her well in this study. This would 
confirm the notion assertion of Jorgensen (1989) with respect to behavioural 
competencies of the participant researcher.  
Ethical issues required active consideration and action at all stages of the research 
including planning the study, designing instruments, and collecting, analysing and 
reporting data. Participant observation, though a powerful research technique in 
research designs that utilize qualitative data, presents several areas of ethical challenge 
based on the proximity of researchers to their subjects (Babbie, 2007). The use of this 
research technique, and other areas in which the research presented ethical challenges, 
must be overtly addressed. Lofland and Lofland (1995, p.312) identified issues raised 
in social research which served as tests of ethical conduct in this study; they are 
presented in Table 9. 
The research design and process of implementation included full consideration of all 
elements of ethics in research. The data will be stored electronically and securely for 
two years at the home of the researcher after which, as participants were advised, it will 
be destroyed in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998). 
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Table 9: Tests of Ethical Conduct 
Test 1: Is it ethical to talk to people when they do not know you will be recording their words?  
Response: The interview preamble specifically sought respondents’ explicit permission to audiotape the 
interview. Audio recordings were made only where this permission was granted either on the tape or 
prior to the interview. In the pilot interview the respondent indicated that audio-recording was 
“expected” but the researcher retained this component of the interview preamble.  
Test 2: Is it ethical to get information for your own purposes from people you hate?  
Response: There was no respondent in the study who the interviewer would describe as eliciting feelings 
of “hate.”  
Test 3: Is it ethical to see a severe need for help and not respond to it directly?  
Response: This test presented a fairly strong challenge to the researcher as the schools were in varying 
stages of their institutional development and would benefit from advice from each other. The researcher 
did not make such interjections except to clarify conceptions of respondents where they did not match 
publicly available information. The findings of the study and implications for practice will be shared 
with all the business schools at the end of the study.  
Test 4: Is it ethical to be in a setting or situation but not commit yourself wholeheartedly to it?  
Response: The research topic was of immense professional interest to the researcher. Despite this, there 
were respondents who the interviewer felt would not provide any useful information in the interview. It 
was important that the researcher seek to overtly demonstrate interest and attention to the interview.  
Test 5: Is it ethical to develop a calculated stance toward other humans, that is, to be strategic in your 
relations?  
Response: The researcher concurs with the arguments of (Kagan, 1998) with regard to the relationship 
between intrinsic and instrumental value and concluded that all relations are strategic. All relations 
however, can be accompanied by appropriate emotional ties and ethical conduct where care for the other 
is genuinely reflected in one’s actions. For example, during data collection at the other sites, the 
researcher took along chocolates for the secretarial staff that was assisting with scheduling interviews. 
Though there was no interaction between the researcher and the secretarial staff prior to the study in the 
context of the researcher’s professional duties, the study provided the opportunity to build lasting 
professional relations where care (and chocolates, unless they are deemed to be not in the best interest of 
the receiver) would continue to be demonstrated.  
Test 6: Is it ethical to take sides or to avoid taking sides in a factionalised situation?  
Response: This test was also quite challenging to the researcher. The topic of the study was well known 
in all contexts and the researcher, in her position, found that her opinion was sought increasingly over the 
duration of the study on matters that involved the relationship between the public and private sector 
actors. It was important to provide an unbiased professional opinion but not to utilise any data or make 
reference to any data sources to form that opinion. The researcher took full note of the importance of 
maintaining a non-judgmental, neutral and objective position on matters related to the study, observing 
all protocols of data management in the process (Fetterman, 2009; Bernard, 2000). 
Test 7: Is it ethical to “pay” people with trade-offs for access to their lives and minds?  
Response: This issue was not confronted in this research.  
Test 8: Is it ethical to “use” people as allies or informants in order to gain entrée to other people or to 
elusive understandings?  
Response: This issue did not arise in this study. The use of the “snowballing” technique whereby 
respondents ae asked to name other respondents who can provide useful data, holds the potential for 
some breach of ethics with respect to access to respondents (Goodman, 1961; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). The researcher only advised respondents, and only when it was asked, that they were selected for 
inclusion in the study by another respondent. Names were not provided at any time.  
 
137 
 
5.15 Assumptions and Limitations of the Methodology  
Social science research that is underpinned by a philosophy of critical realism is always 
limited by the fact that researchers use available and overt evidence of social 
phenomena from which to draw interpretations (Lee and Lings, 2008). Studies in the 
interpretative paradigm openly acknowledge this limitation but stoutly defend the 
scientific validity of the research process and the tendency to “…mix and match things” 
in understanding social phenomena (ibid., p.64). This sub-section addresses the 
limitations of the mixed methods and multiple case study design with respect to 
illuminating the PPP relationship and answering the research question. 
5.15.1 Limitations of the Design  
The quality of a research design depends on “…the degree to which the investigator has 
used the most appropriate procedures for answering the research question(s) and 
implemented them effectively” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009, p.309). Case study 
designs are generally limited by the very factors that constitute the strength of the 
design: factors that limit their utility to answer other questions that may be important to 
understanding the research problem (ibid.). Mainly, the methodology for arriving at the 
results of case studies constrains their statistical generalizability and the findings cannot 
be deemed to exist in other populations (Yin, 2009a). Generalizability in case studies is 
limited to analytic generalisation, or generalisation to the theories (ibid.). 
The study is limited by the selection of sites based on criteria that included access and 
time frame for completion of the research. Yin (2009a) acknowledges that good case 
studies are difficult to do and require extensive time commitments, based on the 
research techniques employed and the way they are used in relation to the research 
question. In this study, the research methods employed required significant time on 
each case to collect data using interviews and archival records. As such, only three case 
studies in the particular context of small, developing countries were conducted. The 
design is therefore limited with respect to statistical generalisation or “transferability” 
of the findings across populations (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). The small number of cases and their deep contextualization in small, developing 
countries in the Caribbean region constrains generalizability, transferability and 
external validity. Transferability, however, “…is relative in that any high quality 
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inference is applicable to some condition, context cultural group, organization or 
individuals other than the one studied…(and) the degree of transferability depends on 
the similarity between those studied and the ones that the findings are being transferred 
to” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009, p.312). 
Some authors argue that it is not possible to derive causal explanations from case 
studies and that any such attempt is merely speculative (Lofland and Lofland, 1995; 
Guba and Lincoln, 1989). However Miles and Huberman (1984), also in the qualitative 
paradigm, claim that “…field research is far better than solely quantified approaches at 
developing explanations of what we call local causality – the actual events and 
processes that led to specific outcomes” (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.132; author's 
italics). The authors propose that field data can provide serious confirmation of 
plausible causal models drawn from aggregated survey data, and produce genuinely 
powerful explanations…by demonstrating how the path of causality actually works 
(ibid.).  
5.15.2 Limitations of the Methodology, Instruments and Data Collection 
Social network is best known for its methodology and it is expected that those in the 
field would use the methodology and contribute to its development and advancement 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti, 2003). In its design, the research incorporated 
mainly the theoretical bases of the social network perspective. However, the social 
network methodology was considered to be less appropriate for yielding causal 
explanations where several contextual variables are present. Such a design is well 
served by the traditional tools of qualitative research such as interviews (Borgatti, 
2003). This justification however, does not shield the researcher from the possibility of  
disdain by, and taunts from, social network “purists” who often vehemently argue that 
researchers who use the concepts, but not the full methodology, in analyzing social 
networks engage in a watered down version of network research (Borgatti, 2003). 
The research design was also limited by the selection and implementation of research 
techniques. The interview context is “...one of interaction and relation; the result is as 
much a product of this social dynamic as it is a product of accurate counts and replies 
(Fontana and Frey, 2000, p.647). The accuracy and completeness of responses from 
participants is therefore limited to their interpretation of the interview context and 
139 
 
questions, as it must be recognized that “...interview participants are actively 
constructing knowledge around questions and responses” (Fontana and Frey, 2000, 
p.647). The design also made limited use of participant observation as there was not 
full immersion in all contexts, as in the case of anthropological and ethnographic 
research with less bounded units of analysis (Bernard, 2000). Other limitations of the 
participant observation method were addressed earlier in this chapter.  
While traditional research techniques are used in network analysis (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994; Borgatti, 2003), there is still some concern about the validity and 
reliability of network data collected through verbal reports (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). The researchers suggest that there is a need to have a better understanding of the 
properties of different questions that are used to elicit information from network 
members and the influence of different question response formats. In this study though, 
the researcher varied the traditional network socio-metric question and asked 
respondents to give information on their perceptions of other actors’ network ties. This 
“cognitive social structure” design served to provide more useful information as actors 
reported on their own group ties and the group ties of the other partner in the public-
private relationship (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.52). 
The study was limited by accessibility to respondents and archival data, for interviews 
and document analysis respectively. In the case of accessing respondents, the 
researcher made repeated calls and sent emails to obtain participation. This was done 
over the extended period for data collection from the date the researcher received 
ethical approval to conduct the research (February 23, 2010), to December 2010 when 
data collection ended as was stated in the agreement with participants. Where data was 
limited, the researcher sought the inclusion of other respondents who could contribute 
to the study. The efforts were successful and the data set is considered to be complete 
and useful with respect to the research question.  
The researcher attempted to conduct the interviews face-to-face so that she could 
establish an interviewer-interviewee “relationship” and allow respondents to “live in 
the moment” thereby facilitating richer and more valid data (Hertz, 1997). Data was 
collected in three countries and, as such, the researcher was forced to conduct some of 
the interviews by telephone where respondents’ schedules did not allow for the 
interviews to take place during the period scheduled. Even so, the researcher attempted 
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to build a “relationship” by using a tone and speech that conveyed warmth, 
graciousness and gratitude for their participation. There was no perceived difference in 
the quality of data between interviews conducted by phone and those conducted face-
to-face.  
Participant observation was easily facilitated at the site where the researcher is 
employed; however, the use of this data-gathering tool was limited by the researcher’s 
constrained presence at the other two sites. There was no conceivable way to mitigate 
this, short of requiring participants to keep diaries of important events that could 
contribute to the research. The limitations of the respondents as senior executives did 
not render this feasible.  
5.16 CONCLUSION  
This chapter included an explanation and justification of the research design and the 
process by which the research was conducted. It examined, in logical sequence, the 
design of the study, the processes used to develop the conceptual framework and 
instruments, and procedures used for data collection and analysis. It also explored the 
ethical issues faced in the research design and in the conduct of the research. Finally, 
the chapter included a discussion of the limitations of this scientific research study. The 
following four chapters present the findings and analysis of the individual cases and a 
cross-case analysis from which the researcher attempts to formulate theoretical 
principles concerning social structure in the context of the research and address the 
research questions of the study. The cases are presented in the order in which the 
business schools were established to aid understanding of the evolutionary trajectory.  
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CHAPTER 6: CASE ANALYSIS - GERRAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Gerran Business School evolved from a project which commenced in 1987 at Green 
University in the country of Gerrantown. The business school was established in 1993 
as an institute with a PPP governance mechanism to oversee its operations. The PPP 
structure has functioned consistently over its twenty-three year existence. The business 
school is located within the university campus and is deeply embedded and 
institutionalised within the rules of the Gerrantown campus. The variables and factors 
that influenced the PPP governance arrangement at Gerran are described and analysed 
to produce explanations of how the PPP attained legitimacy.  
In this case, respondents were found to possess mainly university experience, 
experience in business, and a combination of university and private sector experience. 
In the presentation and analysis of the data, respondents are categorised into three 
groups: public, private, and public-private, consistent with their overall type of 
experience. The implications of this classification are discussed where the differences 
between the groups were material to the analysis and impacted the PPP governance 
arrangement. The case analysis is presented in three major sections. The first section 
examines the environment of the partnership and focuses on the country and university 
contexts, isolating the factors that appear to be relevant to the success of the school. 
The second section of the case report focuses on the PPP at the organisational level. 
Factors relevant to the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP are identified and, 
using relational analysis underpinned by a critical realist philosophy, the relationship 
between those factors are examined to determine how they impacted the performance 
of the cross-sectoral model of governance. At the third level, the case examined the 
interactions of sub-groups of actors within the governance structure. Data drawn from 
the case to support the analysis are presented in evidence pods within the relevant 
sections. This presentation format is also used in the other two cases.  
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6.1 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF GERRANTOWN ON THE PPP 
6.1.1 Background to the country  
Gerrantown is a small developing country in the Caribbean. The country gained 
independence from Britain in 1962 and has had a history of political stability over its 
post-independent years. Gerrantown is “...known for its strong sense of self-identity” 
(BBC, 2011) but is still plagued by widespread poverty and crime (ibid.). The country 
has a GNI of US $4,990 (World Bank, 2009, cited in BBC, 2011). Because of “…its 
limited productive capacity, the island nation is heavily dependent on imported goods 
and on foreign debt relief to sustain its struggling economy” (Encyclopedia of the 
Nations, (2011). International migration is high in Gerrantown but this has also 
increased the level of remittances received making it one of the greatest contributors to 
the national GDP (Adams, 2003). In the year 2000, the country had the highest 
migration rate of all developing countries and this was predominantly at the tertiary 
education level (Adams, 2003, p.29). This phenomenon is demonstrative of the 
economic and developmental vulnerability of small island states (Briguglio, 2003; 
Briguglio, 1995).  
6.1.2 Economic, Geographic and Social Vulnerabilities 
Economic and social vulnerabilities resulted from the on-going crisis in the economy, 
dependency on foreign resources and the geographic location of the country within the 
hurricane belt that often caused infrastructure damage with attendant economic costs. 
The country experienced a perpetual scarcity of financial resources in the overall 
economy and this impacted the PPP. The affordability of business education for 
students as individuals, and the limited financing available from the private sector, 
presented challenges for the business school. Market size was limited due to the impact 
of migration on the overall size of the population. The economic context contributed to 
social issues such as crime and poverty, including the associated ills of health 
challenges.  
There were several vulnerabilities that appeared to emanate from the socio-economic, 
historical and geographic context of the country. Despite the contextual challenges, the 
environment was essentially viewed by both actor sub-groups as providing 
opportunities for the business school “…to generate (and) to advance solutions towards 
143 
 
the building of resilience to those vulnerabilities” (#1 Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran). Public 
actors’ concerns emanated from the ability of students to afford fees whereas the 
public-private sub-group was concerned with affordability from the perspective of what 
it meant for the activities of the business school.  
“If you think about an economic side, we are so tremendously dependent 
on resources that are not Gerrantown backed …it affects us so very, very 
badly.” (#1 Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran) 
The absence of a comment from private actors suggested that they did not consider the 
environment as having significant impact on the success of the business school.  
6.1.3 Competitive Environment of Business Education 
The geographic proximity of the country to the metropolis, the open economy, and the 
largely unregulated education market facilitated the entry of providers that were more 
robust and in a better resource position. Despite this, it appeared that Gerran was able 
to find its space within the market and establish its brand. This may have been 
externally influenced by the strong cultural self-identity amongst citizens of Gerran and 
internally by its organisational presentation to the market as a privately managed 
institute of Green University backed by renowned people on its board of directors.  
The concern for the survival of the business school in its highly competitive 
environment was shared by respondents in all sub-groups. This factor appeared to be 
positioned as a constraint more than an opportunity for the business school, although 
the business opportunity was overtly acknowledged by university actors. One actor 
noted: 
“…there was a business opportunity because this business school has 
been established as a private company” (#3 Pub/Director, Gerran). 
Business was seen as an opportunity to earn profits and this drove the competition to 
provide business education. In one case, the familiarity of university actors with the 
region was viewed as an ‘inimitable’ resource that could favourably position the 
business school amongst its competitors (Barney, 1988; Peteraf, 1993, p.188; Barney, 
1991). Evidence of this is presented in Table 10. All actor sub-groups lamented the 
extent of competition in Gerrantown.  
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Table 10: Respondents’ Comments on the Competitive Environment 
Public “Certainly competition is often strongest in the business training and education area… given 
the belief that business education is the key to a BMW or SUV, based on your preference” (#2 
Pub Director, Gerran). 
Private  “…recognising the increased competition, I don’t know if you know what is happening in 
Gerrantown where all the…everybody is here now and the day when Gerran was the only 
business school offering an MBA (is) far-gone!” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran). 
 
6.1.4 Small World Effect 
In the small country of Gerrantown, social distance was greatly reduced and this may 
have perpetuated the “small world effect” (Newman, 2000, p.1; Kochen, 1989) that 
may have influenced the cognitive social structure and behaviours of actors. The short 
social distance between people in the society was demonstrated in the structure of the 
Board of Directors and it was suggested that they “…all seem to be sort of cut off from 
the same cloth!” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). In the wider environmental context of the 
country, the prominence of directors, as leaders of government and large businesses 
appeared to positively influence the acceptance and legitimacy of the PPP, thereby 
aiding in building the brand within the society. The small world effect appeared to be a 
feature of the society and, as such, a reality of the working environment of business 
school graduates. The implications of the small world for governance, curriculum 
responsiveness and the profile of the business school graduate were articulated by 
respondents as follows:  
“You have to understand too, you know, that it is a very small society! 
People come to the table knowing people, understanding their position, 
respecting their contribution and...they also (take) on board with the 
governance architecture…they also have other objectives to fulfil.” (#4 
Pub Director, Gerran) 
“[The reality of] working in the Caribbean is the fact that very quickly 
you get to the top. …You know you were supposed to be a. the guru on 
the one hand and b. who the hell do you think you are on the other 
hand.” (#1 Pub/Priv Director, Gerran) 
The comments of respondents with respect to the small word effect appeared to reside 
on a continuum of implications from positive and supportive to negative and 
deterministic. The challenge to business education in the region was underscored by the 
respondent who ventured that the business school must produce graduates who are able 
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to take immediate control of business enterprises. Overall, the existence of the small 
world effect held implications for the relationships in the PPP and is considered in the 
explanations developed.  
6.1.5 Risk-Averse Business and Regional Isolation 
 Gerrantown is a member of CARICOM. Respondents commented on the lack of 
integration of the society within the Caribbean region and the resulting sense of 
isolation from the rest of the region. The separation from the region appeared to 
emanate from socio-economic and historical factors in the development of the region in 
general, with some attribution to the actions of the leadership of Gerrantown. There 
also appeared to be perceptions of opportunistic behaviours by the business sector in 
some countries more capable of regional expansion. 
“Lack of regional integration and ability to benefit from regional 
instruments is also …because of our own failing …to address the 
weaknesses in the Gerrantown economy.” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran) 
The impact of isolation and the overall social, economic and cultural factors in the 
society prevented collaborative efforts between businesses in Gerrantown and the 
private sector across the region. One respondent noted the lack of competitiveness and 
innovation across the Caribbean and this may have been partly attributed to lack of 
regional co-operation. More importantly, the loss of opportunity of regional integration 
weakened the private sector which engaged in risk-averse business. This increased the 
distance between sectors, including between academia and business. Respondents 
noted: 
“the sense that one gets is that they’re (private businesses) not 
adventurous… Basically, most people just lend money to Gerrantown 
government and got big returns.” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran) 
 
Respondents indicated that despite the offering of the university, business was 
perceived as lacking innovation and maintained the status quo across the region.  
6.1.6 Summary: Influence of the Country Context on the Partnership 
Private sector actors in particular, saw the environment as a source of opportunity, 
engendering personal commitment. One respondent commented: 
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“Well it makes the school…it almost makes me paranoid and in my 
view paranoid is the best antidote to complacency. The rate at which 
things happen in Gerrantown forces the school to always be on the 
lookout for embracing change, recognizing the external dynamics. You 
are not forced into almost a false cocoon because of the environment 
you are in.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran)  
The directors saw the opportunity for the business school “… to be in the forefront in 
providing support to public sector and private sector, to get out of particular situations, 
to guide them through particular situations” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran). It was noted 
though that the most important consideration for the Board of Directors was “how” to 
influence the transformation.  
Overall, the directors were in agreement with the analysis of the vulnerabilities and 
challenges of the context and this therefore provided a common point of departure with 
respect to the business school agenda. Respondents appeared to link the country’s 
development concerns and agenda to the purpose and responsibility of the business 
school. The smallness of size and the resulting reduced social distance appeared to 
create a sense of personal and collective responsibility for all categories of actors, 
suggesting a network culture that is influenced by the culture and contextual variables 
(Fuhse, 2009). This appeared to positively influence the relationship between actors in 
the governance structure and it appeared that the cultural embeddedness of actors at 
Gerran Business School in the context of Gerrantown provided the business school 
with opportunities for building trust and acting in concert (Dequech, 2003; Zukin and 
DiMaggio, 1990). The extent to which actors in the PPP considered environmental 
factors as critical to strategy will be considered in a later sub-section of the case report. 
The second major consideration in the analysis of the external environment in this 
study is the context of the University in which the PPP was embedded.  
6.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, GERRANTOWN CAMPUS 
The first campus of Green University was established by Royal Charter in Gerrantown 
in 1948. The University serves the Caribbean region and includes fifteen contributing 
countries, all of which are English speaking as current or former colonies of Great 
Britain. The University’s administration is headed by a vice-chancellor and each 
campus is managed by a principal who is also designated ‘Pro-Vice Chancellor’. The 
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extent to which the embeddedness of the PPP in the context of the University presented 
constraints and opportunities to PPP performance is examined in this section.  
6.2.1 Financial Constraints 
Green University, Gerrantown, was publicly funded and university financing was 
limited in the country with on-going economic challenges. The short history of the 
University also resulted in restricted access to endowments and substantial 
contributions from any local sources, including alumni. The concern for financing was 
expressed by all stakeholders but from different concerns about impact. Public actors 
were concerned about survival and, in relation to the environment, affordability of the 
programmes for students. The public-private and private actors examined benchmarks 
and long-term sustainability. This is an area of ideological difference between the 
public and private sector where the private sector is focused on profitability and the 
public sector is concerned about impact on the community (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). 
Respondents’ comments on the financial constraints are presented in Table 11.  
Table 11: Financial Constraints at Gerrantown Campus 
Public “The most critical concern for the business school was always the financial situation at the 
school and “…whether they’re surviving… (and) paying the bills…” (#5 Pub Director, 
Gerran)  
Private  “Funding is the constraint. The environment is not rich enough, we don’t have a lot of 
benefactors like a Harvard or a Princeton.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran) 
6.2.2 Resource Constraints, Regionalism and Strategic Actions 
The concern for financing appeared to be related to the overall concern for resources 
which led to an examination of the extent to which regional resources within Green 
University are shared. There was a distinct lack of regional co-operation between the 
campuses of the University, including the business schools of each campus. This 
influenced the resources available to Gerran and the competitiveness of Green 
University. Co-operation between the campuses of Green University  across the region 
was encouraged by the University administration, but this goal remained an elusive 
commitment of the University hierarchy.  
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Three related variables in the context appeared to create the need for a search for 
resources outside the country – the smallness of the country and the declining 
population due to migration in the overall context of economic constraints experienced 
by all sectors of the economy reduced the possibility of generating financing from local 
sources. Despite these challenges, it appeared that the “…strong sense of self-identity” 
(BBC, 2009), together with the tradition of income from remittances favoured the 
search for resources among the members of the Gerrantown diaspora and alumni of 
Green University more so than from other regional university partners. Respondents’ 
concerns regarding resource constraints, regionalism and strategic actions at the 
business schools are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12: Respondents’ Views on Resource Constraints and Loss of Regionality  
Public  “One of the issues …I don’t think there is enough concern about is regionalism and 
regional co-operation among the business schools.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Public-
private  
“To the question of governance we have seen a public-private governance internal to 
Gerrantown and a public -private governance internal to Arden, and to Rotterdam. The very 
fact that we are in a sense independent ought to have made it easy for us to come together, 
but for funding issues, for ‘we’re the best issues,’ … you get this kind of noise.” (#1 Pub/ 
Priv Director, Gerran) 
Private  “So raising funds whether through alumni endowments, opportunities for large corporate, 
rich individuals to, naming opportunities to give huge monies is something that we had to 
embark on… (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran) 
 
The optimism with regard to the possibility of drawing resources from the campuses of 
Green University across the region was not shared by actor groups. The private sector 
focused on the models of university endowments as demonstrated in larger universities 
in more developed countries. Strategies suggested by the public-private actors to search 
for resources within the region contrasted with the strategic posturing of private actors. 
The next sub-section examines the contrast between the ‘resources’ of a university and 
the influence of the country context on the use of those resources. This further explains 
the contrast between academic and instrumental resources – “social sense” versus 
“commercial sense” (Ghobadian et al., 2004a, p.298).  
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6.2.3 ‘Town and Gown’ Effect 
The history of management studies at the University influenced the perceptions of the 
business sector and propelled the “town and gown” relationship between academia and 
business (McWilliam et al., 1997, p.307; Bruning et al., 2006). It appeared that the 
general problems of disseminating research results (Crosswaite and Curtice, 1994; 
Wandersman et al., 2008) and building community-university relationships was further 
exacerbated by factors unique to the small, developing country context. 
Communication is influenced by socially and culturally constructed conceptions and 
values (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972). In the case of 
Gerrantown, discourse generally used for public education via the media appeared to be 
negatively viewed within the university community suggesting that the power distance 
between academia and the lay population was wide (Fairclough, 2001). This point is 
emphasised in the language of two University respondents, who used lay language in 
emphasising areas for better communication with the private sector and included 
statements such as “boy, this is a possibility” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran) or “well boy, 
come and meet our new graduates, we think this batch is a good group” (#2 Pub 
Director, Gerran). This is an area for further research to examine the influence of the 
developing context on the dissemination of research for public education (Wandersman 
et al., 2008) and the relationship between business research and practice (Wandersman 
et al., 2008). Respondents’ comments on the ‘town and gown’ effect are included in 
Table 13. 
Table 13: Respondents’ Comments on the “Town and Gown” Effect 
Public  “When I was in school going in university, academics frowned on the idea of making their 
work public… putting something in the newspaper or going to a rotary club and make a 
speech …and to some degree the university culture has not changed enough…. because 
you’re a talk show host, you would suffer. Most of them suffer, you can’t become a 
professor!” (#3 Pub/Director, Gerran) 
“So we’re coming back many of us in my age group and older, from the days when the 
businessman was sort of unlettered, crude, uncultured, whatever and he went into business 
because he had no real scholarly potential in getting to alternatives like lawyers, doctors and 
Indian chief academia, and there was an aloofness of academia from business.” (#3 Pub 
Director, Gerran). 
Public-
private 
“The whole business of management training at the university was something that was 
pushed in a sense, certainly in Gerrantown, more by the private sector than by the university, 
because our university’s traditions were such that the teaching of management wasn’t seen as 
something integral to a university and management studies…” (#1 Pub/Priv Director, 
Gerran) 
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The university actors acknowledged the “town and gown” effect openly and, as such, 
this may have positively influenced their interactions and relationship with the private 
sector actors. The state of the private sector in Gerrantown did not inspire confidence in 
a wide sub-set of private actors with respect to the knowledge base of the private sector, 
and as such, also contributed positively to the public-private relationship. The open 
expression of this effect from the public-private and public actors could be attributed to 
two other variables. The interview process itself was more aligned with the 
competencies and professional space of these actors as it gave them the opportunity to 
reflect in an open and relaxed environment. Secondly, it is perhaps indicative of the 
non-threatening relationship between public and private actors. This point is further 
supported by the fact that private actors did not emphasise the town and gown effect.  
6.2.4 Institutional Features of the University System 
6.2.4.1 ‘Oxbridge’ Governance: Ideology, Values and Curriculum 
The ideology, values, curriculum focus and standards of the University appeared to 
contrast starkly with those of the private sector (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). The values 
and research agenda of the University appeared to be inwardly focused, attempting to 
mitigate the historical influences of colonialism and slavery and develop an 
understanding of local society and its challenges. Local knowledge was the purpose of 
the Royal Charter, the instrument used to establish the university in the newly 
independent territory (Bargh et al, 1996) and the University established by Royal 
Charter was expected to be responsive to “…the ‘professional’ needs of an urban and 
industrial society” and represented “…practical efforts to balance the ‘ivory tower’ idea 
of a university with the needs of the community” (Bargh et al., 1996, p.2; author's 
quotation). At Gerran, the University was seen as a response to the challenge of change 
(Sherlock and Nettleford, 1990) and, devoid of the responsibility for financing, which 
was vested in the state, the University developed a governance mechanism that 
resembled the established ‘Oxbridge’ model, its preeminent benchmark (Bargh et al., 
1996, p.2). One respondent noted:  
“What caused the problem in the first place is that the university was, in 
particular its social sciences faculty was isolated from the rest of the 
community. It did not immediately feel its developmental role as one of 
the strategic partnerships with the private sector. The scholarship was 
very negative to the whole private sector ethos and so that had to 
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change, you couldn’t have national development with these two agents, 
at each other’s throats, separate and apart in the same environment, but 
not cooperating and so on…” (#4 Pub Director, Gerran) 
This model became only slightly adapted to include students in the governance 
mechanism, consistent with the governance changes in universities in the UK propelled 
by the “massification” and “marketization” of university education (ibid.).  
The variables associated with the history of the university within the developing 
country context impacted the University agenda. This seemed to influence early 
decisions with regard to the structure of the PPP and the separation of roles and 
responsibilities between private and public actors on the Board of Directors. 
Respondents’ views on the institutionalised ideology of the University are presented in 
Table 14.  
Table 14: Respondents’ Views on Institutionalised Ideology, Values and 
Curriculum Focus 
Public “I’m just speculating though, that part of the decision to make this into a private company in 
an autonomous entity, was to try to get away from the ‘gown’ stigma in the phrase ‘town and 
gown.’” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran) 
“…whenever he comes he says ‘all you guys doing is study(ing) slavery’. That’s what he says 
about the university and the university has a history of association with left politics and a 
hotbed of radicalism and so forth and so on…” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Private  “…we have to beat back that social science dominance! …And the cross culture with the 
university is stifling!” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran) 
 
The extent to which the values and norms of the University was divorced from those of 
the private sector was evident in the opinions expressed by both public and private 
actors. The separation of academia from the society of Gerrantown appeared to give 
impetus to the view held by the University that the gap between its actions and the 
expectations of the society, including business, was indeed too large. The problem was 
felt and expressed in the concerns for development and a deeply felt need on the part of 
the University to engage with its stakeholders.  
The question of how curriculum relevance in business education is attained and how 
the university supports that process appeared to be a main focus of Gerran. The 
importance of the business school to the University with respect to making the 
university relevant to the society was shared by one respondent who indicated:  
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“I’d say relevance, relevance. If we did not have a school of business we 
would be missing out… on contributing to the success and dynamism of 
our societies in ways that would not be excusable!” (#1 Pub Director, 
Gerran) 
The ideology, values and role of the curriculum in business education was a 
predominant factor in this research across all cases. As a participant observer, the 
researcher pondered the question of the relationship between business knowledge and 
academic knowledge and reflected:  
“I had to rethink the relationship between business and university 
knowledge from a “happy marriage” based on what they contribute to 
each other…. Academia presents a process for validating all knowledge 
through the scientific process and mechanism for sharing knowledge 
through education. As such, academia formalises business knowledge 
through research and disseminates it through curriculum processes; 
academia therefore deepens ‘business’ knowledge” (Participant 
Observation).  
This is consistent with the views expressed by Mintzberg (1994) who described the 
inter-relatedness of relevance and rigour, developing each other through different 
processes. The development and utility of this relationship in the interest of 
development appeared to be the focus of the business school.  
6.2.4.2 Faculty Norms in Academia 
The institutional embeddedness (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) of faculty within the 
university environment appeared to negatively impact their ability to engage with the 
private sector. Though the university actors recognised the need for faculty in business 
studies to engage with the private sector, they also noted the extent to which their 
institutionalisation in the university environment and in academia presented challenges 
to them in attaining this goal. The acknowledgement of the limitations of the faculty 
explained by their institutional embeddedness in academia was shared by the public and 
public-private sub-groups. The absence of a comment on this from the private actors 
suggested that they held confidence in the faculty at Gerran School of Business. This 
factor therefore did not appear to present barriers to the PPP governance structure. 
Respondents’ views are presented in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Institutionalisation of Faculty Norms 
Public “The posture of the current (university position) is “… to try and build a higher degree of 
engagement but believe you me, even though he tries, I mean he would probably expect us to 
respond very much more quickly and sort of organically than we can. We just don’t damn 
well know how to do it! We have not spent the last 10, 20, 30 years building and deepening 
relationships with the private sector!” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Public-
private  
“Gerran could be playing a very dynamic role in, at least demonstrating to Gerrantown 
society that there are choices and the consequences of choices.” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran) 
6.2.4.3 Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes  
The institutionalised administrative and academic processes of the university contrasted 
with the rules governing the behaviour of actors in the private sector. This difference 
influenced the extent to which the PPP could adopt new systems and processes that 
would facilitate innovation. The realities of the different systems of administration 
appeared to be challenging to private sector actors. Directors noted the extent to which 
institutionalisation of systems and processes within the University presented challenges 
to the PPP. Gerran Business School was the postgraduate department of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences and within the structure of Green University, the programmes were 
offered under“… the aegis of the School for Graduate Studies and Research in order to 
protect its academic integrity” (#2 Pub/Priv, KOA, Gerran). Tensions between 
academic integrity and real world application of knowledge were evident. This was 
described by one respondent who indicated “It’s a graduate degree; it’s something 
where you must be adding value. When I employ some who has an Undergrad, it just 
tells me that you know how to learn. When I employ someone who has a Graduate 
Degree, I expect you to come into my shop now to add value” (#1 Priv Director, 
Gerran). Respondents’ further comments are int Table 16. 
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Table 16: Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes 
Public “…as in any participating system, had some limitation, how do you put academics and 
business people to work together? Business people are accustomed to taking a decision and it 
is implemented immediately … So I think both sides had to learn…” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran) 
“The university bureaucracy could be onerous, I hate saying so but it is the truth… The 
university is the ultimate democracy. We rule by committee. For a business school, you want 
a business school to operate better like a business, otherwise I mean, you want it in fact to be 
a business, to be a corporation in many respects.” (#1 Pub/Director, Gerran) 
Private “I started to say to them, ‘Why aren’t you speaking to the Law School about programs in 
business and law? How do you resolve disputes in a country that doesn’t have a good track 
record with the resolution of disputes, and that they cost!” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran) 
6.2.4.4 ‘Pure’ Versus ‘Applied’ Research  
The University seemed to focus on ‘pure’ versus ‘applied’ research. The long tradition 
of the established practice of scholarship within the University and the limited transfer 
of scholarship to practice, especially in the business setting resulted in a stark divide 
between ‘academic’ and ‘practice’ knowledge. The division was even more evident 
when one respondent demonstrated the challenge to accommodate a public-private 
actor, possessing doctoral qualifications and several years of university experience, 
within the conceptualisation of ‘academic’ indicating: “But I don’t know if he’s an 
academic, he’s a senior manager” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). The conceptualisation of 
‘academic’ in this case derived from engagement in the practices of curriculum and 
‘pure’ research with the associated publications as opposed to management. This is 
demonstrative of the gap between the activities of academics and practitioners which, 
to be bridged in the university system, requires the management of academic activity 
where the display of managerial competencies is underpinned by experience gained 
from engagement in teaching and research (Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). 
Respondents’ views are in Table 17.  
155 
 
Table 17: Effects of Institutionalisation of ‘Pure’ versus ‘Applied’ Research 
Public “…it’s what we do as academics. Some academics really philosophically and consciously 
retreat from the decision making process. They say ‘I’ll give you the results and give you the 
data, you make the decision.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran) 
“I mean I have a student who runs a business that goes out and gives advice to people and 
…end up saving them millions of dollars …In a sense she is an academic, except, that is, she 
don’t write paper!” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Private “…research to what end? I know in academia, you are awarded for research but is it 
something that you can apply?” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran) 
 
Despite the nomenclature and classifications, public actors appeared to hold respect for 
people in the private and public sectors whose actions produced results for the firm and 
country. Public actors appeared to value the need for relevance of research to the 
business sector and the need for appropriate mechanisms for dissemination. The fact 
that the public-private actors did not make this point suggested their appreciation for 
both research forms and perhaps an understanding of how they relate to each other. The 
importance of research and the way it was conducted by faculty was discussed at a 
Board of Directors meeting held while the researcher was present at the site for data 
gathering. One private respondent recalled this event and indicated that:  
“You understand, as private sector. Yeah you’re doing research but what 
is that research adding value to: the private sector, the development of 
this country, the region? And again, we are reminded by the academia 
you can’t force people. They choose their research. I said okay ... So you 
see I have to learn.” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran) 
In this comment, the private actor appeared to be positioned as a passive recipient and 
suggested acceptance of the fact that it was necessary to learn how academia functions, 
but not to challenge it. This is a point for further examination of practice within PPP 
arrangements to determine if there was unquestioned acceptance of the way in which 
academia functioned and, therefore, the need for the PPP to function within those 
parameters. Again, in this comment, the development agenda at all levels was the 
concern, rather than only business or private success.  
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6.2.5 Summary: Influence of the University on the PPP 
The PPP governance structure at Gerrantown was linked to the overall disconnect 
between academia and business. The governance mechanism was established to 
transcend barriers in the university-business divide and build relationships with the 
private sector. The concerns were readily acknowledged by the respondents from the 
University. Yet, they also appeared to respect the University and noted its importance 
in the environment. Further, the relationship between the business school and the 
Gerrantown campus appeared to be positive and symbiotic and, as such, presented 
opportunities for the mutual benefit of both institutions in their continued development. 
All sub-groups of actors concurred with the view that the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors should be drawn from the private sector and that a larger private sector 
representation was required in the governance structure. At this level, the analysis of 
social networks yielded variables that informed the explanations of how the PPP 
worked.  
6.3 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF PPP - GERRAN  
The University viewed the relationship with the private sector as a mechanism to bridge 
the gap and contribute to the attainment of its social purpose. From the perspective of 
the business school, the relationship with Green University “…provides Gerran with its 
broad institutional identity and reputation, as well as the framework for its governance 
structure and quality control mechanisms” (Gerran School of Business, 2010, p.5). The 
inclusion of the private sector in the governance arrangement impacted the governance 
structure and strategy of the business school.  
6.3.1 Purpose: Strategic Developmental Organisation 
The business school was established to develop management competencies and address 
the education needs of business within the country and region. The engagement of the 
private sector was deliberate and the partnership was approached from the pragmatic 
purpose of development and responsiveness to business on the part of the University 
(Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). The instrumental link between the education and 
development purpose of the PPP served to assert the concern for the social good in the 
process. The primacy of the university in the relationship was recognised by the 
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business school which “…responded to the management development needs of the 
country as well as the mandate of its parent institution, Green University” (Gerran 
School of Business, June 2010, p.5) and acted as an “…outreach arm of the University” 
(Amended Memorandum of Association, 1998, p.1). The wider inclusion of the region 
was reflected in the mission statement of the organisation “…to produce world-class 
transformational leaders equipped to shape the economic development of the 
Caribbean” (ibid.). The assumption of responsibility for the growth and development of 
the business sector and the wider region places the business school in the category of 
strategic developmental organisations (Khandwalla, 1990; Khandwalla, 1988). In this 
context, the PPP governance relationship was informed by the way in which partners 
understood the purpose and as such, their involvement in the processes of governance.  
6.3.2 Motivation for a Separate Organisation  
The institutionalised governance mechanism at Green University, Gerrantown 
comprised committees and councils. The bureaucracy that was institutionalised in the 
university governance structure was a major determinant of the decision for a separate 
business school. Further, the university governance mechanism was restrictive with 
respect to private sector participation, presenting a wide gap between the University 
and the private sector in the level of control over targets, scope of operations and other 
ideological and working practices normally adopted by private managers and 
executives in the conduct of business (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). This appeared to be 
one of the reasons for the establishment of Gerran as a private company. This legal 
form and the installation of a board of directors of representative stakeholders altered 
the organisational form of the PPP by including elements of public and private purpose, 
structure and strategy in which the governance mechanism functioned. 
6.3.3 Bridging the Relationship Gap  
In a strategic alliance of public and private actors, it is necessary to determine how 
actors view their purpose, as their understanding of the purpose of collaborative 
alliances influences their contribution to its success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; 
Austin, 2000). Actors in all sub-groups held the shared purpose of bridging the gap 
between the University and the private sector and this influenced their contribution to 
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its success (Austin, 2000; Gulati, 1995). One University respondent affirmed the 
purpose: 
“…the motivation behind it was the intention of the university to serve 
the business community much better than it had done.” (#1 Pub KOA, 
Gerran) 
The purpose of the business school to provide a relevant university education was 
therefore linked to the understanding that the involvement of business actors in the 
governance structure would bridge the gap between the University and the private 
sector in several ways. The inclusion of private sector directors therefore appeared to be 
taken for granted and one director expressed this when asked about the motivation of 
the University for including private sector directors on the Board:  
“…I know you’re asking me a rhetorical question but I think the simple 
reason is that the university recognized, particularly in the field of 
business, it was important or, as part of the outreach process, it was 
important as part of a way of informing the policy direction, informing 
curriculum development, a way of ensuring relevance.” (#3 Pub 
Director, Gerran) 
The structure was seen as a mechanism for demonstrating respect for business and 
consideration of their needs in the academic activities of the business school. One 
respondent noted this and also emphasised that the University approached the problem 
from an empowered rather than a deficit perspective. 
“You need to know what people want and it’s not to say that our 
curriculum, our scholarship and so on, is going to be entirely demand 
driven, and it’s not to say that we won’t have something to bring. Quite 
the contrary! But I think it gives us a certain relevance to be able to 
engage and it shows respect for the private sector, what they have been 
able to do and what they have been able to achieve.” (#3 Pub Director, 
Gerran) 
6.3.3.1 Building Relevance to Business and Addressing Development 
There was strong agreement among all actors that the purpose of the business school 
was to build the relationship through relevant curriculum programmes and research. In 
so doing, it was believed that there must be both ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research and that 
with respect to programmes, there was a role for the contribution of the University in 
ensuring programme relevance. One respondent made the point that both Mode 1 and 
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Mode 2 research was important to the University but appeared to link Mode 2 in the 
context (Gibbons, 1994; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Huff and Huff, 2001). 
“I believe that, although we don’t disavow blue sky research, what we 
do want to promote are programmes that are going to be relevant to the 
Caribbean society.” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran) 
The applicability of research to the development of society in general, and of business 
in particular, was noted by other respondents who indicated:  
“...we should also use that knowledge in a way which advances the 
development of the country and in the case of business schools, the 
development of businesses, advances businesses!” (#3 Pub Director, 
Gerran) 
The organic linking of business and national development required that the business 
school undertake curriculum and research activities to develop managers who 
possessed the “methodological rigor” that deepens thinking and reflection and the 
“intellectual rigor” required for relevance in business (Mintzberg 1994, p.399). Further, 
it required that graduates also possess an orientation to society as a source of business 
opportunity which must be approached with ethical and responsible action. The extent 
to which the PPP governance mechanism, in its structure and articulation of its purpose, 
was aligned with this outcome is discussed in the following sections. 
6.3.4 Private Sector Motivation and Public Sector Obligation in a Co-Operative 
Model 
The motivation of partners in PPP arrangements for engaging in the partnership directly 
influences the framework for collaboration and the mechanisms by which they create 
value (Davies and Hentschke, 2006). At Gerran, the motivation of the private sector to 
engage in the partnership was related to three main factors –the positive reputation of 
the University, the struggling economic context of Gerrantown, and the related need for 
high quality human resources for businesses to grow. Respondents concurred that the 
private sector was anxious to build a relationship with the University in order to bring 
skills and technical knowledge to the workforce from the activities of the business 
school. The reputation of the University, propelled by the fact that many of the private-
sector directors were graduates of the institution, was also a factor that motivated 
directors to engage in the partnership. The University instilled pride among private 
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sector directors, and this, coupled with the strong sense of self-identity (BBC, 2011) of 
the society, would have also influenced their commitment to its institutions.  
Public sector involvement in the Board of Directors, however, was based on the 
position held within the structure of the University. As such, University directors were 
appointed by virtue of position and motivation was limited by this factor, amounting to 
the discharge of an obligation. Four employees of the University indicated that they 
were not very engaged in the activities of the business school. There was evidence of 
personal motivation on the part of public actors but that too was propelled by the 
institutional rules of the University. It was acknowledged that contributing to the Board 
of Directors was an opportunity to provide service which enhanced promotional 
opportunities.  
Despite their appointment based on position held within the University and overt 
confession of non-engagement in the PPP governance, the University directors 
appeared to support the initiative. This was seemingly influenced by the shared 
commitment of all directors to the purpose of the success of the business school and the 
development agenda. The collaborative mechanism reflected a model of co-operation 
(Berliner, 1997) and suggested supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004) 
in that there was contribution by partners to the work of the organisation, aimed at a 
shared vision. The motivation of partners, however, influenced ‘what’ and ‘how’ they 
contributed within the governance structure and this will be discussed in the next 
section. Respondents’ comments on their motivation for partnering are given in Table 
18. 
Table 18: Motivation and Approach to the Partnership 
Public “… the private sector was perhaps more anxious to change the nature of the position of the 
relation of mistrust, of antagonism, of dispel and the search for legitimacy.” (#4 Pub 
Director, Gerran) 
“…it’s part of the job, I would say. I have never considered the alternative of not being on 
the Board.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Private “…we are getting entrepreneurial skills and so on, by the, what business school does … So 
they’re getting a massive return for their investment.” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran) 
“… I have always admired the Gerran School of Business as a business school. Everything 
pointed in a positive favour in terms of me wanting to be on the board of Gerran.” (#2 Priv 
Director, Gerran) 
“For us it’s a learning as well. It’s a fact that we feel as if we’re giving back and a number of 
the members are former graduates of the university.” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran) 
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6.3.5 University Ownership and Control 
6.3.5.1 Social Network at Establishment  
The network of actors involved in the establishment of the business school is presented 
diagrammatically in Figure 9. In this network, the ties between actors were all 
professional ties in that all actors were employees of Green University, Gerrantown 
Campus. The actors associated with the units and departments of Gerrantown Campus 
are displayed relationally with the symmetrical ties indicating continued relationships 
between nodes. For example, Tony Wong was instrumental only in the establishment of 
the organisation but did not have any substantive working tie to the organisation after it 
was established. In the case of Quinn Freddy, the actor was linked to both the Faculty 
of Social Sciences and Gerran Business School in an ongoing relationship. Red 
connectors are used to demonstrate the hierarchical relationship between structures at 
the Gerrantown campus. The length of ties has no significance in the network and only 
relates to the convenience of representing the data.  
Figure 9: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Gerran  
 
 
162 
 
6.3.5.2 Control by Ownership and Right of Appointment 
The impetus to establish the business school originated from within the University, 
motivated by the existence of the new programme introduced within the funded project 
and the practical demands of providing continued postgraduate management education. 
The governance of the business school therefore included a dense network of 
University actors from its conception. This was emphasised by one respondent who 
indicated that: “…from the word go, the Gerran programme was an integral part of the 
Faculty” (#2 Pub/Priv, KOA, Gerran). The University created a new organisational 
structure to give the project some degree of autonomy and flexibility with respect to the 
bureaucracy of University control.  
This network demonstrates the influence of the University in the establishment of 
Gerran Business School. The density of public actors was greater than that of public-
private actors. Actors from the private sector were not present at the time the business 
school was established. This created a network identity that was reflective of the 
institutionalised processes of Green University, Gerrantown (Fuhse, 2009). The control 
and ownership by the University appeared to be maintained over the evolution of the 
PPP but did not limit the future forms of the network which, in the current period, 
included a majority representation of private actors on the Board of Directors. This 
contrasts with the finding of Granovetter (1992) that the historical network structure 
limits the forms future ones can take. Although control was established by legal 
provisions, the commitment of directors’ was motivated by commitment to purpose, 
driven by environmental factors, which superseded the importance of the legal 
mechanism.  
6.3.5.3 Structure of the Current Board of Directors: Social and Professional Ties  
The Board of Directors at Gerran Business School at the time the research was 
conducted comprised fourteen members with four University directors, eight private-
sector directors, one executive in residence and a student representative. Table 19 
presents the structure of the Board of Directors and factors considered in the 
appointment of members. 
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Table 19: Appointment of the Board of Directors 
 University Directors Private Sector Directors Executive in 
Residence 
Student 
Representative 
Number  4 8 1 1 
Rationale for 
selection  
Position held in the 
University including 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Principal, Executive 
Director and Dean of the 
Faculty of Social 
Sciences and the 
Company Secretary. 
Position of influence in 
private or public sector. 
Included representatives 
of the Private Sector 
Organisation, 
Government, and 
various industry sectors 
This is a position 
that is indicative 
of the tendency 
of the Board to 
appoint persons 
who can 
contribute 
particular 
competencies to 
the Board 
Appointed by 
the Board of 
Directors on an 
annual basis. 
Period of 
appointment  
The post is held “...for 
such time as they hold 
the substantive post 
within the University…” 
(Articles of Association, 
1995, p.5).  
‘…for a period of TWO 
YEARS … (Articles of 
Association, 1995, p.2; 
capitalisation in 
original). 
Two years  One year  
How selected 
and appointed  
Appointed by virtue of 
position held within the 
University. The Director 
is replaced when he no 
longer holds the position 
Appointed by the Vice-
Chancellor based on 
recommendations from 
the Board  
  
Appointment 
of Chairman  
Held by Principal of the 
University until 2008  
Decision taken by the 
Board of Directors in 
2008 to appoint the 
Chairman from among 
private sector directors  
  
 
In relation to the ratio of actor sub-groups, the number of private sector actors in the 
current, as opposed to the historical, network appears to contrast with the finding of 
(Gulati, 1998) whose study of strategic alliances demonstrated that “…the social 
networks of prior ties not only influenced the creation of new ties but also affected their 
design, their evolutionary path, and their ultimate success” (p.294). In the context of the 
small developing country, the professional ties to which Gulati (1998) referred are 
replaced by social ties. Selection to the Board of Directors was based on the previous 
performance, prominence and positions of actors in the society in a model of 
governance based on stakeholder engagement.  
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6.3.5.4 Stakeholder Model of Governance and the Common Good 
In the act of moving the project out of the Department and creating a new 
organisational structure to manage the postgraduate management offerings, the 
Business School adopted many of the institutional structures and processes of the 
Gerran campus of Green University in which it was deeply embedded (Myers and 
Sacks, 2003). The committee model of governance, with participation based on 
hierarchical positions was retained. Given the requirements of a private establishment, 
the format for presentation of the governance structure was the Board of Directors. The 
governance architecture included representative stakeholders. The configuration 
included staff, university leadership and representatives of private sector organisations 
and industries. The initial statement on including the private sector ‘…from time to 
time’ (#4 Pub Director, Gerran), suggested that in the stakeholder model of 
engagement, private sector representatives were selected based on representation of an 
industry or sector. This criterion for inclusion of private actors was consistent with the 
stakeholder model of governance, similar to the rationale for inclusion of students in 
the massification of education (Bargh et al., 1996). This conflagration of purposes 
within the same governance model may have impacted the contribution of private 
sector actors as, in the mid-stage of the evolution of the business school, private 
contribution would have congealed into the existing hierarchical form of governance 
and administrative authority which was evident at the establishment of the school. This 
model of stakeholder representation, however, appeared to be accepted by directors 
who opined that representatives brought the right mix of skills to the Board. The extent 
to which representatives acted as individuals or in concert with their private sector 
colleagues was not evident from the research and presents an area for further research. 
This model, however, would have contributed to the building of internal ‘cognitive 
legitimacy’ for the PPP within the University (Bitektine, 2011).  
The model of including representative stakeholders on the Board of Directors appeared 
to be embedded in the committee model of governance employed by the University. 
This recognition of the importance of addressing the “individual good” of the bodies 
that stakeholders represent excludes the conception of a “common good” but recognises 
the possibility of a “common interest” as the sum of all the individual interests 
(Argandoña, 1998, p.1094). The development of the governance model is explained by 
stakeholder theory which “…is intended both to explain and to guide the structure and 
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operation of the established corporation…and views the corporation as an 
organizational entity through which numerous and diverse participants accomplish 
multiple, and not always entirely congruent, purposes” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, 
p.70). The transition of the purpose of the business school from serving individual or 
collective interests of stakeholders to a shared purpose of development, defined as the 
“common interest” and good of society appeared to be related to the control of the 
governance mechanism and management of relationships by the University. Evidence 
of the stakeholder model of governance is presented in Table 20. This factor appeared 
significant with respect to eliciting commitment by all directors on the Board to the 
purpose and actions of the business school.  
Table 20: Evidence of the Stakeholder Model of Governance 
Public “…we have often had representatives from the Ministry of Finance…Bank of Gerran… 
the commercial sector…the banking and financial sector… And also I would say from 
private sector organisations… So it’s been a mix.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran) 
Private “…the board structure is important. It’s not just private sector, but it’s private sector with 
specific type of expertise that is also brought into the board level.” (#1 Priv Director, 
Gerran) 
Document 
analysis  
(Legal 
control by 
the 
University)  
The legal instruments that established the company and the Board of Directors prescribed 
the limits with respect to the number of persons on the Board of Directors and the 
relationship between the University and Gerran Business School. The Directors in actor 
groups and the number from each sub-group were defined in the Articles of Association 
and included: “The Principal…or his nominee; TEN members of the…Private and Public 
Sectors; SIX members of the academic and/or administrative staff of the University…and 
the Executive Director…” (Articles of Association, Gerran Institute of Business Limited, 
December 6, 1995). This structure did not give control to the University through the 
number of Directors from within the institution. Rather, the legal instruments placed 
legal control with the University through control of appointments to the Board of 
Directors and included the following statements:  
“(b) The Board of the Institute shall comprise not more than eighteen members who shall 
include a majority of members in whose appointment the Vice-Chancellor and the 
Principal of the Gerrantown Campus have concurred” (Ordinance 31, The Gerran 
Institute of Business, p.80).  
“(e) The appointment of the Director of the Institute by the Board shall have the prior 
approval of the University” (ibid.).  
Document 
Analysis  
(Showing 
Support of 
the 
University)  
With respect to financial arrangements, the Affiliation Agreement stated that “The 
Institute undertakes the responsibility of meeting its expenses without prejudice of the 
right of the Institute to accept any grants, loans or other resources from the University 
which the University may offer.” (Instrument of Affiliation, Gerran Institute of Business 
and Green University, dated July 02, 1993, p.3) 
The provision for academic staff by the University was noted in the Instrument of 
Affiliation which stated “3. (a). The University undertakes that it will….provide 
members of academic staff, in such numbers and in such grades as the Institute may 
require, to carry out the academic functions of the Institute” (Instrument of Affiliation, 
Gerran Institute of Business and Green University, dated July 02, 1993, p.2). The 
Institute was expected to reimburse the University “…all or part of the cost…” of 
providing such academic staff (ibid., p.3. (b)). 
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6.3.6 Outcomes of Governance: Strategy Facilitated by Trust 
6.3.6.1 University Supportiveness and Trust  
The relationship between the public and private sectors on the Board of Directors 
reflected the support of the University for the strategic direction of the business school. 
The arrangements outlined in the Affiliation Agreement defined the division of 
responsibilities and roles of each organisation which demonstrated University support. 
Areas of support included programme arrangements and financial buffering through the 
provision of infrastructure including faculty and buildings. In its evolution the Business 
School relied less on the University for financial support and this would have 
contributed to its internal ‘socio-political legitimacy’ within the University.  
6.3.6.2 Commitment to Competitiveness 
The University held the view that the Business School must “…operate better like a 
business …to be a corporation in many respects” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran). As such, it 
was expected that it must be managed as a business without reliance on public funding. 
The company was seen as “…an institution which would be separate and distinct from 
the normal administration of the University and an institution in which the business 
community could play a more effective role and a larger role in the decision-making 
process” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran). The structure of the governance mechanism 
established in this context retained the primacy of the University and accommodated 
private participation in the role of engaged stakeholders. The functioning of the PPP 
governance mechanism based on the structure and directors’ understanding of its 
purpose is explained in the sub-sections that follow. The first sub-section examines the 
social network of KOAs at Gerran.  
6.3.6.3 Hierarchical Control and Trust among Actors 
The social network of KOAs of Gerran Business School is presented in Figure 10. This 
network provided data with respect to the density of actor sub-groups in the 
professional network of KOAs. This data enabled the researcher to make inferences 
with respect to actor sub-group contribution to the school’s development. This network 
represents the professional social network of four of the nine KOAs who held these 
positions throughout the history of the school. The network includes the top four people 
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on the Board of Directors that respondents identified as providing significant 
professional support to them in the management of the School. Where respondents 
indicated more names, these were included in the network. Order of priority was not a 
factor in this network. The selection of KOAs was based on access and availability of 
persons to the researcher. The length of ties is not significant in this network and is 
used for convenience in the presentation of the data. All names are fictitious.  
Figure 10: Social Network of KOAs - Gerran 
 
The network includes seven people from the private sector, four people with public-
private experience and four people from the University. The density of actor sub-group 
appears distributed and non-homophilous (McPherson et al., 2001; Lazarsfeld and 
Merton, 1954) and there is no indication that any KOA relied on the professional 
support of people based primarily on their sectoral experience. As such, it may be 
inferred that the flow of resources from alters in the network increased the social capital 
of KOAs and the performance of the network. In this network, KOAs were from all 
sectors and every KOA sought professional support from at least one other KOA, who 
in only one case belonged to the same sector. The professional support from other 
KOAs indicates the strength of the professional relationship between actors from within 
the University and a reliance of the PPP on hierarchy and control by authority within 
the University. This, however, did not appear to negatively influence the formation of 
relationships with private actors. In fact, the density of the private sector actors in the 
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networks indicates they were strongly engaged in the key decisions and direction of the 
school. This form of engagement appears to be explained by a resource-based view of 
the firm where the KOA draws resource support from the network to maximise the 
value of alliance partners (Gulati, 1999) and build competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Barney et al., 2001). An alternative explanation of control and dominance by 
alliance partners within the small strategic network is contested by the assertion of one 
KOA who indicated that “…one of the things they definitely do is get out of the way 
and allow me to manage, and I respect that a lot” (#1 Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran). 
6.3.6.4 Primacy of the University System, Role Definition and Trust as Control 
Mechanisms 
The new company form changed the roles and expectations of both the university and 
private sector actors. The way in which the new form of governance included elements 
of price, authority and trust, which are the ideal types of market, network and hierarchy 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989), influenced its performance. Respondents were alert to this 
and considered the co-ordination of the new system: 
“The decision certainly was taken at Gerran then to create a company, so 
the Gerran School of Business is a company as you know and there was 
then the need to a. to unambiguously identify the role and authority of 
the University in this the scheme of things and there was also a need to 
identify the role and authority of the private sector” (#1 Pub/ Priv 
Director, Gerran). 
Having established roles within the legal framework, the PPP appeared to have 
functioned in a manner by which trust evolved.  
Studies of alliances in all sectors have asserted that trust is important to the success of 
partnerships (e.g. Larson, 1992; Cross and Parker, 2004; Austin, 2000). In this case, 
respondents indicated that trust had to be developed and appeared to be facilitated by 
the control of the University through the non-reliance on private funding and control of 
appointments to the Board of Directors by the University. This structure is consistent 
with the conclusion that hierarchical mechanisms must co-exist with other forms of 
control in network governance (Eccles, 1985; Stinchcombe, 1985; Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Ingraham and Lynn, 2004) and contrasts with the finding of Rondinelli and 
London (2003) that mutually developed collaboration procedures are indicators of trust. 
In this case, the reputation and developmental trajectory of the PPP appeared to have 
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instilled trust from the private sector. In the context of scarce financial resources within 
the country, the search for financing depended more on the competency of private 
directors to source and manage funds and contributions, rather than the injection of 
their own funds. Working with the funds of a third party ensured that there was no issue 
of private control or domination and this appeared to engender trust of the private 
sector from the University actors.  
6.3.6.5 Shared Control and Unity of the Corporate Body  
Control of the new governance structure by the University created a culture of 
collaboration based on an overall appreciation of the value of stakeholder input and a 
governance form that was configured as a traditional university committee and 
designed to elicit stakeholder involvement and resource contribution. Moreover, the 
resource contribution expected from private sector actors was primarily their 
knowledge of the private sector in general and of their industries in particular, and what 
academic knowledge was necessary for their development. Additionally, private sector 
actors were expected to contribute to the development of the private sector through 
relationship building and advocacy, ensuring that the private sector was more receptive 
and placed greater value on university inputs to their businesses. This purpose was 
articulated by both the private and public sector actors and constituted a shared 
understanding that contributed to the perpetuation of the partnership.  
Dodd (1932, p.1160) contested the ideas of a business executive, Owen D. Young, and 
claimed that: 
“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not 
simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are 
fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they 
are...trustees for an institution (with multiple constituents) rather than 
attorneys for the stockholders” (1932, p.1160; author's parentheses). 
 This statement was extended by (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) to include the phrase 
‘with multiple constituents’ to accommodate the notions of shared responsibility in 
governance and the development of stakeholder theory. The findings of this study 
further extend the statement to account for the notion of shared purpose amongst 
stakeholders in PPP arrangements as follows:  
“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not 
simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers [and Directors] 
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of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual 
members, that they are...trustees for an institution [with multiple 
constituents]…[motivated by a shared, compelling purpose that reflects 
the common good of society].” (Researcher’s italics).  
6.3.7 Private Control of Strategy and Public Ownership  
6.3.7.1 Private-Sector and Academic Actors as ‘Resources’ in Governance 
The academic actors at Gerran generally did not actively participate in the PPP 
arrangements. They were included in the governance structure by virtue of positions of 
influence which could bring administrative convenience within the university processes 
and ensure the control of academic quality. University actors commented on the fact 
that they had an ‘overlapping presence’ indicating “structural equivalence,” which is 
the similarity of nodes in their connections within the network (Lorrain and White, 
1971). The rationale for inclusion of University directors was seen to be the ‘education’ 
of private sector members with respect to how academia functions. The University 
actors’ analysis of their limited role on the Board of Directors appeared to be a 
symptom of understanding the purpose of the organisation and the relevance of their 
own involvement and contribution. Respondents’ views on structural equivalence in the 
network of actors are presented in Table 21.  
Table 21: Respondents’ Views on Structural Equivalence and Relevance  
Public “We had no useful function. It was overlapped and people were there as a matter of right” (#3 
Pub Director, Gerran). 
 “I don’t think that it’s a one size fits all, I think it depends on the particular phase in which 
you are going through… so that in a sense, maybe you could even have a Board with no 
academics so to speak, and it wouldn’t matter, right, so long as the academic issues are going 
to Faculty Board” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). 
 
Academics engaged in the scientific research process develop skills of long-term 
thinking, meta-cognition and analysis (Leshem and Trafford, 2007). These skills are 
developed and demonstrated in a context designed to facilitate argument and counter 
argument amongst peers and colleagues who trust each other’s processes for arriving at 
conclusions and for accommodating differences in the conclusions. This contrasts with 
private sector ‘impatience’, ‘intuition’ and decisiveness. With respect to the PPP, to 
allow the private sector to control and dominate the Board of Directors suggested that 
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the PPP required more private sector logic and strategy at the level of the Board of 
Directors and that the academic as resource would better serve the PPP at other levels. 
It appears that in the evolution of the PPP, the governance structure must also evolve, 
coupling and uncoupling (Weick, 1976) with actor groups based on the stage of 
evolution of the organisation and indeed, of the university in the society in which it 
exists.  
6.3.7.2 Learning and Congealing through Trust 
The context of a shared governance structure between private and academic actors 
presented a network in which transactions between the University and private sector 
actors were either recognised as learning opportunities or opportunities for 
accommodating constraints. The Integrated Model of Network Research proposed by 
Fuhse (2009) is employed to demonstrate the impact of the network on actors and to 
develop a theory of academic contribution to PPP governance. Using this model, the 
Board of Directors in the PPP governance mechanism is the “order principle” that, in 
this case, is the “opportunity” for the interaction of academic and private actors (ibid., 
p.53). The expectations of behaviours of people in the ‘academic’ and ‘private sector’ 
categories inform the “transactions” that take place at the Board of Directors. Cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957) occurs when the behaviour demonstrated in the 
transaction is conceived of as being inconsistent with the expectations of the category. 
This is demonstrated in the opinion of one University director who, with respect to a 
particular activity undertaken by the Board of Directors, expressed the opinion that the 
private sector’s behaviour was becoming indistinguishable from that expected of the 
public sector:  
“…but I’m very surprised at the way the private sector is going with … 
though. I’m not very surprised, I’m just, I am bemused! Because the 
private sector is becoming more bureaucratic than the state sector!” (#2 
Pub Director, Gerran) 
The constraints and learning opportunities presented by the public-private network in 
business schools were discussed by both public and private actors. Private actors felt 
that the presence of the University actors kept them aligned to the realities of working 
in an academic context and with the broader private sector. Respondents’ views are 
presented in Table 22.  
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Table 22: Respondents Views on Learning within the Board of Directors 
Public “…it had to be a mistrust first, institutional learning process where each of the institutions, 
university, the business school is to learn the nuances and the objectives and the aims and so 
on of each other.” (#4 Pub Director, Gerran) 
“…So I think both sides had to learn and …that was one reason I personally remained 
…longer than perhaps I should have because I wanted to make sure that both sides were 
working together” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran). 
Private “We think you can (snaps fingers) introduce it next month and then (we question) ‘why you 
not doing it, other universities doing it, why you not doing it?’ But understanding takes so 
much more and keeping us within the realms of the articles and association and understanding 
the university, because the school is a subset of the overall university and making sure that we 
are properly aligned” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran). 
 
Transfer of learning also took place from Gerran to Green University, Gerrantown, and 
this was noted by all actors. University actors indicated that trust was built by this 
process that emphasised the institutional relationship between the University and the 
business school. This is reflective of the extent to which the business school was 
administratively embedded in the University as an institution (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Private sector actors thought that they contributed their expertise to the business 
school and allowed it to develop a more strategic mode of operation and strategic 
outlook.  
The mitigation of risks to the legitimacy of the business school as it standardised its 
practices was aided by the transfer of learning from the private sector to the business 
school, facilitated by reduced bureaucracy and decentralised management (Meyer and 
Rowan, 2008). The fact that private sector actors did not hold the view that they too 
were learning suggested that the value of academic knowledge was not transferred to 
them, a finding that is consistent with the disengagement of academics from the Board 
of Directors. 
6.3.7.3 Academic Disengagement – Constraints to Academic Resources 
The opportunity of the shared governance structure between private and academic 
actors did not readily accommodate sharing of the ‘resources’ and expertise of 
academic actors in the transactions accommodated by this arrangement. In fact, the 
shared commitment to development, together with ownership and control by the 
university, kept university actors committed to the purpose, though distant from the 
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collaborative governance structure. The governance mechanism whereby the Board of 
Directors met for a few hours on a quarterly basis to provide overall support and 
guidance to management appeared more aligned with the activities of corporate 
governance or “…the general exercise of authority” (Michalski et al., 2001, p.9) in a 
“…system by which the company is directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992, p.14). 
Further, when the Board adopts a strategic role, “…directors guide the definition of the 
corporate mission and are called upon to assist in the development, implementation and 
monitoring of the firm’s strategies (Demb and Neubauer, 1990, p.157). These 
responsibilities and actions contrast with the ethos and conversations of traditional 
committees in universities and was recognised as such:  
“We know how to run sub-committees and committees at the university 
level, Finance and General Purpose and Faculty board and all that kind 
of stuff. Faculty board is not a board. Faculty board for years has been a 
talk shop and I mean, it is a different kind of thing from what you expect 
to happen in a private sector setting.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran) 
It appeared that the conversational space of the governance structure constrained the 
academic actors in several ways. In an analysis of the communication transactions that 
take place between people, Gibson (2000) found that a speaker’s conversational 
agency, which may be understood in the context of PPP governance as the ability of an 
actor to “…carve out a trajectory that could lead to the advancement of…goals,” is 
constrained by structural and situational constraints and not by pre-existing intentions. 
In addition to the traditional one-speaker constraint and the relevance constraint of 
speaking to whatever was just said that governs all conversational discourse (Gibson, 
2000), the inclusion of private directors with contrasting ideologies, coupled with the 
context of quick decision-making, appears to have created a situational constraint in 
which academic actors were subject to additional communication vulnerabilities. 
Despite this, University actors continued to contribute and support the efforts of the 
business school. University actors, though, questioned whether they needed to be on the 
Board to make their contributions. Respondents’ views are presented in Table 23. 
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Table 23: Constraints to Academic Resources in Governance  
Public “And I find that private sector people tend to be impatient with that kind of stuff and…they 
just come and give their report and…not into long talking.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran). 
Public-
Private  
“This is where the public-private sector independence, the school with the board doesn’t 
easily allow for the bridge that is necessary across the board. It doesn’t prevent, it doesn’t 
stop it, but it’s something that I don’t think has happened as much as we would like…I don’t 
know if it is simply because of the Caribbean and its problems.” (#1 Pub/ Priv Director, 
Gerran). 
Private “…natural inclination is almost impatience with puffery…(which) moves away from being 
what the academics are used to, they like to pontificate, maybe. So I think I bring that sort 
of...they say let’s make a decision and quickly.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran). 
 
Despite the restrictions of contributions, general support from all directors appeared to 
be enhanced by the fact that the space of the collaborative governance structure differed 
from the hierarchical administrative space of University committees in that it was not 
“sluggish…inward looking…conservative…and insensitive to resource constraints…” 
(Dearlove, 2002, p.265). In this context, the concern for the fiduciary duties of the 
Board of Directors and the requirement for immediate decisions that must be taken with 
imperfect knowledge appear to be better aligned with the context in which private 
sector leaders and managers function on a daily basis and demonstrate their competence 
essentially through competitive actions. These factors however, appeared to challenge 
the readiness of academic actors to contribute to decision-making.  
In the next section, the actual contributions of public and private actors will be 
discussed and explained. These findings contrast with those of Ansell and Gash (2008) 
who found that factors critical to the success of collaborative governance include face-
to-face dialogue and the development of commitment and shared understanding. 
Departing from the work of Fuhse (2009), the findings and explanations lead the 
researcher to propose the theory that the order principles embodied in PPPs as 
governance mechanisms in the context of business schools constrains the participation 
of directors embedded in academic institutions. The findings present an opportunity for 
further research that analyses the communication content of PPPs to determine how 
interactions of partners address the constraints of the governance context.  
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6.3.8 Cognitive Social Structure in Governance of Gerran  
The cognitive social structure of the main contributors on the Board of Directors to the 
strategy of the School is presented in Figure 11. In this affiliated network, respondents 
were asked to name, among existing and past directors, the top four people who 
contributed to the strategy of the school. This network was constructed to obtain the 
overall perceptions of sub-group contribution to the strategy of the school and to 
provide data regarding the cognitive social structure of the Board of Directors. Names 
have not been included in this network in order to protect the anonymity of respondents 
and actors.  
The frequency with which private sector actors are named in this network is seventeen; 
public actors numbered seven, and people with a public-private background were 
named fourteen times. This indicates that respondents felt that private and public 
contributions were both valued but the public sector actors were least engaged in the 
Board of Directors. This is consistent with the data obtained from public sector actors 
in the interviews.  
In this network, three respondents emphasised the contributions of actors based on 
position held as opposed to the person. In one case, the public sector respondent placed 
emphasis on the role held within the University and, in the other, the public sector 
respondent noted the contribution of the funding agency. This is indicative of the strong 
ties within the University of public respondents. In one case, the private sector 
respondent noted that contributions were based on the competencies that people 
brought from their general roles in the public and private sectors. Given the density of 
private and public-private actors in this network, the cognitive structure in the network 
may be described as private-sector dominant.  
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Figure 11: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance - Gerran 
 
 
6.4 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY: ACHIEVEMENT OF PURPOSE AS 
PERFORMANCE  
6.4.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to the Strategy of the PPP 
The assessment of the performance of the PPP was guided by an analysis of the 
network of contributions of public and private actor sub-groups to major decisions and 
actions of the school throughout its history. The network was developed from the axial 
coding of the strategies and decisions considered important from the perspective of 
KOAs. The network methodology of obtaining the cognitive social structure of the 
entire network by asking all actor sub-groups to indicate what they considered to be the 
contribution of both the public and the private sector actors was employed (Krackhardt, 
1987). The strategies determined to be important by KOAs were classified into the two 
groups based on the researcher’s analysis of whether they were significant to the 
‘cognitive legitimacy’ or the ‘socio-political’ legitimacy of the school at the relevant 
point in time (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, pp.656-658; Bitektine, 2011). This was 
determined by the extent to which the actions served primarily to legitimise the form of 
the business school or to demonstrate its competence with respect to achievement of its 
purpose.  
The PPP, as a strategic developmental organisation, presented challenges with respect 
to stakeholder evaluation of its legitimacy. The mapping of contributions of public and 
private actors to the strategic actions of the school is presented in Figure 12. This was 
based on the extent to which strategies would have promoted stakeholder evaluation of 
the new organisational form as either ‘cognitive’ or ‘socio-political’ (Bitekine, 2011). 
Colour code Public Private Public-private
1 2 3 4 Comment
Respondent 1
Respondent 2 Funding Organisation #1
Respondent 3
Respondent 4 Post in University
Respondent 5 Post in Gerran Business School 
Respondent 6
Respondent 7
Respondent 8
Respondent 9
Respondent 10
Respondent 11 Everyone plays a role 
Respondent 12 Not on Board long enough
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This classification is appropriate based on the newness of the business schools as 
ventures in the environment and the likelihood that they would be evaluated by 
stakeholders based on ‘gut feel’ in the absence of “…external tests of reliability” of 
their actions (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, p. 651, author’s italics). Further assessment of the 
PPP performance was based on the comments of respondents on the future of the PPP 
governance form in the continued evolution of the business school. Using the 
assessment of external legitimacy from the perspective of stakeholders and internal 
legitimacy among firms, in this case the university and business school, is consistent 
with the conclusion drawn by Human and Provan (2000) that both forms are necessary 
for the survival of networks. This method of analysis is also consistent with the 
relational realist perspective and the importance of the meaning structure of the 
network (Fuhse, 2009), in this case, the meaning of strategic actions to the society in 
which the network of actions is located.  
In this network, the contribution of actors was analysed in two sub-groups – public and 
private. Actors who were included in the category “public-private” were also asked to 
comment on the contribution of both public and private actors, the two sector categories 
that guided the data collection and which were the focus of the research problem. As 
such, they are included in the respondent groups, presented as circles on both sides of 
the blocks, which represent the strategies. The respondent groups are included on both 
sides of the network diagram as all respondents named contributions that were analysed 
as relating to either ‘cognitive’ and ‘socio-political’ categories of actions, based on 
their purpose at the point in time they were executed. There is no indication of the time 
period in which strategies were executed in the network diagram and time is noted in 
the analysis where it appears to be significant. The two time periods – ‘early days’ and 
‘current’ used in the analysis below refer to the period before 2008 when the Board of 
Directors was chaired by the Principal of the University and when the private sector 
assumed chairmanship of the business school, respectively.  
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Figure 12: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions – 
Gerran  
 
The network indicates that that both public and private actor sub-groups contributed to 
the development of both cognitive and socio-political legitimacy of the business school 
throughout its existence. Strategies undertaken in the early days to build cognitive 
legitimacy, including the provision of a building and the pursuit of accreditation, were 
supported by both actor sub-groups and contributed to the cognitive legitimacy of the 
business school in the society. Strategies deemed important in the current setting were 
supported strongly by private contribution and suggested that private sector actors in 
the PPP governance were more involved in the actions towards socio-political 
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legitimacy. This appears to be symptomatic of the disengagement of academia from the 
PPP and may thwart the sustained progress of the PPP with respect to addressing the 
problem of business school relevance which, it is argued, requires both methodological 
and intellectual rigour, academic and private engagement (Mintzberg, 2004). Having 
attained cognitive legitimacy, it appears that the impact on the development purpose 
should now be perceived by the society. Failure to achieve socio-political legitimacy 
with regard to its purpose may affect the future of the PPP model and lead to the 
eventual re-integration of the business school into the university.  
Dense networks of ties to the private sector contribution to strategies that produce 
socio-political legitimacy suggest that the model of stakeholder involvement in the PPP 
governance of the business school has worked to evolve a socio-political legitimacy 
that would sustain the business school in its society. This is explained by the levels of 
trust generated in the PPP, propelled by shared commitment to the development 
purpose in the organisational context of scarce financial resources. Further it appeared 
that trust was a facilitator of private strategic actions; responsibilities were shared based 
on expectations of competencies in actor sub-groups in general. The network 
demonstrates instances of actors ‘crossing the divide’. The crossing of the divide by 
both sub-groups is indicative of supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004) 
and the level of trust amongst actors. 
6.4.2 Socio-Political Legitimacy and Future of the PPP 
The general agreement amongst respondents was that the PPP governance arrangement 
was more effective for the business school. With respect to how this was achieved, 
respondents’ views ranged from increased effectiveness to improved outcomes. One 
respondent concluded that the success of the PPP did not reside in the activities of the 
Board of Directors and that relationships were more important in the partnering 
process. This appeared to be consistent with the findings in the case with respect to the 
PPP established as a strategic developmental organisation. It was also noted by 
respondents that the PPP, at this stage in its evolution, had only achieved cognitive 
legitimacy and needed to adopt strategies that would build its socio-political legitimacy 
in the environment. Respondents’ views on the future of the PPP are in Table 24.  
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Table 24: Respondents’ Views on the Future of the PPP  
Public “What I would say is that the partnership between the private and university enabled a better 
quality of decision making than would have been possible if the university handles that 
exclusively… People came in and brought skills and experiences that we in university could 
not possibly have or even dream about” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran). 
“Well I don’t think the public private partnership is...I don’t think the board is the key to the 
public private partnership, that’s the first thing. We could have a board which was entirely 
(university) persons and I don’t see where that would be the big issue. The key to it is 
establishing those relationships and it’s not just the relationships which I say we already 
have…” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). 
Public-
Private  
 “I say all of that indicate that obviously the PPP thing is vital for us, because the nature of 
our governments is that we’re going to have a government involvement in the means of 
production in an on-going way…. But I don’t know if we have opened the door and is that 
because of this governance structure or what, I don’t know. It’s something that we need to 
ask ourselves” (#1 Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran). 
Private  “I mean, my humble opinion, the future direction is that it has to be a full ownership of the 
private sector for it to add value. A business school is not an undergraduate degree (#1 Priv 
Director, Gerran). 
 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS 
The PPP is a purpose-driven organisation that evolves based on its evaluation. In the 
case of business-education partnerships established as strategic developmental 
organisations, partners provide resources to the organisation and guide its direction to 
attain the purpose. In this competitive context, the flow of resources to the PPP and 
between the PPP and its parent university influences the development of each 
organisation, and may enhance or threaten the legitimacy of one or the other. It is 
therefore imperative that the University position itself to accommodate the existence of 
the strategic developmental organisation and the role of ‘boundary spanners’ in this 
context appears important, not only to manage the interaction and relationship but more 
importantly, to manage the bases of legitimacy from which each institution derives its 
right to exist.  
6.6 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA IN THE CASE  
1. Concern for accuracy as the study relied on the memory of respondents; in some 
cases, they indicated that both memory and level of engagement in the 
partnership would have influenced the accuracy of their responses. This was 
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addressed through the process of corroboration across respondents and with 
documents.  
2. It was assumed that the persons who signed the Affiliation Agreement were 
instrumental in the establishment of the school. 
6.7 CASE PROPOSITIONS 
The following propositions with respect to PPPs in business schools in small 
developing countries are derived from explanations in the Gerran case. These will be 
examined in the other two cases.  
1. The PPP is a means of partner resource sharing and co-operation (Berliner, 
1997). The social space of governance that includes both academia and business 
presents constraints that limit the ability of academic actors to communicate and 
share their “inimitable resource” in the governance mechanism of the PPP 
(Barney, 1991). It appears that the order principles (Fuhse, 2009) embodied in 
PPPs as governance mechanisms constrain the participation of directors 
embedded in academic institutions. 
2. The environment is a source of motivation and inspiration to private sector 
directors who contribute to the strategy of the PPP organisation to address the 
development purpose.  
3. The institutionalisation of the PPP as a form that is evaluated by stakeholders 
based on the application of evaluative principles of ‘cognitive legitimacy’ is a 
necessary precursor to the actions that promote socio-cultural legitimacy. The 
embeddedness of the PPP within the institutional framework of the University 
inspires respect and co-operation within the PPP network and promotes 
‘cognitive legitimacy’ within the university environment and in the wider 
society.  
4. The institutional culture of universities in which academics are embedded 
restricts their participation in the planning and execution of strategic actions 
aimed at attaining socio-cultural legitimacy in the environment. The discourse 
structures of the Board of Directors constrain their participation in governance.  
5. The success of a social network is related to the establishment of trust, collegial 
relationships and cultural identity, facilitated by concern for the development 
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agenda (Fuhse, 2009). This agenda however, does not guide the strategic 
actions of business schools towards socio-political legitimacy.  
6. The historical form of social networks does not limit the form future ones can 
take. PPPs are established for a particular purpose and the structure is constantly 
evaluated against the purpose.  
7. For business schools in small developing countries, the success of the PPP 
governance mechanism is related to directors’ commitment to a shared purpose 
such that it supersedes any individual or collective purpose of stakeholders.  
8. Hierarchical control, a shared and compelling purpose, and networks built on 
social and professional relationships promote the development of trust. Trust 
serves as a facilitator of strategy but strategy controls PPP networks, established 
as strategic developmental organisations, leading to their success.  
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CHAPTER 7: CASE ANALYSIS - APPLE BUSINESS SCHOOL   
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This second case study of PPPs as an alternative governance structure in business 
schools highlights the unique factors in the PPP arrangements in Apple Business 
School, which was created through the strategic alliance of Green University and 
members of the private sector in the country of Arden, and also examines propositions 
based on the findings at Gerran Business School. The case included two members of 
the University staff who were directly involved in the administration of the business 
school and one member of the adjunct staff of Apple who was involved in the 
establishment of the business school. This respondent was identified in the selection 
process of snowballing.  
7.1 IMPACT OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP 
7.1.1 Background to Arden 
Arden is considered a developing country, though it is fairly cash rich as an ‘oil and 
gas’ based economy. The country has a GNI per capita of US $16,490 (World Bank, 
2009, cited in BBC, 2011). The country suffered two major oil shocks whereby 
government revenues decreased substantially and the country experienced what is 
referred to as “Dutch Disease” where growing GDP did not equate with the level of 
development (Davis, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1995). In the late 1980s, Arden was 
experiencing a financial depression and several companies of major conglomerates 
were in crisis. This was fuelled by trade liberalisation and other IMF-led structural 
adjustment which resulted in greater competition and increasing pressures on 
businesses to perform. As such, the climate was ideal for the development of a business 
school in Arden. The political environment of Arden is very stable with long-serving 
governments and a strong resistance to change. The society is competitive in the 
context of the “Dutch Disease” economy where resources are, at different times, scarce 
or abundant. Business practice is not resistant to this overall climate and culture and 
businesses have been very cautious in their expansion efforts. Few businesses have 
gone abroad and business has essentially remained in the Caribbean region. The 
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environment of Arden presented unique constraints and opportunities to the PPP 
arrangement at Apple Business School.  
7.2 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP 
7.2.1 Economic and Political Influences  
Apple Business School appeared to consider the effects of the national, regional and 
global environment on the school’s strategy and performance in different ways. Within 
the country of Arden, government policies and heavy subsidisation of education 
through student subsidies resulted in increased access and demand for tertiary 
education, a policy initiative that resulted in expanded enrolment at institutions across 
the country, including Apple and the Arden Campus of Green University. Public-sector 
directors saw the growth of the business school as a threat to the brand and, in a small 
market, a threat to selectivity in student admission and programme quality. Private-
sector actors believed that the environment was only a consideration with regard to the 
strategy and acknowledged that: “…regardless of the economic context or the 
exogenous variables that are affecting your operation, you always have to find a way to 
react or to adapt” (#2 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). The private-sector actors viewed the 
heavy subsidisation of education in the local market as a risk of internal complacency 
and adopted strategies to move away from reliance on products that attracted 
government subsidies. This orientation of directors suggested that they operated in an 
‘entrepreneurial mode,’ adopting actions that suggested “…that the environment is 
malleable, a force to be confronted and controlled” (Mintzberg, 1973, p.46). The 
strategic orientation of the private-sector actors to the environment and the defensive 
orientation of public-sector actors reflected their roles in the PPP and appeared to 
influence the relationship between public and private actors on the Board of Directors 
(Table 25).  
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Table 25: Respondents Views on the Impact of the Environment on the PPP  
Public “Well for one, government having still in place its generous 50% at postgraduate, you have 
to agree that has in fact impacted positively on the organisation in terms of numbers 
and…also on the cautious side…I think it needs some exclusivity and I am not seeing that.” 
(#1 Pub Director, Apple) 
Public-
Private  
“…there is always limitations but our job is regardless of the economic context or the 
exogenous variables that are affecting your operation, you always have to find a way to react 
or to adapt.” (#2 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple) 
Private  “All you do is understand the context and find those aspects of it that could add impetus to 
what you doing.” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple) 
 “I don’t think it mattered. What mattered was the vision and the drive of the directors to 
create that thing (Apple), that’s what matte… once we have the idea of always having 
quality, top fellas, it’s assured!” (#3 Priv Director, Apple) 
 
7.2.2 ‘Means-End’ Divide on Competitiveness in a Regional Market  
The ‘small world’ effect discussed in the case of Gerran Business School also existed 
in Arden. Private-sector actors, however, were actively engaged in regional trade and 
were able to extend their market into the region, obtaining a competitive position 
within the region. This enhanced the prominence of the private sector and led to their 
opinion that environmental factors did not limit the strategy and competitiveness of the 
firm. The environment did not serve as a source of inspiration, as at Gerran (Case 
Proposition 3) but motivated private sector actors to utilize strategies that confronted 
environmental realities. Contrary to the findings at Gerran, the environment was seen as 
an opportunity, rather than a source of constraint to the private sector, and they 
recognised the value of business education. The University recognised that there was an 
internal opportunity for the private sector to guide the University in its own expansion 
and management of regional activities but believed that the University differed from the 
private sector with respect to their consideration of the public good as opposed to the 
private sector’s concern for profitability. This ‘means-end’ values argument (Von 
Wright, 1968) appeared to be the fundamental difference that affected the relationship 
between public and private actors in the PPP (Table 26).  
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Table 26: Public versus Private Good  
Public  “Green would tend to operate more and put higher value on the social good. There are 
programmes of study that we run here which are not necessarily economically viable but 
which, in the milieu of things that we do at university, we feel are necessary for the 
social good” (#1 Pub KOA , Apple). 
“I think they wanted to leave a legacy, that’s my very positive view, because the energy 
they put into it” (#2 Pub Director, Apple)  
Private  “…actually…the impetus for the establishment of the business school did not come from 
the university. It never did! It came from the private sector” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
Participant 
Observation  
“It was very clear that private sector protagonists were all eager to explain their role in 
the establishment of the business school” (Memo: Participant Observation). 
“The rationale for the establishment of a new University in Arden was the apparent 
distance between academia and practice at Green University” (Memo: Participant 
Observation). 
 
7.3 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ARDEN CAMPUS 
7.3.1 Perception as ‘Ivory Tower’ and Ideological Differences 
Both the University and the private-sector actors acknowledged that there was a 
disconnect between what the private sector needed and products of Green University, 
Arden. Private sector actors noted that there was a difference of ideology, and the 
University was thought to be “…rabidly opposed to the notion of business education” 
(#6 Priv KOA, Apple). The differences were deep-seated and private actors thought 
that it translated into a lack of respect for people in business. Respondents’ comments 
are in Table 27.  
Table 27: Perception as ‘Ivory Tower’ and Ideological Differences 
Public “My understanding was that it was a response to a historical situation where it is encapsulated 
in a cliché used at the time ‘town’ did not meet ‘gown’…Some of the stereotypical notions 
had to do –were ideological” (#2 Pub Director, Apple)  
Private  “That is the business they were supposed to prosecute. But remember the University was a 
socialist place...and these people view business schools as foreign and what business schools 
teach as alien, and not true academia, and so they tend to kill it (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
“But we have such a strong private sector side on the board that we don’t have a problem. But 
left to him, everything would be redone and redone and redone and rechecked and rechecked 
and rechecked. Total waste of time, couldn’t run a roti shop in my view!” (#3 Priv Director, 
Apple). 
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Differences with regard to ‘application’ of learning were also perceived in the wider 
context of Arden as, in the early 2000s, a new university was established in Arden to 
address the skills gap in the country. The objectives of the new university were 
articulated in terms of relevance and it was thought that the new institution would not 
conflict with the portfolio and purpose of Green University as it “…will not cater for 
the broad mix of courses offered by Green University, Arden, but will instead place 
emphasis, largely, on meeting the specific needs of the country to take it forward as 
rapidly as possible to be an industrialised nation” (Trinidad and Tobago News Bulletin 
Board, 2004). University actors acknowledged that over the years there was a 
“…separation between university and industry” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The 
relationship with government however, was enhanced over the years because of the 
University’s dependence on government funding. The way in which Green University 
responded to national concerns about the relevance of its programmes to industry and 
the overall development of the University would have influenced the PPP.  
7.3.2 University Motivation for the Partnership: Financial and Stakeholder Needs 
The partnership between the private sector and the University was driven by different 
but related needs of the University and business. At the time of the establishment of the 
business school, the gravity of the economic problem in Arden resulted in financial 
challenges for the Arden Campus of Green University which was dependent on 
government funding. The University saw the need for a business school and the project 
was in the planning stage for some time. The opportunity provided by the private-
sector’s proposal to fund the business school was attractive to the University which 
conceded to the establishment of Apple. This appeared to be the motivating factor that 
drove the partnership for the University. It would appear that the University felt 
compelled though not convinced that it should ‘franchise’ its educational responsibility 
to the private sector, despite the differences that strained the level of trust between the 
sectors. It seemed to approach the partnership as a compulsion and concession, rather 
than an opportunity. This was reflected in the speech of the Principal at the launch of 
the business school when he emphasized that:  
“Education is a national asset, not a Private indulgence, and the burden 
of cost of higher education must be borne by all.” (Address by Professor 
Narrie Biswas, Industry and Commerce and a Knowledge-based Society, 
1989, p.78) 
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The existence of the MBA programme at Gerrantown was also a factor that could have 
propelled the decision, in which case the business school would have been a 
mechanism for ensuring parity between the campuses, so that the Arden Campus would 
“…be in sync with their contemporary global trends and to be on par with other 
universities” (#1 Pub Staff, Green Univ., Arden). University actors, however, 
acknowledged the need for leadership development in business and management for 
national and regional development. They also recognised that they were not meeting 
the needs of stakeholders and that the support of industry was needed to produce 
distinctive graduates and contribute to its developmental mission. It appeared though, 
that in the context of scarce resources, the push of the private sector was the main 
factor that contributed to the establishment of the business school, although it was 
facilitated by public sector actors who understood the broader institutional and societal 
needs (Table 28).  
Table 28: Motivation for the Partnership  
Public  “The reason for the establishment of Apple was …3-fold. One, the Institute was established 
at a time when the Faculty of Social Sciences was overwhelmed by the demand for 
undergraduate management education within Green University…It was recognised in the 
faculty that there was a missing link in the education of students in management studies. That 
missing link was the link to the private sector because students were always being told when 
they applied to the private sector that they didn’t have the experience. The Faculty was 
looking for that linkage” (#3 Pub Director, Apple). 
 
7.3.3 Compelling Private-Sector Purpose and Control 
At the time of the establishment of the business school, Arden was facing a period of 
protracted economic recession. Business leaders recognised that there was a talent gap 
and a dearth of senior managers who could lead the local development and regional 
expansion of their businesses (Table 29). The various accounts of actors’ involvement 
in the start-up of Apple illustrate the widely felt need of the private sector in Arden. 
Additionally, at least one private company had started in-company corporate training 
and this evolved into an affiliated university.  
The purpose of providing relevant education and creating leaders for the society of 
Arden was a laudable objective for both the University and the private sector. The need 
to expand their businesses and the dearth of management talent, along with the 
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differences in ideology of the private sector and Green University, led the private-
sector to seek the partnership with the University and control of the PPP. While this 
strategic alliance had the overall purpose of development, it appeared to directly answer 
to the needs of the private sector. The motivation for the PPP was related to needs at the 
level of the firm and the competitiveness of each institution, rather than the broad 
developmental purpose as in the case of Gerran Business School. The articulation of the 
purpose at the level of the firm appeared to establish a competitive relationship from 
the time of establishment of the PPP. Whilst both organisations held the shared purpose 
of producing relevant graduates who could lead the growth and internationalisation of 
organisations, articulation of the purpose at the level of the firm propelled a competitive 
relationship that militated against the development of shared purpose and collaboration 
aimed at contributing to the success of the PPP. 
Table 29: Compelling Private Sector Purpose 
Private  “[Private-sector actor] went to him and [University actor] said ‘well if you guys are prepared 
to pay for it you getting what you want” (#1 Priv Director, Apple). 
Public-
Private  
“The self-interesting part from the point of view, from the private sector, was to make sure 
that they had an institution that could develop managers that could hold their own in a 
changing world.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). 
 
Both partners agreed there was a disconnect between the programmes of Green 
University and the needs of the private sector, and it was also agreed, on a macro level, 
that Green University and the private sector were engaged in this arrangement for the 
wider interest of the country and its people. The University and the private sector 
entered into an affiliation agreement in which the business school was established as a 
non-profit PPP in Arden with a board of directors to control the organisation. Shared 
purpose did not supersede the relationship as in Gerran (Case Proposition 7), but the 
private sector’s interests and ideology appeared to dominate.  
7.3.3.1 Private-Sector Led Initiative at Establishment 
The business school was established with the funding of the private sector in Arden. 
The social network of actors involved in the establishment of the business school is 
presented in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Apple 
 
The relational ties between the protagonists involved in the start-up of Apple Business 
School included professional relationships, institutional competitors in market rivalry, 
acquaintances and one family relationship. The social network included nine private-
sector actors and two university actors. One university actor had a family tie to a 
private sector actor in the network and this could have contributed to the decision to 
establish the school. The relational embeddedness and dense private sector network that 
included colleagues and rivals demonstrated the extent to which the private sector as a 
whole was affected by scarce talent. Financing was provided by five private sector 
actors in the network, from rival banks and conglomerates, and one manufacturer with 
collegial ties to one central actor in the network. Actors who provided financing are 
depicted by heavy coloured lines around the nodes. All names in the network are 
fictitious.  
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One of the leading social network researchers described the genesis of social network 
theories and analyses as residing in one of the most potent ideas in the social sciences 
which is “…the notion that individuals are embedded in thick webs of social relations 
and interactions” (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.892). The social interactions and relations that 
exemplify these networks tend to be adopted by network members (ibid.). In this 
context in which diverse actors in professional relationships provided funding, and 
considering the negative perceptions of Green University with respect to business 
education, the private sector insisted on control of the organisation. This was reflected 
in the Affiliation Agreement which gave control to the private sector by a majority 
representation on the Board of Directors.  
7.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE PPP AT APPLE 
7.4.1 Purpose of the PPP: Strategic Entrepreneurial Organisation  
The University did not express the need for a separate organisation to address private 
sector needs. University actors believed that the PPP required the legitimacy of the 
University in order to offer its programmes. They also acknowledged that the brand of 
the University was well-established but that the purpose and uniqueness of the 
programmes of the PPP required that Apple establish its own brand, separate from the 
University. Private-sector actors, however, cited other reasons for the PPP to be 
established as a separate organisation, including the need to remove itself from the 
bureaucracy of the University. Further, private-sector actors held the view that they 
only needed the University as an accrediting and legitimising agency. The private 
sector recognised the need for ‘cognitive legitimacy’ of the new organisational form 
and Green University in Arden served that purpose (Bitektine, 2011). The view 
expressed by one respondent that “...programmes need to be blessed by the university; 
it could be any university” (#2 Priv Director, Apple) indicated the confidence the 
private sector had in their own ability to establish and lead the academic institution as a 
PPP. Moreover, one University director acknowledged that the need for a separate 
institution was to brand the business school as an organisation that was distinct and 
apart from the University (Table 30). Private-sector opinion was that they needed to 
control and direct the organisation and this factor appeared to be the reason for the 
relationship challenges between the private sector and University actors in the 
governance structure.  
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Table 30: Need for a Separate PPP Organisation 
Public “But it didn’t want to be controlled by the bureaucracy of Green, which would retard its 
growth and its development and its reflexiveness and so on. So it’s something like England 
in the EU, one foot in and one foot out.” (#2 Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden) 
“…we’ve inherited a seriously British attitude to bureaucracy and to the way in which a firm 
operates.” (#1 Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden) 
Public-
Private  
“…university saw the need as well to create an institution that could be flexible and agile 
enough to be more responsive perhaps, than the rest of the university which was seen earlier 
as sort of not as connected as it needed to be with the society as a whole.” (#4 Pub/Priv 
KOA, Apple) 
Private  “…, perhaps because of the latent opposition in the university anyway, to things related to 
business and management, would be better accomplished by setting up a separate structure.” 
(#6 Priv KOA, Apple) 
The need for the endorsement of the relationship by Green University indicated that the 
University was a source of ‘cognitive legitimacy’ but its brand was not a resource with 
respect to the ‘socio-political legitimacy’ of the business school as a separate 
entrepreneurial organisation. The extent to which Green University was not seen as a 
source of ‘technical’ support to the business school threatened the legitimacy of the 
University as an institution relevant to business development in Arden. This finding 
corroborates the finding in the Gerran case that ‘cognitive legitimacy’ is a necessary 
precursor to ‘socio-political legitimacy’ but contradicts the finding that embeddedness 
in the University institution engenders respect and promotion of cognitive legitimacy of 
the PPP (Case Proposition 3). Loss of respect suggests that cognitive legitimacy was 
attained mainly through the use of Green University’s brand.  
7.4.2 Private-sector control: voluntary game in a competitive environment  
7.4.2.1 Motivation for Control  
The question of control of a new entity involving public and private partners is a 
critical one that shapes the outlook and operations of the entity. Sheppard and 
Tuchinsky (1996, p.142) note that, in network organizations “...control is not exercised 
in the form of hierarchical authority” but rather in terms of “…relationships between 
relative equals”. In the case of Apple Business School, there appeared to be unequal 
positioning of partners and control by the private sector was evident.  
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The private sector retained control and direction of the organisation through its majority 
on the Board of Directors. One respondent explained that the private sector actors held 
the opinion that the organisation must be managed as a business if it were to succeed 
and achieve the aims of the private sector. He indicated that they: 
“…felt at the time that if it were not private sector responsive-driven and 
led, that it would become just another academic institution and they 
wanted to walk that thin line between academic creditability and 
economic responsiveness.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple) 
The non-profit legal form of the organisation placed ownership with the ‘cause’ of 
business education but the private sector felt private-sector control of the PPP was 
critical to its success. The motivation to lead and execute it however appeared to be 
linked to the reputation of the business leaders. While there was no financial gain for 
any director, public or private, the motivation of the private sector could not be 
attributed to moral codes as in the case of non-profits (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), 
given the practicality of the need for leaders to facilitate their success. Motivation to 
control the organisation appeared to be linked to several factors including private-sector 
actors’ success and visibility in the business environment of Arden, and the need to 
protect their reputation. One director indicated that he had put his name there “and 
don’t want it spoilt” (#3 Priv Director, Apple). Other corporate members noted that 
there was a return on their investment of time through recognition and attainment of the 
highest levels of self-esteem from their involvement in the development of the business 
school. The contribution to country development was important in that they were able 
to stand out and be recognized for their contribution to a small developing economy.  
The impetus for engagement in the PPP on the part of the University was quite 
different. The University, in the early years, experienced financial cuts and sought the 
support of the private sector through the PPP. In addition, there was the opportunity to 
understand the needs of the private sector and build a relationship in the national 
interest. Further, there was some intention to achieve transfer of learning and one 
respondent indicated: 
“…for me, by working with the private sector in the establishment of the 
school it could have given Green University a chance to reflect on its 
own processes and to see how it can get as nimble as the private sector.” 
(#1 Pub KOA, Apple).  
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In the case of Apple Business School, however, business was more strongly vested in 
the relationship and the University’s purpose was not achieved under private-sector 
control. In fact, the “facilitating” role of the University, established in the Affiliation 
Agreement, was maintained only through the mechanism for appointing directors from 
the University to the Board of the School by virtue of position. The role of providing 
guidance with respect to programmes was not executed to meet the expectations of the 
private-sector directors and this also resulted in conflict.  
7.4.2.2 Contrasting ‘Moral Syndromes’ and University Protectionism  
Apple Business School was oriented as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation that 
viewed revenue generation and growth as critical to its success (Mintzberg, 1973). The 
financial arrangements with Green University, Arden, included only payment for 
administrative services provided to Apple. In this context, Apple expanded over the 
years and University directors became increasingly apprehensive about the focus on 
revenue generation and differences in the organisational form between Apple and the 
University. In fact, the situation was reflective of the overall difficulty of the private 
and public sectors to meet on common ground and supportive of the stance by Jacobs 
(1992, p.32) who described the public and private domain as two ethical systems with 
different “moral syndromes”. The public domain is characterized by the ‘guardian 
syndrome’, the private domain by the ‘commercial syndrome’ (ibid.). Although the 
PPP represented a quasi-market in the relationship between the University and the 
private sector, its operations differed from the conceptualisation of the quasi-market 
movement as “…a set of arrangements which had more in common with models of 
market socialism than with free market capitalism” (Bartlett et al., 1998a, p.1). The 
outlook of Apple as more of a free market capitalist resulted in an increasing response 
by the University as a competitor to ‘protect’ the society from what was perceived as 
private interest and to regain credibility in the field of business education. One 
respondent commented on the reason for the apparent opposition from the University 
directors and concluded that: 
“They (are) acting in self-interest. And it has to be that. It can’t be that 
they just rabidly opposed; they come in the Boardroom and go mad! It 
has to be that it is more beneficial to them to oppose the business school 
than to support it” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
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Despite the powerfully moral and relevant overarching purpose for the University, it 
appeared that the perceived needs were more connected to the response of the 
University to engage in a ‘franchising’ arrangement and the most senior executives in 
the private sector of Arden, to volunteer their time and expertise to establish and 
operate a business school. The governance model, embodied in the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, clearly outlined the contribution and role of Green University 
as a ‘facilitating’ agent for the business school but was fairly silent on the expectations 
of the business sector except to state that the institution “is responsible for meeting its 
expenses” (Affiliation Agreement) and granting autonomy and control to the private 
sector to operate the institution (Table 31).  
Table 31: Purpose of a PPP Governance Structure  
Public “Well, it’s really to make sure in the way forward in strategic thinking, strategic plan(ning) 
that we take cognizance of the concerns of the private sector” (#1 Pub Director, Apple).  
“There may have also been reasons associated with how the institution is going to be 
funded… I think in all of this business would like a more business-like approach!” (#1 Pub 
KOA, Apple). 
Public-
Private  
“…sometimes the private sector can be very myopic in its very own interest or can be very 
narrow on a particular …So I feel that you need that mix and you need also the creative 
tension effectively managed to get the creative output out of an institution like Apple” (#4 
Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private  “I think that they wanted an MBA programme that was run…they wanted a product that 
would suit their purposes. Not a product that made academic sense to a bunch of academics 
but wasn’t applicable to what they needed” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
It would appear that in this contractual arrangement, located between markets and 
hierarchies (Powell, 1991; Thorelli, 1986) the issue of control positioned the University 
directors to adopt a more ‘protectionist’ stance, seeking to safeguard the University’s 
domain of academic knowledge and academic quality. Although the roles of the 
University outlined in the Memorandum were consistent with their capabilities 
(Leiblein, 2003), there was tension between the University and the private sector with 
respect to the quality of programmes and the strategic management of the business 
school. The absence of a shared alliance strategy was evident (Gomes-Casseres, 1998) 
and the loose coupling of the organisations in a competitive arrangement where one 
legitimises the other established a relationship where the success of one resulted in the 
loss of legitimacy to the other. This was further demonstrated in the contribution of 
actors to the strategic actions of the school discussed later in this case report.  
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7.4.2.3 Dense Network of Private-Sector Support to Key Organisational Actors 
At Apple Business School, KOAKOAs were responsible for management and decision-
making, though the Board of Directors held overall responsibility for the strategic 
development of the business school. The network of KOAs was mapped to determine 
the density of public and private sector support for key decision makers.  
Figure 14: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Apple 
 
The network of KOAs revealed a high degree of “node homogeneity” which refers to 
“…the similarity of actors with respect to behaviours or internal structures” (Borgatti et 
al., 2009, p.894). KOAs held professional ties to more private-sector directors than to 
University directors. In the case of University KOAs, they relied on other KOAs as 
well, which was consistent with the boundary spanning role of University KOAs in 
their relationship with Apple. The dense network of private-sector support suggested 
that the business school was dominated by private sector beliefs and practices, similar 
to the network of actors who were instrumental in establishing the business school. 
This suggested that the network, which was started as an accretion of professional 
relationships, sustained its private sector identity throughout its evolution. This is 
consistent with the findings of Granovetter (1992, p.9) that “…economic institutions 
begin as accretions of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure 
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reflects that of the networks, and even when those are no longer in place, the 
institutions take on a life of their own that limits the forms future ones can take. They 
become ‘locked in’”(author’s quotation marks). While economic conditions restrict 
what are the possibilities, social networks determine what actually occurs and outcomes 
may differ if the social structure is different (ibid.). This finding differs from that of the 
Gerran case where the social network morphed based on purpose and practical 
problems at any point in time. The factor that appeared to cause the difference was 
control by the private sector and the organisational identity of the business school as a 
corporate organisation, governed by a social network of private actors and corporate 
governance principles.  
7.4.2.4 Separation of Management and Ownership in Corporate Governance  
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) differ in many ways including structure, governance 
and conditions that lead to their creation (Jarillo 1988; Powell, 1990). The choice of 
governance structure was governed by the rules of the Affiliation Agreement that gave 
control to the private sector. The Board of Directors established principles of corporate 
governance which reflected their competences and ‘moral syndrome’. The participation 
of the University was governed by the rules of the Affiliation Agreement which defined 
participants at the apex of the hierarchical system of the University’s organisational 
structure. In the PPP, the monitoring of partner contribution in the process of 
governance was related to the aim and purpose of the alliance (e.g. Albers, 2005). The 
incentives for the alliance resided in the attainment of its purpose but did not further 
define participation incentives at the level of the firm for either partner. The only 
safeguard against opportunistic behaviour (Dyer et al., 2001) was the legal agreement 
to dissolve the alliance in situations of irresolvable conflicts (Affiliation Agreement, 
2003, p.3).  
The Board of Directors monitored the brand and controlled the school’s development 
and evolution through three main mechanisms. The first was the focus on profitability 
and management of the Board of Directors by the principles of private management and 
financial accountability; the second was the selection, monitoring and support of the 
school’s leadership and, the third was the monitoring of the quality of graduates 
entering the workplace. It appeared that the Board of Directors depended on the 
leadership to craft and defend the viability of the organisational strategy, referencing 
198 
 
and benchmarking against the strategic actions of global institutions. This separation of 
management and ownership with the oversight of the Board of Directors appeared to be 
a successful model for Apple (Table 32).  
Table 32: Governance Strategy and Leadership at Apple 
Public “…without compromising the quality of the university’s output because Apple’s graduates are 
first and foremost graduates of Green. I want to re-emphasize that (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). 
Public-
Private  
“I took a lot of high risks with Apple and I basically tried to do things that were very creative 
and innovative” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private  “And of course we been through many executive directors in this time, …[Name of KOA] and 
so forth and so on and I think once more again today we have an excellent man…He’s full of 
ideas and is going to move it to another level, which is what I think is going to happen. ” (#3 
Priv Director, Apple). 
“…forget the finances, because we are so solid financially you don’t have to worry about that, 
what was needed was an executive with a lot of future in him, and that he has” (#3 Priv 
Director, Apple). 
“What could happen down the road that I can’t think of now. Financial crisis, we’re in Arden, 
the economy and so on. But education is something that would always be necessary, always. 
And what we got to do and this guy understands it, is quality, quality, quality. Even if we have 
a smaller number of people we got to have high quality students coming out of there that is the 
key to the whole thing, and if he keeps raising the quality as he’s doing, that’s the best 
guarantee of the future” 
Public sector participation in this case, in the role of monitors of curriculum quality, 
would have created tensions at the level of the Board of Directors. The political 
embeddedness of university actors in internal politics and competitiveness between 
both institutions was evident in the responses of actors. It was evident that the private 
sector members of the Board were operating in a familiar environment and control of 
the School from their perspective meant running a good business of postgraduate 
business education. In the relationship between the private and public sectors, there was 
a “connection-based purpose” but the “clarity of purpose” for the university was not 
evident (Austin, 2000).  
The density of their sub-alter networks appeared to contribute to their collaborative 
actions in the interest of the School. This is in contrast with the conception of Rose 
Coser (1975) cited in Granovetter (1985, p.204) that “…there may be an inherent 
weakness in strong ties” (Coser’s italics). It would appear that the strong ties of the 
professional networks of KOA to private sector partners resulted in strong ties to the 
strategy of the private sector to the organisation. Further, it may be construed that the 
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weak ties between public and private partners drove strong ties among directors within 
their own sector. This appeared to connect strongly to the emergent strategic actions of 
the business school. While the pattern of tie connections did not offer useful 
information flows (Gulati, 1998) it appeared to drive the development of strong ties and 
sub-group cohesion among private actors, leading to purposive action towards 
organisational strategy. This is consistent with the proposition of network theories that 
emphasize structure and contend that the optimal structural design is contingent on the 
actions that the structure seeks to facilitate (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
7.4.3 Relational Trust, Empowerment and Disempowerment through Curriculum 
Roles  
The alliance between the University and the private sector resulted in the creation of a 
new organisation which was loosely coupled to the University as its parent institution 
and the private sector (Orton and Weick, 1990; March and Olsen, 1975; Glassman, 
1973). The University actors saw their role as providing guidance with respect to the 
curriculum, having many years of experience with curriculum design and evaluation. 
They also saw their role as guiding Apple to build an institution that demonstrated 
academic values through research, faculty development and programme quality. This 
was an empowering role of the University in the ‘products’ of Apple. One respondent 
noted:  
“Well it is important that Green University’s persons are on the Board. It 
is Green University’s programmes and we are there to see that the 
programmes are of Green University quality” (#5 Pub KOA, Apple).  
The private-sector actors however, considered the role of the University to be a 
facilitator of programme approval and programme administration. They did not trust 
the University to design the programmes they required to solve their management 
challenges. Programme design and quality of delivery resided with the PPP and the 
early separation and distinctiveness of Apple’s programmes and implementation 
strategy resulted in apprehension about quality on the part of the University. Although 
some University actors recognised the importance of having business leaders as an 
integral part of curriculum delivery, this was still experimental from their perspective 
and, as such, they continued to be apprehensive about curriculum quality. The control 
of ‘product’ quality and the positioning of the University as an administrative facilitator 
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of programme approval would have placed them in a disempowered role with respect to 
the curriculum and added to the relationship challenges between public and private 
actors on the Board of Directors. The trust between actor sub-groups with respect to the 
curriculum was challenged and conceptions of quality varied. While they both 
subscribed to the importance of a high quality programme, they held opposing opinions 
about the nature of the programme and the process for ensuring quality.  
The gap between theory and practice was seen as ideological and this placed a 
significant strain on the relationship as it challenged the technical legitimacy (Brown, 
2008) of the University as a source of relevant business knowledge. Respondents noted:  
“You see Green University’s story is that government signs a check and 
rights everything” (#2 Priv Director, Apple). 
“Yes, and what’s important with the business acumen is an eye for 
running a balance sheet and a profit and loss account, university people 
haven’t got a clue! …So yes we lecture this and lecture that and lecture 
the other and now we feel lovely and at the end of the day one would get 
a wonderful reputation for some esoteric subject but it won’t do the 
bottom line any good and it really would not be a building block for the 
school for the future! It would not!” (#2 Priv Director, Apple). 
The University’s role in quality assurance appeared to conflict with their fiduciary 
responsibilities on the Board of Directors to contribute to the growth strategy of the 
School. There was antagonism over the time taken for approvals and the fact that the 
University did not appear to be guiding and facilitating the process in their actions 
outside of the Board of Directors. This also contributed to the deepening of conflicts 
and division between the public and private-sector partners in the PPP.  
7.4.4 Boundary Spanning Based on Conflict Management 
The PPP was created out of a lack of trust in the University to deliver a relevant 
business education. It was also established as a separate institution to isolate its 
processes from the inflexibility and other inefficiencies of the bureaucratic co-
ordinating system of the University. In so doing, the PPP evolved a corporate 
governance strategy and private sector control of the new organisation.  
“The private sector wanted to take control and stay in control of the 
thing was because they felt the university was irrelevant and they don’t 
know how to handle money, they don’t know how to run a business so 
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what I think (University protagonist) was trying to do was drive greater 
relevance into the University system” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private-sector actors appeared to be cognitively and culturally embedded (Zukin and 
DiMaggio, 1990; Dequech, 2003) in the rules of the practice of business whereas 
University actors were similarly embedded in the institutional rules of the University 
institution. The different expectations of each actor appeared to be related to ownership 
of the entity. This created tensions that demanded boundary spanning activities by 
actors in the appropriate role positions within the governance of the PPP (Baker, 2008; 
Takahashi and Smutny, 2002; Noble and Jones, 2006). 
Table 33: Expectations of the Other and Role Expectations 
Public “The private sector is expected to provide expertise and guidance with respect to the needs 
of the financial sector” (#5 Pub KOA, Apple). 
“(Name) was spectacularly ineffective as (boundary spanning role) and spent so long sitting 
on the fence he must have been welded to it. A stronger (role) might have been able to put a 
stop to the constant squabbles between the Green University and the private sector 
directors” (#7 Pub KOA, Apple). 
Public-
Private  
“The business school has had a series of bad (Boundary spanners) (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private   “New programmes have to be approved by the university and very often it’s just blocked 
and stopped which just takes time. What I think I should get done in a month or two 
months or three months for the most, might take a year and that I think is a, that’s a 
negative really” (#3 Priv Director, Apple). 
 
The lack of clarity with regards to ownership, control of the organisation by the private 
sector and the increasing disempowerment of the University actors in the competitive 
space led to conflict in the relationship (Table 34).  
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Table 34: Respondents’ Views on Conflict at Apple 
Public “I would say that there is one challenging area in this relationship and it has to do with 
what could be possibly seen as territorial interest, what could be seen as competition 
becoming an issue” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). 
Private   “There is no way ever, ever that the school would be subjugated to the bureaucracy of 
the university in a manner that was illogical and unreasonable” (#1 Priv Director, 
Apple). 
“I think a certain level of jealousy existed but that is more because the business school 
had its own autonomy and its own funds” (#1 Priv Director, Apple). 
“No, protection. I mean a fella like … (name), all he concerned is how he can jam 
anything and protect the university” (#2 Priv Director, Apple). 
Participant 
Observation 
“I observed a confrontation between a University Director and KOA about the 
organisational relationship between Green and Apple. The conflict escalated but they 
came to the conclusion that the relationship was not clear and needs to be clarified, as 
this was affecting the decisions that needed to be taken and the relationship between the 
public and private sector Directors” (Memo - Participant observation)  
Actors in boundary spanning roles appeared to manage the interaction space at the 
Board of Directors in a manner that recognised members of the Board as “…a board of 
true captains, whether it’s from industry or academia” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The 
management of the Board of Directors was executed in “…such a way as to not 
intensify conflict, (and) not inhibit the growth and development of the institution (#4 
Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). As such, the management of conflict and relationships 
appeared to be the focus of boundary spanning activities at the level of governance and 
the system was co-ordinated by respect for individuals, rather than institutional trust. In 
this context, the management of the relationship was approached from the perspective 
of constraints rather than opportunities which militated against boundary spanners 
seeking opportunities for leveraging the talents of each other for product and market 
innovation in the interest of both institutions. Further, it appeared that the boundary 
spanning activities designed to reduce conflict at the level of the Board of Directors, 
negatively affected the operations of the business school and led to lack of confidence 
in the actors in boundary spanning roles and the value created through boundary 
spanning activities (Table 35). 
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Table 35: Evidence of Boundary Spanning Based on Relationships at Apple  
Public-
Private  
“…so basically I sort of presided over the board in such a way as to not intensify conflict, 
not inhibit the growth and development of the institution, but I was very concerned about 
quality in the institution” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private  “I think the whole thing is a bureaucracy, to be very frank, it’s a bureaucracy. Fortunately 
(Name) is a very good (boundary spanner) and a very good man … But he has to …listen to 
his cohorts from the university and so forth and so on because he’s got to deal with them all 
the time. But he has his heart in the right place and he’s very knowledgeable and I think a 
good (boundary spanner)” (#3 Priv Director, Apple). 
The findings advance the conclusion of Noble and Jones (2006) that a strategy of 
boundary spanning in PPPs is required and it is proposed that the strategy must address 
the different levels of the organisation and identify roles and activities of boundary 
spanners. This study further suggests that the boundary spanning strategy should 
address opportunities, as opposed to addressing challenges as was advanced by Noble 
and Jones (2006). The benefits of boundary spanning appear to emanate from the 
creation of collaborative mechanisms between the parent institutions and the PPP so 
that they create value for all organisations throughout the evolution of the PPP.  
7.5 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY  
7.5.1 Private-Sector Cognitive Social Structure  
The cognitive social structure of the social network of actors in the PPP governance 
arrangement was determined using two social networks. The first was the overall 
perception of contribution of actor sub-groups to the development of the business 
school (Figure 15).  
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Figure 15: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Apple 
 
The second was the contribution of actor sub-groups to particular strategies of the 
business school (Figure 16).  
Colour code Public Private Public-private
Respondent 1 2 3 4
Respondent 1
Respondent 2
Respondent 3
Respondent 4
Respondent 5
Respondent 6
Respondent 7
Respondent 8
Respondent 9
Respondent 10
Respondent 11
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Figure 16: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at Apple  
 
7.5.1.1 Dense Network of Private-Sector Contribution 
The social network in Figure 15 indicated that both actor subgroups recognised the 
dominance of private-sector contribution in the PPP governance mechanism. This was 
consistent with the level of private-sector control in the PPP described earlier in the 
report. The social network in Figure 16 demonstrated the engagement of both sub-
groups with the strategies that enhanced the ‘cognitive legitimacy’ and ‘socio-political’ 
legitimacy of the PPP. The University contribution, however, was focused mainly on 
activities related to the cognitive legitimacy of the business school; the private-sector 
contribution appeared to be equally focused on cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. 
206 
 
The cognitive social structure demonstrated the importance of both sub-groups at the 
strategic level of the organisation but also provided evidence that the University 
contribution related to operational and quality assurance activities. This is consistent 
with the conclusions arrived at in the case of Gerran Business School with respect to 
the levels at which the contribution of University actors in the PPP arrangement 
provides most value. Another significant finding from the cognitive social structure of 
the network was the absence of contribution of directors from both actor subgroups 
with respect to five out of nine key strategies of the business school aimed at attaining 
socio-political legitimacy. This suggested that the advancement of the business school 
in respect of stakeholder judgment as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation was more 
directly related to the leadership and management of the organisation.  
7.5.2 Inside-Out Strategy and Leadership 
Apple Business School used an inside out strategy of internationalisation to establish its 
legitimacy from its inception (Human and Provan, 2000). The importance of 
international activities and benchmarks was cited by all the private sector directors who 
noted that it was important “…to try to build international alliances and build an 
international reputation” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). In addition, the Board of 
Directors recognized that international accreditation would serve to position the School 
as a legitimate and high quality player and the decision was taken to attain international 
accreditation (Minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, May 9, 2000). The 
University directors’ opinions on this strategic direction of the School were not evident 
in the research but this would have further estranged the partners as the University did 
not seek international accreditation for its social science programmes. Apple’s inside-
out strategy in which it built a portfolio of products and strategic actions to enhance its 
socio-political legitimacy served to position the organisation as a strategic 
entrepreneurial organisation in Arden (Table 36). 
207 
 
Table 36: Inside Out Strategy and Leadership at Apple  
Public “Well it’s always to guide the strategic direction of the entity” (#1 Pub Director, Apple). 
Public-
Private  
“I didn’t have the means at that time to make it as the means of business creation because of 
the way it was developed, it could not have emerged as a facilitator of entrepreneurship in 
that way because in a sense it had to find itself entrepreneurly first and to win respect in the 
market place. So the first thing was to position it at the centre of business ideas, business 
thinking, business action” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). 
Private   “These are serious people who have serious responsibilities and have serious influence. 
Whether we use the influence, or have cause to use the influence or not, they are there and 
available to us moving forward” (#2 Priv Director, Apple). 
It appeared that the strategic direction of the organisation was dependent on its 
leadership. The private sector alluded to this and made several references to the 
emphasis placed on having ‘the right man’ to lead the PPP (#3 Priv Director, Apple). 
Leadership was one of the main strategies adopted by the Board of Directors as a 
means of ensuring quality in the organisation. The evolution of the business school, 
however, was defined by the disruptions and progress achieved within the bounded 
periods of service of leaders.  
This study did not address issues of individual leadership and the emphasis on 
leadership presents an opportunity for further research to determine how this factor 
influences PPP performance. The selection of persons to the Board of Directors was 
also a strategy used to gain legitimacy in the context of Arden. Whilst one of the roles 
of the private sector was to ‘open the doors’, this was seen to be at the level of strategy 
execution rather than the student recruitment model observed at Rotter Business 
School. Selection of directors from the private sector was based on their visibility and 
the business school was governed by individuals from the highest echelons of the 
private sector hierarchy. This served to instil confidence in the technical legitimacy of 
the activities of the business school within the private sector of Arden (Suchman, 1995; 
Brown, 2001).  
7.6 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS 
From the purpose and structure of the PPP, it appeared that the motivation for sustained 
private-sector participation in the non-profit entity was located at the firm level in 
which private-sector actors demonstrated group identity in an ecology of games in 
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strategic decision-making (Bacharach et al., 2006). Though they articulated the 
overarching purpose of contribution to country and operated Apple through voluntary 
contribution, it appeared that in a dense network of powerful private sector leaders they 
could not risk failure in an activity at which they were known to be masters – the 
generation of revenue and operation of a business. Despite not having financial returns, 
they appeared to play with finance, without risk, in a game that was all too familiar to 
them. This is referred to by this researcher as “voluntary business game”, a game 
played by the private sector, defined by the rules of the private sector, but with no 
personal financial return or risk. The game is facilitated by the social network of similar 
actors in which personal legitimacy is at stake. It is also propelled by the overall 
network of public-private structure and relations. The thesis of “voluntary business 
game” is extrapolated from the framework used by Klijn and Teisman (2005) to study 
PPPs in Europe; the framework “…sees policy processes as a series of games (where) 
the multiplicity of actors and their various…perceptions, interests and strategies, make 
these games complex” (Klijn and Teisman, 2005, p.139).  
7.7 CASE CONCLUSION: PPP SUCCESS AS A STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANISATION 
In this case it was found that the composition and structure of the PPP governance 
arrangement resulted in the minimisation of the role of the University and 
maximisation of the role of the private sector. Although the overall purpose of 
contributing to the development of talent for the private sector and the country’s 
development was stated by both actor sub-groups, the actions of the public and private 
sector members on the Board and within the ambit of the governance arrangements 
were often at odds. As such, the attainment of the goals of one set of actors resulted in 
the de-legitimising of the other.  
There was distinct segregation of the social networks of University and private sector 
directors underpinned by collegiality and sectoral philosophies and motivated by the 
strength of relational networks. Although the performance of the School continued to 
be strong, it was achieved at the expense of the legitimacy of the University through a 
relationship that was often in conflict, rather than trust. The success of this PPP was 
reflected in its consistent attainment of financial goals and increasing legitimacy in the 
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country of Arden. Whilst this challenged the University in a closed system, positioned 
as a competitor, it provided opportunities for both the University and the PPP to attain 
the broader purpose of national and regional competitiveness. The PPP engaged both 
the University and the private sector, and they were both influenced by the PPP and by 
each other. The University’s continued engagement with the PPP appeared to be linked 
to the recognition of the value of the business school. Disengagement from the 
partnership was also prevented by the possible threat to the University as it would be 
seen as contrary to its raison d’être which is developmental, a claim it held in common 
with the business school which sought “…to develop the international competitiveness 
of people and organisations” (Mission Statement, Apple).  
7.8 SUMMARY OF CASE FINDINGS 
The following are the findings of this case with respect to the functioning and 
legitimacy of the PPP in its environment:  
1. Granovetter (1992) claimed that “…stable economic institutions begin as 
accretions of activity patterns around personal networks” (p.9). It appeared that 
the growth and development of Apple was reflected in the trajectory created by 
the social network of prior ties which influenced its “…evolutionary path, and 
their ultimate success” (Gulati, 1998, p.294). This contrasts with the findings at 
Gerran and was explained by factors that included the density of the private 
sector network of actors, control of the PPP by the private sector and the dense 
network of business leaders in the PPP governance mechanism. This contrast is 
explained by the difference of ownership, purpose and control of the PPP as a 
voluntary organisation. Private actors in control experienced contagion in dense 
networks and engaged in ‘voluntary monopoly’ which optimised private 
ideology and led to the success of the business school.  
2. Clarity and consistency of actions related to the larger purpose were not 
achieved and there was loss of legitimacy and value for the University. Though 
strategic control was held by the private sector, the University maintained the 
role of quality assurance and sought control through their oversight of academic 
programmes. This orientation to their role defined their purpose and placed 
them in a position where the tensions of processes in the University’s efforts to 
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control quality negatively affected the relationship. Control and dominance by 
the private sector, coupled with weak boundary spanners and boundary 
spanning focused on managing conflict, appeared to be the factor that limited 
and distorted the nature of University involvement at Apple. This contrasted 
with the findings at Gerran where University participation was constrained by 
the space of interaction on the Board of Directors (Case Proposition 4).  
3. Financial accountability and private control within the firm appeared to be the 
main factors that explain the success of the PPP in a competitive environment. 
In the governance arrangement, private-sector actors viewed accountability as 
attainment of competitive purpose (Acar and Robertson, 2004; Acar et al., 
2008). This was the antithesis of the virtue of protectionism adopted by 
University members in the context where purpose was neither clear nor shared.  
4. Boundary spanning has particular challenges at the governance and 
management levels where they conflict with each other. Boundary spanning, 
envisaged as a political role in the PPP, weakens the emergence of opportunities 
for product and market development involving both institutions. The PPP 
requires a boundary spanning strategy that addresses the different levels of the 
organisation and identifies roles and activities of boundary spanners. The 
boundary spanning strategy should address opportunities, as opposed to the 
strategy of addressing challenges advanced by Noble and Jones (2006). The 
benefits of boundary spanning appear to emanate from the creation of 
collaborative mechanisms between the parent institutions and the PPP so that 
they create value for all organisations throughout the evolution of the PPP.  
 
  
211 
 
CHAPTER 8: CASE ANALYSIS - ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL  
8.0 INTRODUCTION  
This case distils the findings with regard to the factors that influence the relationship 
between the public and private partners in the governance of Rotter School of Business, 
the third business school established by Green University. In the analysis, theoretical 
propositions and explanations derived from the other two cases are compared and 
contrasted with the findings in this case. In this way, the theoretical propositions of PPP 
success in business schools in small, developing countries are challenged or made more 
robust. In this case, respondents were mainly from the private sector. Managers of the 
business school were included as respondents as they sat on the Board of Directors. 
They were classified as private KOAs because they held responsibility for the corporate 
success of the business school. The analysis that follows discusses events, where 
appropriate, in two generational time periods (Pfeffer, 1992) defined as ‘the early 
years,’ from establishment to about 2005, and ‘current’ which is marked by the entry of 
the new Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences into the University and the PPP 
governance arrangement. The two generational time periods are considered significant 
to the analysis as the entry of the new Dean resulted in a discernible shift in the 
relationship between the University and the business school (Joshi et al., 2010).  
8.1 IMPACT OF THE CONTEXT OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL ON THE 
PPP: ROTTERDAM  
8.1.1 Background to Rotterdam 
Rotterdam is one of the most prosperous and developed Caribbean islands. The country 
ranks in the top 50 countries on the Global Competitiveness Index Ranking 2010-2011 
compared with Arden at 41 points and Gerrantown at 52 points lower than Rotterdam 
(World Economic Forum, 2010). The country has the third highest rank of the Western 
Hemisphere on the Human Development Index, after the United States and Canada. 
The country is a former British colony and gained independence from Britain in 1962. 
It is a ‘Commonwealth realm’ with Queen Elizabeth II as its monarch and head of state 
and a prime minister as the head of government (BBC, 2011a). It is a centre for 
financial services and an attractive tourist destination. GNI per capita is estimated to be 
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$12,196 or more (World Bank, 2010). The territories of the sub-region provide a 
market for business in Rotterdam.  
8.1.2 A Hub for Regional Co-Operation 
The geographic location and advanced state of development of Rotterdam within the 
region positioned it as a centre of activity for the sub-region within CARICOM. The 
institutions of Rotterdam, including Green University and Rotter School of Business, 
included the countries in the sub-region within the bounded space of their market. 
Public and private actors viewed this as both a constraint and an opportunity. 
University actors viewed the geographic dispersion and small size of the market as a 
logistical constraint with respect to programme delivery. Private sector actors 
acknowledged these factors as a constraint to business but endorsed them as an 
opportunity for regional integration. The availability of air-travel around the region and 
to the hub facilitated the thrust for regional integration and the private sector directors 
saw this as an opportunity for developing networks of people and increasing the 
availability of talent. The embeddedness of both institutions, Rotter School of Business 
and Green University, Rotterdam within the broad purpose of regional integration 
influenced the structure and activities of the Board of Directors and the purpose, 
structure and strategy of the business school. Ultimately, it influenced the legitimacy of 
Rotter Business School in Rotterdam and the sub-region (Table 37). 
 Table 37: A Hub for Regional Co-Operation at Rotter 
Public  “I think that the opportunities would be that we are close to the needs. You are not a great 
distance from your clients …” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter). 
Private  “Geographically it is a challenge. In the earlier years we were offering the programmes as 
face to face and especially in the masters level programme people came here…” (#3 KOA, 
Rotter).  
 “Rotterdam is a hub, I think Rotterdam is well suited because you had access to the 
university, to the university library, to the registrar, to all the things that you needed and 
that’s why the falling into the Rotter School of Business was done with tremendous ease” 
(#1 Priv KOA, Rotter). 
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8.1.3 The Private Sector and Governments of the Region 
Within the region, the development status of the private sector was related to the 
overall economic position of each country. Arden was considered to have the most 
aggressive corporate entities and the actors in this country were involved in establishing 
facilitating mechanisms for regional trade. There was therefore some perception of 
unfair advantage for Arden’s business sector which leveraged the opportunities 
available for regional trade. In the climate of suspicion, collaborative efforts were 
further constrained. Governments of the region did not commit strongly to regional 
unification and viewed the private sector as either insufficiently developed to contribute 
to the economic and development success of the region or, in the case of large 
corporate entities, it was believed actors were demonstrating opportunistic behaviours. 
In this context of mutual distrust and lack of confidence between the private sector and 
government, private sector agencies, many of which were involved in the establishment 
of Rotter Business School, viewed their facilitating roles as significant to the process of 
economic development. Further, collaboration amongst the business schools was also 
affected by this overall regional climate (Table 38). 
Table 38: Segregation with Lack of Government Commitment and Private Sector 
Capability 
Private  “Many of the national governments felt that the private sector as a whole…was not really 
interested in working in the field of economic and social development but they were 
interested in pursuing their own bottom line- profits… Also, in many cases, they didn’t think 
the private sector had the capability of making the kind of contribution” (#5 Priv Director, 
Rotter). 
On the private sector side there was a distrust of government and working with governments. 
All they trying to do is get hold of your books and tax you more or whatever” (#5 Priv 
Director, Rotter).  
8.1.4 Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment 
Several factors contributed to reducing the size of the market for Rotter Business 
School. Competition from other providers offering similar products was a factor that 
was noted by both public and private actors. In addition, Green University, in its quest 
to promote regional co-operation, established an informal agreement between the 
business schools which divided the regional market such that it confined Apple 
Business School to operate in Arden, Gerran Business School in Gerrantown, and 
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Rotter Business School in Rotterdam and the other countries of the sub-region. This 
constrained the operations of Rotter as it was faced with the dual challenge of a market 
geographically spread over several island territories with a smaller population size than 
the other two business schools of Green University. In considering possibilities for 
expansion, one respondent noted: 
“…we also have to be mindful with the size of the market. The market 
could only manage but so much because we are not the only players in 
the market” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). 
University actors accepted the small size and geographic spread as a reality of their 
operations but private sector actors noted the debilitating effects on economies of scale 
and competitiveness of Rotter, which influenced the legitimacy of the School as a 
business (Table 39). 
Table 39: Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment 
Public  “One of the issues too is competition in the local market and regionally as well.” (#1 Pub 
Director, Rotter) 
“Well I think size would be one of the constraints that, although we are not confined to 
operating only in Rotterdam and the Eastern Caribbean. We can stretch out to Belize and 
places like that too but I think once you go too far out of the OECS then you start to meet up: 
one Gerran and then Apple and therefore you start to become competitive there.” (#2 Pub 
Director, Rotter) 
Private  “…they faced competition from offshore providers” (#1 Priv Director, Rotter). 
“I mean I have long argued that because we have this sort of ‘Entente-Cordiale’ with the other 
business schools in the Region, we don’t compete in each other’s territories. That is so ‘un-
business’ it is hurting us.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter) 
8.1.5 A Culture of Respect and Partnership in Rotterdam 
The development success of Rotterdam was attributed to several factors including “…a 
sound post-emancipation educational system, a stable political system, an effective 
trade union movement, positive benefits from the colonial administration, a dynamic 
private sector and an effective NGO movement” (CEPAL Naciones Unidas, 2010). 
These factors were identified by respondents in the interviews and noted as contributing 
factors to the success of the PPP. The cultural and historical embeddedness of the 
University was noted in the research process, indicated by the continued reference to 
persons by endowed titles, such as the title of knighthood, ‘Sir’ during interviews. It 
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was also noted in the number of pictures, as opposed to descriptive indicators of 
development, included in a book published on the history of the Campus. The texts, 
however, provided limited information to an outside researcher investigating the impact 
of the Campus on its resident territory. This phenomenon was also observed in respect 
of publications regarding the history of the other two campuses where there was little 
indication of the way in which the Campus influenced the strategy of development.  
In a study of ‘social dialogue’ and the success of the Rotterdam model of tripartite 
partnership, Fashoyin (2001) concluded that the success of social partnership in the 
context could be attributed to the absence of major conflict in the history of the country, 
the commitment to partnership from all sectors evidenced by the presence of a single 
workers’ union and private sector agency, a stable political process founded on 
pluralistic democracy, a homogenous society with strong family ties and civil society 
that plays a strategic role in social dialogue where citizens “…know when Government 
is pursuing the overall good of the people” (Fashoyin, 2001, p.60). In this context, it 
was noted that “…social partnership agreements would have to maintain a certain 
degree of flexibility, enabling business to make appropriate responses to the changing 
competitive environment” (ibid.). The structure and functioning of the PPP appeared to 
be influenced by the context of successful social dialogue at the national level, through 
the involvement of representative organisations. The private sector noted the 
opportunity of the culture of Rotterdam for education organisations, including business 
education whereas University respondents did not suggest these factors as opportunities 
or constraints (Table 40).  
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Table 40: Education, Partnership and Development at Rotterdam  
Public  “…what should our priorities be in this current environment? Should it be to retain 
fundamentally that developmental function and to subsidize that or should we be looking 
to secure our future in financial terms by making sure we develop programmes that are 
going to meet the immediate needs of the market as we see them?” (#1 Pub Director, 
Rotter) 
Private   “Rotterdam knows that without partnering of some kind, the standard of living is going to 
drop. Rotterdam relies on partnering to keep the standard of living, which is reasonably 
high, to where it is.” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter) 
Rotterdam has a tripartite thing, government, private sector (and) trade unions which is 
operated very well, its prevented major crises and major strikes in this region. And it still 
exists today. I think it needs to be strengthened a bit more, maybe adding the NGOs who 
now have a viable movement of some kind.” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter). 
“…whether it is governmental or non-governmental, people in this region have the same 
desire for educational development so the politics doesn’t affect us.” (#3 KOA, Rotter) 
Document The development success of the country “…has been due to a sound post-emancipation 
educational system, a stable political system, an effective trade union movement, positive 
benefits from the colonial administration, a dynamic private sector and an effective NGO 
movement.” (CEPAL Naciones Unidas, 2010) 
“It is widely acknowledged that the success in terms of political and social development is 
underpinned by a shared vision…. It is however not extensively documented exactly how 
these underpinnings were established and what organisational and institutional 
mechanisms were created to facilitate public-private dialogue.” (Ibid) 
 
8.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM CAMPUS  
The Rotterdam Campus of Green University was established as the College of Arts and 
Sciences in 1963. The campus was established by Royal Charter and reflected 
principles and ideologies similar to those of the other two campuses. Green University, 
Rotterdam, was established to serve the needs of a subset of the Caribbean region that 
included Rotterdam and nine other independent territories of the Caribbean region. 
From its establishment “…the campus sought to establish itself as part of the regional 
community (Fraser et al., 2003, p.2). Its first principal was “…dedicated to promoting 
the interests of the campus and committed to regionalism” (Fraser et al., 2003, p.3). 
The campus principal has noted that quality “…is best measured in terms of relevance” 
(Fraser et al., 2003, p.ix). The findings of the study confirmed the positioning of the 
University as an institution for regional integration.  
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8.2.1 University as an Institution for Regional Integration 
Several regional institutions, including CARICOM, have been established to co-
ordinate and promote co-operation among countries of the Caribbean region. The 
private sector of the region established the CAIC which functions on the basis of 
partnerships and claims that they “…are a supporting voice at the regional level for 
national representative bodies and seek to impact upon the development, growth and 
competitive positioning of the Caribbean business environment through partnership 
activities” (Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, 2011). The location of 
Rotterdam in the midst of several other small developing countries of the region has 
placed the responsibility for regional co-operation on several institutions of Rotterdam. 
Green University, as a signatory to the treaties for regional co-operation, was a major 
institution with the responsibility for the unification of the region and held 
responsibility for formulating policies and performing functions in relation to co-
operation and regional unification (CARICOM Secretariat). The Rotterdam Campus of 
Green University, geographically located in close proximity to the other developing 
countries, was viewed as the Campus that served the sub-region. Respondents noted the 
success of the PPP with respect to the inter-relationships and linkages among the 
region’s private sector and the inclusion of the public sector which bridged the gap 
between two sectors considered vital to the tourism and financial services based 
economy. This was facilitated by the small size of the geographic space and social 
cohesion within the territories (Table 41). 
Table 41: The University as an instrument for regional integration 
Public  “The university was established in the first instance to have a developmental function for the 
people of the Caribbean.” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter) 
Private  “…the university is a very integrating factor and having it in Rotterdam …has brought a lot 
of persons …together with tremendous networking.” (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
8.2.2 Reputable Brand and Growth of Green University, Rotterdam  
Green University was a well-established brand within the region and the Rotterdam 
Campus was also recognised as a relevant actor in the policy-making process. Table 42 
illustrates the extent to which both public and private sector directors placed value on 
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the Green University brand. In this context, the business school leveraged the brand to 
enhance its success in the environment. At the same time, the Rotterdam campus grew 
significantly with the addition of a number of taught masters programmes that respond 
to market demand.  
Table 42: Brand Reputation of Green University, Rotterdam 
Public  “One of the reasons that the schools have been successful in attracting quite high quality 
directors is that Green University does actually have quite a good reputation… there is an 
element of prestige involved in being associated with the Green University brand.”(#1 Pub 
Director, Rotter) 
Private  “The receptivity of the university by the community in that when we came out we had a very 
strong and positive image.” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
“The people of Rotterdam are very supportive of the Rotterdam campus of Green University… 
the support for the university is very strong.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter) 
 
8.3 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The development status of Rotterdam, which was facilitated by its education and social 
culture, provided opportunities for the PPP. Public and private actor sub-groups 
recognised the opportunities and the logistical challenges of operating in a segregated 
geographic territory. The University was held in high acclaim and the business school 
recognised this and leveraged on the value of the brand. The regional agenda was both 
mandated by the University and culturally embedded amongst actors. The effect of the 
environment on the organisation and on the PPP are considered in the explanations and 
propositions derived from the further analysis of the PPP at the level of the firm.  
8.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL  
8.4.1 Background to Rotter Business School 
Rotter Business School, Rotterdam, was the third business school to be established as a 
PPP by Green University. The PPP was initially established as a partnership between 
Green University, Rotterdam, and the private sector of Rotterdam, through the 
facilitation and active involvement of the Caribbean Association of Industry and 
Commerce, Inc. (CAIC). The CAIC “…is an umbrella organization for private sector 
representative bodies” (CAIC, 2011). The PPP has been in existence for twenty years. 
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The organisation was established in 1991 as a Centre for Management Development of 
the Rotterdam Campus and was upgraded in 2006 as a school of business. The School 
is located in the CARICOM Research Park of the Rotterdam Campus of Green 
University in accordance with the Affiliation Agreement which stated that “…the 
headquarters of the… (School) shall be at the Rotterdam Campus, Rotterdam”.  
8.4.2 Purpose of the Business School: Outreach Arm of the University 
The purpose of the business school was viewed by public and private directors in very 
different ways, based on their stakeholder interests (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Within the framework of the University, the business school was given the portfolio of 
providing training programmes and short courses that were relevant to the management 
needs of private business and public sector agencies. In the early years, the innovation 
of taught masters within the University system presented a conflict of ideology between 
‘pure’ and ‘applied’ teaching and research and the business school was seen to be the 
outreach arm of the University to deliver ‘applied’ programmes in management 
education. The separation of portfolios was deemed to be important in maintaining the 
distinction between the activities of the Rotterdam Campus and those of the Business 
School. The clarity of the portfolio served to quell dissent between actors in the 
University and Business School. The separation however, provided the Business 
School with access to a market but without a product strategy and opportunity for 
product innovation (Baden Fuller, 1995). This appeared to affect the growth of the 
organisation. 
8.4.3 Nature of Private Involvement 
The historical network architecture included actors from the University and actors from 
the private sector who belonged to CAIC. These actors all held the shared purpose of 
regional integration and regional development. The role of CAIC was to facilitate the 
development of the private sector for regional trade. Kris Sears of Rotterdam and Grey 
Hound of Arden were business colleagues and friends and, along with CAIC, they 
secured USAID funding for the start-up of the business school. Kris Sears and Xavier 
Prince were the signatories to the Affiliation Agreement. One respondent noted that 
“…half of the guys who were on the Board at CAIC literally came over to be on the 
Board of Rotter School of Business” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). All actors named in the 
220 
 
historical network, except Neptune Cross, served on the Board of Directors of Rotter 
Business School. 
Figure 17: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Rotter 
 
The structural embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997; Granovetter, 1992) of the actors in the 
network with ties to the social partnership agenda, the private sector movement for 
development, and the University as an institution for integration, influenced the 
regionalist agenda and social identity of the PPP. The relational embeddedness (Uzzi, 
1996) of the actors from CAIC suggested that they were “cohesively tied” and would 
emulate each other’s behaviour (Gulati, 1998, p.296). The architecture of strong social 
ties in the historical network also influenced the information flow of the network and 
promoted the development of trust among private sector actors (Granovetter, 1973; 
Podolny and Baron, 1997). Moreover, the structural and relational embeddedness of 
actors in the network suggested that the cognitive social structure amongst private 
sector actors impacted the cognition and mental representations of actors (DiMaggio, 
1997; Emirbayer, 1997) embedded in social relations and actions that involved co-
operation rather than competition, facilitation and support, and reliance on external aid 
funding for project development, influenced the nature of private involvement in the 
PPP. This contrasted with the nature of private involvement at Apple that featured a 
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regime focused on profitability. Along with the other factors, including the spread of 
the territories to be serviced by the business school, it appeared to restrict the extent to 
which business actors in the PPP demonstrated competence for producing wealth, the 
core competencies associated with private sector actors (Ghobadian et al., 2004a).  
Public and private actors in the network adopted the role of facilitating the entry of 
Rotter Business School in the various territories. This distortion in the competitive 
context produced positive short-term and negative long-term impacts for the business 
school. The context of the organisation shaped the strategy (Porter, 1994) of 
stakeholders as an entry mechanism and this, along with the reputation of the 
University, protected the business school from local rivalry. In the early years, the 
school achieved social impact as it was able to create the social networks of actors as 
alumni across the sub-region. This however, appeared to create a situation in which the 
market was saturated with respect to the programme offerings and Rotter Business 
School experienced severe financial challenges in the later years.  
In light of its portfolio of high-end, expensive products, University actors viewed the 
business school as a “money-making entity” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter), with the dual 
responsibility of serving the business community whilst achieving its own success as a 
business. The functioning of the School as a business was understood to be aligned 
with the demand of the private sector for similar type competencies in the training 
programmes. The implications for the structure of the business school that impacted its 
performance as a business entity included reduced bureaucracy, efficiency, 
effectiveness and quality of service in the delivery of programmes. The continuing 
challenges to achieve financial success resulted in University actors questioning the 
appropriateness of the governance and strategic direction of the business school.  
Private sector actors viewed the business school as an opportunity and mechanism to 
fill the talent void in the private sector which was experiencing a dearth of senior and 
middle management. The private sector need and partnership culture of the Rotterdam 
society that drove the establishment of Rotter Business School as a separate entity was 
unlike the deep-seated development needs that propelled the establishment of Gerran 
Business School. A rival explanation for the establishment of the School was that 
Green University, having already established business schools at its other two 
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campuses, would have deemed it important to serve Rotterdam and the sub-region in 
the same way.  
There was clarity with respect to the purpose of the PPP from the perspective of public 
and private actors (Austin et al., 2000). This factor, together with the social identity 
(Ellemers et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000) of private sector participants as ‘regional 
integrationists’ and advocates of social partnerships, drove the establishment of the 
business school. What was lacking, however, was a shared or connection-based purpose 
(Austin, 2000) that motivated both public and private actors in the PPP governance 
structure. The developmental purpose evident at Gerrantown was not present in the 
environment at Rotterdam.  
8.4.4 Organisational Structure of the PPP: Corporate Training Entity 
The business school oriented its structure as an outreach arm of the University in the 
organisational structure of a ‘corporate training entity,’ as opposed to a ‘corporate 
university’ where training products are developed through organisational analysis and 
research and delivered to fill particular gaps in the knowledge base of employees in 
business. It appeared that the purpose of the private sector was unevenly 
accommodated in the agenda of the business school and the University only engaged 
with the business school administratively with respect to the quality of its programmes. 
There was little evidence of the contribution of the University to the knowledge base on 
which the products of the business school relied. As such, its socio-political legitimacy, 
based on its product portfolio and relevance to the business sector, was compromised 
(Table 43).  
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Table 43: Rotter as a Corporate Training Entity  
Public  “Rotter School of Business is set up in theory as a money making entity. Nonetheless, it 
still has a service function and ironically that’s exactly what the private sector directors 
sitting on the board are saying repeatedly, that we need you to help us develop the skills 
and so on in the interest of our society and in the interest of our business.” (#1 Pub 
Director, Rotter) 
“…Rotter could provide a way of, a means of outreach and a means of customized 
programmes that we cannot spend as much attention on…” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter) 
“...the postgraduate level would have to come back over to us(#2 Pub Director, Rotter). 
Private  “Taught masters is a fairly new phenomenon as you know, and you really wanted less of a 
research degree and more of an applied programme so you had to create a vehicle for that.” 
(#1 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
 “…these academics sit up on the hill and have no sense of what really goes on down in the 
trenches of business… So my guess is that they recognized that they needed an arm that 
was not seen as so academic and aloof from the real business world.” (#3 Priv KOA, 
Rotter) 
Document 
Analysis  
“The mission of the Rotter School of Business is to provide education, training, 
development and conduct research while serving as a conduit for organizational growth in 
companies and organizations in the Caribbean region.” (Strategic Plan of the Rotter School 
of Business 2009 -2012:2) 
8.4.5 Ownership and Control 
The Rotter School of Business followed the trajectory of the other two schools and was 
established as a private company limited by guarantee, not having a share capital 
(Articles of Association of The Rotter School of Business, Inc.). As such, ownership by 
the ‘cause’ of education was legally affirmed and control of the organisation was 
effected by the Board of Directors and management. The legal arrangements initially 
indicated that the Board of Directors “shall comprise not more than twelve (12) 
members who shall include the three (3) shareholders of the Company who can be 
transferred and therefore not hold permanent shareholding” (Affiliation Agreement, 
1991, p.1). In a later review of the by-laws, control of the business school by the 
University appeared to be the purpose for establishing the ratio of public to private 
sector members and it was agreed that the “… Board should be no more than sixteen, 
nine of whom must be affiliated - and that word is very key - affiliated with the 
university” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). This statement suggested, however, that there was a 
recognised need to have more private involvement. In this arrangement, several actors 
from the private sector were involved in other mechanisms of the university and as 
such, were considered to have fulfilled the requirement of ‘affiliation’ to the University. 
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The revised by-laws also affirmed control by the University and stated that “…the 
Principal would always be either the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman…and there is 
an executive committee of three which will always be the Chairman, the Principal and 
one other” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).  
The current Board of Directors comprises ten persons from the private sector and 
external agencies and four persons from within the University structure. Control of the 
organisation by the private sector ‘ideology’ was seen to be important and people who 
were ‘affiliated’ to the University were thought to possess an “…appreciation for both 
sides (whereas) university players tend to be more one-track in their orientation. They 
tend to see things in a fairly ‘siloed’ kind of orientation” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). 
University actors and those from the private sector appeared to endorse the ownership 
and control structure of the PPP.  
8.4.6 Financial Arrangements  
The Rotter School of Business was considered to be responsible for meeting its 
expenses. This was noted in the Affiliation Agreement which stated: “The CMD 
undertakes the responsibility for meeting its expenses, without prejudice to the right of 
the CHSB to accept grants, loans or other resources from the University which the 
University may offer” (Affiliation Agreement, 1991, p.2). The University committed to 
providing academic staff “…in such numbers and in such grades and the…(School) 
may require, to carry out the academic functions of the …(School) on such specific 
terms and conditions as may…be agreed to from time to time with the… (School)” 
(ibid.). The Affiliation Agreement also indicated that the University will assist the 
School “…through the use of its good offices in the procurement of grants or other 
financing from regional and international bodies” (Affiliation Agreement, 1991, p.3). 
Finally, the University committed to the provision of “…adequate adult lecture rooms 
to seat forty-five (45) persons for the purpose of conducing its academic and training 
programmes. The cost of such facilities will be the responsibility of the… (School)” 
(ibid.). The School has generated revenue mainly from fees charged for its programmes 
but has also received financial endowments from international development agencies, 
including USAID, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International 
Investors Club (IIC), and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). It 
has also received financial endowments from organisations in Rotterdam.  
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Rotter Business School was financially dependent on the Rotterdam campus and this 
would have contributed to their conformance with the control initiatives of the 
University actors. This was noted by one respondent who affirmed: “Dependency 
brings, well, if I give you money you have to do what I tell you and that also could 
restrict our competitiveness” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter). The University actors either 
empathised with the financial challenges of the business school or viewed them as a 
threat to the University’s resources and another reason to question the internal 
legitimacy of the separate existence of the business school.  
8.4.7 Structure of the PPP Governance Mechanism 
8.4.7.1 Motivation for PPP Governance Structure  
The PPP governance mechanism was established at the start-up of the business school. 
It was intended to recognise the role of the University as guardians of the quality of 
programmes, in that the business school sought the imprimatur of the University for 
their programmes. The private sector and University adopted joint responsibility for 
direction and control of the new organisation in the early days, giving due attention to 
recruitment of KOAs and supporting the new organisation financially. The University 
appeared to have trust in the private sector with respect to the governance of the 
business school and the Affiliation Agreement was fairly open, giving no emphasis on 
the actor sub-group composition of the Board of Directors. One respondent addressed 
the difference in nature of the private sector and University governance mechanisms 
and suggested that: 
“University directors tend to be largely academic and not to detract from 
that, their experience is largely confined to the governance around 
academia and the governance around public sector type of 
administration models. As a result, I think sometimes in some of those 
structures, some of the disciplines around accountability, performance, 
governance and just straight or just simple or fundamental business 
practices tend not to be as rigorously adhered to or pursued as we would 
in the private sector.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter) 
8.4.7.2 Roles in the Governance Structure  
The Affiliation Agreement committed the “…Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
or such other official as may be designated by the University, shall be responsible for 
obtaining all other necessary approvals for any programme…” (Affiliation Agreement, 
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1991, p.3). The Affiliation Agreement did not include any other guidelines with respect 
to the operation of the PPP or its governance structure. In the case of Rotter, two 
committees were established as the geographic dispersion of directors in various 
territories challenged the use of committees in the governance structure. One 
respondent explained:  
“There are two committees really and you see the reason we have to 
keep those kinds of things to a minimum is because of the spread of our 
Directors. They’re very useful. One is really university committee…The 
Finance is the one that meets a lot more frequently.” (#2 Priv KOA, 
Rotter) 
The business school appeared to be administratively embedded in the University’s 
hierarchy and structures for programme approval and programme administration. The 
structure appeared to conflict with the definition of a PPP characterised by “…joint 
definition of specific goals, and a clear assignment of responsibilities and areas of 
competence between the pairs in the pursuit of a common endeavor” (Jamali, 2004, 
p.416). There was an absence of shared understanding of the ‘goals’ and public and 
private actors held different and conflicting understandings of the purpose of the PPP. 
The demarcation of areas of responsibilities in the legal agreement provided clear roles 
for the University actors. This, however, translated into administrative support and 
there was little indication of the University’s involvement and commitment to the 
development and enhancement of the research and teaching ‘products’ delivered by 
Rotter Business School. Further, the limited engagement of private sector directors in 
the formulation and control of strategy was evidenced by the lack of clarity of the role 
of the private sector directors in the management and accountability of the School in 
the context of a defined strategy. University actors appeared to distance themselves 
from the performance outcomes of the School but co-operated in the provision of 
administrative support and boundary spanning actions (Baker, 2008). 
8.4.7.3 Stakeholder Model of Governance in a Quasi-Market Context 
The stakeholder model of governance (Freeman, 1984) established the importance of 
stakeholder interests in the strategy of the business school. While business felt the 
demand for talent, there was less felt need on the part of the entire society for 
development, as was evident in the case of Gerran. The preference for private sector 
competences and involvement in the Board of Directors suggested that there was a 
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perception that private involvement in the governance of Rotter would have served to 
enhance the strategy and competitiveness of the business school. This however, 
appeared to be distorted by the stakeholder model of governance which was propelled 
by the need to include representatives of various territories, and private sector directors 
who had a history of affiliation with the business school. This is consistent with the 
view that “… board size and composition are not random or independent factors, but 
are, rather, rational organizational responses to the conditions of the external 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972, p.226). As such, the members of the private sector on the 
Board of Directors were not necessarily selected for their business competencies and 
acumen but included professionals and executives in reputable businesses and business 
organisations. The University actors, as in the case of Apple and Gerran, were selected 
to the Board of Directors based on the positions they held within the University 
hierarchy.  
The rationale for selection of private sector directors supported the business strategy of 
the organisation. Private sector directors provided access to the market in their 
territories and “opened doors” for the business school, which influenced their position 
in the market (#3 Priv KOA, Rotter). This was also viewed as the role of University 
actors, who, by virtue of their position within the University, served to provide 
technical advice and access to resources. This interference in the market operations 
affected the competitiveness of the business school (Porter, 2008) and contributed to 
the quasi-market positioning of the business school (Le Grand, 1991; Bartlett et al., 
1998a; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993).  
In the case of Rotter, the quasi-market arrangement (Le Grand, 1991) was established 
by the independent competitive nature of the business school in relation to the 
traditional University as provider of business education. The operation of the PPP 
influenced the market from both the demand and supply sides. With respect to demand, 
the social position of private sector actors influenced demand in the various territories 
and the supply of students. On the supply side, the business school operated in a 
competitive environment but was legitimised by the brand of the University. The quasi-
market that was established under motivational conditions of profit and output 
maximisation, and the added motivation of purchaser as user, and as provider appeared 
to influence the success of the PPP in the early years (Bartlett et al., 1998b).  
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This model of governance, with market type incentives, depended on the motivation 
structure of the agents involved in decision making (Le Grand, 1997). One respondent 
indicated that “…if it had been operating as a private entity it would have gone broke 
by now. It’s not sustainable as it currently operates, in my opinion, as a business” (#1 
Pub Director, Rotter). The business school was heavily subsidised by the Faculty with 
respect to the provision of buildings and some administrative support that was not 
costed. The stakeholder model of the Board of Directors warranted further examination 
to determine how it influenced the outcomes of the PPP. 
8.4.7.4 Private Sector Cognitive Social Structure 
The density of the private sector actor sub-group in the social network architecture of 
KOAs at Rotter Business School demonstrated continued structural and relational 
embeddedness of KOAs in the private sector cognitive identity which influenced the 
meaning structure of the network (Fuhse, 2009). The network of KOAs is presented in 
Figure 18.  
Figure 18: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Rotter 
 
All KOAs relied on the private sector for information and support. Further, the 
inclusion of KOAs from the University indicated loose-coupling of the business school 
with the University as its parent institution at its highest levels (Weick, 1976). This was 
explained from the perspective of roles as well and one KOA noted that: 
“…everybody has tremendous strength. I tend, and that may not be a 
good thing, I tend to discuss things more with my private sector 
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colleagues and [KOA] always, always seeks the advice of… [University 
actors]. That’s a role she plays, both, she has to deal with both” (#1 Priv 
KOA, Rotter). 
In the current PPP governance structure, one KOA noted his tendency to be self-
sufficient, resulting in a network support structure directly related to the routine 
operations of the business school. This respondent commented:  
“I am fairly self-servant you know, or self-sufficient, I am. I tend to be 
the very self-sufficient type. Unfortunately, it has its advantages and its 
disadvantages.”  (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
8.4.7.5 Boundary Spanning Role of Directors 
The role of individuals as boundary spanners, in the environment on the part of the 
private sector directors, and with the University on the part of their representatives, 
featured strongly in this case. This suggested the absence of a shared and unifying 
purpose, which placed actors in the position of having to defend (University) or 
advocate (private sector) for the existence and functions of the business school. The 
Board of Directors, in the early days, performed more of a service function than a 
strategic function (Zahra and Pearce, 1990). This reflects boundary spanning roles 
whereby boards, as boundary spanners, link the corporation and its environment (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1990). In the early days, the Board of Directors’ role with respect to 
establishing links between the business school and the environment served to capture 
the market and extend the legitimacy of the business school by socio-political judgment 
mechanisms and beyond the cognitive legitimacy it developed through the reputation of 
the Green University brand. Boundary spanning however, was a less appropriate role 
for the University with respect to building a strategic relationship and establishing a 
shared purpose. The division of the market through the establishment of the business 
school perpetuated the ideological separation and suspicion with regard to the ‘quality’ 
of programmes. This is directly related to the fundamental concern about what is valid 
knowledge from the perspective of a university and what knowledge should be 
disseminated in the context of teaching at the business school (Mintzberg, 2004). It 
appeared that the role of the University was currently being extended, through 
boundary spanning in the first instance, to address the issue of knowledge and the 
relationship between both institutions for the sustainability and seamless integration of 
both the University and the business school with respect to the knowledge ‘product’. 
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The problem of divided responsibilities and boundary spanning was evident in the 
observation of one respondent who described the boundary spanning role of one 
director:  
“I am pretty sure he seems committed to the Rotter School of Business 
and to see that they get their share of the pie. He is handling that fight 
right now and, as I said, I think it is a credit to management.” (#2 Priv 
KOA, Rotter) 
The movement into strategic roles is evident in the current scenario but may be due to 
the intervention of individuals, rather than the broad orientation of the Board of 
Directors. This is evidenced by the unclear definition of roles amongst members of the 
Board, lack of evidence of strategic planning or oversight control of strategy.  
The role of University actors as guardians of quality and gatekeepers of the programme 
approval process presented some frustration to private sector actors who, in later years, 
sought to implement corporate governance techniques and strategic decision-making 
within the PPP governance mechanism (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1990; Demb and Neubauer, 1990). One respondent reflected:  
“…but I don’t understand why it is we can’t run it exactly like how we 
run our businesses but we can’t because we are now part of the 
university and things don’t happen with the alacrity with which we do 
our things.” (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
In this case, the researcher observed that participants appeared to be motivated by self-
fulfilment in the good of their actions, reputation and commitment to regional 
integration. Directors from both actor-sets were proud of both the business school and 
the University and attributed the school’s success to individual actions, but more 
directly to its management. The sense of ownership appeared to be lacking but they 
were positively engaged in making a contribution (participant observation).  
8.4.7.6 Threats to Internal Legitimacy of Rotter School of Business  
There were several constraints in the relationship between Rotter School of Business 
and its parent organisation, Rotterdam Campus of Green University. While there 
appeared to be mutual respect between public and private actors, control mechanisms 
within the governance of the business school and the strategies adopted by the School 
did not yield the expected financial performance. As such, the business school was 
challenged to achieve internal legitimacy within the University (Human and Provan, 
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2000). This influenced the emergence of trust between public and private actors, with 
respect to the fiduciary responsibilities for organisational performance. Among the 
factors that appeared to contribute to this were dependence on the local market, the 
limited availability of faculty expertise, curriculum decisions, resource constraints and 
financial dependence of the business school on the University campus. Another factor 
that contributed to constraints in the relationship over the years was a historical 
problem whereby one KOA had established a confrontational relationship with the 
University. The fundamental problem, however, appeared to reside in the 
competitiveness between the two institutions. This was fuelled by the separation of the 
executive and business training, which constituted the portfolio of the business school, 
and the growth of the University as a provider of applied business education. Table 44 
below gives evidence of the relational constraints between the University and the 
business school and the concerns of public and private sub-actor groups throughout the 
history of the business school.  
Table 44: Relational Constraints at Rotter  
Public  “And then we also have an unresolved situation in the sense that the relationship between the 
Department of Management Studies, here on campus, and the Rottter School of Business has 
not been as smooth as we might have liked.” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter) 
“That came about at the time at which the school started out and a suspicion on the part of the 
private sector that the Faculty of Social Sciences had some kind of lurking interests that were 
counter to theirs and therefore that it was useful to have this separate body that would then 
look after private sector interest.” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter) 
Private  “But from where I stand it seemed to have worked well and in fact it’s a model that I think 
should be adopted throughout the university.” (#1 Priv Director, Rotter) 
 “That’s the most friction that I have seen, is around that (curriculum). I don’t know if that 
make sense.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter) 
The impact of the growth of the Rotterdam campus on Rotter Business School appeared 
to place the wider faculty as an attractive provider of relevant business programmes. 
Even in this competitive context, boundary spanning was evident within the 
relationship. One respondent noted:  
“I had no difficulties with being able, as I told you before, I can handle 
paradox and therefore my style was that I can handle these two worlds 
and I was able therefore to strike up a very good relationship with the 
[KOA] and we have worked very well together.” (#2 Pub Director, 
Rotter) 
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8.5 STRATEGY OF THE PPP  
The strategy of the PPP was described as “A strategy for lean, mean efficiency, a 
strategy for relevance, a strategy for quality” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).  
8.5.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to Key Decisions 
The social network presented in Figure 19 maps the top four people deemed to have 
contributed significantly to the strategic direction of the business school, constituting 
the overall cognitive social structure of the organisation.  
Figure 19: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Rotter  
 
The frequency of private actors mentioned in the cognitive social structure described in 
the network is thirty-three compared with two people named from the University. The 
private sector contribution was considered to be significant to the operations of the 
business school. In one case, the respondent indicated that the directors from the region 
were most valuable and in two cases, the management of the School was deemed to be 
the most important contributor to the School’s development. In one case, the question 
was omitted in error. In this network, the cognitive social structure of the network of 
actors may be described as private sector dominant.  
In the social network presented in Figure 20 which mapped the contributions of both 
actor sub-groups to specific ‘cognitive’ and ‘socio-political’ strategies and actions, it 
was found that both actor sub-groups contributed mainly to the activities of business 
school that were related to ‘cognitive’ legitimacy.  
Colour code Public Private 
1 2 3 4 Comment
Respondent 1 Two longest serving private sector members
Respondent 2 People who run it
Respondent 3 People who run it
Respondent 4
Respondent 5
Respondent 6
Respondent 7
Respondent 8 Directors from the Region
Respondent 9
Respondent 10
Respondent 11 Question omitted from interview in error
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Figure 20: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at 
Rotter 
 
The support of the Board of Directors therefore ensured that the business school was 
viewed as a university structure, a legitimate provider of business education. University 
actors were seen to contribute mainly to activities related to the quality of programmes 
and quality of service. Private sector actors contributed mainly through their business 
expertise in the operation of the business school as an entity and in providing access to 
the market. This is consistent with the ‘outside-in’ strategy described by one respondent 
who indicated: “Yes well we rely on the environment to survive in large measure and 
because of the softening of the market right now, the contraction of the market, in terms 
of the economic environment, we see as inhibitors.” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
In this social network, there were fewer ties of members of the Board of Directors to 
the strategic decisions and actions of the business school than were found in the other 
two cases. This suggested that management was perhaps more involved in the strategic 
decision-making processes than the Board of Directors. Moreover, the strategic 
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direction of the business school appeared to be controlled by one person. This was also 
the case at Apple Business School in its earlier days, which was mentioned by one 
respondent from Apple who indicated that the main concern for him upon assumption 
of duty “…was the one identified by a quality assurance report that was done about six 
months prior (2002) by the University…which said that the business school was 
essentially the work of one man and that there is a great vulnerability here” (#1 
Priv/KOA, Apple). This phenomenon of management ownership and control in a 
system that did not demand accountability for performance was related to the Board of 
Directors’ model of supportive private sector actors in geographic territories. This 
contrasted with the corporate governance model whereby directors possess “…the 
formal authority to ratify management initiatives, to evaluate managerial performance 
and to allocate rewards and penalties to management on the basis of criteria that are 
supposed to reflect shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The stakeholder 
model of governance in this case, was influenced by the nature of private actors as 
representatives of corporations, NGOs and actors affiliated with the University. 
Directors, in the early stages, appeared to be more concerned with the attainment of 
social objectives of impact and regional integration and less concerned with fiduciary 
responsibilities and the performance of the business school as a competitive entity. 
Further, several directors were tightly coupled to management in longstanding 
professional relationships and one respondent indicated: “Granted very many of them 
are my personal friends but outside of that, the relationship with the (key university 
stakeholders was important)” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). This reduced the focus of the 
Board of Directors on the control of the organisation and positioned it as a service 
support body. As such, the control and strategic direction of the firm were within the 
ambit of the School’s management and this limited its strategic initiatives towards 
socio-political actions. The business school focused mainly on its cognitive legitimacy 
as it appeared to be focused on the purpose of social impact that de-emphasised 
strategic direction and control by the Board of Directors.  
8.5.1.1 Organisational Separation and the Value Chain of Knowledge 
The separation of the business school from the University in a strategy aimed at 
reducing bureaucracy to deliver a more relevant and efficient service to executive 
clients impacted the value chain of business education (Porter, 2008). Using the 
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concept of the value chain as described by Porter (1985), value in business education 
may be understood to derive from the creation of knowledge through research through 
to the point of delivery for the education service provider, but to the point of utility for 
the business organisation. In the separation, the business school was established at the 
interface of both the University as producer of knowledge, and business as the end user, 
loosely coupled to both (Weick, 1976). The PPP governance structure, which 
emphasised service to management rather than strategic functions (Demb and 
Neubauer, 1990; Gopinath et al., 1994), coupled with the market strategy for accessing 
and delivering service to clients, de-emphasised consideration of value in the 
production of knowledge and sustainable generation of new ‘products’. The 
relationship with the University was expected to be a value adding partnership with 
“...the understanding that each player in the value-added chain has a stake in the others' 
success…as one competitive unit” (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988, p.95). This 
arrangement would allow actors to “...look for opportunities beyond their own 
corporate boundaries…[and] for ways the resources at one part of the value-added 
chain could be used in another” (ibid, p.95). In this model, faculty create value at the 
start of the knowledge chain through research that yields relevant and useful findings 
and business enhances the applicability and utility of knowledge in firms.  
In the business-university partnership at Rotter, the focus of University directors on 
administrative support and the relationship gap between the University and the business 
school are evidence of the separation of the production of knowledge at one end of the 
value chain and the impact of business education at the user end. Moreover, the 
suspicion by the University actors regarding the quality of education delivered at the 
business school suggested faculty disengagement from the knowledge product. The 
internal competition generated, together with the independent growth of the University 
as a provider of ‘relevant’ business education in its own right, and the declining 
financial sustainability of the business school, threatened the internal legitimacy of the 
business school as a part of the University.  
Application of the ‘value adding partnership’ concept to the operation of the business 
school suggested that the administrative benefits of separating the organisations were 
not complemented by value adding activities beyond organisational boundaries of the 
business school and University that would have allowed for the “...recognition of 
serious threats that lie elsewhere along the value-added chain” (Johnston and Lawrence, 
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1988, p.96). PPPs may be considered as a value strategy in which the collaborative 
mechanism is loosely coupled to the parent organisation/s or stakeholder interests and, 
as such, the success of the PPP is dependent on the creation of shared value (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2011). The success of the PPP is dependent on the 
attitudes and behaviours of participating managers (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988) with 
respect to seeking opportunities beyond organisational boundaries and implementing 
strategies for sustained collaboration in the enhancement of value at the respective 
points of the value chain. Strategy is “…the art of creating value…(and) is the way a 
company defines its business and links together the only two resources that really 
matter in today’s economy: knowledge and relationships or an organization’s 
competences and customers” (Normann and Ramirez, 1993, p.65).  
The PPP is an opportunity for the creation of an appropriate value strategy (which) is 
“...primarily the art of positioning a company in the right place on the value chain – the 
right business, the right products and market segments, the right value-adding 
activities” (ibid.). For the PPP and cross-sectoral arrangements, this requires the 
demonstration of collaborative competencies in management and governance to create 
network structures where shared purpose and individual destinations are recognised and 
communicated, and shared value serves as the control strategy. This finding extends the 
‘shared value’ contribution of Porter (2006; 2011). It also extends the findings of 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) and Ingraham and Lynn (2004) who recognised that the 
PPP combines mechanisms of co-ordination and control, creating network structures 
that utilise market co-ordination with price as control and hierarchical mechanisms with 
authoritative controls. The findings in this study, however, contrast with the findings of 
Bradach and Eccles (1989), and Gulati (1998) in the conclusion that trust is not the 
control mechanism of PPPs in the context of business schools in small developing 
countries. This study argues instead that ‘shared purpose’ is the mechanism for network 
co-ordination and ‘shared value’ is the control strategy. The strategy of the organisation 
is therefore to grow, innovate and create shared value. This was recognised by one 
respondent who perceived the importance of a shared purpose and destination as the 
basis of the PPP:  
“I think where the public sector needs to catch up with the private sector 
is on aligning that strategy for delivery and aligning those goals for what 
we produce…Worry less about how the private sector gets there and 
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how the public sector gets there, but the more important thing to do is to 
agree on the agenda.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter) 
8.6 FUTURE OF THE PPP  
At the time of writing this thesis there were plans for the restructuring the operations of 
the business school and integrating the school into the Faculty of Social Sciences. The 
opinions of respondents with respect to this restructuring are presented in Table 45. It 
appeared that the acceptance of the restructuring arrangements by the management of 
the business school was based on the limitations of size and financial concerns that 
challenged its internal legitimacy.  
Table 45: Reintegration of Rotter  
Public “…we are actually going through a review of the governance relationships with the Faculty 
and the Rotter School of Business because we are going to actually have to integrate them 
into what we call a Faculty Centre” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter). 
Private “Bigger, more comfortable. Where we see it in the next 5 years is making a fairly quantum 
leap in terms of the whole question of innovation, creativity, entrepreneurship, leadership in 
the region” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). 
“… I think it is clear that we are part of the Faculty … but we want to see how we can work 
more closely with the faculty so that somewhere down the line some of their faculty will 
have responsibility for teaching on some of our programmes” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). 
 
8.7 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CASE DATA 
The data gathered in this case was limited in two ways. Firstly, there were only two 
respondents in the category of ‘public’ and, as such, there was no access to the historic 
experiences of persons who had retired. Secondly, the access to documents was limited 
and the researcher only had access to some agreements.  
8.7.1 Limitations of the Findings  
There was no indication of transfer of learning from the University to the business 
school with respect to knowledge and relevance of business knowledge. Although the 
faculty of the University taught at the business school, there was no data available on 
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the way in which they adapted their teaching to address the issue of relevance. This was 
not a direct question in the research but was a finding in the other two cases.  
8.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AT ROTTER 
The success was based on the Board of Directors and PPP as market strategy for a 
section of the education market considered as ‘executive training’. This strategy had the 
effect of giving primacy to the market and responding to the features of the 
environment, rather than the product. The product strategy was therefore based on 
market and internal efficiency in delivering to the market. Cognitive legitimacy was 
facilitated by the reputation of the University but socio-political legitimacy was not 
addressed by the business school. In fact, this was based on alignment of the executive 
experience with the logistical and administrative requirements of ‘executives’ in a 
responsive market strategy. The University still placed value on what the business 
school was doing but there was no explicit value to the parent organisation. Further, the 
parent organisation had grown to accommodate the fundamental elements of the 
portfolio of the business school and presented a source of internal competition, 
challenging the internal legitimacy of the business school. Without a distinctive product 
and business strategy the School’s sustainability was threatened and the structural 
relationship with the University was in the process of being re-evaluated. The following 
are the major case findings:  
1. Recognition of the role of the PPP in the creation of shared value determines 
the effectiveness of boundary spanning behaviours.  
2. The PPP is a mechanism for resource sharing that requires the co-operation of 
partners. Actor involvement was based on relationships, mutual concerns and 
commitment to development. Trust is a facilitator of this process but does not 
motivate actors to continue in the long-term relationship.  
3. The institutionalisation of the PPP as an organisational form evaluated by 
stakeholders as a part of the University (cognitive legitimacy) contributed to its 
success throughout its history. This however, appears to be challenging the 
future success of the PPP.  
4. Participation of University actors based on defined roles supported the 
administrative processes but did not acknowledge the knowledge ‘product’ and 
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the role of the University in the production of business knowledge. Contracts 
and role definition have specific but limited usage in the execution of PPPs.  
5. Financial dependence outside of contractual arrangements distorts the level of 
trust. Financial sustainability is critical to the continued success of the PPP.  
6. The PPP exists in a competitive space along with parent institutions and is 
influenced by the rate of growth and success of the parent institution. 
According to Johnston and Lawrence (1988), “...when all the partners are 
strong, the entire value-added chain can stand up to the toughest of competitors, 
integrated or not” (p.96). 
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CHAPTER 9: CROSS SITE ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION 
9.0 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the cross-site analysis and interpretation of the findings across 
cases. The objective of the chapter is to move towards the development of 
“…incrementally more powerful theories” and to develop a model to guide practice by 
examination of past literature, insights of the researcher and empirical observations 
across the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.548). The cross-site analysis was undertaken by 
identifying the variables found to have within-case significance and developing ‘time 
ordered’ and ‘effects matrices’ to demonstrate causal explanations across the cases 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.190). Causal streams are presented in meta-networks, 
which were developed based on variables analysed at the three levels of the study. The 
meta-networks respect the site level analysis and include a summary of the within-case 
analysis of actor perceptions and actions with respect to variables identified and the 
resultant effect of those perceptions on the relationship between public and private 
actor subgroups at each site (Ibid). The effects of convergence and divergence of 
partner sub-group perceptions of variables on partner synergy are extrapolated and 
analysed to explain the impact on the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP.  
This chapter is organised into five sections. In the first section, the process of 
conducting the analysis is explained. The second section demonstrates the cross-site 
analysis to determine the variables that created ‘spaces of optimisation’ in the PPPs. 
The third section engages the sense-making process and examines the inclusion of 
private ideology and the relationship between purpose, structure, strategy and outcomes 
across the sites. The final section includes an interpretation of the ‘time’ and ‘effects’ 
events in relation to the Research Questions to derive the overall findings of the study.  
9.1 THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SITE ANALYSIS 
The process of cross-case analysis was aided by the development of themes or patterns 
of evidence considered significant to the theoretical propositions that guided the study, 
and to the policy and practice of cross-sectoral partnering (Yin, 2009a). The themes cut 
across levels of the study and case explanations were constructed by drawing on the 
findings from more than one level, across the sites. The comparison was undertaken 
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using three main analytical processes in the coding. The first level of coding served to 
isolate the variables across the three cases and determine the causal networks in each 
case (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The second level was the determination of 
connections and disconnections, in a process of sense-making (Weick et al., 2005; 
Selsky and Parker, 2010) to link antecedents with new interpretations to yield 
explanations. The third level was an interpretation of the relationship and ‘meaning 
structure’ within the social network (Fuhse, 2009). This conceptual schema informed 
the decision with regard to the organisation of the chapter and presentation of data at 
the three levels of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
The analysis is undertaken by interpreting the evidence to arrive at a conclusion as to 
whether actors perceived that variable as an opportunity or constraint, and deriving a 
‘resultant outcome’ of actor perceptions and interactions on their support for and 
contribution to the PPP, based on the theoretical and conceptual framing of the study. 
The process of analysis was aided by a ‘causal toolkit’ in which the Research Question 
(RQ) was used to generate researcher-derived propositions in relation to the theoretical 
framework. The propositions created an opportunity to examine ‘spaces of 
optimisation’ (SOO) (Soja, 1999) and produce a lens from which to evaluate PPP 
performance based on the ‘optimisation of space’(OOS) and relationships (Lichtenstein 
et al., 2006). This process of sense-making (Wright, 2005; Henneberg et al., 2010; 
Selsky and Parker, 2010; Weick et al., 2005) aided the researcher to arrive at a 
conclusion on the process by which PPPs attain performance outcomes. The sense-
making process is embodied in the ‘causal tool-kit’ described in section 9.1.1.  
9.1.1 Causal Toolkit for the Analysis  
The ‘causal toolkit’ was developed to link the findings related to the purpose, structure, 
strategy and outcomes of the PPP to answer the research questions. The study adopted 
the evolutionary perspective and included the search for indicators of evolutionary 
change in the alliances. This provided the framework for examining the performance 
result of the total involvement of firms and partners in strategic alliances in their 
evolution. Probing and linking questions were developed to guide the analysis using the 
propositions derived from the research questions as a guide. The causal model is based 
on the assumption of logic in the process that assumes rational behaviour and the 
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purpose of optimisation of results in time and space, as opposed to a process of 
serendipity or determinism, in arriving at decisions.  
9.1.2 Proposition 1: Determining Purpose and Linking to Structure 
Proposition 1: Public and private-sector institutions in small developing countries face 
unique performance challenges that drive the establishment of PPP organisations, 
which must possess a clear purpose, structure and strategy to address institutional 
needs. 
Causal questions to determine the attributes of the PPP:  
1. Who and what in the country and institutional environment inspired the 
establishment of the PPP?  
2. What did they hope to achieve? (Purpose or cause). 
3. How was this different from their existing attributes? 
4. Why was it necessary?  
5. When did it become necessary? (Felt needs created by difference between 
current capabilities and vision).  
Linking question to organisational level: Why was the purpose not attainable within the 
existing structures? This question will isolate the constraints of institutions and 
opportunities of the other. 
9.1.3 Proposition 2: Determining Structure and Linking to Strategy 
Proposition 2: PPPs are established by parent institutions to optimise the value of 
contributing partners in governance arrangements.  
Causal questions to understand the attributes of the structure of the PPP organisation:  
1. How should the partnership be structured to optimise organisational resources? 
(Organisational attributes of the PPP).  
2. How should it be co-ordinated and controlled? (Governance and leadership – 
attributes of control). 
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Causal question linking structure to strategy to actor sub-group level on governance: 
What attributes of the PPP structure inspired the strategic actions of the PPP 
governance mechanism?  
9.1.4 Proposition 3: Determining Strategy and Linking to Outcome 
Proposition 3: Actors, as they interact in PPPs and demonstrate embeddedness in their 
environmental and institutional contexts, will encounter opportunities and constraints 
and this will influence their support for the PPP organisation and contribution to its 
evolution. 
Defining attributes of the governance mechanism: 
1. What is the structure of the governance mechanism?  
2. How was it connected to the purpose of the PPP?  
3. What affected its functioning?  
4. How did it affect the form of the organisation?  
5. How did it affect the purpose of partners?  
Linking question to impact: What was achieved in the PPP with respect to its original 
purpose? 
9.1.5 Proposition 4: Evaluation of PPP Performance  
Proposition 4: The public institution provides cognitive legitimacy to the PPP which 
increasingly develops socio-political legitimacy and creates value for both partners as it 
evolves. 
1. What were the achievements of the PPP?  
2. How do the achievements align with the original purpose?  
3. How do the achievements of the PPP impact the institutions from which it was 
established?  
Linking question to cycle of development: What changed in the PPP and what are the 
next steps in its evolution?  
The findings are mapped to establish a causal model. Major linkages in the model are 
illustrated in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Causal Model of PPP Evolution  
The analysis proceeds by examination of the variables in the environment and at the 
level of the firm that presented opportunities and constraints to the PPP social system. 
The data is presented in data-reduction tables (Appendix 12).  
9.2 VARIABLES ACROSS SITES  
Miles and Huberman (1984) explain that “…cross-site causal networking is a 
comparative analysis of all sites in a sample on variables estimated to be the most 
influential in accounting for the outcome or criterion measures” (p.197). The variables 
across the sites are drawn from the individual cases and are highlighted in the meta-
network in Figure 22. 
9.2.1 Variables in the Country and Institutional Environment  
Analysis of the external environment was undertaken to determine how actor sub-
groups perceived the environment as providing a source of opportunity or constraint to 
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the business school, the University itself, the society or the private sector. A summary 
of the antecedents and effects on the PPP is presented in Appendix 12. 
The environment produces opportunities and constraints to the strategy of organisations 
(Child, 1972; Leifer and Delbecq, 1978; Kiggundu et al., 1983). The PPPs at Gerran 
and Apple generally viewed the environment as a source of motivation and inspiration, 
but not a constraint to strategy. Rotter, however, perceived the external environment as 
a significant constraint to its governance structure and strategy. This resulted in the 
escalation of particular activities and the de-emphasis of others, based on actor sub-
group perceptions and meanings attached to variables.  
National policy with respect to social partnerships and education provided 
opportunities for the PPPs and University. The effects of size and competition were 
viewed as constraints that affected the business schools, especially at Rotter and 
Gerran. The developing country environment was perceived as an opportunity for the 
business school, except at times when government revenue increased, as this prompted 
competitive behaviour between the PPP and the University as the University sought to 
grow as an organisation; this was the case of Apple. The environment was chiefly a 
source of inspiration for actors at Gerran and Rotter but, at Rotter, it was seen to be a 
constraint to the structure of the Board of Directors and overall performance of the 
PPP.  
The institutional environment also presented opportunities and constraints that affected 
the supportiveness of actors in the network for the PPP (Appendix 12). The institutional 
environment constrained the participation of private sector actors and the autonomy of 
the business school at all three sites, to varying degrees. Support for the business school 
was evident at Rotter and Gerran but not at Apple where the development of the 
business school was not seen by University actors to be linked to constraints of the 
University.  
9.2.2 Variables at the Level of the Firm  
The need to recognise the business school as an entity and the need for increasing 
private influence led to the establishment of all three organisations as legal non-profit 
organisations with varying partnership arrangements and governance structures. 
Differences in the PPPs related to who was inviting the resources of whom into the 
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entity, an issue of control of the organisation. The findings of the study led the 
researcher to classify Gerran as a strategic developmental organisation, Apple as a 
strategic entrepreneurial organisation and Rotter as a business education arm of the 
Rotterdam campus of Green University. The University played various roles in 
establishing the legitimacy of the business schools. At Gerran it legitimised the content 
of the business school’s programmes, whereas at Apple it legitimised the form of the 
business school as a University. At Rotter, it legitimised the relationship between the 
University and the business school. The variables at each site and across sites are 
outlined in Figure 22.  
9.3 EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF THE PPPS  
The analysis now adopts an evolutionary perspective, seeking to determine what each 
PPP was attempting at various phases in their development and the rationale for their 
actions.  
9.3.1 Funding Arrangements  
Both Rotter and Gerran received seed funding at start-up from an international funding 
agency. The private sector at Apple contributed seed funding and the school later 
received a significant endowment from a corporate leader. Rotter continued to depend 
on financial contributions from Green University whereas Gerran progressed to 
financial independence. Apple maintained financial independence although there were 
challenges as to whether Green University received financial value for its contribution 
to Apple. The question of value for money in the PPP (National Audit Office (UK), 
2008; Yong, 2010) appeared to be tied to the overall contribution of the business 
schools to the purpose of relevance as assessed by stakeholders who judged them as 
having high socio-political legitimacy in the environment.  
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Figure 22: Comparison of Variables across Sites 
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9.3.2 Governance Arrangements  
The governance arrangements included public and private actor sub-groups with 
various control mechanisms. Rotter and Gerran adopted a stakeholder model of 
governance, whereas Apple adopted an economic model of corporate governance based 
on competitive behaviour. The private sector sub-group on the Board of Directors at 
Apple adopted a strong sense of ownership from the start-up of Apple and this 
influenced the extent to which they controlled the organisation. It appeared that the 
Board of Directors retained responsibility for the direction and control of the business 
school by placing private accountability measures on the leadership and management of 
the business school. At Rotter and Gerran, the University retained ‘ownership’ of the 
business school and the stakeholder model of corporate governance was evident as the 
boards of directors served to support the leadership and management of the business 
schools. Control of the business school by the Board of Directors was more evident at 
Gerran than at Apple where control appeared to be linked with organisational 
leadership and management. The way in which private ideology was adopted and 
diffused through the business schools accounted for the various performance outcomes.  
9.3.3 Growth of Private Sector Ideology  
The inclusion of private influences in the organisational structure of the University 
commenced at Gerran Business School, Gerrantown. The birth of private-sector 
ideology in Gerrantown appeared to be related to the social and economic needs of 
Gerrantown and the understanding that the University ought to be serving the 
developmental needs of the society. The sections that follow present the analysis in a 
sense-making process that examines the impact of private ideology on the purpose, 
structure, strategy and outcomes of the PPPs.  
9.3.3.1 Birth of Private Ideology  
Inclusion of the private sector commenced at Gerrantown with the University’s 
recognition of the need for, and the push by, the private sector facing challenges in the 
economy and the separation of the university from their needs.  
“The whole business of management training at the university was 
something that was pushed …more by the private sector than by the 
university because our university’s traditions were such that the teaching 
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of management wasn’t seen as something integral to a university.” (#1 
Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran) 
The structure of the arrangement was acceptable to both actor sub-groups who 
indicated as follows:  
“There was a lot of debate about whether it should be embedded as was 
the department of management studies in the faculty of social sciences 
and I think what emerged is “hey, let’s not do that.” (#1 Pub/ Priv 
Director, Gerran) 
The stakeholder governance mechanism that evolved at Gerran was unlike that of 
Apple and Rotter which featured private sector dominance from inception. Country 
influences propelled this but private sector control impacted the strategy of the PPPs in 
different ways. Apple gained socio-political legitimacy whereas Rotter retained its tight 
coupling to Green University, Rotterdam.  
9.3.3.2 Advancement of Private-Sector Ideology  
The advancement of private sector ideology was evident from the establishment of the 
PPPs as autonomous firms; this was evident at Gerran Phase 2, Apple Phase 1 and 
Rotter Phase 1. The ideology of private involvement appeared to spread rapidly across 
the campuses and was motivated by different conceptions of purpose, structure and 
strategy at each site. At Gerran, the purpose of including the private sector was linked 
to the need to cross the divide to advance the cause of the private sector and the 
University. A space for the optimisation of private ideology was created at Gerran.  
“It was very clear that the programme needed to be very employer 
related and so there was a clear need to bring the employers, I mean 
from the private sector on board from the early days.” (#1 Pub/ Priv 
Director, Gerran) 
“… the private sector was perhaps more anxious to change the nature of 
the position of the relation of mistrust…They knew they needed...the 
intellectual capital if they’re going to run business.” (#4 Pub Director, 
Gerran) 
Private ideology at Rotter was not as evident at establishment. It appeared that Rotter 
was established to commercialise the University’s programmes by providing 
programmes that were directly relevant to the needs of the private sector. This created a 
‘space of opportunity’ that was more operational than ideological.  
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“The University was not into… designing programmes for the market, 
into the commercial operation of programmes as they are now.” (#2 Pub 
Director, Rotter) 
The commencement of the relationship between private and public sector actors at 
Apple was not based on a ‘space of opportunity’, as in the case of Gerran and Rotter, 
but on the ‘space of constraint’ and acknowledged weakness of the University and the 
hesitation of the private sector in the relationship.  
“It provided us with the link to business through…bridging the gap 
between the University and the private sector and saying ‘alright, since 
you know nothing about the University, come and see.” (#3 Pub 
Director, Apple) 
“The reason the private sector didn’t do it on their own was because they 
wanted the university’s accreditation.” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple) 
The effect of establishing the business school in a ‘space of constraint’ resulted in 
tensions between both actor sub-groups at Apple and the growth of private control 
through dominance of the private sector actor sub-group and growing competitiveness 
between the University and the PPP.  
9.3.3.3 Protection of Ideology in a Space of Constraint 
In the early days of Apple’s existence the private-sector appeared to be in search of 
legitimacy as a resource and the University also seemed positioned to defend its right to 
educate, acknowledging its resource constraints. It appeared that the private sector 
sought to protect the ideology of private business and capitalism whereas the 
University sought control over quality and the social good. Respondents indicated the 
following:  
“But it didn’t want to be controlled by the bureaucracy of Green, which 
would retard its growth and its development and its reflexiveness and so 
on…It wants to be autonomous but at times it wants to be inside of 
Green.” (#2 Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden) 
“Because you have that kind of socialist/communist kind of logic and 
these people view business schools as foreign and what business schools 
teach as alien, and not true academia, and so they tend to kill it.” (#4 
Pub/Priv KOA, Apple) 
 
The issue of ‘who’ needs ‘whom’ appeared to arise when the University and the private 
sector sought to locate themselves in a position of power in the relationship. The 
University acceded to control by the private sector as they were initially comfortable 
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with the executive leadership and the agenda of relevance was shared. Later they 
sought control through institutionalisation of the roles of KOAs. They noted, however, 
differences embedded in their governance arrangements. In later years, the differences 
between the actor sub-groups and the embeddedness of the University actors in the 
institution appeared to threaten the relationship.  
“The university guys take the appointment to the Board of the business 
school as if they are appointed to any other committee. Because 
remember in a university system, Academic Board is a board! …And so 
they treat it as a committee and they don’t see the legal liabilities, they 
don’t see the other aspects that relate.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple) 
At Gerran, where there was trust in the leadership and the purpose was shared, the 
private sector ideology grew. At Apple, it grew through private sector ownership and 
competitive strategy. The arrangement provided University legitimacy to the PPP 
which focused on accountability as profitability of the organisation. This model of 
corporate governance contrasted with the stakeholder model observed at Gerran and 
Rotter where University control and ownership were evident.  
9.3.4 Institutionalisation of the Ideology and Strategy of Competitiveness in a PPP  
The ideological separation of the University and the private sector in the PPP at Apple 
appeared to result from the private-sector’s competitive behaviour. At the growth 
phase, the social network of actors demonstrated increasing private control and an 
ideology of competitiveness. The institutionalisation of private ideology was attained 
with increasing negative impact on the relationship between the University and the 
business school.  
9.3.4.1 Private Dominance and Notions of Quality  
The network at establishment was ‘owned’ by the private sector through financial 
contribution and representation on the Board of Directors. Private-sector dominance in 
the network was affirmed by all interview respondents. The growth of private ideology 
was linked to the growth of quality in the curriculum process and recognition of the 
business school as a premier brand, distinct from Green University.  
“We always wanted to see progress, adopting the most vanguard 
methods of teaching and subject matter and ultimately to get the 
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university to be recognised within our domain as the premier business 
school in that area.” (#2 Priv Director, Apple) 
The increasing focus of the private sector on the leadership and curriculum of the 
school threatened the right of the University actors to protect the quality of the 
programmes. Additionally, innovation in curriculum and the application of knowledge 
in various forms appeared to create contestations in the minds of university actors. The 
private sector, approaching the PPP as a business, isolated the answer to the question 
“What business am I in?” as curriculum and defined the main resources for innovation 
in the curriculum as results-driven leadership and corporate strategy. The rapid growth 
and institutionalisation of innovation in the operations of Green University distanced 
the university actors, and effectively placed control of the curriculum within the PPP. 
This led to redefinition of curriculum standards using international benchmarks for 
business education, which were not evident within Green University, and a loss of 
respect and trust resulted.  
“But we have such a strong private sector side on the Board that we 
don’t have a problem. But left to him, everything would be redone and 
redone and redone and rechecked and rechecked and rechecked. Total 
waste of time, couldn’t run a roti shop in my view!” (#3 Priv Director, 
Apple) 
The relationship was held together by the fact that Apple was increasingly developing 
its own legitimacy and respect in society, despite the university adopting more 
protectionist behaviours. Individual actors also appeared to play a role in keeping the 
relationship together by reaching across apparent boundaries between academia and 
corporate strategy. 
9.3.5 PPP Strategy and Competitiveness  
The strategy of the PPPs at Gerran and Rotter were based on the nature of private 
involvement and the competencies and roles of individual actors and actor sub-groups. 
These schools adopted an “outside-in” strategic approach. They were focused on the 
environment, seeking to mitigate perceived weaknesses and leverage areas of strength 
on the boards of directors. This was motivated by the commitment of directors to the 
University, the business school and the development agenda. The adoption of 
responsibility for strategic management of the PPP weakened the role of directors as 
fiduciaries for the PPP as an organisation, reducing the role of the Board of Directors to 
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a mechanism to control the organisation and ensure accountability to stakeholders. At 
Apple, however, the strategy of the school was more directly related to 
internationalisation and the adoption of global standards. This inside-out strategy 
appeared to result from the opinion of directors that the environment must be 
acknowledged but must not be allowed to control the direction of the organisation.  
9.3.6 Managing Internal Threats 
Threats to the corporate strategy at Apple emerged from within the University and from 
the PPP itself. Threats related to the autonomy to design and manage programmes and 
the overall relationship and control of the University over Apple; respondents 
indicated:  
“Apple fought like crazy, tirelessly, tenaciously, to get them accepted in 
the programme … because the University was clear in its mind that you 
had to have a first degree to do it” (#2 Pub Director, Apple). 
“I remember one of the recommendations in the audit report was that the 
School (Apple) should come directly under the day to day 
administration of the Head of Department and I remember… vigorously 
disagreeing for the reason that … this is a business enterprise… why 
would you bring it under an already over-burdened Department of 
Management?” (#2 Pub Director, Apple) 
9.3.7 Summary of Ideology of Privatization and Governance across the Schools  
The summary demonstrates the development of private ideology and the configuration 
of the models of corporate governance at each school, at each stage of their evolution.  
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Table 46: Evolution of Ideology of Privatisation and Governance Models 
Gerran Analysis  Shock to 
next phase 
Phase 1 Establishment of ideology of privatisation at the top level of University 
hierarchy in a committee structure 
Programme 
expansion 
Phase 2 Stakeholder model of corporate governance established and retained. Slow 
infusion and development of private ideology with an outside-in strategy of 
development 
Leadership 
change  
Phase 3 Enhanced private sector involvement located at the top of the hierarchy. 
Stewardship model of corporate governance university ownership and 
control and outside-in strategy of development 
Leadership 
change 
Apple Analysis  Shock to 
next phase 
Phase 1 Stakeholder model of governance with shared control Leadership 
change  
Phase 2 Agency model of corporate governance with private ownership and control 
and inside-out ‘bottom-line’ strategy of development  
Leadership 
change  
Phase 3 Agency model of corporate governance with private ownership and control 
and inside-out ‘academic’ strategy of development  
Alliance 
strategy  
Rotter Analysis  Shock to 
next phase 
Phase 1-2 Stakeholder model of governance retained throughout the evolution of 
Rotter with private ownership at establishment moving to University 
ownership and control  
Governance 
change  
The ideology of privatisation appeared to evolve differently and at different times 
across the cases. Moreover, the ideology was emphasised by the relationship across and 
within institutions based on leadership shocks. The approaches to sustaining the 
ideology across the schools differed, according to their environmental contexts and the 
embeddedness of actors within institutions.  
9.3.8 Gerran: Development Purpose, Loose-Coupling and University Stewardship 
in Stakeholder Governance  
Gerran established a purpose of development and this was reflected in the 
organisational development of the business school. Despite the fact that a private sector 
actor served as Chairman of the Board, it is felt that the Board of Directors is “…too 
heavily weighted with the preconceptions of the University” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran). 
255 
 
Ownership and actor embeddedness within the University and the stakeholder model of 
governance that incorporated private sector needs and interests served to establish the 
cognitive legitimacy of the business school as a provider of business education. 
Competitiveness of the school as an institution, however, appeared to be compromised 
by the lack of appropriate management controls, as the Board serves as a support to 
management and strategy, rather than a control and accountability mechanism. This 
reflects a stewardship approach to corporate governance (Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
9.3.9 Apple: Competitive Purpose, Loose-Coupling, and Private Control in 
Corporate Governance  
Gerran optimised its purpose of development but not its competitive behaviour and 
contribution to purpose. Apple however, was loosely coupled with the University and 
focused on organisational performance. The development purpose appeared to be a 
means to the end of organisational performance. The Board of Directors served as a 
control and accountability mechanism on the leadership and management of the 
business school. University control was effected through the Chairmanship of the 
business school, but the overall reporting relationship to the Board of Directors was 
maintained with strong private sector control on financial accountability. Socio-
political legitimacy was achieved by the growth of the business school and this 
established a competitive relationship between the University and the business school. 
Apple optimised its competitive purpose and strategy, but not its relationship with the 
University.  
9.3.10 Rotter: An Arm of a Developing University  
Despite the recognition that the business school was an economic organisation with a 
profit-seeking orientation, the tension between profitability and service was evident and 
the Board of Directors was established as a direct support to management. University 
dominance was evident, propelled by the stakeholder model of corporate governance 
and the appointment of directors based on representativeness in the market rather than 
expertise to support the management of the school (Cornforth, 2002). Boundary 
spanning within the University, individual actor contribution and the leadership and 
management of the business school appeared to be major success factors at Rotter. The 
business school built socio-political legitimacy in Rotterdam but its sustainability as an 
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entity was compromised by its continued reliance on financial and technical product 
support from Green University. At the same time, the University appeared to have 
grown and adopted practices related to profitability and product differentiation. This 
has led to the possibility of the business school becoming re-integrated into the 
University and the disestablishment of the current PPP model. The growth of the 
University campus at Rotterdam appeared to be driven by private ideology and the 
Rotter School of Business became increasingly folded into the overall University.  
The evidence presented in this section demonstrates the evolution of the ideology of 
privatisation and its impact on the socio-political and cognitive legitimacy of the PPPs 
and their parent institutions.  
9.4 INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE: ANSWERING THE RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 9.4.1 Organisation of the Interpretation  
This section relates the evidence to the conceptual framework of the study and provides 
an interpretation of the evidence to distil findings and contributions in relation to the 
research questions. Each research question is discussed in separate sections for clarity. 
The format for presentation of the section is as follows:  
1. Presentation of the research question and propositions. 
2. Identification and discussion of themes based on the evidence related to the 
research question and propositions.  
9.4.2 Research Question 1: Defining Attributes of the PPP  
Research Question 1: What are the defining attributes of the PPP governance structure 
engaged by the business schools? 
Proposition 1: Public and private-sector institutions in small developing countries face 
unique performance challenges that drive the establishment of PPP organisations, 
which must possess a clear purpose, structure and strategy to address institutional 
needs. 
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9.4.2.1 Establishing Purpose: Addressing Country Needs or Embracing 
Opportunities  
The PPPs were initiated by the private sector in response to socio-economic challenges 
in the country environment. Where the University perceived constraints and 
acknowledged challenges to its relevance, support for the PPP was evident. In an 
attempt to assert the public claim to ownership of PPPs, Datta (2009) proposed that 
PPPs “…must aim at bringing private resources into public projects, not public 
resources into private projects” (p.73). Although vulnerabilities in the environment 
were a source of shared concern in all three cases, the invitation to the private sector 
emerged only at Gerran. At Apple, the demand was generated by the private sector, as a 
result of differing ideologies between business and Green University. The collapsing 
economy at Arden also created a compelling need and the University agreed to the 
partnership, recognising the gap between the University and the society in general. At 
Apple and Gerran, there were compelling deficiencies of human resources and 
development, respectively.  
At Rotter, however, the University did not perceive the need for the partnership in the 
context of an advanced economy and the University’s positive reputation in society. 
The partnership was therefore established as an opportunity to develop the private 
sector, facilitated by a social partnership agenda within the country. The objective of 
private sector development and purpose of regional development and integration was 
established by the influence of CAIC on the Board of Directors. Whilst one’s 
understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences one’s contribution to 
their success (Austin, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1985) it appeared that motivating 
the contribution of both public and private partners is dependent on the connection to 
purpose.  
9.4.2.2 Connection-Based, Shared and Facilitative Purpose of the PPP 
Public-private connection was achieved where both actor sub-groups had similar 
perceptions of environmental factors as providing constraints or opportunities to their 
own development, the business school or to the society. Connection in the public-
private relationship was also achieved where one actor sub-group identified sources of 
opportunity or constraints to the business school, or to the other partner. This was the 
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case at Gerran where the public and private sector actors connected on a number of 
issues in the environment, including the university context. Within the country context, 
the small size and competitive environment of the economy were factors on which 
actor sub-groups connected in the case of Gerran and Rotter and this resulted in the 
connection-based purpose for the strategic collaboration (Austin, 2000).  
Shared purpose in the PPP was a result of connection on economic and social 
variables that affected a broad range of stakeholders and to which each sub-group was 
committed. This only resulted when both the public and private sectors were motivated 
by similar needs, as was evident at Gerran. This is the first major finding of the study. 
Their felt concerns led to the shared purpose of development for the business school, 
the University, the private sector and for the wider country. This appeared to be 
facilitated by the cultural embeddedness of both actor sub-groups in the context 
(Dequech, 2003). It appears that the exacerbated needs and vulnerabilities of the 
environment of developing countries, coupled with a strong cultural identity, as was 
evident at Gerran, motivate actors to achieve its shared purpose. The attainment of a 
shared vision and purpose was acknowledged as an important factor in building the 
competitiveness of a country; it appeared to stimulate action and competitive behaviour 
in the creation of shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011). At Rotter and Apple, 
however, University actors facilitated the business school as a revenue generating unit 
that addressed the training needs of the private sector; an agenda that was outside of the 
purview of the University and perhaps paradoxical to the purpose of the University 
itself. The facilitation of the purpose of the other, despite ideological differences, is 
the second finding of the study.  
9.4.2.3 Developing Cross-Sectoral Relationships 
At Apple and Rotter, where the private sector sought the partnership with the 
University, the functioning of PPPs at the organisational level may be compared with 
the practices of strategic alliances in the method and rationale for partner selection and 
engagement. At Rotterdam, the private sector agency positioned its members on the 
Board of Directors of the business school and co-opted the support of Green 
University, Rotterdam campus. These two institutions connected on their mutual 
purpose of regional integration. One University actor and one member of the private 
sector at Apple acknowledged that Green University was not the private sector’s first 
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choice for the partnership and establishment of the business school. Having failed to 
acquire an international partnership, Green University was approached for the 
partnership. The third finding of the study is that PPPs may include co-opted 
partners who hold differing ideologies for the purpose of acquiring resources, 
including legitimacy.  
9.4.2.4 Managing Relationships and Resources in the PPP 
According to Berliner (1997), the PPP in education is a means of partner resource 
sharing and co-operation. Gerran established its expectations of the private sector’s co-
operation to advise the University about its needs and to ensure its programmes were 
relevant. In establishing the new company, the University sought to accommodate the 
private sector’s participation. At Rotter, the private sector sought the University’s 
imprimatur for the business programmes as they were not in the business of education. 
They depended on Green University in this regard but the University held no 
expectations of returns from the relationship. This was due to the perception of a 
positive reputation of Green and, as such, their engagement with the business school 
was a contribution of resources. At the inception of Apple, the resource-sharing plan 
involved collaboration between the private sector, the public sector and Green 
University with expectations of major stakeholders clearly outlined. The private sector 
at Apple, however, did not envision reciprocity and mutual interdependence due to the 
differing ideologies. Their purpose was accommodated by the University’s contribution 
to facilitate the academic tasks and eventually this arrangement led to competition in 
the relationship. Alignment of the partnering model with the expected partner 
contribution ranged from resource sharing to resource contribution. Where resources 
were ‘contributed’ rather than ‘shared,’ through co-optation rather than 
collaboration, internal competition created challenges to the PPP; this is the fourth 
finding of the study.  
9.4.2.5 Close Coupling of Governance Structure and PPP Purpose 
The PPP at Gerran was structured to bring university knowledge and public resources 
to the business school. In the context of economic stringency, public sector actors in 
government were invited on the Board of Directors to facilitate the provision of 
resources to the business school. As such, actors changed over the years in accordance 
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with the resource needs of the business school. The Board of Directors at Apple 
included several members of the private sector who established a private sector 
ideology in the control and accountability of the organisation. At Rotter, private 
participation essentially comprised members of a non-profit organisation established to 
facilitate the development of the private sector in the region and provide access to 
markets in small countries. The PPP demonstrates close coupling of purpose and 
structure to derive particular resources; this is the fifth finding of this study.  
9.4.3 Research Question 2: Composition and Structure of the PPP  
Research Question 2: How do the composition and structure of the governance 
arrangement influence the contribution of public and private partners to decision-
making? 
Proposition 2: PPPs are established by parent institutions to optimise the value of 
contributing partners in governance arrangements. 
9.4.3.1 Maximising Partner Contribution through Structure and Strategy  
Gerran Business School was controlled by the University. Its establishment within the 
University structure and the representational structure of the private-sector involvement 
posed no threat to University control. In fact, in Phase 3 of Gerran’s development, the 
University revised the Memorandum of Affiliation to grant control to the private sector 
through the placement of a private-sector actor in the role of KOA, a role traditionally 
held by the University. This decision appeared to be driven by the motivation to secure 
more private involvement. It appears that this occurs under conditions of resource 
constraints, retention of public control and ownership, and the development of trust at 
the executive level. At Apple, the private sector contributed seed funding to the 
establishment of the school and, in order to protect the investment, requested control of 
the PPP. At Phase 1, the private sector relied on the University actors to guide decision-
making but later utilized private control and accountability practices in the governance 
and organisational strategy of the PPP. Private sectors actors, who were competitors in 
business, admitted their reputation was linked to the success of the business school. 
This contributed to the success of the business school and their control increased as the 
University withdrew its co-operation, due to challenges to its own legitimacy. This 
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discussion distils the sixth finding of the study. Actor sub-groups in PPP networks are 
motivated to maximise partner contribution under conditions of trust, resource 
constraints and public control and ownership. 
9.4.3.2 Restricting Partner Contribution  
At Rotter, the historical network of private sector actors was retained throughout the 
school’s evolution. As such, the nature of private involvement changed very little over 
the years. As representatives of a private sector organisation and country 
representatives, the nature of private involvement was different from Apple. This was 
similar to the model at Gerran, but the impact was less at Gerran as there was a strategy 
for inviting directors onto the Board of Directors to provide market access within 
territories, resulting in a quasi-market situation at Rotter (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). 
In a small market, this appeared to negatively impact the competitiveness of the 
business school and, as such, its financial health was compromised. Based on this 
analysis, it may be concluded that in the absence of a strategy of alliances (Gomes-
Casseres, 1998), expectations of private contribution to governance on a board of 
directors are distorted by the cognitive embeddedness of private-sector actors in 
institutional frameworks. This is the seventh finding of this study.  
9.4.3.3 Optimising Private Contribution in a ‘Voluntary Business’ Game  
Actors are automatically classified into two actor sub-groups and expectations of each 
sub-group are established in the PPP. The categorisation of private-sector actors and 
separation of the camps at Apple resulted in conflict and lack of trust as there was a 
difference of ideology at the start. In this context, it appeared that private sector actors 
coalesced in a dense network and established dominance and control of the business 
school. University actors increasingly withdrew from active participation on the Board 
of Directors for their individual reasons.  
This appeared to further propel the private sector to action, driving them to take actions 
to develop the business school to international standards of quality, establishing marked 
differences between the business school and the University, its parent organisation. 
This appeared to be a game of power between actor sub-groups. It was driven by 
several factors including the dense network of private actors who were at the helm of 
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the top businesses of the country and could not risk failure in their undertaking at the 
business school. In addition, as a voluntary organisation, there was no risk of personal 
financial loss and actors appeared to be embroiled in a game of business, a game in 
which they had demonstrated competence. Finally, University actors embedded in 
institutional bureaucracy and controlled by the allocations of particular programmes to 
the business school and to the University, were disadvantaged players in the game of 
organisational development and growth. The institutional history and context of the 
PPP produced a set of variables that motivated strong private contribution, the eighth 
finding of this study. Private control and strategy reflected a ‘voluntary business’ 
game in which private-sector actors appeared to be engaged. This confirms the findings 
of Bissessar (2002) and Ryan and Bissessar (2002) that political and cultural factors 
affect the implementation of cross-sectoral projects. At the level of the firm, trust and 
respect, rather than economic factors, affected the relationship. 
9.4.3.4 Contradictory Supportive and Protectionist Public Roles 
University actors in the PPPs were required to oversee the academic quality and 
facilitate the approval of the business school’s programmes. This worked at Gerran 
where public actors actively withdrew from governance and acknowledged their role in 
the administrative academic process. At Rotter, University actors perceived their role 
on the Board of Directors to be one of ‘guidance and facilitation’. In this case, 
University actors also felt their presence on the Board of Directors was necessary for 
boundary spanning, attempting to rationalise the activities of the business school to 
their University counterparts. This arose due to historically weak ties between the 
University campus and the business school, stemming from the lack of felt need for the 
PPP on the part of the University.  
The public role in assurance of quality was seen as ‘protectionist’ from the perspective 
of the university and its conceptions of academic quality and, at the same time, 
‘supportive’ of the innovations in the PPPs. At Apple, this apparently oxymoronic 
position was demonstrated as protectionism in the context of expansion of university 
education and wider threats to the legitimacy of Green University. The protectionist 
stance was interpreted by private-sector actors as being self-serving and this led to their 
declining trust in, and respect for, University actors. The protectionist stance was 
increasingly adopted as the country’s resources climbed at the turn of the century and 
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opportunities expanded for both the University and the business school. The private-
sector actors responded by expanding the search for external benchmarks of quality, 
seeking guidance from external sources. This led to the ninth finding of the study. 
Mistrust in the PPP leads to public protectionism which constrains the opportunity for 
mutual learning and growth in the partnership. Further, protectionist roles in 
governance oppose the fiduciary responsibilities of actors on a board of directors 
(Kaplan, 1975). This leads to the tenth finding of the study that public actors in 
protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role contradiction at that level, 
especially in competitive contexts.  
9.4.3.5 Optimising Private Management  
The business schools were all able to successfully engage the private sector in their 
governance structure and this led to more innovative and enterprising undertakings at 
the schools. Private-sector management practices were evident at all sites, consistent 
with the direction of the NPM movement (Ferlie, 1996). The integration of faculty and 
management created cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) for University actors as 
this structure was dissimilar to the traditional separation of ‘administration’ and 
‘faculty’ at the University. At Apple and Gerran, private management practices 
produced innovation in management in attempts to address the issue of relevance. The 
private sector at Apple, recognising that education was not their core business, 
employed a leadership strategy and an accountability and performance evaluation 
mechanism for the top management of the school that was derived from private sector 
management practices and based on profitability. This led to increasing financial 
success at Apple. The strategy of using directors to access markets at Rotter appeared 
to sustain the school but did not optimise private contribution. The findings across the 
cases led to the conclusion that in small, developing countries, the growth of the PPP 
organisation is directly related to the strategy for optimising private-sector 
management in the network. This is the eleventh finding of this study.  
9.4.4 Research Question 3: Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP 
Research Question 3: What opportunities and constraints are presented by the 
embeddedness of the PPP network?  
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Proposition 3: Actors, as they interact in PPPs and demonstrate embeddedness in their 
environmental and institutional contexts, will encounter opportunities and constraints 
and this will influence their support for the PPP organisation and contribution to its 
evolution. 
The PPPs experienced constraints and found opportunities in the wider country and 
institutional environments. These are referred to as the ‘external environment’ and 
‘internal environment’ respectively.  
9.4.4.1 Cultural Embeddedness and Relationships 
The external environment of Gerran presented several constraints and opportunities to 
the business school. The strong cultural and social identity of the people of Gerrantown 
(BBC, 2011b) served to accentuate the relationship between actor sub-groups on 
several variables. Actor sub-groups connected on the importance of variables in the 
environment, especially the socio-economic context, the competitive context of 
business education and the implications of the small world phenomenon on the PPP 
(Chapter 6.1). Many actors were educated abroad and returned to contribute to the 
country’s development. They held the view that Gerran was an opportunity for 
Gerrantown and linked the country’s development concerns directly to the purpose and 
responsibility of the business school. This led to the establishment of a shared purpose 
between actor sub-groups. In addition to the ‘ownership’ and control by the University 
through its development, competitiveness between the PPP and the University was 
reduced due to the cultural embeddedness and friendships among actors.  
Opportunities in the external environment were also perceived by Rotter. The 
emergence of a social partnership within Rotterdam, the presence of a market in the 
sub-region, the activities of the regional private sector organisation, and the active 
support of private sector leaders from the other two countries provided an opportunity 
for the private sector organisation to establish the business school. In the case of Apple, 
the opportunity was created by the economic challenges experienced at the time. This 
leads to the twelfth finding of the study that PPPs derive purpose and are motivated 
by embeddedness in the environment. Perception of environmental factors as 
opportunities or constraints is unrelated to whether they are positive or negative factors 
in the environment.  
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9.4.4.2 Political Embeddedness and Competition 
A major constraint to regional cooperation among the campuses of Green University 
was the extent to which each campus was economically and politically embedded in its 
own country environment. This was due to a history of failed political efforts at 
regional integration and each campus was sustained by the financial contributions of 
the government in the country in which it was located. Actors at Gerran and Rotter, 
constrained for resources, viewed the regional context of the campuses as a constraint 
of their external environment. This affected the strategy of the PPPs as they focused 
their efforts on their geographic space and diaspora.  
In the case of Apple, private sector actors were concerned about the success of 
business, despite the environment. The private-sector actors grasped the opportunity to 
expand the operations of the business school and enhance its socio-political legitimacy. 
This increased the level of perceived competition between the business school and the 
University. This study revealed that PPPs exist in a potentially competitive relationship 
with their parent institution and, in the absence of an appropriate boundary 
spanning strategy, the growth of one organisation negatively impacts the other. 
This is the thirteenth finding of the study.  
9.4.4.3 Challenging Institutional Embeddedness with Trust  
The PPP as an organisation was constrained by actor embeddedness in the established 
rules of the University. At Gerran, it appeared that University actors felt disempowered 
in the discourse at the level of the Board of Director where the environment required 
rapid and significant decision-making (Chapter 6.3.6.3). The level of trust in the 
relationship guided the University actors to suggest changes to the structure of the 
Board of Directors to reduce University representation and optimise the role of the 
Board. The converse occurred at Apple where University actors, in the context of 
increasing suspicion and competitiveness between the business school and the 
University, held strongly to the view that the University should have a majority 
representation on the Board to protect the academic quality of the business school. The 
study concludes that, where embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance, 
optimisation of public resources is facilitated by trust. This is the fourteenth finding 
of this study.  
266 
 
9.4.4.4 Optimising Strategy by Boundary Spanning  
Boundary spanning roles of KOAs were important in the evolution of the PPPs. 
Significant changes in the relationship between Rotter and the Rotterdam Campus were 
achieved in recent years through the presence of a University actor on the Board of 
Directors. Commitment to the development of both the business school and the 
University department, led to the proposal of several changes for the business school, 
including its reintegration into the University department. This decision may threaten 
the existence of the business school in its current format but will also provide an 
opportunity for another level of public-private relationship that includes synergies in 
product development. Boundary spanning also appeared to be a function of KOAs at 
the business school and this was one of the factors that maintained the School’s 
existence. This function appeared to be directly related to the acceptability of actors as 
technically legitimate (Brown, 2001) in both the world of business and academia. This 
led to the fifteenth finding of the study; boundary spanners in PPPs in business 
schools must possess technical legitimacy in both the University and private sector 
in order to effectively undertake this task.  
Actors in boundary spanning roles at Apple appeared to manage the interaction space 
on the Board of Directors in a manner that recognised the Board as “…a board of true 
captains, whether it’s from industry or academia” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The 
management of the Board of Directors was executed in “…such a way as to not 
intensify conflict, (and) not inhibit the growth and development of the institution” (#4 
Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). As such, the management of conflict and relationships 
appeared to be the focus of boundary spanning activities at the level of governance. In 
this context, the management of the relationship was approached from the perspective 
of constraints which militated against boundary spanners seeking opportunities for 
leveraging the talents of each other for product and market innovation in the interest of 
both institutions. At Gerran, there was early and prolonged boundary spanning by a 
single KOA that appeared to be focused on similar learning across the divide. It 
appeared that in the PPPs, boundary spanning activities are focused on relationship 
management when actors are deeply embedded in their traditional contexts. The focus 
of boundary spanning on relationship management detracts from the strategic 
purpose of the PPP. This is the sixteenth finding of this study. 
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9.4.5 Research Question 4: How does the PPP Build Legitimacy?  
Research Question 4: How does the PPP strategy utilized by business schools in the 
English-speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success? 
Proposition 4: The public institution provides cognitive legitimacy to the PPP which 
increasingly develops socio-political legitimacy and creates value for both partners as it 
evolves. 
This section brings together the discussions and findings above to answer the overall 
Research Question that guided the study: How do Public Private Partnerships influence 
business school performance in the English-speaking Caribbean? It addresses the 
responding variable of legitimacy and also includes some of the author’s reflections and 
metacognition based on the findings.  
9.4.5.1 Leadership as Strategy  
Leadership of the business school was recognised as a critical strategy in all three 
cases. Gerran and Apple sought to optimise the leadership of the business schools and 
appeared to select leaders with both business and academic expertise. In one case, the 
search for a leader of the business school took two years. By constantly revisiting its 
leadership and matching leader competencies to the strategic challenges of the 
University, as in the case of Gerran, and applying private-sector measures of 
accountability to the PPP leadership, the practice at Apple, the business schools 
emphasised leadership in their strategy. The leadership phenomenon was not the focus 
of this study, which centred broadly on issues of governance. This presents an area for 
further study. Rotter maintained its leadership structure for most of its existence. As 
such, its strategy appeared to be closely coupled to the competencies of executive 
management. The nature of the private sector representation on the Board of Directors 
did not facilitate the introduction of private-sector principles of performance 
management that would enhance the competitiveness of the PPP. This appeared to 
contribute to the escalating financial challenges of the business school and threaten its 
technical legitimacy internally in its relationship with the University. It also threatened 
its moral legitimacy in the wider environment as a provider of business solutions 
(Brown, 2001). This study therefore concluded that PPP evolution is directly related 
to its privatisation and leadership strategy. The autonomy of the business school and 
a private cognitive social structure enhances its success. This occurs when performance 
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management practices align with a strategy of competitiveness. This is the seventeenth 
finding of the study.  
9.4.5.2 A strategy of Relevance  
The business schools all claimed the agenda of relevance in business education as the 
primary purpose for which they were established. They achieved success in this regard, 
but in different ways. Gerran’s embeddedness in its socio-cultural context, the presence 
of trust, the alignment of strategic challenges and leadership competencies all served to 
develop the school incrementally in a manner that was responsive to the local needs of 
business and society in Gerrantown. The demonstrated qualities of this business school 
led the author to categorise Gerran as a ‘strategic developmental organisation’ 
(Khandwalla, 1990). 
The constellation of causative factors at Rotter positioned the business school as a 
‘corporate training agency’ for the private and public sectors, serving as an ‘outreach 
arm’ of Green University, Rotterdam. The strategy of leanness and efficiency, however, 
did not appear to be well aligned with the purpose of business development which 
requires a constant flow and regeneration of innovative products and practices. This is 
best achieved through a product strategy and the deepening relationship with the 
University, which has established a track record in the development of new, relevant 
and innovative business solutions. The new proposition holds much potential for the 
product strategy at Rotter. Threats to private sector participation in the PPP could arise 
in this case and boundary spanning activities focused on the value created from the 
solutions at the merged entity would be required.  
Apple soon moved from need to opportunity-driven motivation, morphing into an 
entrepreneurial business school as the private-sector principles of management became 
more evident and achieved more significant impact on business and the society of 
Arden (Thompson, 1999). The business school increasingly undertook high profile 
activities benchmarked to international standards. This strategy of internationalisation 
and innovation served to contribute to the rapid development of socio-political 
legitimacy. This, however, was accompanied by increasing suspicion and lack of trust 
for the business school on the part of the University. This leads to the eighteenth 
finding of the study that trust is a facilitator of relationships and incremental 
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strategy but militates against rapid innovation in business schools as education 
organisations.  
In all cases, the University’s name and reputation contributed to the cognitive 
legitimacy of the business schools. Where the University was held in high regard in the 
society, cognitive legitimacy was both an opportunity for survival and a constraint to 
the development of the schools’ socio-political legitimacy. Where the University’s 
reputation was strong, at Rotter and Gerran, the business schools required more 
innovative strategies to establish socio-political legitimacy. This did not threaten the 
existence of the schools but made it more difficult for them to become differentiated. In 
the case of Gerran, the University’s endorsement of, and contribution to, the products 
of the business school helped to establish the reputation of the business school in the 
society.  
Rotter’s strategy of tight-coupling to the business school enhanced its reputation as an 
integral part of Green University, Rotterdam. The University provided legitimacy to the 
relationship with the business school. In the absence of a boundary spanning strategy to 
optimise the alliance based on its products, coupled with a performance management 
system that was not focused on improving competitiveness, the business school 
floundered to continue to provide innovative solutions. In the case of the PPP at Apple, 
the reputation of Green University, Arden, as a provider of education with strong 
relevance to country needs was threatened in the society. Leading thinkers suggested 
that the Arden campus should focus on graduate education and research whilst other 
institutions address the human resource talent needs of the country (Spence, 2011). 
Apple increasingly sought a new cognitive legitimacy as a business school through its 
strategy and marketing. This further compromised the University’s participation in the 
PPP as the business school relied less on the University to provide legitimacy to its 
form. The nineteenth finding derives from this reality. In PPPs, cognitive legitimacy is 
the antithesis of socio-political legitimacy in phases of high innovation. Strategies to 
promote socio-political legitimacy in the PPP lead to increasing distance between the 
norms and practices of the business school and the University.  
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9.5 CONCLUSION  
The findings of the study hold implications for theory and for the broad field of PPPs. 
Firstly, contributions to theory emerge in several disciplinary areas and the discussion 
focuses on the theoretical connections based on the findings related to the meaning 
structure of the PPP network. This is the focus of Chapter 10. Secondly, explanations of 
PPP success derived from this study indicate significant areas in the professional field 
of PPPs that open the discussion for examination of the field in a new light. Indeed, 
actors at all the business schools project the enhancement of the relationship and the 
increasing success of the business schools.  
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CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
10.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the discussion of the findings focuses on distilling the theoretical 
contributions that emerged from the study. The chapter seeks to link the findings of the 
research to the body of theory that underpinned the research, extending the body of 
theoretical knowledge that explains the success of partnerships and PPPs. New 
theoretical insights were arrived at by examining existing theory and research in PPPs, 
strategic alliances and the NPM, and adopting the perspective that management theories 
should lead to positive change (Ghoshal, 2005). The focus of the study on explaining 
success locates it within the research tradition of ‘positive psychology’ (Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) which calls for “…as much focus on strength as it is on 
weaknesses, as much interest in building the best things in life as on repairing the 
worst” (Ghoshal, 2005, p.86).  
The chapter is organised into five main sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the research process undertaken so far. It examines the process from formulation of 
the research questions to arriving at findings. In the second section, the author 
undertakes an extended discussion of the theory, linking findings to the theory and 
identifying contributions. This is organised by theoretical themes that emerged from 
the findings in relation to each research question. The third section provides an 
evaluation of the conceptual framework with respect to its appropriateness to provide 
answers to the research questions. The assumptions, delimitations, and limitations of 
the study, are presented in section four. In the final section, a summary of the 
contributions is presented and opportunities for further research are identified.  
10.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
10.1.1 Research Purpose 
This study addressed the main research question:  
 How do public private partnerships in the governance of business schools in the 
English-speaking Caribbean influence their performance?  
The objective of the research was to: 
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1. Examine the factors that influence the PPP governance model in business 
schools in developing countries; and 
2. Develop a dynamic model to guide actors in PPP governance arrangements in 
developing countries.  
10.1.2 Research Process  
In order to understand how PPPs fit into the overall study of partnerships the researcher 
undertook an examination of the field of PPPs to determine what has been studied and 
possible areas for research. The review of the literature found that PPPs create network 
forms of organising that uniquely combine features of hierarchies and markets 
(Thorelli, 1986). Although studies of PPPs were prolific, they were often evaluative 
and directed at political interest. These studies, however, yielded important concepts 
and a plethora of middle-range practical theories. Gaps in the field were found in 
relation to process studies that posed the ‘how’ question; what makes this work?  
The study then moved to construct a theoretical framework that would provide a 
compelling and directed approach to the study. Explanations of PPP behaviour were 
found to rely on network theories (e.g. Gulati, 1998) and the concept of embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985) which explained ‘distortions’ in the expected behaviours of public 
and private actors as they engage in cross-sectoral partnering. Theoretical propositions 
from the literature focused on the purpose, structure and strategy of PPPs but did not 
connect these constructs to outcomes and did not examine the process of cross-sectoral 
partnering. The plethora of existing constructs in the field required the researcher to 
define particular boundaries and create an organising framework that defines and 
connects the dimensions of the relationship that were critical to successfully answering 
the research question. The design framework focused the study on the relational link 
between public and private actors in interactions at three levels: the group level within 
the PPP governance structure, the firm level, at which it examined the relationship with 
respect to organisational purpose, structure and strategy, and the environmental context 
of developing countries.  
The research design was then developed (Chapter 5). Three case studies, using multiple 
methods and multi-level analysis allowed the research to obtain insights into how 
actors connected on purpose, structure and strategy in the evolution of successful PPPs. 
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The research design allowed the researcher to deep dive into the actual interactions 
through network analysis of actors in the governance arrangement.  
10.1.3 Answering the Main Research Question 
Two main instruments helped to guide the definition of sub-questions that guided the 
research. Based on the conclusion from the theoretical framework that network theory 
and legitimacy theory interacted to provide understandings of the factors that contribute 
to network success, propositions drawn from both theoretical positions guided the 
development of the first instrument (see Figure 2 p.81).  
The conceptual framework was developed to focus the research on the relationship 
between purpose, structure and strategy in PPPs in small, developing countries in order 
to arrive at findings and that provide intertextual coherence (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 
1997) in the field of PPPs (see Figure 3, p.85). Social network perspective and 
relational realism provided the relational emphasis and directed the study within the 
theoretical framework of the new sociology (Granovetter, 1990). Middle-range theories 
were drawn to explain the findings.  
10.2 DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS: LINKING FINDINGS TO 
THEORY  
10.2.1 Defining Attributes of the PPP Governance Structure (Research Question 
1) 
10.2.1.1 A strategy for Optimising Private Ideology  
PPPs in developing countries may be considered organisational devices that emerge in 
actors’ attempts to evolve the ideology of privatisation and competitive behaviour 
within institutions, and effect country development. To this end, the PPP organisation 
adopts varying attributes between hierarchies and markets (Powell, 1991) by the 
optimisation of space created through opportunities or constraints of the country and 
institutional environment. Where actors optimise spaces created by country need, the 
locus of control is external and this inspires commitment, but not necessarily the 
demonstration of corporate behaviour through achievement motivation (Weiner and 
Kukla, 1970; McClelland, 1965). This is affected by the embeddedness of actors within 
institutional contexts, as demonstrated in Gerran and Rotter. Where actors optimise 
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spaces in the ideological divide, as in Apple, and do so in the context of increasing 
competitive behaviour and mistrust in the space of optimisation, the locus of control is 
internal to actor sub-groups and inspires entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of 
private-sector actors (Ahmed, 1985). This increases the ideological divide between sub-
groups but stimulates the growth of the PPP firm.  
Actors in developing countries at different points in time are inspired to respond to 
external needs of the country environment or internal needs of the institution. When 
public and private actors interact at the level of governance, competitive behaviour is 
optimised when the space of interaction inspires private management practices, an 
internal locus of control and ownership for private-sector actors which results in the 
adoption of entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of the firm.  
10.2.1.2 Theme 1: Moving from Private to Shared Purpose and Shared Value 
Studies of PPPs have shown that public agencies enter into cross-sectoral strategic 
alliances for several reasons including political benefit (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; 
Savas, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2010; Elg and Johansson, 1997), risk sharing (Medda, 
2007), resource sharing (Weiss, 1987), economic development across various sectors 
and institutions (Rondinelli and London, 2003; Widdus, 2001; Burke, 2010), and 
partnering to innovate for development (Samii et al., 2002). Government and public 
agencies generally seek to get more resources, satisfy norms and values, obtain political 
advantage, solve problems, reduce uncertainty, and obey legal mandates (Weiss, 1987). 
Engagement of the private sector by public agencies is usually triggered by crises and, 
as such, are generally “...pragmatic, functional, purpose driven and centred on 
economic development” (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). The findings of this study 
confirm this and also indicate that, in environmental conditions of severe social and 
economic challenges and strong social identity, public sector actors culturally 
embedded in the context are motivated by the development purpose.  
This study also revealed that PPPs in small countries are established by the motivation 
and actions of the private sector. This finding counters the assertion of Datta (2009) 
that PPPs must be understood as a mechanism of bringing private resources into public 
projects, not public resources into private projects, so that they maintain their moral 
codes (Datta, 2009). The first contextual contribution of this study is the recognition 
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that in small countries, PPPs are also initiated and established by the voluntary action 
of private sector, who, when they connect with public sector agencies on similar needs 
in the environment, establishes a shared purpose that sustains the partnership. This 
study therefore contributes to the development of a process theory for establishing 
shared purpose in PPPs motivated by private need. The study also found that PPPs 
may include co-opted partners who hold radically differing ideologies about the 
purpose of acquiring particular resources.  
The literature on strategic alliances claims that one’s understanding of the purpose of 
collaborative alliances influences one’s contribution to their success (Austin, 2000; 
Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1985). In this study, shared purpose was found to be an 
optimising, though insufficient condition for establishment of private sector ideology 
and competitive strategy in the alliance. Where this occurred, it was facilitated by 
public-private disconnection at the level of the firm and the blurring of the boundaries 
between the PPP organisation as a non-profit, and as a profit-seeking enterprise. This 
study found that this occurs when private sector actors develop dense networks in 
conditions of internal competition between the PPP and its parent institution. The 
blurring of the boundary between successful for-profits and non-profits is one of the 
strong signs that creating shared value is possible (Porter and Kramer, 2011). The 
attainment of a shared purpose is an important factor in building the competitiveness of 
a country; it appears to be an important pre-cursor to the creation of shared value 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
10.2.1.3 Theme 2: Optimising Models of Cooperation  
Berliner (1997) identifies drivers of collaborative efforts in a range of sectors and 
organisational forms, including education and business alliances, as the demand to do 
more with fewer resources, the need to establish new markets, the need for sharing 
expertise, and the need for professional learning communities. This study contrasts with 
the findings of Berliner (1997) on all these dimensions clarifying where they apply at 
different stages of PPP evolution and with varying understandings of the purpose of the 
alliance. This research revealed that PPPs engage in several models of partnering, based 
on the purpose, structure and human agency that influence the relationship. The 
partnering model is aligned with the expected partner contribution that could range 
from resource sharing to resource contribution to partner co-optation. Austin (2000) 
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produced a list of guidelines that include the seven ‘Cs’ of collaboration in strategic 
alliances and included establishing a connection-based purpose that engages people. 
This study found that, when partners connected on the need or opportunity for the PPP, 
this influenced their conception of their contribution. At Rotter and Apple, the 
University perceived the PPP to be appropriate to the needs of the private sector, but 
not necessary to them. As such, their contribution to the Board of Directors was viewed 
as a donation of time, ‘technical expertise,’ and in the case of Rotter, financial 
resources in academia. This finding provides the basis for the second contribution that 
actor engagement in PPPs varies with their connection to the purpose of the PPP and 
influences the model of collaboration and resource contribution which affects 
organisational outcomes and partners relationships. This suggests a refinement of the 
phrase “that engages people” proposed by Austin (2000) to include the connection and 
its implication. In this case, the opportunity exists to optimise the model of 
collaboration and produce an appropriate alliance strategy by examining how public 
and private actors connect on the purpose of the PPP and contribute resources to the 
attainment of purpose (Gomes-Casseres, 1998). This contribution also extends the 
proposition of Gulati (1998) that strategic alliances result in a new form of governance 
and decision-making process intended to maximize value of alliance partners (ibid.). 
Based on the findings of this study, it is claimed that the maximisation of value is 
achieved through optimisation of the model of collaboration.  
This study also deviates from Berliner (1997) in the proposition that partnerships are 
driven by the need for sharing expertise and establishing professional learning 
communities. In the case of Apple and Gerran, the University actors expected the 
private sector to inform them of what was required to deliver a relevant business 
education and, in all cases, the University actors saw their role as the protection of 
academic quality and this resulted in the main, in University directors explaining to the 
private sector how academia worked in order to guide the strategy of the PPP. Private 
sector actors at Apple and Gerran, however, saw their role as sharing business expertise 
to develop the organisation through the insertion of private management practices into 
the operations of the business school. This is an opportunity for further research to 
determine how PPPs create professional learning communities through sharing of 
expertise and how this influences the attainment of the purpose of the PPP. This 
information would further serve to optimise the model of collaboration.  
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Berliner (1997) further suggests strategies to enhance success in partnerships including 
establishing a clear, shared sense of direction, adapting leadership to fit structure and 
moving from competition to collaboration (p.5). The findings of this research supported 
these conclusions but differed on several points. It was found that competition in PPPs 
is embodied in their structure based on the fact that the new PPP organisation is 
established to address the challenges of the parent organisation. In the case of business 
schools, this challenge is in the form of relevance and, as such, PPP success threatens 
the legitimacy of the parent institution on its right to deliver education, attacking the 
institution at its core purpose. As such, perceived internal competition in the 
partnership, during stages of rapid growth of the PPP, is an expected outcome. The 
findings also indicated the importance of adapting leadership to fit structure but as this 
was not the focus of this study, leadership of PPPs is suggested as an area for further 
research.  
10.2.2 Composition and Structure of the PPP Governance Arrangement (Research 
Question 2) 
10.2.2.1 Theme 3: Structuration and Network Flows  
With this question, this study sought to explain how PPPs optimise their contribution to 
decision-making by examining the composition and structure of the board of directors. 
The research question was derived from concepts and theories of sociology, mainly 
drawn from the ‘new economic sociology’ as advocated and defined by Granovetter 
(1985), and network theory (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). The theoretical framing responds to the observation that “...one area where a 
great deal of work remains is integrating network concepts and measures into more 
general social and behavioural science research” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:733). 
The study therefore adds to this area of theory described as ‘relational realism’ carved 
out from the integration of the two research traditions of sociology and network theory 
(Oliver and Myers, 2003; Fuhse, 2009; White et al., 2009; White, 1992).  
The theory of structuration provides an integrative framework that links purpose and 
structure (Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 1984). The researcher aligns with Giddens (1979) 
and adopts the position that actors actively contribute to the success of organisations as 
decision-making by actors resulted in the restructuring of the governance arrangement 
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in ways that optimise value from the alliance. In explaining the evolution of industries, 
Granovetter (1992) suggested that “…stable economic institutions begin as accretions 
of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure reflects that of the 
networks, and even when those are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of 
their own that limits the forms future ones can take; they become ‘locked in’” (p.9). 
This study found that university actors are motivated to adopt decisions that alter the 
historical network structure so as to maximise the value of alliance partners. The third 
contribution of the research is that optimisation of the network appears to occur under 
conditions of resource constraints and is dependent on the historical embeddedness of 
public actors and the development of trust at the executive level where public control is 
maintained. It is important to note that Granovetter (1990, p.106) discounted 
conceptions of determinism in the theory and proffered the explanation that 
“…outcomes can vary dramatically even for the same economic problems and 
technologies if the social structure, institutional history, and collective action are 
different and that these crucially limit and shape future possibilities”. This contribution 
to the theory of strategic alliances in business schools located in small developing 
countries is supported by the ‘network flow model’ and ‘network architecture’ model of 
social network theorising (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). Utilising the ‘network 
flow model’, the fourth contribution of this research was distilled. It was found that in 
high-growth phases, PPP evolution was characterised by dense private-sector networks 
which develop under conditions of competitiveness and display contagion with respect 
to the flows of influence (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). This leads to a cognitive 
social structure (Krackhardt, 1987) that is private-sector dominant in its ideology and 
increasing controlled by the sub-network of private actors in the governance of the 
voluntary PPP. Institutional embeddedness of university actors in their contexts 
contributed to the separation of roles in the social network, which established camps of 
responsibility for strategy on the part of the private sector and accountability for quality 
by the university. The social context of governance and university actor institutional 
embeddedness also compromises their participation in governance and contributes to 
disengagement. Disengagement of university actors is compounded in contexts of high 
levels of mistrust. This finding contributes to the theoretical dialogue on social 
networks and responds to the suggestion that “…since ties are multiple, fluid, and 
narratively constructed (and reconstructed) in relation to evolving timeframes, the new 
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challenge for network analysis…was to understand this link between temporality, 
language and social relations” (Mische. 2011, p.4). 
The social network of actors in the PPP also included private actors who were 
representatives of institutions or sectors. Deep-level application of network theory and 
analysis of the social networks revealed that these social networks possess a strong 
private-sector cognitive social structure but their architecture includes friendship and 
professional ties, a criterion for private-sector actor selection that assumed actor 
support in obtaining market access (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). This was 
evident at Rotter and to some extent at Gerran and reflects the theory of small worlds 
(Kochen, 1989; Newman, 2000). The phenomenon was mitigated at Gerran by the 
domination of the networks of KOAs. Where there was evidence of the small world, 
private-sector actors demonstrated behaviours that were aligned with public-sector 
ideology, placing priority on social outcomes as opposed to profitability. Amongst 
other differences, an area of ideological difference between the public and private 
sector is the private sector’s focus on profitability and the public sector’s concern about 
impact on the community (Ghobadian et al. 2004a). The presence of trust in the 
network served to heighten the blurring of the structural boundaries, but did not achieve 
ideological flows. This finding contributes to the empirical literature on PPPs 
associated with the ‘blurring of the boundaries’ and the complexity of reconciling 
opposing values in the objective of PPPs to “‘...marry the best of both sectors’ in order 
to overcome the weaknesses of both” (Baru and Nundy, 2008, p.68). 
10.2.2.2 Theme 4: Optimising Governance  
The governance arrangements at Gerran and Rotter reflected elements that combined 
stakeholder, stewardship and agency theories in different ways. In the case of 
collaborating actors from various sectors and agencies the governance form, structure 
and order is the result of the interactions and relationships among influencing 
stakeholders (Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993, p.64). The models at Gerran and Rotter 
featured stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making where trust 
relationships and business ethics were the main proposals for stake-holding 
management (Letza et al., 2004). This study found stakeholder governance PPPs 
included public control and private competitive strategy facilitated by private actor sub-
group agency, with trust as a the coordinating mechanism (Jones et al., 1997).  
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At Rotter, the relationship bore features of a franchising arrangement in that the 
business school utilised the legitimacy of the University and the governance 
mechanism to establish a quasi-market in the tradition of the NPM (Powell and 
Exworthy, 2002; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; Bartlett et al., 1998a). In the case of 
Rotter, the governance mechanism developed as an integral part of the strategy of the 
firm. In this case, competitive strategy was not optimised. This study aligns with the 
suggestion and contribution by Mador et al. (2008) that the increasing presence and 
influence of third sector organisations “…require understanding of the privatisation 
process of these organisations based on the specific nature of their context and settings” 
(Mador et al., 2008, p.605).  
At Apple, the separation of control and management reflected agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and this motivated the management of the school to higher levels 
of performance and competitive behaviour. This study contributes the proposition that 
PPP performance is optimised in governance mechanisms with public control and 
private strategic management structures. In this arrangement, the separation of 
management and control in dense networks of private actors on the Board of Directors 
serves to optimise the competitive purpose of the PPP. The emergence of the 
governance model and competitive behaviour (Daily et al., 2003; Cadbury, 1992; Benz 
and Frey, 2007) created tensions on the Board of Directors. The study found that 
university actors in protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role contradiction 
in that setting. Public actors in the PPP hold fiduciary responsibility to the university 
and, as such, in the absence of boundary spanning behaviours (Leifer and Delbecq, 
1978; Noble and Jones, 2006) and a strategy of alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1998), 
developed protectionist behaviours as they perceived the PPP as a competitor. This 
finding is aligned with the expectations of corporate governance behaviours relating to 
particular fiduciary duties: the duty to act in the corporation’s interests and to not 
compete with the corporation (Kaplan, 1975). These rules would be breached by a 
protectionist and competitive stance that debars public actors from acting in the interest 
of the PPP (Kaplan, 1975). The fifth contribution of this study is that public actors face 
role ambiguity and develop protectionist behaviours as competitive relationships 
develop between the parent organisation and the PPP. Public actors face role ambiguity 
(Hartman and Johnson, 1989) and demonstrate protectionist behaviours which distort 
their role as fiduciaries for the corporation and create tensions between public and 
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private sub-groups. This contribution based on role theory (Van Sell et al., 1981; 
Hartman and Johnson, 1989; Biddle, 1979; Tubre and Collins, 2000) confirms the 
conclusion of Tubre and Collins (2000) that role ambiguity should not be dismissed as 
an unimportant variable determining job performance. This finding extends the 
contribution of Tubre and Collins (2000) by providing an explanation of how role 
ambiguity influences public actor performance in governance roles in PPPs.  
10.2.3 Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP (Research Question 3)  
10.2.3.1 Theme 5: Optimising Embeddedness through Boundary Spanning  
This study has supported the view that PPPs derive purpose and are motivated by 
opportunities in the environment (Hodge and Greve, 2010) and that the environments 
of developing countries present unique challenges to the partnership (Jamali, 2004; 
Baru and Nundy, 2008; Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). Actors embedded in contexts 
perceive opportunities and constraints that subvert original plans and intentions and 
influence the direction of the partnership. Two other findings in this study related to the 
embeddedness directed the researcher to examine their implications with respect to 
boundary spanning. The discussion examines challenges of the PPP that emerged in the 
study from embeddedness of actors and the resultant perceptions of constraints and 
opportunities and contributes to the theory of boundary spanning.  
The process by which members of an organisation participate in networks outside the 
organisation and manage the interface between the organisation and the environment is 
referred to as ‘boundary spanning’ (Newell & Swan, 2000). Leifer and Delbecq (1978) 
posit that “...persons who operate on the periphery or boundary of an organization, 
performing organizational relevant tasks, relating the organization with elements 
outside it, are called boundary spanners” (p.41). The study found that PPPs exist in a 
potentially competitive relationship with their parent institution and, in the absence of 
an appropriate boundary spanning strategy in the inter-organizational relationship, the 
growth of one organization negatively impacts the other. The study further revealed 
that boundary spanning activities found at all case sites focused on relationship 
management when actors are deeply embedded in their institutional contexts. The sixth 
contribution is that the focus of boundary-spanning activities on relationship 
management detracts from the strategic purpose of the PPP. This opposes the 
conclusion of Jones and Noble (2008) who emphasise relationships and the 
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development of social and psychological contracts in the process of boundary spanning 
during implementation of the PPP. The findings of this research lead to the contention 
that boundary spanning across organizations requires attention to strategy, rather than 
relationships, to produce ‘win-win’ outcomes for both partners.  
The findings of this study support the conclusion of Noble and Jones (2006) that a 
strategy of boundary spanning in PPPs is required. The research confirms the value of 
an evolutionary approach to boundary spanning as advanced by Noble and Jones (2006) 
and, in the seventh contribution of this research, it is proposed that the boundary 
spanning strategy of PPPs must address the different levels of the organization, seeking 
opportunities and identifying particular roles and activities of boundary spanners in the 
evolution of the organization. The study found support for boundary spanning 
strategies that address opportunities (Baker, 2008), as opposed to the strategy of 
addressing challenges advanced by Noble and Jones (2006). The benefits of boundary 
spanning appear to emanate from the creation of collaborative mechanisms between the 
parent institutions and the PPP to derive value for both organizations throughout the 
evolution of the PPP. One of the outcomes of positive PPP relations is the development 
of trust.  
10.2.3.2 Theme 6: Managing Trust  
One of the findings in this study was the impact of trust on the PPPs. This section is 
discusses trust as a process. Studies of alliances in all sectors have asserted that trust is 
important to the success of partnerships (e.g. Larson, 1992; Cross and Parker, 2004; 
Austin, 2000). In the opinion of Adler (2001, p.217), “...trust is the key coordinating 
mechanism in the community form” and institutional trust is important in the 
evaluation of partners in the arrangement.  Eberl (2004, p.258) argues that “...trust is 
based on emotional bonding and thus cannot be fully controlled by organizational 
measures. Rather, organizational structure can provide a context that fosters closer 
relationships”. Following this argument, this study posits that effective boundary 
spanning will be able to contribute to trust building by optimising the relationship 
between actor sub-groups. Trust in institutions or ‘institutional trust’ “…depends on 
their perceived legitimacy, technical competence, and ability to perform assigned duties 
efficiently (Khodyakov, 2007, p.123). Using the process conceptualisation of trust, 
Khodyakov (2007) proposes that “...trust is a process of constant imaginative 
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anticipation of the reliability of the other party’s actions based on (1) the reputation of 
the partner and the actor, (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) 
assumptions about the partner’s actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality 
of the other side.” (Khodyakov, 2007, p.126; McKnight and Chervany, 2000).  
This study found that optimisation of the PPP is facilitated by trust in situations where 
embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance. In this study, it was found that 
trust serves as a facilitator of positive relationships and incremental strategy, but 
debilitates rapid innovation in PPPs oriented as entrepreneurial organizations, 
especially during phases of high growth. This researcher argues against the proposition 
that success of a social network is related to the establishment of trust, collegial 
relationships and cultural identity, facilitated by concern for the development agenda 
(Fuhse, 2009) and proposes that the economic success of the PPP is propelled by a lack 
of trust between actor sub-groups and protectionist behaviours by public actors. This is 
the eighth contribution of this research. This researcher argued that development of 
institutional trust depends on effective boundary spanning and a strategy of alliances. 
These findings have implications for management in the development of trust through 
boundary spanning and an effective and dynamic strategy of alliances.  
10.2.4 How Does the PPP Build Legitimacy? (Research Question 4)  
10.2.4.1 Theme 7: Governance, Leadership, Strategy and Legitimacy  
Moving away from public to private models for delivering public products and services 
results in tensions and political uncertainty (Ball, 2007; Peters and Pierre, 1998). In this 
study, business schools in small developing countries established PPPs in an effort to 
bring private-sector influences to the public offering of business education. The 
initiative is considered successful as the organizations have survived and attained 
legitimacy in the markets in which they are located. The PPPs represented a move 
towards privatisation, through their establishment as non-profit organizations governed 
by the university and private sector volunteers. It is noted that “...privatisation makes 
companies move from defensive and reactive strategies to analytical and prospective 
ones” (Zabalza and Matey, n.d. p.2). The firm relies more on deliberate strategies 
through the strategic planning process and strong signals from the market (Mintzberg, 
1994; Miles et al., 1978). This study found that PPP evolution is directly related to its 
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privatisation and leadership strategy where the autonomy of the business school and a 
private cognitive social structure enhances its success. This occurs when control 
mechanisms align with an organizational strategy of competitiveness. This research 
advances, as its ninth contribution, a theory of ‘voluntary business game’ which 
contends that private-sector actors in dense networks in voluntary PPPs demonstrate 
sustained competitive behaviours in contexts of increasing internal competition and 
loose-coupling (Weick, 1976) of the private and public-sector actors and institutions. 
This is facilitated by differing ideologies with respect to purpose at the firm level and, 
building on the assertion of Whitty (2000) that privatisation could be understood as an 
attempt to contribute to privatisation in an ideological sense, the study advances a 
notion of ‘quasi-ideologisation’ as the outcome of the PPP arrangements in the context 
in which they were studied. Although existing studies demonstrate political motives on 
the part of PPPs using game theory this study aligns with Medda (2007) in the 
application of game theory as organizational strategy (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; 
Scharpf, 1997; Savas, 2000) and attributes private-sector competitiveness in PPPs to 
the formulation of a strategy for competitive advantage (Porter, 2008). At the level of 
the organization, this is based on the shared ideology of the private actor network that 
financial performance is an output indicator of business success, including the business 
of education. The application of game theory can be explored in further research that 
focuses on analysing actual decisions taken within the board of directors. This is 
included as a delimitation of this work due to inaccessibility to minutes of the meetings 
of the boards of directors across the case sites.  
Private sector-driven strategies are aligned with the development of socio-political 
legitimacy and, in the case of rapidly advancing socio-political legitimising of the 
PPPs, the public partner serves as a legitimising resource to the PPP. This finding links 
the two forms of legitimacy judgment advanced by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) and distils 
the tenth contribution of the research, proposing the thesis that cognitive legitimacy by 
the public institution increasingly functions as an antithesis to socio-political legitimacy 
and threatens the PPP relationship. In this study, where the development of socio-
political legitimacy was tightly coupled with the advance of the PPP as a business 
entity, corporate governance practices were evident and leadership and management 
accountability was primary. It is proposed that when organizations understand the basis 
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from which their legitimacy in society derives (Brown, 2001), and work consistently 
towards its attainment, they increase their chances of survival in the environment.  
10.2.4.2 Theme 8: Strategy of Relevance  
The study commenced with the problem of relevance in business education (Clinebell 
and Clinebell, 2008; Boyd et al., 2010; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; Grey, 2004; Hawawini, 
2005; Ivory et al., 2006; Mintzberg, 2004). Studies have located the problem as a gap 
between theory and practice of business and advanced several solutions to ‘bridge the 
gap’ in the scholar-practitioner divide (Hay and Heracleous, 2009) or ‘gap the 
bridge’(Weick, 2001), based on their perspective of the problem. Researchers located 
the problem in various areas of business schools’ operations including research, the 
curriculum and the relationship between them (Mintzberg, 2004; Starkey and Madan, 
2001) and offered suggestions that addressed the student as the output of the system 
(Moldoveanu and Martin, 2008) and the professionalization of  business schools by 
enhancing their  reputation (Rindova et al., 2010; Baden-Fuller and Hwee Ang, 2001; 
Baden-Fuller et al., 2000). Other researchers proposed the management of inter-
dependencies and complex relationships (Boyd et al., 2010) and the employment of 
strategies that allow for the meeting of ‘fads’ and ‘fundamentals’ of management 
(Weick, 2001). This research was undertaken to seek a scientifically validated 
suggestion for the governance of business schools in small developing countries and to 
offer a thesis of relevance as the objective of the governance mechanism of business 
schools in those settings. To this end, the study found that the PPP strategy was a useful 
and appropriate start to addressing the problem of relevance. The study found that 
boundary spanning strategies that advance opportunities for shared value through 
resource optimisation in the network contribute to the success of the network. In order 
to survive they must compete in the context of scarce resources and, as such, develop a 
dynamic strategy of alliances that optimises the collaborative advantage (Kanter, 1994), 
spanning the environment to move towards shared purpose at the broadest level, and 
internal and external boundary spanning in an institutional framework that brings 
reputation that redefines professionalization in business education (Trank and Rynes, 
2003) and draws out innovation and enterprise through collaboration.  
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10.3 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
This study was undertaken by examining the PPP governance mechanism through the 
relationship between public and private-sector actors on phenomena related to the 
purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP. The research drew on variables at three 
levels: the environment, the PPP organization and governance, and focused on the 
directors of the business schools as the main data source. The conceptual framework 
was found to be wholly appropriate to the study. It was constructed on an appropriate 
theoretical framework that aligned network perspective and theory with legitimacy 
theory and provided the researcher with the opportunity to draw on deep and midde-
range theories and to fully integrate ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ perspectives (Pike, 1954) to 
explore the PPP phenomenon and contribute to theoretical knowledge in the field.  
10.4 ASSUMPTIONS, DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
The study of public-private relationships included a number of ways in which the 
researcher proactively prevented an undertaking to do it all and reactively responded to 
situations encountered in the process of conducting the research, yet giving attention to 
the ‘making’ of validity of the process and confidence in the findings (Koro-Ljungberg, 
2008, p.988).  
10.4.1 Assumptions 
1. PPP success is defined as social judgment and is evaluated on the basis of the 
cognitive and socio-political legitimacy of strategies adopted by the 
organization. There are other bases for judgment of the success of the PPP 
which adopt other indicators of success. These are dependent on the perspective 
and criteria of other evaluators. Social judgment is considered an appropriate 
construct to explain PPP survival in the context of the study as the 
organizational activities were undertaken in the public domain and in the 
interest of the ‘cause’ of business education.  
2. The study assumed a causal relationship between purpose, structure and strategy 
of an organizational form. It also assumed a causal relationship between the 
contribution of public and private actors on the Board of Directors and the 
development of organizational legitimacy.  
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3. The study assumed the cases shared similarities that could be examined to 
produce a powerful theory of PPPs in the context of developing countries. The 
justification for this assumption was premised on two main contextual realities. 
Firstly, there were institutional similarities between the business schools based 
on their attachment to the same University and establishment during the same 
time period. Secondly, there were environmental similarities based on their 
shared historical evolution from colonialism and existence of a ‘Caribbean 
identity’ developed through interactions in a shared geographic and trading 
space.  
4. The study assumed that interactions between actor sub-groups at the governance 
level impacted the strategic direction of the PPP as a firm. This assumption was 
justified as the PPP governance arrangement was the most tangible structure for 
the inclusion of the private sector.  
10.4.2 Delimitations  
10.4.2.1 Contextual Delimitations at Country Level 
The study was delimited in relation to the environmental context at all the levels at 
which the relationship was examined. At the country level, the study was conducted in 
countries classified as small, developing countries. 
10.4.2.2 Contextual Delimitations at Firm Level 
The relationship between public and private actors was examined mainly from the 
perspective of the Board of Directors. The PPP, in this context, was established as a 
new firm and, as such, the examination considered the actions of public and private 
actors in relation to the governance of the new firm and with respect to the impact on 
the parent organizations. The justification for the focus on the firm level is that it 
constituted a legally defined structure within the PPP and a clearly defined point of 
interaction between actor sub-groups. Further, the assumption of actor sub-group 
contribution was the focus of the study and the individual actor contribution was not 
actively investigated.  
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10.4.2.3 Contextual Delimitations at Actor Sub-Group Level 
There was no differentiation of the private sector into size of companies, ownership 
structure, or any other variables that distinguished the nature of private contribution, 
except that which emerged in the case of Rotter.  
10.4.3 Limitations of the Study 
10.4.3.1 Theoretical Limitations 
The study is underpinned by the network perspective and legitimacy theory. Whilst the 
network perspective is wholly appropriate for understanding the relationship between 
partners, the theories that explain alliances and partnerships are essentially drawn from 
research conducted on the private sector and public governance. Limitations therefore 
arise from the application of these theories to the cross-sectoral analysis. 
10.4.3.2 Managerial Limitations 
The study was conducted solely in the context of business schools in small developing 
countries. As such, generalizability of findings is limited to similar contexts. The use of 
the dynamic model for guiding actors in PPP governance mechanisms will also depend 
on the skill of the practitioner in the consulting process.  
10.4.3.3 Limitations of the Findings  
1. Theoretical saturation was not possible due to the small number of cases and the 
limitations of the use of methods. Although selected for their similarity, the 
differences between the cases emerged the most relevant issues pertaining to the 
study of PPPs in business schools in small developing countries.  
2. The findings of the study are limited by the skills of the researcher. 
Attentiveness to evidence, the ability to analyze and interpret evidence were 
skills of the researcher that constrained the findings and interpretations in areas, 
but also advanced knowledge in others.  
3. The findings are also limited by the level of physical and psychological access 
to respondents and evidence. Interpretation of evidence considered the context 
of the research and that of respondents, attempting to ‘wade’ through the 
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responses to distil the psycho-social content of the discourse and create the 
optimal ‘mosaic’ of causation with respect to PPP performance. Interference at 
various physical and psychological levels would have constrained access and 
impacted the research process. 
4. The study did not actively interrogate many of the issues that emerged and, as 
such, findings are closely coupled to issues of governance and cross-sectoral 
partnering, rather than to other issues such as motivation at the individual actor 
level. This is a limitation of the critical realist approach to the study and 
provides an agenda for further research.  
10.5 MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH: A RESEARCH AGENDA  
The PPPs which comprised the site for empirical investigation of the research question 
all survived and grew in different ways. Yet, none of them appeared to be maximising 
the contribution of partners. At Gerran, private sector attributes of competitive 
behaviour and the University’s knowledge system were not optimised, mainly due to 
embeddedness in the country and institutional environment. At Apple, competitiveness 
and growth of the PPP was attained by sacrificing the relationship with the University 
and, at Rotter, the growth of the University itself did not include the business school in 
product innovation and restricted its contribution to overall support for their activities. 
Where actor sub-groups dominated the relationship, their behaviour appeared to be 
motivated by their own need for reputation, goal attainment, demonstration of personal 
competence or the possibilities of private ideology. The inspiration of the ‘other’ was 
not evident, yet, this appears to be the solution for maximising the potential of the 
partnership. Inspiration was reflected in the partnership, but at the actor level, and 
related to the need to learn from the other.  
This study contributes a theory of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ in cross-
sectoral partnerships in business schools in small, developing countries. The concepts 
of ‘creativity’ and ‘inspiration’ derived from Western literary traditions are applied to 
the findings of this study from the work of Timothy Clarke (Clark, 2001). It is noted 
that ‘inspiration’ has not been subject to debate and instead accommodated within the 
‘esctatic intuition’ or ‘Romantic imagination (ibid., p.1). The relevance of the concept 
to governance derives from the translation of inspiration according to Derrida (quoted 
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in Clarke, 2001, p.1): “In ‘The poetic”, Derrida writes “let us say it, would be that 
which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under 
diction, by heart’…inspiration has barely been part of a continuously sustained 
tradition of debate”  
The thesis of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ removes the responsibility for 
governance from the pinnacle of the firm and locates it wherever the heart of the firm 
lies, through the art of composition of strategy. Clark (2001) explains the process of 
inspiration as “…the process of composition as the site of a unique, valuable and rare 
transformation and even revolution of the psyche; in a word, ‘inspiration’” (quotations 
in original). This appears to be an appropriate scientific explanation for success in 
PPPs, presenting an opportunity to bridge the ‘self-referential’ and ‘auto-poetic’ nature 
of these systems that prevent communication across them (Kieser and Leiner, 2009).  
Indeed, the process of learning across the firms spreads the ‘inspiration’ to do right and 
good by finding the best where it exists. Perhaps the creation of value lies at the feet of 
the most uninspired employee, but most importantly, there must be connection from the 
feet to the head and vice-versa. What is governance? What forms will it take? What 
actions will it look like? Where will it be located and how will it work? The findings of 
the study have demonstrated that governance in PPPs and cross-sectoral alliances occur 
in spaces of optimisation that emerge out of psycho-social and environmental 
conditions. The ‘fluidity of spaces’ is reflective of the postmodern tradition of ‘liquid 
modernity’ which posits that value is derived in spaces created within the context of 
man (Bauman, 2000). Based on the findings of the study, the research suggests we 
optimise by starting from the heart of man and strategizing outwards.  
This study has revealed that PPPs represent the moving ideology of privatisation across 
levels and time. The purpose of ‘relevance’ inspired at the country or institutional level, 
where it is shared, becomes a ‘cause’. This creates the opportunity to optimise the 
process of a purpose becoming a cause. The structure of ‘institution’ becomes 
‘partnership’ in the PPP arrangement and creates an opportunity to link the ‘cause’ to 
the ‘organization strategy’ in the PPP. Governance becomes a strategy to ‘inspire’ by 
optimising the linkage of ‘cause’ to ‘partnership strategy’. This process has time and 
effect outcomes and relational outcomes based on how it evolves in societies. The 
ideology moves by structuration based on the needs of the people, rather than any overt 
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changes in public or private institutional characteristics. The thesis of corporate 
governance as inspiration is proposed as a mechanism for inspiring change in the 
professionalisation of business education in PPPs in small developing countries.  
The research revealed that in the absence of an articulated alliance strategy (Gomes-
Casseres, 1998) beyond the legal instruments by which they were established, the PPPs 
evolved mechanisms that contributed to their sustainability and legitimacy in the 
societies in which they existed. The main findings of the study and the theoretical 
contributions are illustrated in the Findings Model below. The contributions are derived 
by extending models, adding to theoretical discussions and emphasising contradictions 
where they apply. The theorists and theories to which this study contributes are 
included in the model. The model includes the PPP environment as a source of 
opportunities for action within the PPP organization. The performance of the PPP is 
assessed in the ‘zone of judgment’ and this provides impetus for change and evolution 
of the PPP.  
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Figure 23: PPP Findings Model  
 
The findings of this study hold implications for social policy and management practice.  
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CHAPTER 11: CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY AND PRACTICE  
11.0 INTRODUCTION  
The findings and theoretical contributions of this study have several implications for 
organizational development in PPPs in small, developing countries of the English-
speaking Caribbean. In this discussion chapter, the findings of the study are examined 
in relation to policy and management practice. The author attempts to achieve 
‘intertextual coherence’ by problematizing the findings of the study in relation to the 
existing literature on cross-sectoral alliances (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997), 
including the presence of PPPs in business education that are motivated by the private 
sector. This is attempted to offer guidance based on the findings related to PPPs and 
their implications for higher education policy.  
Consistent with the objective of the research to generate a dynamic model of 
partnerships that would guide the development of PPPs and cross-sectoral relationships, 
the study provides a model for interrogating the partnership to understand its attributes 
and evaluate its potential to contribute to its purpose. The contribution of the study to 
policy resides in the questions that would guide decision-makers in small, developing 
countries to assess the value of the PPP in order to effect policy decisions that impact 
the future of these organizations that are motivated by societal needs.  
11.1: INSERTION INTO THE FIELD OF PPPS  
11.1.1 Redefinition of PPP in the Context  
PPPs examined in this study exist in ‘liquid spaces of interaction’ (Lichtenstein et al., 
2006) inspired by actors in ‘semi-autonomous spheres’(Van Kersbergen and van 
Waarden, 2004a) of public and private institutions, seeking solutions with the other, 
against legitimacy threats and perceived gaps by the other. Actors participate in 
different ways, based on whether the PPP is perceived as an opportunity or constraint 
and their own position as one of resource limitation, support or inspiration. The 
embeddedness of actors in their institutional contexts and configured identity in the 
‘space of interaction’ creates tensions and institutional distortions which influence their 
participation and PPP performance. The PPPs challenge institutional norms, and 
agency is more an “act of interpretation” (Suddaby et al., 2010, p.1239) of the meaning 
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of structure of the network. PPPs and their parent organisations develop cognitive and 
socio-political legitimacy in the resolution of the gap, in a process that inspires 
innovation from one or the other.  
11.1.2 Evolution of a Model of Collaboration 
Based on this re-definition of PPPs and the model of collaboration in the context, 
several deviations from the existing literature on PPPs arise which bear policy 
implications for publicly funded universities and PPPs in developing countries. These 
will be identified in relation to the critical success factors and policy recommendations 
to support PPPs in education in developing countries, extending the suggestions 
advocated by Jamali (2004). Voluntary private participation in the PPPs studied 
requires reconsideration of some of the conclusions regarding private investment. 
Firstly, the notion ‘return on investment’ as advanced by Scharle (2002) must be 
understood in terms of PPP performance. Secondly, the ‘latent’ reasons for inviting 
private participation do not always reside in the differences between public and private 
(Jamali, 2004, p.417) but, as revealed in the study, may be undertaken in an effort to 
defend against legitimacy threats. It is noted that because of the stronger position of the 
private partner, more stringent governmental regulation and transparent regulatory 
frameworks are needed (Pongsiri, 2002; Scharle, 2002). It is also necessary to remove 
threats to market competition to inspire private actors. The extent to which there is 
confidence in these affects the participation of the private sector in PPPs.  
11.1.3 Redefinition of the PPP Problem for National Policy  
PPPs in education and other projects across the world are currently understood as the 
transfer of financial and other forms of risk from government to the private sector 
where it appears to be better managed, and the transfer of management practices from 
the private to the public sector for political gain (Medda, 2007). This study found that: 
 In business schools in small, developing countries, the PPP problem is redefined 
as a means of bringing the ideology of privatisation into the public ‘cause’ of 
education by challenging institutional rights, norms, capabilities and legitimacy. 
PPPs acknowledge the right of the private sector to do so, as they seek 
appropriate solutions to problems faced by business and society.  
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This reality has implications for national systems of accountability and financing of 
education in small, developing countries. Developing countries are constrained by 
regulatory and financial constraints (Pessoa, 2008) which can impact PPPs and their 
parent organizations in the context of constrained resources and decision-making for 
optimisation. At the national level, understanding PPPs has been a process of 
ideological suspicion and the questioning of partners’ rights and roles. Evaluators have 
challenged the competencies and roles of the public sector (Peters, 1997) in general and 
in service sectors, including education, with the stinging and unhelpful intent to 
highlight incompetence and inefficiency (Ball, 2007). Motivation to engage in 
partnerships has depended on evaluation of risk and determination of private gain based 
on level of risk. This study, however, focused on PPPs that emerged from need, with no 
consideration of risk in the relationship. The PPP problem appears to be the transfer or 
sharing of resources at different levels of the organization and the determination of 
what resources should be best transferred by which actors and in what areas of need.  
11.2 PROBLEMATISING PRIVATE SECTOR PPPS 
11.2.1 The Right to Public Financing and Resources  
Two of the PPPs in this study were initiated by the private sector’s interest and 
intervention in business education which threatened the fundamental role of the 
University as provider of relevant education and triggered their response. The success 
of the PPPs appeared to establish the right of the private sector as a participant in 
education provision and, in one case, directly threatened the legitimacy of the 
University as provider.  
Publicly funded universities in small, developing countries are the centre of education 
for economic development and, as such, tend to receive preferential treatment with 
respect to public financing and support. This is not the case in large countries where 
private involvement is often evident through the activities of large corporations in 
education (Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). Indeed, the business schools in the study 
attempted to involve government representatives and other key public sector players 
who could ensure equity in the provision of financing for business school endeavours.  
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11.2.2 The Demand for Competent Regulatory Frameworks 
PPPs in education in small, developing countries interface with two direct areas of 
national policy: regulation or accreditation and financing. Questions regarding the 
legitimacy of the PPPs in society and the capacity of government agencies to 
understand and support them were raised by (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 
2004a) who asked:  
“Do the new actors or governance arrangements have legitimacy? Does 
the public trust them, the courts, the privatized companies, the 
independent regulatory agencies, the expert networks, the large business 
enterprises? What is the relationship between institutional controls and 
trust? How ‘independent’ are independent regulatory agencies… Who 
controls the controllers? What are the roads for public discourse on the 
performance of governance mechanisms, criticism, redress?” (p. 158) 
PPPs, based on the purpose for which they are established, deviate from the norms of 
institutions and require new competences of regulators who must judge their value. As 
such, regulators themselves must be considered competent, independent and legitimate 
(Pessoa, 2007). To this end, small developing countries must undertake steps to ensure 
transparency and competence in the public system mandated to manage and control 
PPP activities.  
11.3 EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR PPPS IN EDUCATION  
A review of the extant literature demonstrates that research on the performance of PPPs 
in education has not been able to connect the strategy of PFIs with school performance 
based on student success (Kakabadse et al., 2007; Jamali, 2004; Davies and Hentschke, 
2006; Jones and Bird, 2000; Gibson and Davies, 2008). Indicators of performance at 
the level of primary and secondary education include output indicators of test scores 
and, only in some cases, on the happiness of teachers and students in the learning 
context (Gibson and Davies, 2008). Based on the findings of this research, it is 
recommended that the evaluation focus of the policy maker with regard to PPPs in 
education should be based on the academic capabilities that would lead to business and 
management change, and national development in emerging economies (Liefner and 
Schiller, 2008).  
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Table 47: Dimensions of Performance Important to Policymakers: Start-up Phase 
of PPP 
Phase of 
development: 
Start up  
Assessing capabilities of the PPP in 
business education 
Indicators of performance 
(Policy makers build capability to 
manage and evaluate PPPs on 
these indicators)  
Purpose  1. How connected is the purpose to national 
developmental goals? 
2. To what extent do actors align with the 
vision and purpose of developing 
competitively?  
 Expressions of purpose 
 Actions aligned with purpose  
Structure 1. How does the governance arrangement 
provide for competitive strategy?  
2. How does the PPP provide for 
accountability within its structure? 
3. To what extent do the structures of the 
PPP align with the need for public 
accountability on the attainment of the 
purpose of the PPP? 
 Control 
 ‘Ownership’ of the cause 
 Commitment to the cause 
 Level of trust and collaboration 
at the site of action  
 
Competitive 
strategy  
1. How does the PPP plan to achieve self-
sustainability? 
Financial and programme 
management 
Leadership 
strategy  
1. What is the leader’s orientation to 
leadership across both organizations? 
2. What is the leader’s orientation to issues 
that would arise across both 
organizations?  
 Strategic plan 
 Strategy of alliances 
 Indicators of influence on 
critical thought  
Performance 
outcomes  
1. How will the PPP assess its performance? 
2. How is the performance of each partner 
addressed?  
 Impact of research, teaching 
innovation and programme 
innovation 
 Knowledge emergence 
processes  
 
 
At the growth phase of the PPP, policymakers in small, developing countries are faced 
with decisions regarding the allocation of funding among institutions. Table 48 
includes some of the questions for consideration at this phase.  
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Table 48: Dimensions of Performance Important to Policymakers: Growth Phase 
of PPP 
Phase of 
development: 
Approach to 
government through 
the window of need 
(Baker, 2008) 
Assessing capabilities of the PPP in 
business education 
Indicators of performance 
(Policy makers support PPPs in 
refining these indicators)  
 
Purpose  1. How connected is the purpose to 
national developmental goals? 
2. To what extent do actors align with 
the vision and purpose of developing 
competitively?  
 Expressions of purpose 
 Actions aligned with purpose  
 
Structure 1. How does the governance 
arrangement provide for competitive 
strategy? 
2. How does the PPP provide for 
accountability within its structure? 
3. To what extent do the structures of 
the PPP align with the need for 
public accountability on the 
attainment of the purpose of the 
PPP? 
4. How has the structure changed, and 
what is its impact on the 
accountability of the PPP? 
 Control 
 ‘Ownership’ of the cause 
 Commitment to the cause 
 Level of trust and 
collaboration at the site of 
action  
 
Competitive strategy  1. To what extent is the PPP 
developing self-sustainability?  
 
 Financial and programme 
management 
 Programme evolution  
Leadership strategy  1. What is the leadership’s orientation 
to managing complexity across both 
organizations?  
 Reflects the social-psychology 
of managing spaces to 
optimise both  
 Influencing critical thought  
Outcomes  2. What performance measures have 
emerged which are useful for 
internal communication and for 
communicating to the public?  
 Impact of research, teaching 
innovation and programme 
innovation 
 Impact on development 
 Relationships across 
institutions  
 
11.4 THE FUTURE OF PPPS  
The future of PPPs appears to be best understood from a broad consideration of the 
future capabilities of man and society to solve problems through innovation. Indeed, all 
the respondents in the study pointed to the enlargement of the PPP presence and agenda 
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in the solution of the problems of their countries and region. It is expected that alliances 
will continue to be formed with non-traditional partners of opposing ideologies. It is the 
reality claimed by the philosophical orientation to life of ‘liquid modernity’ which 
moves the problem beyond postmodernism into a reality that is fluid and adaptive 
(Bauman, 2000). Systems should be “…flexible enough not to bar freedom of future 
movements in the constantly changing volatile circumstances…(o)r the precariousness 
of human partnerships now burdened with expectations greater than ever, yet poorly, if 
at all, institutionalized, and therefore less resistant to the added burden (Bauman, 2000, 
p.50). The problem will continue to exist with respect to optimising PPPs, by 
optimising institutionalised systems to support them as they create shared value for the 
common good. 
11.4.1 Gerran: Inspiring Innovation in Teaching, Learning and Research  
The main insight from Gerran Business School with respect to the continuity of the 
PPP was related to the importance of the programme content. One respondent 
indicated:  
“I don’t think the Board is the key to the public private partnership… 
The key to it is establishing those relationships and it’s not just the 
relationships which I say we already have.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran) 
The comment suggests that the future of the PPP lies in the space from which the 
problem emerged: relevance of the curriculum. This is consistent with the findings of 
the study and it is recognised that leadership of the schools appeared to be a major 
factor in their survival and growth. Regulatory frameworks that recognise the advances 
of this PPP would be inclined to provide support for its curriculum innovation efforts.  
11.4.2 Apple: A PPP at Crossroads of Separation  
The PPP at Apple appears to present a direct threat to the legitimacy of the University. 
This has occurred in the context of a lack of boundary-spanning behaviour and attempts 
to optimise the space of interaction for transfer of learning. One respondent indicated 
that the PPP governors should:  
“If the School is the graduate management school of Green University, 
then it should align its mission with that of Green University and 
concentrate on delivering academic programmes... As a constituent part 
of Green University, the debilitating undermining and internal 
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competition… should cease because there would be no reason for it.” 
(#7 Pub KOA, Apple) 
Based on the findings, this would re-constitute the business school into the very 
institutionalisation it was created to avoid and restrict its autonomy and entrepreneurial 
and innovative behaviour, thereby threatening its success and restricting its purpose of 
country development based on competitiveness. As such, the researcher disagrees with 
this recommendation. In this case, the research presents an option of optimising 
boundary spanning behaviour with a view to redesign the institutional framework 
within which management and business education must co-exist in a seamless 
relationship. The public policy framework would need to support the innovative 
purpose of the PPP and build institutional capability within the public sector to 
continually understand its purpose and evaluate its impact.  
11.4.3 Rotter: A PPP at Crossroads of Reintegration 
The PPP at Rotter appeared to be divorced from the product innovation that was 
evident at the Rotterdam campus of the University. As such, respondents indicated the 
possibility of its reintegration into the main campus from where it can be better 
supported in its purpose. One respondent indicated her vision of the future:  
“Perhaps a lot of the other guard would have moved on and so we would 
have an emergence of people who understand these kinds of 
movement… and understands the value of having the school of business 
aligned to the university way.” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter) 
Loose-coupling of the University and the private sector is supported by the findings of 
the study, yet, in the case where the PPP did not evolve a product strategy, reintegration 
appears to be an optimal solution. Having a critical mass of persons who understand the 
nature of the PPP and cross-sectoral alliances at all levels, and across all sectors, is a 
rational and hopeful recommendation for PPPs in small, developing societies. In this 
and all cases, government would be encouraged to support research and development of 
the ‘third sector’ organizations in ways that stimulate purposive action in relation to 
social problems.  
Having explored the broad alignment of the findings of the study with the field of 
business education in small, developing countries and suggested an analytical 
generalisation and implication for policy with respect to cross-sectoral alliances, the 
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study now turns to the process by which the firm, as a PPP, can optimise its 
performance.  
11.5 MANAGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE 
The findings and theoretical contributions of the study provide the basis for the 
development of a ‘management tool’ for evaluation of the performance of PPPs and 
development of an optimised model of boundary spanning leadership. The management 
tool comprises a series of suggested questions to evaluate PPPs with respect to the way 
in which they combine public and private sector ideology, organizational structures and 
institute governance mechanisms to produce a new form that will be able to deliver 
public services and attain their defined purpose. PPPs are usually considered to be “… 
a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the private sector to 
achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own individual interests” 
(Pessoa, 2008, pp.3-4). As such, the management tool is developed on the assumption 
that the PPP is ‘locked in’ to the shared purpose of partners.  
The model focuses on optimising the PPP and is therefore congruent with the tradition 
of ‘positive psychology’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This is considered an 
important contribution to the practice of PPPs which usually engage institutions and 
actors over long periods of time and with defined value creation propositions for both 
public and private partners. Indeed, it is also considered critical for business schools in 
the continuing search for relevance, the purpose for which the business schools, 
included in the study, were established. The model is not theoretically limited to 
optimisation and will also guide the establishment of new PPPs as the questions raised 
will alert actors to the potential change ‘crises’ that require reorienting of the PPP and 
its actor sub-groups to its purpose.  
11.5.1 Description of the Management Tool  
11.5.1.1 Optimising Purpose, Structure and Strategy  
The management tool includes a series of suggested actions to determine how the 
purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP are adapted in the fluid environment of actor 
sub-group interactions. The actions are directly related to the findings of the study 
(Table 49).  
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Table 49: Management Tool to Guide PPP Performance 
PPP 
Dimensions  
Research Findings and Suggested Actions 
Optimising actor 
connection on 
purpose of the 
PPP  
F1. Shared purpose in the PPP was a result of connection on economic and social 
variables that affected a broad range of stakeholders, including those external to the 
PPP or its parent institutions. This only resulted when both the public and private 
sectors were motivated by similar needs (How did they arrive at similar needs?) 
F12. PPPs derive purpose and are motivated by opportunities in the environment. 
The social and economic challenges of developing country contexts provide 
opportunities for the contribution of both sub-groups to enhance country 
competitiveness 
Concerns for Review 
1. Revisit actor sub-group congruence with respect to their understanding of the 
purpose of the partnership. 
2. Examine the motivation of actors on institutional and country variables that 
influence the purpose of the PPP. 
3. Examine connections between actor sub-groups on the needs to be addressed by 
the partnership 
F8. The institutional history and context of the PPP may produce a set of variables 
that motivate strong contribution of one actor sub-group.  
Concerns for Review 
4. Examine the variables that motivate strong contribution by actor sub-group 
5. Examine rationale for constrained participation of the other partner  
Optimising actor 
connection on 
PPP governance 
structure  
F2. PPPs may be established as efforts to bring private resources into public projects 
or public resources into private projects. University actors facilitated the 
business school as a revenue generating unit that addressed the training needs of the 
private sector; an agenda that was outside of the purview of the University and 
perhaps paradoxical to the purpose of the university itself. This occurred despite the 
absence of a plan for financial contributions of the business schools to the 
University (Organization) 
F3. PPPs may include co-opted partners who hold differing ideologies, for the 
purpose of acquiring particular resources (Organization). The forms of PPP co-
operation range from tolerance to contribution and support. The ‘happy marriage’ 
analogy may be revised to a ‘functional relationship’ 
F4. PPPs engage in several models of partnering, based on the purpose, structure 
and human agency that influence the relationship. The partnering model is aligned 
with the expected partner contribution that could range from resource sharing to 
resource contribution. (Organization) 
F6. Public actors are motivated to adopt decisions that alter the historical network 
structure so as to maximise the value of alliance partners. PPP governance networks 
are restructured in response to constraints in the environment. This is dependent on 
the historical embeddedness and retention of public control and the development of 
trust at the executive level of the PPP 
Concerns for Review 
1. Examine the model for resource sharing to determine the nature of resources and 
relation to the PPP purpose. 
2. Examine the efficiency and effectiveness of resource sharing model. 
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PPP 
Dimensions  
Research Findings and Suggested Actions 
3. Examine the structure and roles of partners in the arrangement  
F5. PPPs result in a new governance form intended to derive particular resources 
and value from alliances partners. The PPP demonstrates close coupling of purpose 
and structure to derive particular benefits from actors. (Organization). 
Concerns for Review 
1. Examine the connection between purpose and strategy  
F9. High levels of mistrust leads to academic protectionism which constrains the 
opportunity for mutual learning between partners in the PPP.  
F10. Public actors in protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role 
contradiction at that level, especially in competitive contexts 
Concerns for Review 
1. Examine the participation of actors in roles and determine measures to optimise 
their participation in the PPP. 
2.  Examine issues that impact trust and assess this in relation to strategy and 
purpose of the PPP and determine the implications for boundary spanning. 
3. Construct opportunities to inspire innovation in both organizations. 
Optimising actor 
connection on 
organizational 
strategy  
F7. In the absence of a strategy of alliances, expectations of private contribution to 
governance on a Board of Directors are distorted by the cognitive embeddedness of 
private-sector actors in institutional frameworks.  
F14. Optimisation of the PPP is facilitated by trust in situations where 
embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance.  
F17. PPP evolution is directly related to its privatisation and leadership strategy. 
The autonomy of the business school and a private cognitive social structure 
enhances its success. This occurs when performance management practices of the 
organization are aligned with a strategy of competitiveness. 
F11. In small, developing countries, the growth of the PPP organization is directly 
related to the strategy for optimising of private-sector ideology in the network. 
Concerns for Review 
1. Examine the ideology of privatisation in the PPP. 
2. Determine to what extent private-sector ideology is institutionalised in the 
environment. 
3. Assess the contribution of private-sector actors in relation to expectations. 
4. Determine how embeddedness is influencing actor sub-group behaviour 
F13. PPPs exist in a potentially competitive relationship with their parent institution 
and, in the absence of an appropriate boundary spanning strategy, the growth of one 
organization negatively impacts the other. 
F15. Boundary spanners in PPPs in business schools must possess technical 
legitimacy in both the University and private sector in order to effectively undertake 
this task. 
F16. Boundary spanning activities are focused on relationship management when 
actors are deeply embedded in their traditional contexts. The focus on relationship 
management detracts from the strategic purpose of the PPP. Organizations that 
understand the basis from which their legitimacy in society derives, and work 
consistently towards its attainment, increase their chances of survival in the 
environment. 
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PPP 
Dimensions  
Research Findings and Suggested Actions 
F18. Trust is a facilitator of relationships and incremental strategy but debilitates 
rapid innovation in business schools as education organizations.  
Concerns for Review 
1. Determine the outcome for partner organizations in the PPP. 
2. Examine the actions of boundary spanners in the PPP. 
3. Examine the institutional embeddedness within the PPP. 
4. Craft opportunities for boundary spanning and innovative destruction of 
institutionalised processes and structures. 
5.  Build inspiration within the network to address opportunities for both 
organizations  
Optimising PPP 
relationship 
based on 
emerging 
legitimacy 
outcomes  
F19. In PPPs, cognitive legitimacy is the antithesis of socio-political legitimacy in 
phases of high innovation. Strategies to promote socio-political legitimacy in the 
PPP leads to increasing distance between the norms and practices of the business 
school and the University.  
Concerns for Review 
1. Determine the extent to which actors are committed to the ideology of 
privatisation. 
2.  Explore the ways in which their development will influence each other. 
3.  Craft change management strategies for boundary spanners within both 
organizations.  
  
The questions highlighted in Table 49 are intended to interrogate the PPP on its 
purpose, structure and strategy. This however, will only provide information regarding 
that status of PPP performance and issues in the relationship. The management of the 
relationship relies on one’s adoption of private ideology and ‘positive psychology’ in 
leading others to seek opportunities that arise for both partners in the PPP environment. 
This strategy based on the thesis of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ addresses the 
issue of leadership in the PPP context of a fluid relationship between ownership and 
control.  
11.5.1.2 Optimising Governance and Leadership  
The purpose of the PPP is determined at establishment, with public and private actors 
having some idea of how the PPP aligns with the institutional purpose of the public 
actors. Purpose becomes strengthened, or threatened, for either public or private 
partners as the PPP develops. The role of boundary spanners (Baker, 2008; Jones and 
Noble, 2008) becomes important and the way in which they seek opportunities to 
creatively destroy the organization (Schumpeter, 1942) and enhance relevance must be 
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examined. While the thesis did not confirm ‘How do PPPs work?’ it raised a new 
question of ‘Where do PPPs work?’ and guides the direction of further research to 
examine the issue of leadership.  
The model of PPP performance is based on an extension of the causal links between 
purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP, considering the influence of environmental, 
organizational and group level variables that continue to impact the PPP. The model 
includes the considerations and questions in relation to the alliance strategy, the 
organizational outcomes and legitimacy evaluation of the PPP, based on the findings of 
the study, and seeks to guide the governance model of PPPs in business schools in 
small, developing countries.  
11.6 CLOSING REFLECTIONS  
This thesis is as much about the DBA doctoral process as it is about corporate 
governance in cross-sectoral partnerships. In this process of attempting to become a 
scholarly professional (Phillips and Pugh, 2000) the researcher identified a research 
challenge that held her passion in her own professional trajectory in the real world. The 
DBA project became an attempt to seek a sustainable solution that respected the 
academic process, recognising the challenge of producing a defensible contribution to 
management theory and a laudable contribution to management practice in the context. 
The work is submitted as an exhibition of the current skill level of the scholarly 
practitioner but more so, and in this case, represents a commitment to improving the 
practice field. It extends the work of regional scholars, addressing challenges and 
raising further questions. Any errors are understood to be that of the researcher.  
Knowledge of corporate governance as inspiration and the leadership agenda it 
generates has potential value for all societies. The content and methodology of a 
humanist and humanitarian approach to corporate governance and leadership is 
priceless. The leadership journey appears to have started at Apple, where the 
philosophy of leading from above the line is posited as a response to the crisis of 
leadership (Ferguson, 2009). Further research will interrogate its scientific rigour and 
relevance in different societies in the management of the leadership education process. 
Further application will explore the impact on actors – to examine the creation of value 
for self and the other in one’s life project.  
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At its broadest level, this thesis is about optimising cross-sectoral partnerships and at 
the empirical level it examines the role of business schools in the inspiration of 
business and society, leading to development. Whether the development agenda is 
viewed as the business of business education and from its most negative theoretical 
perspective of transaction cost (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), or one adopts the view of 
education as a social good, it is evident that the sustainability and well-being of society, 
including that of business, depend on the same factors and shared understandings. The 
confidence in the utility of the research to the researcher as practitioner emerges from 
engagement in the scientific process and an appreciation of the value of that process for 
arriving at appropriate questions and a process of engaging actors in the context and 
analysis of the data to arrive at solutions that can be considered.  
11.7 FUTURE PROFESSIONAL AGENDA 
This thesis of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ (Clark, 2001) which was derived 
from the examination of the interactions of people, spaces and identities in the search 
for value, contributes to the theory and practice at the levels of social life, from which it 
was drawn. For business schools, the most recent articulation of the problem and a 
solution was presented by Nitin Nohria, Dean of Harvard Business School who noted:  
“The moral legitimacy of business was challenged recently… (and)…the 
rise of business schools in developing countries will be good for 
business education as a whole – we can learn from each other” (Nitin 
Nohria, Dean, Harvard Business School, Interview with Financial 
Times, Podcast)  
This thesis, at its broadest level, connects the global environment of business schools to 
their purpose of educating people for business and society. The answer to the question 
“how,” from where the problem was observed, is posited by this researcher as follows:  
 The concern for the social good is a necessary, but insufficient condition for 
success and the creation of value. In the governance of business schools lies the 
ability to devise strategies that will inspire many to ‘gap the bridge(s)’ (Weick, 
2001) and develop inspirational networks of people and spaces. This is achieved 
by weaving threads of connections among sectors and organizational forms to 
inspire the attainment of developmental purposes (Bauman, 2000). 
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Cross-sectoral alliances, presented with the opportunity to engage, ‘maximise the 
value’ (Gulati, 1998) of a range of resources and behaviours driven by varying 
ideologies. In so doing, they adopt different purposes, organizational and governance 
mechanisms, and strategies that guide their response to the need for performance, 
defined in various ways. In the context of business schools, whether optimisation is 
viewed as the business of business education, or just business, and actors prioritise the 
‘social good’ or the ‘business good’, the end result must be the creation of value. 
Examination of the organization, and the sustainability and well-being of society, 
including that of business, depends on the same factors and shared understandings. The 
confidence in the utility of the research to the researcher as practitioner emerges from 
engagement in the scientific process. The process itself has generated respect for 
academia as a value-creating and inspirational engagement in society. The utility of the 
research for investigating the problem of partnerships emerges from various factors 
related to the research process including the case study design, the use of multiple 
methods of data collection, and multi-level analysis of the phenomenon, including the 
group level, organizational level and country level. PPPs are generally embedded as 
cases in particular contexts and the elements of the context are critical to their 
functioning. This chapter distils the practical knowledge that has emerged from the 
study with respect to the problem of university-business partnerships in the governance 
of business schools in small developing countries. It addresses the research question:  
 How do public private partnerships influence business school performance in 
the English-speaking Caribbean? 
…to produce an answer that is limited by its research methods and context. By 
examining the factors that influence the governance model, the study has confirmed the 
relevance of ‘relational realism’(White et al., 2009; Fuhse, 2009) to the study of PPPs 
and the influence of relationships between variables in arriving at decisions and actions.  
In the spirit of positive organization studies, it is noted that in 1876, Daniel C. Gilman, 
the first president of Johns Hopkins University expressed the hope that American 
universities would one day “…make for less misery among the poor, less ignorance in 
the schools, less bigotry in the temple, less suffering in the hospital, less fraud in 
business and less folly in politics” (quoted in Harkavy, 1998, p.4; Martin et al., 2005, 
p.3). It is to this end that this researcher now turns with a process and commitment to 
offer humbly this agenda to the world. 
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APPENDIX 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
Cross reference: 2.3.1 Tensions across Sectors (taken from Ghobadian et al., 2004,
pp.297-298). 
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APPENDIX 2:  WAYS OF PARTNERING
Cross Reference: 2.4.3 The Internal Environment: Structure of the PPP Organisation
(taken from Berliner, 1997, p.4); original in Shine-Ring, 1994). 
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APPENDIX 3: OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE - THEORY AND 
CONCEPTS 
Cross reference: 3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
Social network theory may be considered a perspective, a theory, a methodology and, 
most significantly, a way of viewing the world through relational concepts (Borgatti, 
2003). Wasserman and Faust (2004) summarized the fundamentals of the social 
network perspective as follows:  
 “Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather 
than independent, autonomous units  
 Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer 
or flow of resources (either material or non-material)  
 Network models focusing on individuals view the network 
structural environment as providing opportunities for or 
constraints on individual action 
 Network models conceptualise structure (social, economic, 
political etc) as lasting patterns of relations among actors.”  (p.4) 
Research, using social network perspective and methodology, moves away from a 
focus on monadic variables (attributes of individuals) to a focus on dyadic variables 
(attributes of pairs of individuals). Network theorists “…posit interpersonal processes 
in which one person imitates or is influenced by or receives something from another” 
(Borgatti, 2003:np). The network environment is described in terms of providing 
benefits and constraints which actors exploit and manage (Borgatti, 2003). 
Social Network Theory 
The theory is described by (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:6) as deconstructed into 
three layers: “…a deep layer that defines the rules of a theoretical universe with which 
to work, a middle layer which consists of a theorem derived from the rules of the 
universe, and a surface layer that connects to the variables associated with a specific 
empirical setting” (p.6). The authors explain further that “…the deep layer consists of a 
very simple model of how social systems work, which is essentially that they are 
networks through which information (or any resource) flows from node to node along 
network paths consisting of ties interlocked through shared endpoints” (Borgatti and 
Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:6). The ‘paths’ or network ‘girders’ or ‘ties’ “…simultaneously 
imply both connection and disconnection, with the length of paths indicating the degree 
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of dis-connection” (ibid.). The path model is referred to as the “network flow model” 
and through logical and mathematical reasoning the “network flow model” extends into 
the middle level, deriving the theorem that “…transitivity (closure; clusteredness) 
slows network flows by increasing path length” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 
2011:6)italics and parenthesis in original). At this middle level of analysis, the process 
of developing theory involves identifying “…constructs defined on the underlying 
model…and relating them to outcomes in the same universe” (ibid.). The surface level 
of analysis “…can be seen as a “personalization” of the theory that ornaments the basic 
theory with variables drawn from the immediate empirical context, and which serve as 
an interface to general social theory” (ibid.).  
The authors use the example of the theory of “strength of weak ties” proposed by 
Granovetter (1973; 1983) to explain how the theorist adds the strength of ties as an 
antecedent to transitivity (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). In this research of cross-
sectoral alliances, the network approach facilitates a better understanding of the way in 
which actors, public and private, through their ties, influence each other and the 
decision process. This is considered a far more fruitful approach than an analysis of 
only the decision outcome (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The network flow model may 
be a useful model that can explain how the strength of ties in “ego” centred networks of 
KOAs, comprising public and private directors as “alters”, influences decision-making 
within the network (ibid.).  
In a further explanation of how the network flow model works, Atkins (1974; 1977), 
cited in Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell (2011, p.8, italics in original) explains that “…two 
major kinds of relational or dyadic phenomena… referred to as backcloth and traffic” 
are important in understanding network flows. The underlying infrastructure 
(backcloth) serves as a conduit to the flows (traffic). In this study, the professional 
support network of KOAs is analysed. In this case, the “backcloth” is the professional 
tie between the KOAs and the directors who serve on the board of directors. The 
“traffic” is the flow influence or contribution. The study also includes the social 
network analysis of an affiliation network. The affiliation network is a two-mode 
network that has one set of actors, who may be grouped into sub-sets, and the second 
mode is the set of events to which the actors belong (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In 
the case of the partnerships, the event comprises the strategic action in the development 
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of the schools. The “traffic” is the contribution of the actors in public and private sub-
groups to the event whereas the “backcloth” is the similarity of conceptualisation of the 
event.  
Other fundamental theories developed from the “elemental theoretical memes” 
(Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:2) of social network theory include the structural 
hole theory of social capital (Burt, 1992). This theory is based on the “network 
architecture model” in which node success is a result of the ego’s alters acting in 
concert with or on behalf of the ego, thereby creating a much stronger bonding within 
the network and making it a more robust (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:10). In 
this case “…it is the alignment between nodes produced by the flow that yields the 
outcome” (ibid., p.11). The network architecture model will be used to describe the 
network relationships that led to the establishment of the schools.  
The purpose of network theorising is deemed to be connected with the nature of 
explanations derived from the “elemental theoretical memes” of the “network 
architecture model” or the “network flows model” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 
2011:13). The study uses this process and identifies how the network creates flows that 
result in contagion or social capital. This is illustrated in the summary below:  
Network Functions by Model and Research Tradition
(Taken from Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell (2011, p.13)) 
In both cases, the outcome of network research is either the acquisition of social capital 
or social homogeneity. With respect to the network flow model, the outcome on the one 
hand is capitalization which means that nodes acquire “…ideas, resources and 
opportunities through their ties, and this process either directly increases their human 
capital or increases their ability to exploit their human capital, which in turn contributes 
to their success in terms of performance and rewards” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 
2011, p.14). Contagion, on the other hand, refers to nodes adopting the qualities of their 
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environment through the process of “…contamination/infection/staining so that one’s 
location in a network has much to do with one’s acquired traits” (ibid.). With respect to 
the network architecture model, the outcome of social capital is that networks provide 
benefits because they can co-ordinate multiple nodes and bring resources to bear on a 
problem in a co-ordinated fashion (ibid.). In the case of adaptation, the node converges 
with its environment through adaption, in a mode similar to the phenomenon of 
convergent evolution, such that it becomes morphed into the environment (ibid.). The 
outcomes of social network theory will demonstrate the effect of the network on the 
schools, providing a rationale and explanation of their attributes, behaviours and 
performance outcomes.  
Whereas these concepts and explanations in basic network theorizing provide a useful 
point of departure from which to explain how partnerships work, the explanations 
themselves are limited to the concepts that emerge but do not provide answers beyond 
the immediate descriptions and conclusions within the context of the relationships 
amongst concepts and findings in the network. What it does offer though, is the 
opportunity to ask further questions which will then allow the researcher to engage with 
the data in a new way, or seek alternative sources of data to enrich the quality of the 
explanations. For example, the research may yield an explanation that the level of 
adaptation in the network is high and that public and private partners are essentially 
non-distinguishable. This does not, however, provide a full explanation of how 
adaptation within the network structure promotes action and influences performance.  
Concepts in Social Network Analysis 
Social network theory and analysis is “…based on the assumption of the importance of 
relationships among interacting units” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.4). In the 
definition and analysis of social networks, fundamental concepts that are well defined 
within the research perspective are employed. Those concepts that are relevant to the 
theoretical framework are presented below; the definitions are taken from Wasserman 
and Faust (2004):  
Actor and Mode: An actor is a social entity that may be an individual, corporate, or 
collective social unit. This study views actors as individuals as well as groups – public 
and private directors on the board of directors and stakeholders who are instrumental to 
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the success of the business schools. Actors may be of one type, in which case the 
network is a one-mode network or they may be conceptually different types, thereby 
constituting a two-mode network.  
Affiliation Network: This is a special type of two-mode network comprising one set of 
actors, who may be sub-divided into groups, and their relationship to an event. The 
event may be a club or organization to which they belong. In this study, the affiliation 
networks of sub-groups of private and public actors and the key strategic actions of the 
schools (events) are analysed to determine the contribution of actor sub-groups to the 
strategy of the schools. In this case, the unit of observation is the event, the strategic 
action of the school.  
Relational Ties: Actors are linked together by social ties, which may be viewed as 
“girders” or “pipes” giving rise to “structuralist” or “connectionist” explanations of the 
phenomena within the network (Borgatti, 2003, p.1002). Relations may be quantified 
by examining two properties: “…whether the relation is directional or non-directional 
and whether it is dichotomous or valued” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.44; authors’ 
italics). The analysis undertaken in this study will examine different ties between 
actors, and between actors and events in developing descriptions of the networks and 
explanations in the process of theorising.  
Structural and Composition Variables: Structural variables are measured on pairs of 
actors and refer to ties of a specific kind. In this study, the structural variable is the 
professional tie between actors in the governance structure. Composition variables are 
actor attributes and this study has identified the attribute of belonging to the private or 
public sector and belonging to other organizations and institutions as the only 
compositional variables relevant to the research problem.  
Network Population: The network population refers to the total set of actors from 
which a sample may be drawn. In this study, the population comprises persons who 
held membership on the board of directors (current and past) and persons from the 
private or public sectors who played influential roles in the development of the school.  
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The Concept of Embeddedness 
One of the more widely used concepts in social network theory, the concept of 
“embeddedness”, is employed to facilitate the development of explanations. The 
concept and its application are explored below.  
Origin and Meaning of Embeddedness 
In their attempt to highlight the potency of social network theory for the advancement 
of new theoretical ideas, Kilduff et al., (2006:1033) outlined four interrelated principles 
which they consider to be central to the development of new theoretical ideas: “the 
primacy of relations between organizational actors, the ubiquity of actors’ 
embeddedness in social fields, the social utility of network connections, and the 
structural patterning of social life” (2006:1033). These ideas they found recurring in 
social network research and, in this study, will be central to the multi-level analysis and 
crafting of explanations of partner engagement and action in the context of PPPs. The 
concept of embeddedness is explored in the context of its inclusion in theoretical 
propositions that derive from social network theory.  
Granovetter’s theory of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) utilised network 
theory to explain that strong ties are unlikely to be a source of new information and 
value to the individual. The strength of ties theory required explanation of the concepts 
and description of the strength of ties, and the concept of embeddedness was utilised to 
answer the question ‘why?’ Polanyi (1944) introduced the notion of embeddedness to 
emphasize the primacy of society in pre-capitalist times and to make the point that 
economics was a branch of sociology and that this was changed in capitalist society 
(Swedberg, 1997). Granovetter’s use of embeddedness, however, clearly located 
“…economic actions as truly social actions in capitalist society” (Swedberg, 1997:165). 
In the “classical’ period when economics concerned itself with the market from a 
“Smithonian” perspective, sociological theory was struggling to gain credence and set 
itself an agenda delimited to social life (Granovetter, 1990). The sociological agenda 
from the perspective of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim resulted in an “…impact that 
defined economic sociology as a field that did not mainly concern the day-to-day 
workings of the economy” (Granovetter, 1990:90). This defines what Granovetter 
considers the “old economic sociology” in which he is critical of neo-classical 
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economic theory to adequately explain differing outcomes for the same technological 
problem. He contends with the frustration of his own arguments and concedes that 
“…outcomes can vary dramatically even for the same economic problems and 
technologies if the social structure, institutional history, and collective action are 
different and that these crucially limit and shape future possibilities” (Granovetter, 
1990:106). He acknowledges the need for such sophisticated dynamic models and the 
role of the “new economic sociology” in achieving this. He also contends with the issue 
of over-determinism and uses his analysis of the case of electric utilities to demonstrate 
that there are many possible outcomes but “…historical contingencies embedded in the 
structure of social networks, of resource mobilization, and of relations between actors 
and government determined which of them (outcomes) did occur” (Granovetter, 
1990:107). This conclusion opened up the new economic sociology to a broader agenda 
that includes institutional theories, organizational theories and apparently oxymoronic 
configurations such as actor-network analyses (Swedberg, 1997).  
Embeddedness surfaced as an appropriate concept, emerging from network theory to 
demonstrate the relationship between actors and their environment. The embeddedness 
concept bridges the two world views of economics and sociology with theorists giving 
primacy to one or the other - economic goals embedded in social relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985) or social outcomes that derive from economic concerns 
(Williamson, 1975). The concept is also used to explain the influence of institutions as 
a context for economic action (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Dacin et al., 1999; Baum 
and Dutton, 1996). The concept of embeddedness gives wide berth to the generation of 
explanations of actor behaviour in partnerships, fostering causal linkages by 
demonstrating levels of embeddedness in phenomena at different levels and in different 
socio-temporal contexts. As such, it allows for consideration of the influence of a 
number of concepts and theories as possible explanations whilst guarding against the 
tendency to be deterministic in such explanations. Network perspective and network 
theory focus the study on the relational concepts and processes (strategies) involved in 
explicating the broad research question. The focus on relations, the influences of one on 
the other, is appropriate to the agenda of creating an appropriately dynamic model with 
sufficient explanatory power, alluding to how PPPs work. The next sub-sections will 
focus on some of the applications of the embeddedness concept in other areas of 
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organizational and institutional life; elements that require active consideration in this 
research.  
Structural and Relational Embeddedness 
The embeddedness concept derives from the work of Granovetter (1985) and was 
extended in his later work (Granovetter, 1992) where he proposed an agenda for “…a 
new economic sociology” that emphasizes “…classical sociological arguments about 
the embeddedness of economic goals and activities in socially oriented goals and 
structures” (Granovetter, 1992:3). Granovetter (1992) identified two aspects of 
embeddedness: relational and structural. Relational includes the extent to which parties 
in a dyadic arrangement consider each other’s needs and goals and the behaviours they 
exhibit (Uzzi, 1996). Structural embeddedness refers to the extent to which a “…dyad’s 
mutual contacts are connected to one another” (Granovetter, 1992:35) thereby enabling 
social mechanisms to co-ordinate and safeguard exchanges (Jones et al., 1997).  
Institutional and Political Embeddedness 
The concept of embeddedness was more broadly defined than its social relationships or 
structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements (Zukin 
and DiMaggio, 1990). The study of partnerships, with influences from small social 
networks and the well-established institution of the university within small societies, 
requires the broader consideration of the embeddedness of relations within these social 
constructions. Granovetter (1973) explicitly tied the study of embeddedness to a 
network perspective but suggests that once the initial network has “congealed” into an 
institution, the original network plays less of an important part (Swedberg, 1997; 
Granovetter, 1992).  
Myer and Rowan (1977:340) explain that “…in modern societies formal organizational 
structures arise in highly institutionalized contexts…(and) organizations are driven to 
incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of 
organizational work (as)…institutionalized in society” (1977:340). They do so in order 
to increase their legitimacy in the context in which they operate and, in most cases, to 
attract necessary resources (ibid.). Attempts to conform to institutionalized rules often 
conflict sharply with efficiency and success criteria, and undermine the organization’s 
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legitimacy and support. The authors contend that “…the formal structures of many 
organizations in post-industrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their 
institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities”. In the case 
of business schools, the lack of external legitimacy within the business environment is 
strongly demonstrated in the arguments related to the lack of business school relevance. 
The extent to which the partnership provokes organizational structures and strategies 
that are embedded in the institutional context of the university must be considered in 
explanations of how the governance structure works. A broader explanation of the 
institutionalisation of education and the influence of corporate society on the purpose of 
education unearths factors that are significant in the particular context of education.  
Internal and External Political Embeddedness 
Political embeddedness may also be a factor that influences the performance of the 
partnership, as economic action is always located in the context of political struggle 
(Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Zukin and DiMaggio define political embeddedness as 
“…the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle 
for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions,” such as the legal 
framework of the state (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). In studies of the evolution of 
business networks, Halinen and Törnroos (1998) note that most research tends to ignore 
the broader contextual setting in which both actors, and dyads of actors are embedded. 
Attention to political issues should consider the four forms of political embeddedness: 
“…political settings, political actors, the political activities of firms and political 
resources” (Welch and Wilkinson, 2004:3).  
Cognitive and Cultural Embeddedness 
Other forms of embeddedness that may be considered in an examination of the 
relationship between public and private sector partners in a strategic alliance include 
cognitive and cultural embeddedness. Cognitive embeddedness “…has to do with 
factors that limit the human mind in its mental processes” (Swedberg, 1997:168) or 
“..the ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of 
economic reasoning” (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990:15-16). This conclusion is supported 
by research from cognitive psychology and decision theory (ibid.). With respect to the 
value of cognitive embeddedness as a factor in explaining behaviour, Zukin and 
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DiMaggio  project that “…the notion of cognitive embeddedness is useful in calling 
attention to the limited ability of both human and corporate actors to employ the 
synoptic rationality required by neo-classical approaches” (p.16).  
According to Zukin and DiMaggio economic behaviour is culturally embedded as 
shared collective understandings shape economic strategies and goals. Economic 
culture affects the economy through “…beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted 
assumptions, or formal rule systems” (p.17). Dequech (2003:463) cites Zukin and 
DiMaggio (1990) and explains the way in which cultural embeddedness influences 
economic action and rationality: 
“Culture sets limits to economic rationality: it proscribes or limits 
market exchange in sacred objects and relations... or between ritually 
classified groups. Moreover… culture may shape terms of trade… 
Culture, in the form of beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted 
assumptions, or formal rule systems, also prescribes strategies of self-
interested action... and defines the actors who may legitimately engage 
in them… Culture provides scripts for applying different strategies to 
different classes of exchange. Finally, norms and constitutive 
understandings regulate market exchange.” (2003:463) 
The consideration of culture seeks to focus on the use of culture rather than the 
production of culture so as to “…lay a foundation for a view of culture as working 
through the interaction of shared cognitive structures and supra-individual cultural 
phenomena (material culture, media messages, or conversation, for example) that 
activate those structures to varying degrees” (DiMaggio, 1997:264). In networks, it 
provides a ground where people “play” in a safe environment that is reflective of a set 
of values that are endemic to their culture.  
Cultural Embeddedness and the Relational School 
Network theorists of the “relational” school undertook various research projects 
focused on the relationship between networks and culture (Mische and White, 1998). 
The broad perspectives employed adopted various positions with respect to culture 
including the view of networks as a conduit for culture (Oliver and Myers, 2003e.g. ; 
Marwell et al., 1988), networks as shaping culture, networks as cultural forms, and 
networks as culture via interaction (Mische, 2011). Other scholars who applied and 
extended the concept of embeddedness in relation to culture, linking culture to 
institutionalism, include John Levi Martin (2003; 2009) who traces the genealogy of 
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the “field” metaphor in social analysis from Lewin and Bourdieu through new 
institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 2001; Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2008; Mohr, 2010). The conception of networks as cultural forms may be 
particularly relevant to this study of partnerships in that the partnership may produce a 
new cultural form and model of institutional change (Mohr and White, 2008).  
The concept of embeddedness, and all its particular applications with respect to the 
study of relationships, organizations and institutions, has promulgated new research 
trends in the area of the new economic sociology. It is clear that the embeddedness 
concept and its intertwinement with other concepts and theories that explain 
partnerships and strategic alliances yield much insight into how they work.  
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APPENDIX 4: MAJOR THEORISTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS RELATED TO PPPS 
Cross Reference: 2.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Dimensions  
of 
partnership 
Proposition Researcher/ 
Theorist 
Theoretical 
roots 
Empirical 
context 
Purpose 
Political/ 
strategic 
game  
Partnerships do not form in PPP 
arrangements because of the complexity of 
actor composition, institutional factor and 
the strategic choices of public and private 
actors. 
 (Klijn and 
Teisman 
2003) 
Game theory PPP – public 
policy – 
Dutch case 
Political 
strategy 
PPPs are a means to avoid the opprobrium 
associated with ‘contracting out’ and 
‘privatization’ as a result of its basis on the 
assumptions of the neo-liberal economic 
paradigm and the pervasiveness of this 
paradigm in the public policy community  
(Savas, 2000)  Public policy 
– PPPs in the 
UK 
Motivation 
for private 
participation 
in PPPs  
Urban crises can trigger engagement and 
cross-sectoral collaboration. Governance 
alliances between business and 
government are usually pragmatic, 
functional partnerships that are purpose 
driven with a primary focus on particular 
outcomes usually centred on economic 
development.  
(Austin and 
McCaffrey, 
2002) 
Regime 
theory 
PPPs 
Motivation 
for 
partnering 
Public agencies enter into co-operative 
arrangements to get more resources, satisfy 
norms and values, obtain political 
advantage, solve problems, reduce 
uncertainty, obey legal mandates 
Weiss (1987)  Public policy 
Maximising 
value of 
partners  
Strategic alliances result in a new form of 
governance and decision-making process 
intended to maximize value of alliance 
partners  
Gulati (1998) Network 
theory 
Strategic 
alliances 
Clarity of 
purpose and 
connection 
based 
purpose  
One’s understanding of the purpose of 
collaborative alliances influences their 
contribution to its success This question 
seeks to establish connection-based 
purpose  
Harrigan 
(1985) Gulati 
(1995) 
Austin (2000) 
Network 
theory 
Strategic 
alliances 
Motivation 
for non-
profit 
collaboration 
“An organization is more likely to increase 
the degree of formality of its collaborative 
activities when it is older, has a larger 
budget size, receives government funding 
but relies on fewer government funding 
streams, has more board linkages with 
other non-profit organizations, and is not 
operating in the education and research or 
Guo and Acar 
(2005) 
Resource 
dependency, 
institutional 
and network 
theories 
Public policy 
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Dimensions  
of 
partnership 
Proposition Researcher/ 
Theorist 
Theoretical 
roots 
Empirical 
context 
social service industry.” 
Competitive 
advantage  
Strategic networks are a mode of 
organising for competitive advantage  
(Jarillo, 1988) Strategy and 
competitive 
advantage 
Strategic 
networks 
Structure 
Structure and 
embedded-
ness  
Economic actions are influenced by the 
social context in which they are embedded 
and actions can be influenced by the roles 
and social position of actors in the 
networks. 
Gulati (1998, 
p.295) 
Social 
network 
theory and 
concept of 
embedded-
ness 
Strategic 
alliances 
Structure and 
evolution for 
survival  
“If personal relationships do not 
supplement formal role relationships over 
time, then the likelihood increases that 
conflicts will escalate between the role 
specialists of the organizational agents”  
(Ring and 
Van de Ven, 
1992:109) 
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
and agency 
theory 
Strategic 
alliances 
Managerial 
complexity  
PPPs are difficult to manage and are time-
consuming. This is because PPP projects 
bear institutional characteristics that 
continually link local projects with supra-
local arenas which are located across a 
whole range of different networks  
(Klijn and 
Teisman, 
2005) 
Institutional 
theory 
PPPs – 
public policy 
and 
management 
Markets and 
hierarchies  
Collaborative governance creates a form of 
control that is between markets and 
hierarchies  
(Powell, 
1991; 
Thorelli, 
1986; 
Johnston and 
Lawrence, 
1991; Bartlett 
and Le 
Grand, 1993; 
Pisano and 
Teece, 1989) 
Transaction 
cost 
economics; 
resource-
based view 
of the firm 
Strategic 
alliances 
Co-
ordination in 
network 
governance  
Network form of governance is a response 
to exchange conditions of asset specificity, 
demand uncertainty, task complexity, and 
frequency. These exchange conditions 
drive firms toward structurally embedding 
their transactions, which enables firms to 
use social mechanisms for coordinating 
and safeguarding exchanges 
(Jones et al., 
1997) 
Transaction 
cost and 
social 
network 
theory 
Strategic 
alliances 
Governance 
structure  
Firm specific capabilities influence the 
choice of governance structure  
Leiblein 
(2003) 
Transactions 
cost; 
Resource-
based view 
of the  firm; 
real options 
Strategic 
alliances  
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Dimensions  
of 
partnership 
Proposition Researcher/ 
Theorist 
Theoretical 
roots 
Empirical 
context 
theory  
A process 
model of the 
evolution of 
alliances - 
Control and 
co-ordination  
A process model of network formation that 
highlights the important of reputation, 
trust, reciprocity and mutual 
interdependence.  
(Larson, 
1992) 
Social 
control; 
institutional 
theory  
Strategic 
alliances  
Resource 
alignment 
and firm 
performance  
“Partner resource alignment directly 
affects collective strengths and inter-firm 
conflicts in alliances, which in turn 
contribute to alliance performance.” 
(Das and 
Teng, 
2000:61) 
Resource-
based view 
of the firm  
Strategic 
alliances 
Support 
within the 
network 
The dimensions of relationships that can be 
used to assess the general atmosphere and 
supportiveness in a network include liking, 
friendship, career support, personal 
support, energy and trust  
Cross and 
Parker (2004) 
Social 
network 
theory  
Strategic 
alliances 
Sustained 
private 
participation 
in cross-
sectoral 
alliances  
“Regimes form and stay in existence 
because powerful public and private actors 
bargain, develop trust, and mutually learn 
to solve problems. The defining 
characteristics of regimes are that they are 
inter-organizational, sustained, 
coordinating and empowering.”  
John and 
Cole (1998, 
p.387; Austin, 
2002) 
Regime 
theory  
PPPs 
Strategy and Decision-Making 
Performance 
of alliances 
Five key issues for the study of alliances: 
(1) the formation of alliances, (2) the 
choice of governance structure, (3) the 
dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the 
performance of alliances, and (5) the 
performance consequences for firms 
entering alliances  
Gulati (1998) Embedded-
ness in 
social 
networks 
Strategic 
alliances and 
networks 
Alliances as 
strategic 
tools  
Studies of partners similarity and alliance 
governance.  
Pangarkar 
and Klein 
(2001;  
(Dodourova, 
2009) 
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
Strategic 
alliances 
Value 
creation  
The establishment of inter-firm 
collaboration is a complex phenomenon 
that is driven by a variety of processes, 
including transaction costs, strategies of 
the firms involved and other organizational 
and geographic variables 
Lin (2006), 
Angel (2002, 
p.341) 
 
Combined –
resource-
based view 
of the firm, 
Transaction 
cost 
economics, 
Network 
theory, 
embedded-
Strategic 
alliances 
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Dimensions  
of 
partnership 
Proposition Researcher/ 
Theorist 
Theoretical 
roots 
Empirical 
context 
ness concept 
Conditions 
for 
successful 
partnerships 
Propositions with respect to how to make 
partnerships work 
Kanter 
(1994), 
Austin 
(2000). 
 Strategic 
alliances 
Strategy 
formulation  
Actor-network theory can be used to 
facilitate strategy formulation and explain 
how social and technological elements 
determine interest alignment  
Gao (2005) Actor-
network 
theory  
National 
policy  
Conditions 
for 
successful 
partnering  
Mutually developed collaboration 
procedures and information sharing 
processes are fundamental indicators of  
trust and willingness to transfer knowledge 
and, as such, are also critical preconditions 
to overcoming 
the obstacles to cooperation in interactive 
collaboration 
(Rondinelli 
and London, 
2003) 
 Cross 
sectoral 
collaboration 
Resource 
asymmetries, 
power and 
decision-
making 
Structural change and the adoption of 
innovations within inter-firm networks is 
influenced by political activities during the 
decision process.  
(Elg and 
Johansson, 
1997) 
Resource 
based view 
of the firm; 
strategic 
networks  
Strategic 
alliances  
Network 
survival and 
legitimacy  
Networks use various strategies to 
legitimize their existence. Both internal 
and external strategies are necessary for 
the survival of the network  
Human and 
Provan 
(2000) 
Social 
networks 
and 
legitimacy 
theory  
Strategic 
alliances  
Governance 
and 
legitimacy  
The UK “Third Sector” must establish its 
legitimacy to participate in the new forms 
of governance that includes partnerships 
(Taylor and 
Warburton, 
2003) 
Legitimacy 
theory  
Public policy 
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APPENDIX 5: COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
THREE CASES  
Cross Reference: 5.5 SELECTION OF CASES 
 
 
 Campuses of Green University 
Apple, Arden Gerran, Gerrantown 
 
Rotter, Rotterdam 
 
ES
TA
B
LI
SH
M
EN
T 
A
N
D
 U
PG
R
A
D
E 
Year and 
Form  
1989 –Institute of 
Business, affiliated to 
Green University, Arden 
Campus  
1990 – Established as a 
registered charity in Arden  
Nov 1994 – Memorandum 
and Articles of Association 
signed with Green 
University, Arden Campus  
2003- Developed and 
signed the Bylaws 
outlining the regulations 
governing the partnership 
2005 – Moved to new site 
and upgraded to a School 
of Business. Renamed after 
a donor in accordance with 
international naming 
convention for business 
schools.  
1987 - Collaborative 
management project 
between Green University 
and an international donor 
agency.  
1990 – Established as an 
Institute of Business, 
functioning as a 
department within the 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
1994 – The Institute of 
Business is incorporated 
as a Company limited by 
guarantee 
2001 – Upgraded and re-
named the Gerran School 
of Business (GSB)  
2002 – The GSB is moved 
to upgraded facilities  
2002 - GSB received 40th 
Anniversary Award for 
Excellence in Education 
by the donor agency 
1991 – Established as a 
Centre of the Rotterdam 
Campus of Green. This 
was a collaborative effort 
that included governments 
of several small islands, 
the Rotterdam campus 
and an international donor 
agency  
2006 – Renamed the 
Rotter School of Business  
Initiated by  Private sector individuals Green University, 
Gerrantown 
Regional private sector 
organization 
Seed 
Funding  
Private sector International Funding 
Agency 
International Funding 
Agency  
G
O
V
ER
N
A
N
C
E 
Composition 
of the Board 
of Directors 
(based on 
legal 
agreements)  
Comprises two-thirds 
private sector and one-third 
university members 
Comprises not more than 
18 members who shall 
include a majority of 
members in whose 
appointment the Vice-
Chancellor and the 
Principal of the 
Gerrantown campus have 
concurred.  
Limited to 16 members no 
more than 9 of whom 
must be affiliated to 
Green University, 
Rotterdam 
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 Campuses of Green University 
Apple, Arden Gerran, Gerrantown 
 
Rotter, Rotterdam 
 
Role of the 
Board of 
Directors  
Develop and approve 
policy direction, 
accountability for strategic 
direction, oversight on 
major operations  
Develop and approve 
policy direction, 
accountability for 
strategic direction, 
oversight on major 
operations 
Board of Directors serves 
management in an 
advisory capacity 
Current 
Chairman 
drawn from  
Principal, Green 
University, Arden 
Private sector  Private sector 
Appointment 
of Executive 
head  
Executive Director 
appointed by Green 
University, Arden on the 
advice of the Board of 
Directors  
Executive Director 
appointed by Green 
University, Gerrantown 
on the advice of the Board 
of Directors.  
Chief Executive Officer 
appointed by Green 
University, Rotterdam on 
the advice of the Board of 
Directors 
Main criteria 
for selection 
of Executive 
head  
International experience in 
the private sector and with 
Universities 
 Experience with corporate 
sector 
Main criteria 
for selecting 
members of 
the Board 
(non-
University)  
Private sector experience, 
expertise and prominence 
Individuals and 
representatives of 
companies, NGOs, 
Government etc of 
strategic importance to the 
business school.  
Consensus of the Board of 
Directors and 
representation of the 
smaller island territories 
served by the School 
Role of 
Executive 
Director in 
relation to 
the Board of 
Directors  
Ordinary member. ED is in 
a reporting relationship to 
the BOD 
Ordinary member. ED is 
in a reporting relationship 
to the BOD 
Ordinary member. ED is 
in a reporting relationship 
to the BOD 
 
Voluntary 
nature of the 
Board of 
Directors 
Supported by the voluntary 
contribution of time from 
members of the Board of 
Directors  
Supported by the 
voluntary contribution of 
time from members of the 
Board of Directors  
Supported by the 
voluntary contribution of 
time from members of the 
Board of Directors  
 
Appointment 
of private 
sector 
Directors  
Nominated and appointed 
by the Board of Directors.  
Nominated by the Board 
of Directors and 
appointed by the 
Principal, Green 
University, Gerrantown 
Nominated and appointed 
by the Board of Directors. 
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 Campuses of Green University 
Apple, Arden Gerran, Gerrantown 
 
Rotter, Rotterdam 
 
 
Appointment 
of University 
Directors  
Appointed by Board of 
Directors mainly, though 
not necessarily, by virtue 
of position at Green 
University, Arden. Once 
appointed, may remain on 
the Board of Directors even 
if position at the University 
changes.  
Appointed to the Board of 
Directors by virtue of 
position at Green 
University, Gerrantown 
only. Once the position is 
no longer held, the 
appointment is rescinded.  
Appointed to the Board of 
Directors by virtue of 
position at Green 
University, Rotterdam 
only. Once the position is 
no longer held, the 
appointment is rescinded 
 
Nature of 
non-
University 
Directors 
Senior executives in high 
profile positions in the 
country who are respected 
in the private sector 
Representatives of 
organizations drawn from 
either private, non-profit 
or government sector. 
Individuals from leading 
private sector 
organizations. 
Representatives of 
organizations drawn from 
either private, non-profit 
or government sector. 
Individuals from leading 
private sector 
organizations. 
 
Appointment 
of Directors 
from other 
Sectors  
No  May include 
representation from 
Government, public and 
private sector 
organizations, NGOs etc  
May include 
representation from 
Government, public and 
private sector 
organizations, NGOs etc 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
A
IT
O
N
A
L
 F
O
R
M
 
Voluntary – 
Non-profit 
distributing 
Funds ploughed back into 
the operations. Payment 
made to Green University, 
Arden for specific services 
by contract.  
Funds ploughed back into 
the operations. A 
percentage is also paid to 
Green University for 
services provided.  
Funds ploughed back into 
the operations and 
payments to Green for 
services by contract.  
Private or 
Public  
Private autonomous. No 
direct funding from 
government or Green 
University, Arden 
Semi-autonomous. 50% 
financing from Green 
University, Gerrantown.  
Semi-autonomous. 
Obtains financing in 
variable amounts from 
Green University, 
Rotterdam.  
Legal Form  Affiliate of Green 
University. Incorporated 
under the Companies Act 
as a Non-Profit 
organization in Arden.  
Affiliate of Green 
University. Incorporated 
under the Companies Act 
as a Non-Profit 
organization in Arden.  
Affiliate of Green 
University. Incorporated 
under the Companies Act 
as a Non-Profit 
organization in Arden.  
EL
EM
EN
TS
 
O
F 
ST
R
A
TE
G
YStrategic 
Planning  
Strategic planning is 
guided by the Executive 
Director with input and 
approval from the Board of 
Directors 
Strategic planning is 
undertaken as a joint 
activity that includes the 
Board of Directors and 
management  
Strategic planning is 
undertaken as a joint 
activity that includes the 
Board of Directors and 
management 
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 Campuses of Green University 
Apple, Arden Gerran, Gerrantown 
 
Rotter, Rotterdam 
 
Faculty 
model  
Few internal faculty hired 
by Apple Business School 
on contract and no tenure. 
Mainly adjunct faculty 
model drawn from Green 
University and reputable 
international business 
schools  
Few internal faculty hired 
by Green University, 
Gerrantown and placed at 
Gerran Business School. 
Mainly adjunct faculty 
model drawn from Green 
University and reputable 
international business 
schools 
Internal faculty are also in 
management.  
 
Mainly adjunct faculty 
model drawn from Green 
University and reputable 
international business 
schools 
Relationship 
between 
management 
and strategy  
Management does not sit 
on the Board of Directors.  
Management does not sit 
on the Board of Directors.  
Management sits on the 
Board of Directors and 
help to craft and manage 
strategy 
C
O
U
N
TR
Y
 A
T
TR
IB
U
TE
S 
Developmen
t and 
Competitive
ness Indices  
(Higher 
ranking – 
more 
competitive 
and 
developed)  
Global Competitiveness 
Index 2010 – Rank (84); 
Score (3.97)  
 
Human Development Index 
2010 – 59 
Global Competitiveness 
Index 2010 – Rank (95); 
Score (3.85)  
 
Human Development 
Index 2010-80 
Global Competitiveness 
Index 2010 – Rank (43); 
Score (4.45)  
 
Human Development 
Index 2010-42 
Economic 
Stability  
Dutch Disease  Unstable  Stable  
History of 
social co-
operation  
Weak  Strong  Strong  
Cultural 
Elements  
General respect for 
authority but open to 
challenge  
Established and respected 
positional authority.  
Established and respected 
positional and conferred 
authority e.g. Use of Title 
of “Sir” as knighted by 
the Queen of England  
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APPENDIX 6: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: KEY 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS 
Cross Reference: 5.8 PILOT OF THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT 
Preamble to Interview 
Thank you for taking the time to facilitate this interview. The research topic is public 
private partnerships as governance mechanisms. You have been selected for this 
interview as a (past) _______________ of the ________________School.  
Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and your anonymity will be 
maintained. The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed 
after 2 years. 
I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview. Please do indicate to me if 
at any point you are uncomfortable with the questions asked and if you wish to stop or 
defer the interview.  
1. How long have you been the Chairman/ Executive Director of CHSB?  
1a. What is the structure of the BOD? (To be determined from document review).  
1b. What would you say was the reason for the establishment of the School?  
1c. Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector Directors 
and University Directors? 
4. a. What did you see as the main concerns for the School at the point of your tenure?  
2a. What are some of the key decisions taken that have positively impacted the School 
during your tenure?  
2b. Who would you say are/were most influential in helping you to arrive at the best 
decisions?  
2c. Who would be the top 4 persons in order of priority who you sought professional 
advice from on key decisions in the interest of the School?  
2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making 
process? 
3a. How did your role at the School fit in with the other roles you perform at the 
University/private sector?  
3b. How did the context of the School constrain your choices? 
3c. How did it provide opportunities for you and the School?  
Based on the responses, and consistent with the “laddering technique” in interviewing, 
respondents will be probed with the question: “Why is/was that important to you?”  
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APPENDIX 7: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: OTHER 
DIRECTORS  
Cross Reference: 5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents 
Preamble 
Thank you for taking the time to facilitate this interview. The research topic is public 
private partnerships as governance mechanisms. You have been selected for this 
interview as a past _______________ of the ________________School. Also, you 
were identified by ________ as having played a critical role in decision-making at the 
School.  
Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and your anonymity will be 
maintained. The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed 
after 2 years. 
I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview. Please do indicate to me if 
at any point you are uncomfortable with the questions asked and if you wish to stop or 
defer the interview.  
1. How long have you been on the Board of Directors of the Cave Hill School of 
Business?  
1a.What encouraged you to join the Board of Directors of the ________School?  
1b. Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector Directors 
and University Directors? 
4. a. What did you see as the main concerns for the School at the point of your tenure?  
2a. What are some of the key decisions taken that have positively impacted the School 
during your tenure?  
2b. In what way were you able to contribute to the decision/strategy?  
2c. Who would be the top 4 persons in order of priority who contributed to these 
decisions?  
2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making 
process? 
3a. How did your role at the School fit in with the other roles you perform at the 
University/private sector?  
3b. How did the context of the School constrain your choices? 
3c. How did it provide opportunities for you and the School?  
Based on the responses, and consistent with the “laddering technique” in interviewing, 
respondents will be probed with the question: “Why is/was that important to you?”  
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APPENDIX 8: EMAIL TO RESPONDENTS  
Cross Reference: 5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents 
 
 
Dear (Name) 
 
I am presently pursuing my DBA at Aston University and at this time, engaged in 
gathering data for my research on the topic of Public Private Partnerships in business 
schools. I have selected the three business schools associated with the (Green 
University) as subjects of the research. As a member of the Board of Directors of the 
(Name of Business School), I am seeking your kind assistance and participation in this 
research.  
I am humbly requesting an interview with you at your earliest convenience. The 
interview is expected to be about one hour long. 
I will follow up with a call to you in this regard. 
Thank you very much for your kind attention. 
 
 
Best regards  
Kamla Mungal (Mrs) 
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APPENDIX 9: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL  
Cross Reference: 5.9.2 Archival Data 
 
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
NAME OF SITE:  
 
Document Reference: 
Title:  
Full Date: 
Type of Document (Board paper, Agreement, email etc): 
Published by:  
City: 
 
Concepts “Quotation” Who said/ 
wrote it 
Page 
number 
Description of context in 
which it was said 
PURPOSE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
Formation     
Motivation      
Relevance      
Quality (what)     
Control      
Accountability      
Legitimacy      
STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
Roles     
Relationship     
Trust      
Respect      
Collaboration     
Competition      
Collegiality     
STRATEGY OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
Quality (How)     
Legitimacy     
Efficiency     
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APPENDIX 10: EMAIL FROM INDEPENDENT EXPERT 
(Received June 6, 2011) 
Cross Reference: 5.11.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
Hi Kamla, 
This chapter on cross site analysis and findings clearly presents the key findings of the 
doctoral research and hence contribution to the existing body of knowledge. Having 
previously read the individual cases, I can say that this chapter brings the comparative 
analysis required and so a holistic view of the dynamics of PPPs related to our business 
schools (in terms of their evolution, challenges and future). The theoretical/ managerial 
contributions are also presented which in turn brings the value of the work to 
management practice and the governance of PPPs. This may be the most important 
chapter! 
I have no suggestions for improving this chapter because I find it well written and 
loaded with all relevant data.  
All the best… 
Regards 
(Name)  
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APPENDIX 11: CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
Confidentiality Agreement  
September 10, 2010 
(Name and Address) 
Dear (Name)  
I wish to thank you for your willingness to be a respondent on my research study 
related to public private partnerships in business school governance. I wish to 
underscore the fact that your anonymity will be maintained throughout the study as 
fictitious names will be used for the organization as well as for participants in the 
study.  
The study includes three major forms of data collection:  
1. In-depth interviews: Each interview is expected to be approximately one hour and 
will be conducted at your convenience. Interview data will be kept confidential and 
will be stored at my home. Additionally, the data from interviews will be kept 
safely and securely and destroyed after 2 years. 
2. Document analysis. Documents including strategic plans, emails, memos etc will 
be analysed based on the research questions.  
3. Participant observation: This involves my own interpretation of events that I have 
been party to/witnessed in my involvement during the data collection period. It will 
include an account of events, how people behaved and reacted, what was said in 
conversation, where people were positioned in relationship to one another, their 
comings and goings, physical gestures and my subjective responses to what was 
observed. Again, participants’ anonymity will be maintained.  
Data will be gathered over the period September to December 2010.  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may also withdraw 
from this research study at any time.  
I will appreciate if you would sign the attached copy of this letter, indicating your 
consent to be included as a participant in this study.  
With many thanks 
Sincerely,  
Kamla Mungal      
(DBA Student and Principal Researcher)   (Participant) 
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APPENDIX 12: SUMMARY TABLES 
Summary Table 1: Antecedents effects matrix: Summary of variables in the 
environment and supportiveness in the environmental social system 
Reference: The variables across the sites are drawn from the individual cases and are 
highlighted in the meta-network in Figure 22. 
9.2.1 Variables in the Country and Institutional Environment 
Opposition to PPP  Support for PPP  X – not identified  
 
Environmental 
variables 
Gerran Rationale Apple Rationale Rotter Rationale 
1.Economic 
constraints  
Cs-all  Under-
development and 
uncompetitiveness  
Cs-all in 
‘crashes’ 
Dutch disease Cs-all  Uneven 
development 
Op-all in 
‘booms’ 
Partner 
competition  
Geographic 
vulnerabilities 
Cs-all National disaster, 
Close to 
metropole  
Cs-bs Small market  Cs-all Market dispersion  
Foreign 
competition to 
business school 
Cs-unv 
and ps 
Geographic 
proximity to 
Metropole  
X X Cs-bs  Online 
universities from 
Metropole 
threatened their 
model 
Local 
competition to 
business school 
Cs-unv 
and ps  
Larger market  X X X X 
Small world  Op—all  Social cohesion;  
Capability to 
address small 
social distance  
Cs Small market to 
increase student 
competitiveness; 
Inferiority 
complex  
Cs-all  Nationalism and 
corruption in 
small territories 
threatens growth 
of business  
Lack of 
regional 
integration  
Cs-all  Limited resources  X X Cs-bsc  Size and scale  
Size of region  X X Op-ps 
and bsc 
Regional market 
for business 
creates 
motivation for 
talent  
Cs-bsc  Scale; Not for 
university as they 
were established 
in the regional 
market with larger 
scale of operation 
Private sector Cs-all  Constrained Op-bsc Regional market 
for business 
Op-bsc  Demand for 
training by the 
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Environmental 
variables 
Gerran Rationale Apple Rationale Rotter Rationale 
competitiveness development  and ps creates 
motivation for 
talent 
private sector  
Social 
vulnerabilities 
(Crime etc) 
Cs-all  Linked to 
economic 
vulnerabilities  
X X X X 
Government 
subsidization of 
education to 
students  
  Op-all Partner 
competition and 
Apple’s growth  
  
National value 
for education  
    Op-all  Both University 
and Rotter grew 
but they were not 
in competition 
with each other  
National social 
partnership  
    Op-all  Establishment of 
the business 
school  
Hub for 
regional 
business  
    Op –all  Build networks 
across the region 
and achieve 
regional 
integration and 
optimization of 
the market 
 
Summary Table 2: Antecedents Effects Matrix: Summary of variables in the 
institutional environment and supportiveness in the network 
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Opposition to PPP Support for PPP X – not identified 
 
Institutional 
variables 
Gerran Rationale Apple Rationale Rotter Rationale 
Discipline 
scholarship- not 
management 
Op-all  
Cs- bsc  
Business did not 
value academic 
research  
X X X X 
Faculty norms in 
academia  
Cs-bsc  Faculty embedded 
and connection is 
difficult 
X X X X 
Academics 
disengaged from 
business and 
society – 
‘aloofness from 
business’  
Op-all  
 
Need to connect 
with society to 
facilitate 
development was 
recognised by all.  
Op-bsc 
and Unv 
Establishment of 
the business 
school (Phase 1) 
The University 
did not ask for it. 
Op-bsc  University did 
not see the need 
for it  
University 
efforts to 
integrate region  
Op-all 
 
Seeking to 
optimise regional 
resources 
X X Cs-bsc University rules 
of non-
competition 
with other 
business 
schools 
constrained the 
market  
Commitment to 
regionalism but 
lack of 
integration  
Cs-all  Resource 
constraint  
X X Op-bsc  Opportunity for 
business school 
to contribute to 
regional 
integration  
‘Town and 
gown’ effect 
Cs-all  
Op-bsc  
Ideological 
difference but not a 
constraint due to 
private-sector’s 
need for education  
Cs-bsc  Recognised by 
University but not 
problematised; 
Affected the 
competitiveness 
of business  
Op-bsc  Demand by 
business for 
relevant 
training 
Bureaucracy  Cs-bsc  Recognised by the 
University and the 
decision taken to 
establish an 
autonomous 
business  
Cs-bsc  Cited as a main 
reason for 
establishment of 
PPP. Private 
sector made 
autonomy a 
condition for their 
contribution  
Cs- bsc  Affected 
service quality 
to students and 
University 
attempted to 
assist  
 
